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AREA HANDBOOK
for
AFGHANISTAN



327-100001

[Area hand-drawn series]

AREA HANDBOOK for AFGHANISTAN

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Fourth Edition

PUBLISHED 1973

(This handbook supersedes DA Pam 550-65, February 1969.)

DA Pam 550-65

1.5
341
73

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 73-600084

**For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402 — Price \$4.35**

FOREWARD

This volume is one of a series of handbooks prepared by Foreign Area Studies (FAS) of The American University, designed to be useful to military and other personnel who need a convenient compilation of basic facts about the social, economic, political, and military institutions and practices of various countries. The emphasis is on objective description of the nation's present society and the kinds of possible or probable changes that might be expected in the future. The handbook seeks to present as full and as balanced an integrated exposition as limitations on space and research time permit. It was compiled from information available in openly published material. An extensive bibliography is provided to permit recourse to other published sources for more detailed information. There has been no attempt to express any specific point of view or to make policy recommendations. The contents of the handbook represent the work of the authors and FAS and do not represent the official view of the United States government.

An effort has been made to make the handbook as comprehensive as possible. It can be expected, however, that the material, interpretations, and conclusions are subject to modification in the light of new information and developments. Such corrections, additions, and suggestions for factual, interpretive, or other change as readers may have will be welcomed for use in future revisions. Comments may be addressed to:

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PREFACE TO THE FOURTH EDITION

The third edition of the *Area Handbook for Afghanistan*, research completed December 1967 and published in 1969, was a revision of the 1964 handbook. Since publication of the third edition the country has experienced a drought of unprecedented severity, causing extensive famine in many remote regions and economic hardship throughout the country.

In late 1972 the decision was made to publish a fourth edition of the 1969 handbook without revision but with a new section entitled "Summary of Events: January 1968—November 1972." This new section was completed in late November 1972 by Beryl L. Benderly and Newton B. Parker under the supervision of Richard F. Nyrop.

On July 17, 1973, as this book neared the final stages of publication, a coup led by Lieutenant General (and former Prime Minister) Mohammed Daud deposed King Mohammed Zahir Shah, who was in Italy on a rest cure. Early reports from Kabul indicated that a republic had been proclaimed and martial law declared. Information available before publication did not permit appraisals of the degree of popular support the coup might have or of the relationship, if any, between the coup and the various kinds of dissidence among students, labor unionists, and others, which have characterized the country for a number of years. With the abrupt end of the forty-year reign of King Zahir Shah, the future internal or external course of the country was uncertain. Daud, however, announced that he intended to maintain the country's traditional nonaligned posture. During his tenure as prime minister (1953-63), Daud had favored various reforms until he was removed from office in an assertion of power by the king. He had since then been precluded from official government activity because, as a cousin and brother-in-law of the king, he was affected by a new law forbidding all members of the royal family except the king from holding office.

Data on Afghanistan remain sparse and open to question. In late 1972, for example, many observers agreed that the population was nearly 18 million; a census had never been conducted, however, and some observers suggested that the figure of 18 million may be too high by as much as 25 or 30 percent. Economic statistics should also be taken as approximations rather than as final reports. All tons are metric unless otherwise specified.

COUNTRY SUMMARY

1. **COUNTRY:** Afghanistan, the "land of the Afghans," a constitutional monarchy, was founded as an independent nation in 1747 by a Pashtun tribal chief.
2. **GOVERNMENT:** King Mohammad Zahir Shah has reigned since 1933. The constitution, promulgated in 1964, separates governmental powers into executive, legislative, and judicial functions.
3. **POPULATION:** Perhaps 18 million in late 1972; annual growth rate estimated at from 1.9 to 2.3 percent. A variety of ethnic groups, largest of which are Pashtuns and Tajiks; other large groups are Uzbeks, Turkomans, Hazaras, and Chahar Aimaks.
4. **SIZE:** Area, about 260,000 square miles — greatest width (north-south), approximately 350 miles; extreme length (east-west), 770 miles.
5. **TOPOGRAPHY:** Main pitch of land is from northeast to southwest. Three major regions. Central Highlands, part of Himalayan chain, approximately 160,000 square miles, fan out from Pamir Knot on the border with People's Republic of China descending toward Iran. Peaks on the main ridge (Hindu Kush) rise above 21,000 feet with passes up to 15,000 feet. Northern Plains, approximately 40,000 square miles, with elevations about 2,000 feet, are north of the central mountain core and are fertile and populous in much of the area. Southwest Plateau, southwest of the Central Highlands, is an arid area, approximately 60,000 square miles, with an altitude of about 3,000 feet.
6. **CLIMATE:** In general, semiarid steppe type with cold winters and dry summers. Subarctic in the high mountain region of the northeast; in the Northern Plains it is a transition between mountain and steppe; in Southwest Plateau, effects of the Indian monsoon bring tropical airmasses into the central part of the Pakistan border area. Farther west, high winds low precipitation, and high summer temperatures prevail along the boundaries with Iran and Pakistan.
7. **LANGUAGES:** Dari (Persian in its Afghan variant, formerly called Farsi) and Pashto (language of the Pashtuns) are the official languages. More than twenty others are spoken. Uzbek and Turkoman are the most important minority languages.
8. **RELIGION:** Islam is the official religion. About 99 percent of

the people are Moslems—80 percent Sunnites, and the remainder Shiites. The constitution declares that the king must be a Moslem follower of the Hanafi school, one of the four schools of Islamic law upheld by Sunnites.

9. EDUCATION: Literacy rate estimated at about 10 percent. Village, primary, secondary, and senior high school enrollments in 1971 totaled about 660,000.

10. HEALTH: Vital statistics are lacking. Reports of foreign medical personnel indicate that chief causes of debility and death are gastrointestinal infections, tuberculosis, communicable childhood diseases, venereal diseases, trachoma, and malaria. Vaccination campaigns have reduced but not eliminated smallpox and cholera.

11. JUSTICE: Independent judiciary, except in special cases that are tried in accordance with the principles of Hanafi jurisprudence. Old Islamic law being replaced by codified secular law. Under decree of October 1967 the judiciary, headed by chief justice of the Supreme Court, consists of a three-tier structure: courts of first instance; provincial courts; and the Supreme Court. The tribal justice system still exists in some areas where violators are tried by family or tribal *jirgahs* (councils of family heads and notables), based on their customary laws.

12. ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS: Twenty-eight provinces, each province usually divided into districts, and each district, into subdistricts. Population centers of 500 houses or more have municipal governments.

13. ECONOMY: Basically agricultural. Traditional stockraising and farming engage 75 to 85 percent of the population and contribute to more than 75 percent of the country's exports besides providing raw materials for rudimentary industry.

14. INDUSTRY: Minor but of increasing economic importance. Development hampered by inadequate capital, transport facilities, marketing channels, and technical skills. Manufacture of cotton textiles is largest industry. Rich mineral deposits including natural gas, are present, but only natural gas, coal, salt, and lapis lazuli have been exploited.

15. LABOR: Labor force between fifteen and sixty years of age estimated in 1967 to be about 7.6 million. Approximately 90 percent were farmers and herdsmen. Reportedly little unemployment but extensive underemployment.

16. EXPORTS: Primarily agricultural products, including Karakul, fresh and dried fruits, and nuts; remainder, mostly wool, cotton, rugs, and sheepskins. Principal buyers were the Soviet Union and East European countries, the United Kingdom the United States, and the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany).

17. **IMPORTS:** Sugar, fuels and lubricants, cement, iron and steel, plus basic consumer goods. Principal suppliers were the Soviet Union, Japan, India, Pakistan, West Germany, and the United States.

18. **FINANCE:** *Currency.* Basic unit is the afghani, subdivided into 100 puls. In 1972 the official rate of exchange was 45 afghanis, to 1 United States dollar; the free rate ranged from 84 afghanis to 1 United States dollar in April 1972 to 78 afghanis to 1 United States dollar in September 1972. *Banks.* Central Bank is the conservatively managed Bank of Afghanistan, directed by the cabinet acting for the king.

19. **COMMUNICATIONS:** *Telephone and Telegram.* Principal cities and some towns served by government-owned system. Telegraph landlines connect with India, Iran, Pakistan, and the Soviet Union. *Radio.* Government-owned Radio Kabul has mediumwave and shortwave transmitters. Receiving sets estimated between 300,000 and 500,000. *Television.* None in 1972.

20. **RAILROADS:** None.

21. **ROADS:** Approximately 7,000 miles. Paved primary highways, connecting major cities, 1,250 miles.

22. **AIRFIELDS:** The best equipped field, about nineteen miles from Kandahar, has landing strip of 10 500 feet, modern hangars and workshops, but limited fueling facilities and is infrequently used. Second best and most heavily used, located north of Kabul, has landing strip of 9,000 feet but is located in difficult terrain. Minor fields are at Jalalabad, Shindand, Herat, Maimana, Mazar-i-Sharif, and Kunduz.

23. **AIRLINES:** Government-owned Ariana Afghan Airlines Company has flights to New Delhi, Karachi, Teheran, Beirut, and Tashkent. Airlines from Pakistan, Iran, India, the Soviet Union, and Czechoslovakia fly into Kabul.

24. **INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND TREATIES:** Consistent with nonalignment policy, no formal alliances, civil or military, have been concluded that would have a bearing on balance of power between East and West.

25. **AID PROGRAMS:** *Civil.* Many and varied, consisting generally of loans, credits, and technical assistance. Major suppliers of loan funds: the Soviet Union the United States, West Germany, and the United Nations Special Fund. Credits have also been granted by Czechoslovakia, Poland, West Germany, Japan, the International Development Association, and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. *Military.* Advanced types of modern air and ground equipment received from Soviet Union since mid-1950s.

26. INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS AND MEMBERSHIPS: Joined League of Nations in 1934; became a member of the United Nations in 1946 and belongs to most of its subsidiary organizations. Since 1964 has been a member of the Colombo Plan for Co-operative Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia.

27. THE ARMED FORCES: Total strength about 85,000. The air force of about 6,000 is an integral part of the army. Police (Gendarmerie and National Police) total about 21,000 and operate under the Ministry of Interior. Conscription, usually for two-year period, from age twenty-two to twenty-eight inclusive. Budget usually somewhat less than 20 percent of total budget.

SUMMARY OF EVENTS: January 1968—November 1972

In late 1972 King Mohammad Zahir Shah continued to be the most powerful individual in the government as well as in the country since the resignation of his cousin as prime minister in 1963. The king's real and potential power overshadowed that of his cabinet and the legislature, and he continued to rule as well as reign. Although in the 1964 Constitution the king had delegated many of his former responsibilities to his ministers and Parliament, he had, in effect, reserved authority and initiative to himself (see ch. 14). In many areas of government the king has appeared reluctant to intervene, but the cabinet and legislature has seemed unsure of the delegation of authority and, on the whole, has also failed to take action.

In the Third Five Year Plan (1967-71) the government continued to allocate substantial sums of money to education and social services (see ch. 10). There were indications that Afghanistan was gradually achieving a reservoir of skilled and competent managers and technicians; the danger existed, however, that the supply might soon exceed the demand. Although the government was continuing its efforts to extend educational, medical, and other social services to the estimated 80 to 90 percent who live in the rural areas, in 1972 the few urban centers such as Kabul, Kandahar, and Herat received a disproportionate share of the development funds (see ch. 4; ch. 9).

In late 1972 the government was attempting to cope with, and the people were attempting to recover from, the devastating effects of a drought of apparently unprecedented severity. As an immediate result thousands of persons died of starvation; the areas that experienced the most severe hardships tended to be remote areas with which communication and transportation were limited and difficult. The exact number of deaths will probably never be known, but various estimates placed the total as high as 500,000.

The drought also seriously depleted the country's huge herds of livestock, especially the Karakul sheep, the skins of which have been a major export item (see ch. 20; ch. 24). Hundreds of thousands of livestock either died of starvation or were slaughtered because of inadequate pasturage and because of the people's need

for food. It presumably will be several years before the herds can be built up to their former size.

MAIN POLITICAL EVENTS

During the 1968-72 period, relations between the cabinet and Parliament were generally inharmonious. One of the few pieces of legislation passed by the Parliament in this period was a bill providing for the formation of political parties. As of late 1972 the king had not endorsed this legislation, however, and political party activity was illegal and would probably continue to be so at least until after the 1973 parliamentary elections.

The legislators, mostly inexperienced in parliamentary procedures, concentrated their attention on parliamentary prerogatives, especially their right to question the cabinet on policies and performances. This question-and-answer device, so highly valued in long-established and sophisticated parliaments, has been notable mostly for parliamentary attacks and for criticism of cabinet members and government policy.

The government also experienced considerable difficulty in dealing with various dissident groups. The student demonstrations in 1969 exemplify the problems encountered by groups in voicing grievances and by the government in reacting coherently. The protests began over a relatively minor issue—a charge of nepotism in hiring at a college in Kabul. When a large group of students demonstrated against the issue in May, the principal of the college requested the help of the minister of education, who ordered the students back to class. When they refused, he called in the police.

The government reportedly ordered the nonviolent arrest of demonstration leaders and the dispersal of the other demonstrators. The order was apparently misinterpreted somewhere along the oral chain of command, and the police invaded the campus, killing one student and injuring at least fifty others. Some observers blamed the violence of the police intervention in part on the resentment and animosity of largely non-Pashtun rural policemen toward the more privileged, predominantly Pashtun college students. In any case, the students removed from police custody the body of the slain student and bore it to a mosque for a hero's funeral attended by thousands. The police, however, recovered the body before the burial and arrested some students.

Many demonstrators took refuge in the dormitories of nearby Kabul University, where students from that institution and numerous other local secondary schools and colleges planned a massive march on the Ministry of Education. The police, however, surrounded the campus and on May 19 attacked in force, injuring

many persons—including a dozen faculty members and perhaps 500 students, some of whom required lengthy hospitalization. On the following day over 15,000 students, including grammar school children, rallied on the university campus, but the government did not attack. Small bands of students circulated through the city, attacking police in isolated incidents.

Agitation on campus continued. Students drew up a list of demands, nearly unanimously supported by the faculty, concerning the territorial integrity of the campus and punishment of the police. The students conducted a successful strike, and protest spread to other schools. Demands escalated to include the right of organized political activity by students and teachers. Much student rhetoric was antigovernment, antiforeign, and radical in tone. Finally, students developed "non-negotiable demands," including the end of nepotism, increased freedom of the press, and a second chance for students who were unsuccessful on entrance tests.

The government, however, refused to consider demands while the strike continued. The faculty continued to draw pay but, under threat of dismissal, secondary school teachers withdrew their support of the strike. After some weeks, the students began to favor returning to class if the originators of police orders were punished and if the student demands were discussed. In a radio speech on June 28, however, Prime Minister Nur Ahmad Etemadi announced the formation of a government-sponsored student union as the "sole legal venue capable of expressing the wishes of the university students" and threatened newspapers that expressed the student viewpoint.

Strengthened in their resistance, the students resumed demonstrations. The periodical *Masawat* criticized the speech on July 2, and the government banned that issue and also one of *Afghan Millat* (see ch. 17). The government closed Kabul University July 6 and sent the students home. Demonstrations thereupon spread to the provinces. High school classes in Kabul, however, resumed.

Although there were further minor demonstrations during the fall, when the university reopened on November 6, 1969, no demonstrations took place. Some students tried to organize marches later but found little support. Students ultimately returned to classes because of pressure from families and because of a desire not to lose further time. The issues and demands that had been formulated and advanced by the students and faculty remained unresolved.

Voting for the Thirteenth Parliament took place throughout the country between August 29 and September 11, 1969, preceded by spirited campaigning in many areas. The government took active steps to influence voter opinion against a few opposition candi-

dates, notably against former Prime Minister Mohammad Hashim Maiwandwal and his supporters. All candidates ran as independents.

All Afghanistan nationals of both sexes over twenty years of age were eligible to vote (see ch. 14). In many districts, however, no reliable records of birth or population exist, and many persons neither know their exact age nor can produce documents proving birth date or citizenship. Voter lists were compiled by election officials who in practice permitted registration of all persons past puberty who could produce a witness to swear that they had lived for ten years in Afghanistan. Approximately 2.5 million persons appeared on the official voter rolls but a much smaller number, estimated by some at approximately 10 percent, actually voted. Although adult women had the franchise, very few in rural areas took advantage of it. Interest in the elections for the House of Elders (Meshrano Jirgah, the upper house—see Glossary) was even lower than in those for the House of the People (Wolesi Jirgah, the lower house—see Glossary). The person chosen president of the senate was said to have received twenty-six votes, and his leading rival, fifteen.

The Parliament resulting from the 1969 election, although similar in composition to its predecessor, had a more conservative and more rural cast. During the first parliamentary elections (1965) the supporters of the parliamentary system were primarily liberals and modernists (see ch. 15). Many of the traditional tribal leaders, landlords, and other rural power figures remained aloof from the electoral process because of mistrust, skepticism, unfamiliarity, or a combination of these factors. By the 1969 elections, however, four years of parliamentary government had demonstrated to these persons that a seat in Parliament represented prestige, influence, and power. Consequently, many more of them came forward to stand for office.

Marshaling the traditional loyalty owed them by the rural population, the old-style leaders were able in many cases to win seats. As many as fifty members of the former Parliament might have been characterized as liberals; the number in the 1969 Parliament was much smaller. Other shifts included an increase in the number of non-Pashtuns from sixty-seven to eighty-two; among the Pashtun majority there was an increase in the number of members of the Durani tribe, to which the king and his family belong, from six to forty-three. A continuing problem in executive-legislative relations remained the overwhelmingly rural character of Parliament as opposed to the urban sophistication of the cabinet. Prime Minister Etemadi, for example, was a well educated modernist, whereas up to one-third of the members of the Wolesi Jirgah, ac-

cording to some estimates, could neither read nor write.

On October 14, as the new Parliament was being organized, Prime Minister Etemadi submitted his resignation as required by the Constitution. The king asked him to form a new government, which gained parliamentary ratification in November. The new Parliament displayed many of the weaknesses of its predecessors. Much debate concerned the privileges of members of Parliament. Quorums proved difficult to achieve. The lower house lost forty-two days before a quorum of 109 members attended. Two months passed in organizing the Parliament, which adjourned in December. According to resident observers, ten rural members never even visited Kabul in 1970.

Parliament came back into session in March 1970, but much important legislation remained stalled in committee or on the floor. No action was taken on the national budget or on measures necessary to implement the Third Five Year Plan (1967-71). In May the threat of a no-confidence vote against the leader of the lower house further slowed proceedings. In addition, various members criticized the minister of information for allegedly failing to provide adequate coverage of parliamentary activities. Some members favored a vote of no-confidence in the government, but the issue did not come to a vote before adjournment in early August.

In April 1970 the publication of a poem sparked demonstrations by religiously conservative elements. The poet had used the word *durud* (all honor to him) to refer to Lenin; usually applied exclusively to the Prophet Mohammed, the word aroused cries of sacrilege from Islamic leaders (see ch. 12). The demonstrations by Kabul mullahs (see Glossary) were at first tolerated and perhaps encouraged by the government, and the large numbers of religious leaders who arrived in Kabul from the provinces reportedly traveled in government vehicles. Almost immediately, however, the demands of the mullahs became increasingly conservative. Originally limited to the poem itself and to a general resistance to communism, the mullahs' list of demands grew to include a ban on liquor, the reinstitution of female seclusion, an end to female secular education, and the institution of religious as opposed to secular law. In May the government intervened and arrested a number of mullahs, sending some home to the provinces and jailing others. Most of those jailed were released by November.

Also in April 5,000 women demonstrated in Kabul to protest actions by religiously conservative elements who favored a return to traditional subservience for women (see ch. 8). These demonstrations recurred in October. In May and June, members of Shinwari (Pashtun) tribes in Nangarhar Province rose against the police, partially because of the treatment accorded provincial mul-

lahs in the Kabul demonstrations and partially over a local land dispute. The army put down this rebellion and arrested the main leaders, most of whom were freed during the summer. At least ten other major demonstrations were recorded that year, expressing such varied grievances as displeasure with United States aid to Israel; anger at supposedly anti-Moslem acts; demands for higher pay, the right to strike, bus transportation, improved working conditions, and changes in university entrance requirements; and dissatisfaction with the prime minister.

In May 1971 Etemadi's government fell. A dispute with Parliament had arisen over whether or not the prime minister should answer questions posed by legislators. Etemadi refused to permit debate on the issue, maintaining that the Constitution provided that he answer only at "certain intervals." Faced with a probable motion for a vote of confidence, his government submitted its resignation. During two governments, he had secured very little legislation from Parliament. The only bill passed in the 1969-70 session was the acceptance of an interest-free foreign loan. The 1970-71 budget was passed only six weeks before the end of the fiscal year, and its final form did not authorize many requested expenditures because of the failure of Parliament—dominated by the conservative landed interests—to pass new land taxes. At the insistence of the king, Parliament remained in session an extra month to enact legislation establishing an industrial development bank.

On June 9 Abdul Zahir, the ambassador to Rome and former minister of health, was named prime minister. His appointment was ratified on July 26, after nineteen days of debate in the Wolesi Jirgah, during which 204 members spoke. Zahir's government lasted a little over a year. On December 5, 1972, the king accepted Zahir's resignation, which had been submitted in mid-September, and asked Foreign Minister Mohammed Musa Shafiq to form a new government. As prime minister, Shafiq also served as foreign minister. Shafiq's cabinet included several new individuals in key positions, but retained several members of the previous cabinet.

An important problem confronting all Afghan governments has been a chronic shortage of revenue. Parliament has consistently rejected proposals to raise land tax rates, which have remained virtually unchanged for fifty years. In 1966 the Maiwandwal government ended a tax on livestock, and no new taxes have since been voted to replace it (see ch. 25). During fiscal year 1970/71 it was reported that only 1,500 businessmen in the whole country paid taxes, although more than 2,500 businessmen and 160 commercial companies did business in Kabul alone. Authorities doubt that Parliament will vote to raise taxes, although considerable

additional revenue could be acquired by improved collection procedures of taxes already on the books.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

The government's foreign policy continued in the early 1970s to be determined by four interacting factors: the country's landlocked position; its need for substantial foreign aid and assistance; its commitment to nonalignment in international affairs; and its advocacy of what it calls "the Pashtunistan issue." Since the resignation of Prime Minister Sardar Mohammed Daud in March 1963 the espousal of the Pashtunistan issue—that is, that the Pashtuns resident in Pakistan desire an independent state and should be allowed to form one—has been relatively restrained (see ch. 16). It has not been abandoned, however, and in 1972 Afghanistan maps on the proposed state continued to include the Baluchistan area of Pakistan with its seaports on the Arabian Sea. Foreign observers, and particularly Pakistanis, have consistently asserted that Afghanistan's advocacy of the cause of Pashtunistan was related directly to the Afghan desire for a ready access to the sea. The fact that the country's foreign trade is subject to interruption by any of its neighbors all of which are militarily more powerful, remained a major foreign policy issue in late 1972.

Although during the early 1970s Afghanistan relied heavily upon the Soviet Union for military and economic aid and assistance, for transit privileges for overland trade with Europe, and as the sole customer for natural gas exports, the government sought with considerable success to maintain a nonaligned posture both in East-West and Sino-Soviet disputes. Afghanistan takes an active role in the United Nations and the various specialized agencies and has increased its participation in the Colombo Plan (see Glossary; see Economic Development, this section). Afghan government officials usually participate in conferences of those nations that are not aligned in East-West confrontations or in military alliances.

A potential source of foreign affairs discord not only between Afghanistan and two of its neighbors—Iran and Pakistan—but also with West European countries and the United States was the smuggling of opium and hashish. The borders with Iran and Pakistan are for the most part unpatrolled and, given the length and remoteness of the borders, will probably remain open and easily crossed by smugglers for the foreseeable future. In addition, some observers suggest that large quantities of drugs have been smuggled out of the country without interference from the police and under the presumed protection of senior government officials.

According to these observers, perhaps as much as 100 tons of opium have been smuggled out each year, and one to two tons of hashish reach the West European, Canadian, and American markets each month. Pressure on the Afghan government to take more forceful measures to curb the drug traffic increased during the early 1970s.


SOCIAL CONDITIONS

Many of the government's problems reflect underlying tensions in Afghanistan's social structure. The country lacks a national consciousness a unified system of stratification, or any other mechanism capable of tying all elements of the society into a cohesive whole. It consists of various ethnic and cultural segments only marginally identified with the national government and the state (see ch. 5). Some observers maintain that the king's refusal to sign the political parties bill into law reflects his fear that parties would form primarily along ethnic lines and thus add a new element of divisiveness to an already fragmented situation. Government policy has for some years favored the creation of a national loyalty and identity to override particularistic and tribal ties, but by the early 1970s this policy had achieved only limited success.

Another important element of cultural fragmentation is the small, but vocal and growing, modernist intelligentsia. Centered in Kabul, this group numbers no more than several thousand, but its influence far exceeds its numerical strength. This was the group that most desired the "new democracy" (*democracy-i-nao*) and that was most attuned to the values and techniques of parliamentary democracy.

The intelligentsia is also an increasingly frustrated class. By the early 1970s educational facilities had increased substantially so that approximately 1,000 students graduated from Kabul University each year (see fig. A). On the other hand, the economy appeared to be nearing the limit of its ability to absorb into white-collar work persons with the skills acquired in the present curriculum. The government has attempted to provide work for these graduates, but it has been overstaffed for some years. In 1971, for example, a reported 51 percent of those with nine years or more of education were employed by the Ministry of Education. Those with technical training, on the other hand, remained in short supply.

Another cause of frustration among the educated class has been their apparent inability to unify or organize into a cohesive group. Modern educated Afghans have studied in a variety of countries abroad and, within Afghanistan, in schools aided and sponsored by



Source: Adapted from Afghanistan, Ministry of Planning, Department of Statistics, *Survey of Progress, 1970-1971*, Kabul, 1971, p. 96.

Figure A. Afghanistan, Progress in Education (Excluding University) 1966 and 1970

several different foreign nations, each of which has imposed its curriculum, outlook, system of organization, and language of instruction on the program. In Kabul, for example, the several university-level schools and faculties run by the Americans, French, and Russians require their own language and teach according to their own customs. As a result, modern educated Afghans do not share a single educational experience, language of study, or outlook. Student demonstrations have therefore centered on the variety of requirements for entry to higher educational institutions; a consistent demand has been the adoption of a single set of requirements and a single language of instruction more congenial to citizens of the country. Some of this dissatisfaction expresses itself in left-wing dissidence. Most observers agree, however, that the leftists are themselves disorganized and fragmented and have little realistic chance of gaining support.

Between 1969 and the winter of 1971 and 1972, very little rain fell in certain parts of Afghanistan. In July 1971 the government

instituted the Food for Work Program to aid residents of affected areas by supplying them food in exchange for work on public works projects. By September 1971, however, it became apparent that a famine of major proportions threatened. Foreign Minister Mohammed Musa Shafiq in that month stated that the prolonged drought had destroyed the wheat crop, causing a predicted deficit of 500,000 tons in 1971, and might cause the loss of 70 percent of the country's 20 million head of livestock. Major rivers, such as the Helmand, Arghandab, Hari Rud, and Farah Rud, carried very little water, and some important reservoirs held as little as 1 percent of capacity (see ch. 2).

International aid in the form of emergency food shipments arrived in 1971 and 1972 from the World Food Program of the United Nations and from a number of foreign countries, including Iran, the United States, the Soviet Union, France, Canada, and the People's Republic of China (PRC). About 300,000 tons of wheat were delivered, two-thirds of which came from the United States. Nevertheless, a number of factors acted to prevent many of these supplies from reaching the hard-hit rural people. Inadequate roads, the nomadic mobility of some groups, and insufficient numbers of vehicles slowed shipments. Because of the Indo-Pakistani war, 56,000 tons of United States wheat were briefly detained in Karachi or elsewhere en route to Afghanistan. In addition, numerous foreign observers reported in publications such as the *New York Times* that corruption within the Afghan government diverted some supplies from needy groups and that inefficiency prevented their speedy delivery. Throughout this period food prices rose precipitously, and many rural persons were forced to slaughter valuable livestock either to eat or because there was not enough pasturage to keep them alive through the winter. Observers have commented that profiteering in food was not unknown.

The human suffering caused by the drought and famine has been vast, and its dimensions will probably never be accurately known. Deaths from starvation between January and June 1972 probably numbered at least in the tens of thousands and have been estimated as high as 500,000. During the worst month of the famine, April 1972, at least 500,000 persons were suffering from severe hunger. Reliable observers described gruesome scenes of people attempting to eat grass or stuff themselves with dirt to fill their stomachs and of others wandering dazed in search of food or lying on the ground unable to muster the strength to move. The area affected by the famine contains an estimated 20 percent of the population.

In the late spring of 1972 news of the food crisis and of the


problems of relief began to appear in the local press. Abdul Haq Waleh, editor of the Kabul daily *Caravan*, wrote a series about conditions in Ghor Province, one of the most distressed areas. For a time, reporters were banned from visiting the area, but the government soon took steps to improve the distribution of food supplies. A government inquiry in eight provinces discovered officials selling relief wheat on the black market, and a number of officials, including at least one governor as well as police and development functionaries, were ultimately discharged.

In the late summer of 1972 the government got underway a concerted relief effort described by observers as the most effective project it had ever undertaken—an effort to supply outlying areas with both food and seed grain before winter weather closed roads to traffic. Reports indicated that this program had largely succeeded, although the full extent of its results would not be known before the 1973 harvest.

Government policies over a period of years have attempted to improve conditions of life. For example, medical facilities have increased in number (see fig. B). Nevertheless, there was in late 1972 little evidence that health conditions had improved for the mass of the people. In 1967 there was one physician for about every 40,000 people; by 1972 the ratio had changed to one physician for roughly 30,000 people. Statistically, this was an impressive improvement, but the fact remained that most Afghans never receive the care of a physician (see ch. 9).

In 1968 a step toward medical modernization was taken with the founding of the Afghan Family Guidance Association, which runs family planning clinics and courses in birth control techniques for medical personnel. The cabinet, government radio, modernist opinion generally, and—according to some observers—many rural women favor birth control; traditionalist opinion and most rural men oppose it. The association has issued materials containing Koranic quotations purportedly favoring family planning. Supposedly a private organization the association receives aid from the Ministry of Public Health. Other health projects include a serum and vaccine plant being constructed in 1972 and health centers, of which eighty-nine were operating in 1972 and fifty-two were under construction.

In order to improve housing, the government, in cooperation with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), established the Central Authority for Housing and Town Planning in the prime minister's office. Formed in 1969, this agency was charged with research, development, and implementation efforts in planning and housing. At the time of its establishment, the government estimated that about one-fourth of the population



Source: Adapted from Afghanistan, Ministry of Planning, Department of Statistics, *Survey of Progress, 1970-1971*, Kabul, 1971; and Louis Dupree, *Population Review, 1970: Afghanistan* (American Universities Field Staff Reports Service, South Asia Series, XV, No. 1), New York, 1971, p. 13.

Figure B. Afghanistan, Increase in Number of Physicians and Some Medical Facilities, 1963, 1967, and 1970

lived in cities but that only about 5 percent of the city dwellings could be characterized as modern in terms of sanitary facilities. It further commented that some older urban areas are overly dense and estimated that 11,500 new housing units would be required yearly in cities.

Scarcity of food has exacerbated conditions in many rural areas, increasing intergroup tensions, forcing nomads and seminomads, along with sedentary people, out of drought-stricken areas and toward cities, and accelerating a long-term trend of cityward movement. Foreign observers noted in late 1972 that at least 1,000 families were camping around Kabul. The population of Kabul exceeded 500,000 in 1969, and the annual number of migrants grew from 7,600 in 1961 to over 19,000 in 1965. The bulk of the migrants came from that city's own hinterland. Whether the extraordinary conditions of the drought had altered this tendency was not known in 1972.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

By the customary orders of measurement, Afghanistan in the early 1970s remained one of the poorest of the underdeveloped

countries, with an estimated annual income of the equivalent of US\$55 to US\$90 per person, depending on the exchange rate used. The lack of accurate information however, was monumental. The few available official economic data are subject to large margins of error as a result of inexact information at the source and unsophisticated methods of compilation and analysis. The available data should be taken only as orders of magnitude or as reflecting trend movements.

Not even the basic economic dimensions could be stated unequivocally. As of 1972 the country had not yet had a population census and, on the basis of sample surveys and varying estimates of population growth rates, the population was variously estimated at between 14 million and 17.9 million in 1972. The gross domestic product (GDP), a common measure of income and welfare, was variously estimated at between 50 billion and 80 billion afghanis (45 afghanis equal US\$1 at official rate—see Glossary) in fiscal 1969/70, which in 1972 was considered to be the most recent economically normal year.

Any dependable measure of per capita income was therefore virtually impossible. Because of the lack of information, however, appreciable future changes in the economic potential could not be discounted. It was expected in late 1972, furthermore, that Afghanistan would shortly have a middle-level echelon of exceptionally competent economic expertise, trained and experienced abroad.

Resources

In 1972 the country's resources were meager on the basis of current showings and without prejudice to the possibility of important new findings. The resources consisted mainly of good, though limited, agricultural areas a few minerals, some splendid scenery, and a hard-working peasantry.

The basic framework of communication and power networks was reasonably well developed in 1972. Much of the postwar foreign assistance that had not gone into multipurpose irrigation projects had gone into providing transportation, communication, and power facilities. The basic transportation system, consisting entirely of highways, had approached completion and would progressively continue to open up the country (see ch. 23). Many areas remained isolated, however. Communication and power networks linked the major centers and provided sufficient electric power—more than half of it in and around Kabul—to meet existing needs for the time being.

Tourism over the 1965–69 period increased, by official count, almost ninefold—from some 10,000 or 11,000 tourists to about

100,000. Of the total, 51,000 were from Pakistan; better than 9,000 each from the United States and the United Kingdom; 5,000 to 6,000 from the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany); and 25,000 from the rest of the world.

Economic Problems

In 1972 Afghanistan faced a formidable array of accumulated economic problems. Three were most immediate. The cold war economic competition in Afghanistan between the United States and the Soviet Union, which over the previous twenty years had provided most of the motive power for economic development there, was apparently running down. In the case of the United States at least, there was indication of a sizable reduction in economic assistance to Afghanistan. Simultaneously the annual service on the accumulated loans, about 72 percent of which were from the Soviet Union, was apparently increasing very rapidly, placing a heavy burden on exports and the foreign exchange reserves.

In addition, the country in 1972 was recovering from an apparently disastrous drought, extending over the crop years 1969/70, 1970/71, and 1971/72, that had not only seriously reduced the rural sector's inventories of seed grains and soil moisture but had also decimated the livestock population, placing a damper on future livestock-based exports and inducing agricultural imports. This problem promised to place further strains on availabilities of foreign currency for economic development over the next few years.

Behind these problems lay a number of more secular, if not more basic, ones. One of the more important of these was a very low rate of literacy, which has made for a shortage of skilled manpower. This shortage had apparently created bottlenecks at practically all levels of government planning, decisionmaking, administration, and control.

Role of the Government

In 1972 the role of the central government in the economy continued to be important and widespread, although not pervasive, because various regions were virtually immune from government control (see ch. 19). It was however, the country's major entrepreneur (both in agriculture and industry), the owner of practically all the country's utilities, and the source of the bulk of the country's investment—all except small-scale and cottage industry, traditional agriculture, and urban housing. Operating mainly with the loan and grant funds of foreign aid, the government had served throughout the post-World War II period as the basic controller

of the economy's advancement. The government was the source of most of the country's best jobs and, as employer of the military and the educational system, was the country's largest employer.

In its administrative function the government controlled the fiscal, monetary, price-fixing, and foreign exchange mechanisms. Since 1967, under the provisions of the Domestic and Foreign Private Investment Law, the government had also controlled the sources, direction, and conditions of private investment. It had initiated the country's development planning program and was responsible not only for the coordination of the implementation of the central planning process but also for the extension of the process to the investment activities of the provincial and local units of government.

Public Finance Development Programming and Foreign Aid

Public Finance

The central government finances are organized within a three-way budgetary framework broken down into ordinary (current) expenditures; development expenditures in local currency; and development expenditures in foreign currency (see table A). As customarily presented, the budget shows only the local currency revenues and expenditures of the ordinary (current) and the development budgets. The foreign currency expenditures of the development budget are presumed to be exactly offset by foreign-financed capital inflows needed to pay for them. They are therefore not included in the budget, but they are presented both as imports and as capital-inflow items in the balance of payments.

Apart from indirect taxes, the largest single source of government revenue was income received from government-owned enterprises, which provided some 18 percent of government current revenues over the 1967-71 period. The balance of current revenue was derived from direct taxes (9 percent) and a variety of licenses, fees, fines, government property rentals, employee and other small private loans, and the sale of natural gas.

The ordinary (current) expenses of running the government from fiscal 1967/68 to 1971/72 showed a steady tendency to increase although it should be noted that the figures for 1971/72 were budget estimates and, under the depressed conditions prevailing in 1971/72 and 1972/73, were subject to revision downward when the final figures should appear. The largest single component of current expenditures throughout the period was the estimated item for civil security and defense, which apparently accounted for around 30 percent of total current expenditures. The rest of the government's current administrative operations ac-

Table A. Revenues and Expenditures of the Central Government of Afghanistan, Fiscal Years 1968-72, at Current Prices¹
(in millions of afghanis)²

	1967/68	1968/69	1969/70	1970/71 ³	1971/72 ⁴	Total	Percent
<i>Current Revenue:</i>							
Direct taxes	556	372	411	469	528	2,336	9
Indirect taxes	2,495	2,083	2,549	2,818	2,806	12,751	51
Of which: import duties	(1,356)	(1,365)	(1,626)	(1,791)	(1,900)	(8,038)	(32)
Income from government enterprises	613	1,008	996	950	975	4,542	18
Other revenue and income	547	1,002	1,129	1,481	1,390	5,549	22
Of which: sale of natural gas	(73)	(429)	(483)	(720)	(630)	(2,305)	(9)
Total	4,211	4,465	5,085	5,718	5,699	25,178	100
<i>Current Expenditures:</i>							
Defense and security ⁵	1,350	1,450	1,550	1,550	1,650	7,550	32
Other ordinary current expenditures	1,597	1,818	1,864	1,962	2,230	9,471	40
Service on the foreign debt ⁶	666 ⁷	601	867	1,070 ⁸	1,295	4,499	19
Subsidies		385	451	560	870	2,266	9
Total	3,613	4,254	4,732	5,142	6,045	23,786	100
<i>Development Expenditures:</i>							
Local currency	1,707	1,820	1,920	1,743	2,130	9,320	49
Foreign currency ⁹	2,808	2,274	2,003	1,249	1,250 ¹⁰	9,584	51
Total	4,515	4,094	3,923	2,992	3,380	18,904	100

<i>Total expenditures</i>	8,128	8,348	8,655	8,134	9,425	42,690	
<i>Government Deficit (current revenue less total expenditures)</i>	3,917	3,883	3,570	2,416	3,726	17,512	
<i>Financing the Deficit:</i>							
Foreign commodity assistance	517	1,018	479	627	1,115	3,756	21
Foreign grants and loans	2,808	2,274	2,003	1,249	1,250 ¹⁰	9,584	55
Domestic borrowing from the Central Bank	593	592	1,089	540	1,361	4,175	24
Total	3,918	3,884	3,571	2,416	3,726	17,515	100

¹ Fiscal year is March 21 through March 20.

² At the official exchange rate, 45 afghanis equal US\$1.

³ Preliminary.

⁴ Budget estimate.

⁵ Approximate.

⁶ Includes interest and amortization.

⁷ Includes payment of domestic loans of 187 million afghanis.

⁸ Includes payment of domestic loans of 50 million afghanis.

⁹ Converted at 45.3 afghanis equal US\$1.

¹⁰ Estimate.

Source: Adapted from Afghanistan, Ministry of Planning, *Survey of Progress, 1969-1970*, Kabul, 1970, pt. I, ch. 1 and corresponding tables in statistical annex; and Afghanistan, Ministry of Planning, *Survey of Progress, 1970/1971*, Kabul, 1971, pt. I, ch. 2 and corresponding tables in statistical annex.

counted for about 40 percent of the total over the period. In addition, there were included under current expenditures the service on the foreign debt and monies spent on increases in the conversion rate (from foreign currencies to afghanis) that the government allowed the exporters of Karakul pelts, cotton, and wool over the period; these increases were treated for accounting purposes as subsidies to the exporters. Both these items increased rapidly over the period and, especially in the case of the debt service, were due to continue to increase, at least in the short run.

In the 1967-71 period as a whole, current revenues showed a surplus over current expenditures (including amortization of the foreign debt). If development expenditures were added to the current expenditures, however, their sum exceeded current revenues by about 40 percent for the period. The resulting deficit was financed about 55 percent through foreign "project" grants and loans, about 20 percent through foreign "commodity" loans (for example, wheat), and about 25 percent through domestic borrowing at the central bank. Project loans were so called because their utilization was restricted to the particular project for which they were granted.

The balancing item in the government's deficit financing was provided by loans from the central bank (see ch. 26). In the absence of other domestic sources of local currency funds for development, the government had to depend on the central bank for long-term financing that in more developed economies would have taken the form of government bonds or other debt instruments sold to the public. Central bank loans held the danger of price inflation, but there was no alternative if the government wished to take advantage of available foreign resources and was unable or unwilling to increase the tax base by including in it the income and wealth embodied in the agricultural sector.

Development Programming and Foreign Aid

Social and economic development planning had its start in the mid-1950s. By the end of 1972 it had taken the form of three completed five-year plans (1957-61, 1962-66, and 1967-71) and the projected fourth plan for the five-year period 1972-1976. The plans were prepared in the Ministry of Planning and implemented under the aegis of the ministries of planning and finance. The five-year plans consisted of groups of distinct and often unrelated projects that had in common only that they were subject to the discipline and control of a single budget. A good part of the time, in fact, the major projects were for practical purposes selected and carried out under the auspices of the grantor or lender of the foreign exchange component. These grantor-lenders mainly

were the Soviet Union and the United States, who frequently acted in competition with one another but not infrequently with the end result of virtual collaboration.

The Third Five Year Plan had proposed to reduce the emphasis on infrastructure found in the earlier plans in favor of smaller, quicker yielding projects in agriculture and industry. Two circumstances conspired to undermine much of those good intentions. The first was the drag on the budget of already ongoing projects that it was felt had to be continued. The second was a short fall in financial resources that tended to fall on new rather than the ongoing projects.

The First Five Year Plan (1957-61) had cost around 10.5 billion afghanis at current prices. The second plan had been expanded to around 25 billion afghanis (also at current prices). The third plan as originally drafted was expanded by about 30 percent beyond the dimensions of the second plan. In the meantime, however, the United States Congress had become disenchanted with foreign aid, and the diminished urgency of the cold war had wound down the American-Soviet foreign aid competition in Afghanistan. On the local currency side, increases in import, monopoly and some other taxes and partial improvement in collection administration had not been sufficient to compensate for the rescinded (1966) livestock tax and to provide the additional local currency called for by the program. As a result, the estimates for the plan were apparently cut back to around 25 billion afghanis and, in the event, actual expenditures declined to less than 20 billion afghanis.

At the end of 1972 the Fourth Five Year Plan (1972-76) was available only in outline, and it was undoubtedly subject to some revision in light of the unfavorable conditions that had prevailed in the early 1970s. As previewed, it appeared to presage greater attention to agriculture, industry, fast-yielding projects, and the private sector, and it was perhaps supported by improved coordination of credit and marketing facilities, increased availability of fertilizers, better seeds, and improved extension services.

The project of the fourth plan proposed expenditures somewhat over 20 billion afghanis. Of these, approximately one-half would be financed by foreign project loans and grants; about one-quarter, by foreign commodity aid; and the remaining quarter, by government borrowing at the central bank. Owing mainly to continued rapid rise in service on the foreign debt, domestic revenues were visualized as barely sufficing to finance the current budget, much less have anything left over for the development budget.

In 1972 the Soviet Union was generally expected to continue to

be the largest contributor of foreign assistance (see ch. 24). The Soviet Union was understood, subsequent to the drafting of the plan, to have made commitments totaling 100 million rubles (1 ruble equals US\$1.10) over the plan period and to have agreed to a moratorium on some of the annual debt service payments due it for the life of the plan. The United States was expected to continue its commodity aid, at least through the period of massive wheat shortages. There was a likelihood that, as a major source of project loans over the life of the plan, the United States might be replaced by the IBRD and the Asian Development Bank. In 1972 the United Kingdom and the PRC had already indicated an interest in helping the fourth plan; the PRC, in part with commodity aid. West Germany, Japan, and the United Nations were expected to continue their economic assistance.

Balance of Payments and Foreign Trade

As presented in the government's official documents, the balance of payments is divided into a goods and services account and a capital account. The two accounts are summed up in a "net receipts or payments" item. This, in turn, is netted against the actual "foreign exchange asset change" for the year—that is, the change in the official reserves of gold and foreign exchange. The difference, if any, between the "net receipts or payments" and the "foreign exchange asset change" is covered by a net errors and omissions item, required because of inaccuracies in data compiled in the principal accounts. The goods and services account is subdivided into a commercial account and a foreign aid account (see table B).

The sum of the total goods and services account and the capital account showed an overall negative payments balance of US\$7 million in 1971, indicating there ought to be a net decline of that amount in the foreign reserve position. Inasmuch, however, as the exchange reserves actually increased by US\$100,000, the apparent negative result of the payments balance had to be offset by a positive net errors and omissions item of US\$7.1 million to make the payments balance coincide with the actual change in the foreign reserves position.

Net foreign assets in August 1972 were estimated by the IMF at US\$43.5 million. This compared with net foreign assets of US\$30.7 million at the end of 1970/71 and US\$36.5 million at the end of 1967/68.

In fiscal 1970/71, of total exports of US\$83.6 million equivalent, the most important were dried fruit and nuts (US\$20.9 million, compared with US\$17.9 million in 1966/67) and natural gas

Table B. Balance of Payments of Afghanistan, Fiscal Years 1967-71¹
(in million US\$ equivalents)²

Item	1966/67	1967/68	1968/69	1969/70	1970/71
Goods and services:					
Exports of goods and services .	66.4	76.1	83.1	95.7	98.6
Merchandise exports					
(f.o.b.) ³	63.7	66.4	71.8	81.2	83.6
Foreign embassies' local expenses	2.7	7.3	8.9	9.0	8.3
Tourism		1.9	2.4	4.8	6.7
Imports of goods and services .	-68.1	-66.2	-69.0	-75.8	-79.4
Merchandise imports					
(c.i.f.) ⁴	-66.7	-62.9	-65.6	-72.5	-76.0
Expenditure on Afghan diplomatic missions abroad	-1.4	-1.3	-1.4	-1.5	-1.4
Travel		-3.0	-2.0	-1.8	-2.0
Balance on commercial transactions	-1.7	9.9	14.1	19.9	19.2
Foreign aid goods and debt services	-103.6	-83.3	-68.4	-63.2	-52.2
Import of project goods and services	-81.2	-62.0	-50.2	-44.2	-27.6
Commodity assistance imports	-20.3	-13.4	-12.9	-10.0	-14.7
Foreign debt interest payments for government and government guaranteed organizations	-2.1	-7.9	-5.3	-9.0	-9.9
Balance on goods and services	-105.3	-73.4	-54.3	-43.3	-33.0
Capital account:					
Gross capital inflow	101.5	75.4	63.1	54.2	42.3
Development loans and grants	81.2	62.0	50.2	44.2	27.6
Commodity assistance ...	-20.3	13.4	12.9	10.0	14.7
Gross capital outflow	-4.2	-4.3	-10.7	-14.7	-16.3
Repayment of foreign loans for government and government guaranteed organizations ..	-4.2	-4.3	-10.7	-14.7	-16.3
Balance on capital account	97.3	71.1	52.4	39.3	26.0
Net receipts or payments	-8.0	-2.3	-1.9	-3.8	-7.0
Errors and omissions	3.9	7.6	4.1	-1.2	7.1
Foreign exchange asset changes ..	-4.1	-9.9	2.2	-5.0	0.1

¹ Fiscal year is March 21 through March 20.

² At the official exchange rate, 45 afghanis equal US\$1.

³ Free on board.

⁴ Cost, insurance, and freight.

Source: Adapted from Afghanistan, Ministry of Planning, *Survey of Progress, 1970-1971*, Kabul, 1971, table S-10.

(US\$14 million, compared with zero in 1966/67). The next most important were Karakul skins, raw cotton, fresh fruit, wool, and carpets and rugs.

The year 1969 was the latest year for which a breakdown of imports was available in 1972. Of total imports equivalent to US\$72.5 million in 1969, the largest categories were consumer goods (US\$21 million, compared with US\$13.7 million in 1965), of which the largest component was food; semidurable consumer and producer goods (US\$20.8 million in 1969 and US\$16.4 million in 1965), and raw materials (US\$17.5 million in 1969 and US\$4.1 million in 1965). Smaller categories included fuels and lubricants, industrial and transport equipment and durable consumer goods.

In fiscal 1969/70, the last year for which data were available, about 38 percent of exports went to the Soviet Union, compared with 25 percent in 1965/66 (before the export of natural gas). About 20 percent went to India; 15 percent, to the United Kingdom; 4 percent, to Pakistan; and 3 percent, to the United States. Of total commercial imports in 1969/70 Japan accounted for about 20 percent, and the Soviet Union, for 17 percent. India contributed about 15 percent, the United Kingdom 7 percent; and the United States and West Germany, approximately 6 percent each. Czechoslovakia, which in 1965/66 had contributed about 7 percent of total commercial imports, in 1969/70 accounted for less than 1 percent.

According to the balance of payments, the total cost on account of interest and amortization payments on the official foreign debt in 1970/71 came to US\$26.2 million. This compared with total outlays for the same purpose in 1966/67 of US\$6.3 million. It represented in 1970/71 about 31 percent of estimated exports, compared with less than 10 percent in 1966/67, indicating the growing magnitude of the debt service problem and the growing importance of increasing the country's exports.

According to the IBRD's 1972 Annual Report, Afghanistan's outstanding external public debt on December 31, 1970, totaled the equivalent of US\$687 million, of which US\$162 million was still undisbursed. The bulk of the debt—US\$664 million—had been contracted bilaterally with other governments; and about US\$15.4 million, with multilateral institutions. About US\$7.6 million represented credit from foreign suppliers, and about US\$1.5 million was owed to foreign private banks.

Money and Prices

The monetary unit in 1972 was the afghani, which was divided into 100 puls. A par value of 45 afghanis per US\$1 was agreed with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1963. This has

remained the official rate since then, but its application (with or without exchange taxes or subsidies) has been limited to export proceeds from cotton, wool, natural gas, and Karakul pelts; to official expenditures abroad and portions of government payments to foreign experts; to conversion of foreign loan and grant assistance; and, with varying modification, to the bilateral trade agreements with various communist countries. Most essential commercial imports and most commercial nontrade international receipts and payments used the free market rate, which rose from 50 afghanis per US\$1 in 1963 to 90 afghanis per US\$1 in early 1971 and stood at 78 afghanis per US\$1 in September 1972. Nonessential imports and other nontrade foreign exchange movements came in at the bazaar free market rate, which tended to run slightly higher than the official free rate.

Money supply (the sum of currency in circulation, demand deposits, and private sector deposits in the central bank) increased about 50 percent between the end of fiscal year 1965 (March 21, 1966) and September 21, 1972. In the absence of a corresponding increase in the GDP, prices rose during the same period from a base of 100 to an estimated 188. Of the increase in the money supply over the period, about 70 percent resulted from central bank loans to the government, about 28 to 29 percent from bank credit to the private sector, and about 1 percent from an increase in the gold and exchange reserves.

The banking system remained rudimentary. It consisted of a pseudocentral bank (Bank of Afghanistan); three commercial banks (including a commercial banking department in the central bank); and three specialized banks—the Agricultural Development Bank, the Industrial Development Bank, and the Mortgage and Construction Bank. There was no commercial code and no commercial banking law; neither did the so-called central bank have the usual statutory central bank powers to control credit and the money supply and regulate the operations of the commercial banks. Central bank liabilities had to be covered up to 25 percent by gold and foreign exchange.

Apart from the banking system the only money or capital market available was that of the traditional bazaar, in which loans were made at extortionate rates of interest. What small amounts of bank credit were available were largely limited to the government, the foreign trade sector, and the cotton exporters for relending to their cotton suppliers; for other private-sector agriculture and industry, access to credit was difficult. The situation was aggravated by the absence of a commercial code setting ground rules for the rights and responsibilities of both borrowers and lenders.

The Agricultural Development Bank was rechartered and reorganized in 1970 with technical help from the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and with financial support from the International Development Association (IDA). The Industrial Development Bank was legally established in 1971, but as of late 1972 it had not begun operations. It proposed the securing of technical and financial assistance from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD, known as the World Bank) and a consortium of American and West European banks. It was hoped that the establishment of the new institutions would effectively relieve some of the traditional credit scarcity as a major obstacle to development.

National Income

Gross Domestic Product

At the end of 1972 there was no dependable national income series that would enable clear visualization of the course of income growth. Among the several estimates, the best one readily available seemed to be that prepared by the Afghan Ministry of Planning for inclusion in the Colombo Plan's eighteenth annual report (1971). It estimated for fiscal year 1969/70 a GDP equal to approximately 68 billion afghanis at current market prices. Converted to dollars at the official rate (45 afghanis equal US\$1), this amounted to the equivalent of US\$1.5 billion.

The IBRD in its *World Tables* (January 1971) for the year 1968 showed agriculture accounting for about 53 percent of the GDP, mining for 0.5 percent, manufacturing and handicrafts for close to 11 percent, construction for 1.6 percent, and power and water for less than 1 percent. Transport and communication contributed slightly more than 2 percent; trade and finance, better than 13; government sources, almost 5.5; and other sectors, almost 13 percent.

With agriculture accounting for over 50 percent of GDP and being heavily dependent from year to year upon weather conditions, the contribution and impact of agriculture on the economy may vary rather widely from one year to the next. As the government succeeds in its program of replacing antiquated production methods, particularly irrigation, with more modern ones, however, the hitherto wide annual fluctuation in agricultural output will tend to be reduced.

The modern manufacturing sector may be expected to continue to grow, perhaps progressively, at the expense, in percentage terms, of handicrafts and cottage industry. The mining sector may also be expected to grow as natural gas output increases and

as the other mineral deposits are brought into production (see ch. 21). Power, water, and transport facilities will tend toward a somewhat parallel growth. Construction will increase along with highway, housing, school construction, and irrigation works development. The catchall "other" category in the breakdown includes housing (estimated at 6 to 8 percent of total GDP) and nonfinancial private-sector services.

Agreement has been general that the average annual growth of the economy was small over the 1962-72 decade. Such growth over the first half of that decade has been generally estimated at not more than 2 percent annually in real terms—that is, net of price increases. In fiscal 1968/69 and 1969/70 income growth may have averaged somewhat better than 3 percent on a real basis, but during the next two years the drought intervened, and real income declined. In 1972 it seemed doubtful that, when the data were in, there would have been in that year any considerable increase over the years 1968 and 1969. On balance therefore, it was unlikely that the second half of the decade would have been much more productive than the first—indeed, perhaps less so.

Per Capita Income

When account is taken of the population growth—estimated to have ranged from perhaps 1.9 percent per year at the start of the 1962-72 decade to possibly 2.3 percent at the close of it—the likelihood becomes increasingly remote that, everything taken together, there was much, if any, per capita annual growth in income over the decade. Taking total GDP in 1969 at 68 billion afghanis and using the United Nations estimates of total population in mid-1972 of 17.9 million and of growth rate in recent years of about 2.3 percent, the per capita income figure for 1969 would be around 4,050 afghanis, or US\$90 at the official exchange rate.

Productive Sectors

Agriculture

At the end of 1972 agriculture continued to be the mainstay of the economy. It afforded a livelihood to more than 80 percent of the population; accounted for around 50 percent of GDP; and in recent years had provided an estimated 80 percent of commodity exports (see ch. 20). On the basis of current knowledge, it was expected to remain the main support of the economy at least through the next several five-year plans.

The basic structure of the agricultural sector showed little change between 1967 and 1972, despite the continued sizable outlay on agricultural infrastructure projects in various parts of the

country; this did not mean, however, that outlays would not pay off in the long run. Agricultural land had probably increased marginally. In the early 1970s it apparently represented some 34.6 million acres (21 percent of the total national area), of which 15.3 million were in permanent pasture. Around 6.4 million acres of the cultivable area were irrigated (estimated to comprise more than 50 percent of total potentially irrigable land); 6.2 million were dry farmed; and some 6.7 million (probably in large part potentially irrigable) were allowed to lie fallow from one year to the next. Around 4.9 million acres were by definition classified as forest, generally under scant and inferior types of cover, including an estimated 988,000 acres of wild pistachios.

Under the influence of population increase, as well as of government efforts to settle the nomadic tribes, and shifts in the pattern of the traditional annual nomadic movements, marginal cropping had infringed on traditional grazing areas to the detriment of both agriculture and grazing. The traditional areas of cultivation showed a trend of soil deterioration, and the new areas created increasingly serious erosion problems.

Owing to the unreliability of the available statistics and to the persistence of exceptional drought conditions through the better part of three successive years, it was difficult at the end of 1972 to determine with any accuracy the trend of agricultural production. Overall, it seemed likely that even after allowance was made for the impact of the drought, the trend in the long run was upward.

The structure of land tenure has been the subject of a number of piecemeal studies in the general framework of manpower and employment appraisal. Although the outline of that structure cannot be firmed up until a countrywide agricultural census has been carried out (for which plans were being laid in 1972), it was nonetheless possible in the meantime to form a rough idea of the shape of the structure from official information referring to approximately one-half of the total area under cultivation in 1967. The information suggested that, of the 618 000 landowners included in the study, about 40 percent had holdings of less than one acre; in the aggregate their holdings represented about 4 percent of the total acreage included in the study. The next size group (1.5 to 9.6 acres) took in another 40 or more percent of the landowners, and an estimated 25 percent of total acreage. At the other end of the scale the next to the top category (forty-nine to 240 acres) accounted for 2 percent of landowners and 34 percent of total acreage. The top category (240 acres and larger) accounted for some 0.2 percent of the landowners and an estimated 8 percent of total acreage.

If the structure as described were blown up to include the full amount of land under cultivation, it would leave an estimated residual of approximately 500,000 agricultural workers without any land of their own in 1967; and it is not unlikely that the extreme shortage of precipitation in 1970 and 1971 added to that number through the effect it had on marginal land, which was only cultivated with difficulty under the best of conditions.

The agricultural sector up to 1972 continued to be subsistence oriented; 80 to 90 percent of the cultivated area was under cereals, and less than one-half of the production of the agricultural sector, including livestock, typically passed through the marketplace. Note should be taken, however, of a trend in recent years toward an increasing component of cash crops such as cotton, fruits, vegetables, and tobacco, in the agricultural output.

By far the most important crop was wheat, the mainstay of the Afghan diet (see table C). Half was grown on rain-fed land; and half, on irrigated land. The area planted to wheat was estimated in 1969 to account for some 5 million acres, about 60 percent of the cultivated land in that year.

In 1970 and 1971 the influence of better inputs was more than offset by very low rainfall. Estimated production declined sharply, and the government was expected in 1971 and 1972 to have imported more than 500,000 tons of wheat. Because of the exhaustion of soil moisture and the consumption of planting seeds and because of the excessive pressure placed upon administrative facilities for coordination of inputs, credit, and expert counseling, a lag of another year or more was foreseen before the 1968-69 upward trend in wheat output could be resumed.

Cotton is important both as an export and as raw material for the domestic textile industry. Because it competes with wheat over a considerable portion of the area, the output of cotton, which in the early 1960s was the country's major export, has depended on the ratio of its price in afghanis to that of wheat. A progressive government reduction in that ratio between 1964 and 1966, intended to increase the domestic production of wheat, led to a halving of the production of seed cotton. An increase in the ratio in 1968 was followed by increases in cotton production. In 1970 drought-induced increases in wheat prices were followed by smaller cotton production, but it is not clear whether this reflected only the drought or, in part, the changed price ratio.

Since 1966 the largest increase in area cultivated was in that under fruits and nuts, which apparently more than doubled in output in the second half of the decade and by the end of the decade became the country's largest single export. Oilseeds, on the other hand, apparently underwent a drastic reduction in area

Table C. Estimates of Agricultural Production and Livestock Numbers in Afghanistan, 1962-66 Average and 1967-71
(production in thousand tons)

	Average 1962-66	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971 ¹
Field and tree crops:						
Wheat	2,158	2,241	2,354	2,454	2,081	1,950
Corn	715	768	773	785	667	600
Barley	380	357	361	365	310	300
Rice	341	396	402	407	326	310
Total food grains	3,594	3,762	3,890	4,011	3,384	3,160
Cotton (unginned) ²	80	69	71	80	76	70
Sugar beets	52	67	62	68	62	60
Sugarcane	48	57	57	60	55	49
Oilseeds ³	51 ⁴	35	36	37	35	n.a.
Fruit	775	826	834	842	759	700
Vegetables	552	638	654	671	626	600
Livestock Numbers (in million head):						
Sheep					15.0	
Karakul sheep					6.5	
Cattle					3.7	
Goats					3.2	
Donkeys					1.3	
Camels					0.3	
Horses					0.5	
Poultry					6.0	

n.a.—not available.

¹ Preliminary estimate.

² Of which one-third represents cotton and two-thirds, cotton seed.

³ Presumably other than cotton seed.

⁴ 1966.

Source: Adapted from Afghanistan, Ministry of Planning, *Survey of Progress, 1969-1970*, Kabul, 1970, table S-22; and Afghanistan, Ministry of Planning, *Survey of Progress, 1970-1971*, Kabul, 1971, p. 64, table S-22.

cultivated, in production, and in export value. Vegetables, perhaps reflecting the development of truck gardening, showed a substantial increase in productivity. Both beet and cane sugars, minor crops, were produced at high cost under government subsidies in response to the government's purpose to expand where possible the country's self-sufficiency in respect to foodstuffs.

Sheep and goats are the main support of the livestock sector, which accounted for an estimated 20 percent of the overall agricultural sector's contribution to GDP and about one-third of the country's total agricultural exports in 1969. About one-quarter of the sheep are Karakul sheep, the source of the widely prized lambskins. Under the tutelage of the Karakul Institute, established in 1966, the technology of producing, processing, and marketing Karakul skins has been improved to the considerable benefit of the country's balance of payments.

As a consequence of the drought in 1970 and 1971, large numbers of livestock died, were slaughtered, or were sold out of the country. This had the short-run effect of increasing the supply and lowering the price of meat, thereby relaxing somewhat the pressure on prices of other commodities notably wheat, and increasing exports. In the longer run it will lower consumption and exports as the herds are rebuilt.

Industry

Industry is taken to include mining, power, and construction as well as manufacturing (including handicrafts). At the start of the 1970s, manufacturing accounted for some 11 to 12 percent of the GDP; mining, around 1 percent; power (including water), 1 percent; and construction, around 2 percent.

In terms of size of productive units, industry covered a wide range, from a few units at one extreme with fifty or more employees each to a large number of cottage units at the other extreme engaging only members of the family. Ownership of the large-scale production units (including mining and power) was divided more or less on a forty-to-sixty basis between the government and the private sector. Sales and employment were similarly divided, but the government units apparently represented close to 75 percent of the total investment. Employment in the large-scale units apparently averaged between 300 and 330 per unit.

In general, manufacturing tended to fluctuate in line with the year-to-year changes in agricultural production. This was so not only because the agricultural sector represented so large a proportion of GDP and purchasing power but also because it provided a large part of the raw materials used in manufacturing.

In 1967 the government enacted the Foreign and Domestic Pri-

vate Investment Law to stimulate through tax exemptions and other incentives an increase in private and, especially where suitable, foreign private investments in industry. Through the second quarter of 1972 about 168 industrial projects had been screened and cleared by the Investment Committee set up for that purpose in the Ministry of Commerce. About eighty projects had started operation, and another forty or so were in the planning or construction stage. A total of around 2 billion afghanis had been invested; there was, however, only a small foreign capital component in this new investment. There were indications in 1972 that some of the new projects were operating at only around 50 percent of capacity. Excess capacity, in fact, was a condition that prevailed throughout most of the manufacturing sector. It derived from a number of causes, in addition to the drought, including faulty market analysis, inefficient management, and government duplication of private productive facilities.

Manufacturing for the most part consisted of such light industries as food processing and textiles; heavy industry was represented by electricity production and cement. Mining included the production of coal, salt, lapis lazuli, and marble. Natural gas represented a special case. Production facilities, completed in 1967, were financed by the Soviet Union, which imported practically the whole of the output in partial payment of Afghanistan's large debt to the Soviet Union.

Production in light industry, except in the case of ginned cotton and the yarn and textiles derived from it, increased in 1968 and 1969 in the wake of improved agricultural, especially wheat, output and income (see table D). Heavy industry, including construction, tended to decline in response to completion or suspension of a number of the large infrastructure projects and to growing limitations of foreign financial assistance. In 1970 and 1971 the very serious drought conditions which drastically reduced production and income in the agricultural and livestock sector, extended the decline in heavy industry to include light industry as well. In 1972 no considerable short-run improvement was in sight, unless the government could promptly undertake a sizable program of quick-yielding development projects in the agricultural sector.

The greater part of heavy industry was owned or controlled by the government. This included all the large-scale production of power, coal mining, cement natural gas, grain milling, slaughterhouses, and printing. The government also participated actively in the production of metal manufacturing, textiles, vegetable oils, and sugar. Other food-processing and textile production, as well as metal work, leatherwork, fruitpacking, carpetmaking, and raisin sorting, was carried on by the private sector. The cottage

Table D. Mining, Manufacturing, and Power Production of Afghanistan, Fiscal Years 1967-71¹

	Unit	1966/67	1967/68	1968/69	1969/70	1970/71 ²
Mining:						
Coal	thousand tons	161.6	151.0	124.8	136.2	170.0
Salt	-do-	38.7	31.3	36.9	36.6	37.6
Lapis lazuli	thousand pounds	22.7	12.1	n.a.	9.9	22.0
Marble	thousand cubic yards	6.1	5.8	6.1	8.0	6.0
Food processing:						
Wheat flour	thousand tons	55.0	67.5	58.0	40.0	51.3
Sugar	-do-	7.1	7.5	5.3	7.6	8.6
Vegetable oil	-do-	3.4	3.1	3.0	2.8	4.1
Textile and leather products:						
Ginned cotton	thousand tons	24.0	18.5	13.9	27.0	30.1
Cotton textiles	million yards	72.2	70.0	53.3	53.8	62.4
Rayon textiles	-do-	1.4	1.4	3.1 ³	2.6 ³	9.1 ³
Woolen textiles	-do-	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.8	0.4
Shoes	thousand pairs	107.6	123.3	123.8	161.1	199.0
Other:						
Soap	million cakes	1.4	1.5	3.6	3.0	5.3
Coal briquettes	thousand tons	29.4	37.3	27.2	23.0	30.0
Cement	-do-	174.0	124.0	91.0	104.0	94.0
Electric power	million kilowatt-hours	286.0	259.0	301.0	324.0	356.0
Natural gas	billion cubic meters		0.3	0.7	2.0	2.6

n.a.—not available.

¹ Fiscal year is March 21 through March 20.

² Preliminary.

³ Estimate.

Source: Adapted from Afghanistan, Ministry of Planning, *Survey of Progress, 1970-1971*, Kabul, 1971, table S-24.

industry devoted itself mainly to rugmaking, cotton textiles, and raisin sorting.

In the early 1970s a fertilizer plant, based on natural gas, together with a thermal power plant, also using natural gas, were being set up at Mazar-i-Sharif and were expected to be completed by the end of 1973. The fertilizer plant would suffice for the country's current needs, with some production probably available for export. The power plant would enable a further extension of electricity to adjacent areas.

Electrical power capacity continued to grow, especially in the Kabul area. In 1970 capacity was officially estimated at almost 210,000 kilowatts, of which some 191,000 kilowatts were generated by hydropower, 12,740 kilowatts by diesel, and 4,810 kilowatts thermally. The great bulk was owned and operated by the Afghan Electricity Authority. Capacity was scheduled to increase by some 36,000 kilowatts of thermal power when the power plant at Mazar-i-Sharif was completed in 1973 or thereafter. It would be increased by a further 33,000 kilowatts with the completion of a hydro plant at Kajakai, as part of the Helmand Valley Authority project. Production of power in 1970 totaled an estimated 362 million kilowatt-hours. The fact that power consumption had failed to keep pace with growing capacity reflected, in part at least, faulty coordination in carrying out the parallel extensions of the distribution network.

NATIONAL SECURITY

In 1972 the army, with almost 80,000 officers and men, was organized into four infantry divisions, two armored divisions one special infantry brigade (the Royal Bodyguard), and various support elements. The military equipment was almost completely of Soviet origin, and the army was totally dependent upon the Soviet Union and—to a lesser extent, Czechoslovakia—for replacements and spare parts for the T-34 and T-54 medium tanks, 135-mm artillery weapons, communications equipment, and other weaponry and hardware (see ch. 28).

The 6,000-man air force was equally dependent upon the Soviet Union for the air force's approximately 120 combat aircraft and its transports and helicopters. In 1972 the most advanced aircraft consisted of three squadrons of MiG-21 interceptors and two squadrons of Su-7 fighter-bombers.

The king remained the supreme commander in chief. In 1972 General Khan Mohammad Khan was the minister of defense, a post he had held since March 1963. Both he and the chief of staff, General Sayyid Hassan, are Pashtuns, as were most members of

the officer corps and most of the career soldiers.

The officer corps constituted an elite interest group that was, relative to the general population, committed to technology and modernization. In comparison to the educated and modernizing civilian elite however, the officer corps probably represented a cautious, conservative counterbalance. A large number of both the commissioned and noncommissioned officers had received training abroad, mostly in the Soviet Union or in the United States, but there was no indication that they had been politicized.

As a result of a conscription program, perhaps as many as half the enlisted men are returned to civilian life after a two-year tour of duty. As a general policy, military personnel are not posted in the area from which they were drafted or recruited. Military service, therefore, tends to increase the national consciousness of a fairly large number of citizens. In addition the soldiers are exposed to some rudimentary training in personal hygiene, national history and, at least for a few, basic mechanics.

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PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION

This is a revision of the second edition of the 1959 *Area Handbook for Afghanistan*, which was prepared under the Chairmanship of Richard W. Weeks by the Foreign Area Studies Division, Special Operations Research Office, The American University. An earlier monograph prepared in 1956 for Human Relations Area Files (HRAF), New Haven, Connecticut, was directed and edited by Donald N. Wilbur; it was of great value in preparing the 1959 edition of the handbook.

The present edition deals with the political, social, economic, and military developments since 1959, which have contributed to Afghanistan's continuing national stability and its gradual progress toward becoming an increasingly modern state.

Special credit is given to Dr. Louis Dupree of the Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Pennsylvania State University and of the American University's Field Staff, Incorporated, for his sound advice and preceptive comments based on extensive experience as an observer in the field. Especially helpful were his timely remarks regarding political and social developments. Particular appreciation is extended to the staff of the Military Assistance Institute of the American Institutes for Research for their liberal cooperation in providing the use of facilities and important source materials and for their assistance on many parts of this study.

A visit to Afghanistan by the team economist, Frances C. Rintz, yielded both published and unpublished books and documents in addition to many discerning firsthand observations. In connection with this visit, the authors are grateful to the Kabul staff of Robert R. Nathan Associates, Incorporated, for source material, guidance, and other assistance granted to her while working in the country. Thanks are due, also, to Dr. Paul English, Department of Geography, University of Texas, Austin Texas, for supplying valuable data from his original research in Herat. Mohammad Khan of the Finance Department in the Afghan Ministry of Planning, contributed substantially to chapter 25, Public Finance.

Appreciation is also extended to Dr. James G. Scoville, of the Department of Economics, Harvard University, for furnishing information on labor, wages, and other economic matters. Moreover,

Foreign Area Studies is greatly indebted to William Frederick Spengler for his advice on the history of Afghanistan. Theodore S. Gochenour, Jr. drew on his specialized training in Afghan languages for helpful advice particularly relating to chapter 5, Ethnic Groups and chapter 6, Languages and Communication.

Grateful acknowledgment is also due many persons within and outside the United States Government who are too numerous to mention individually but who gave their time and special knowledge to provide data and objective criticism of preliminary chapter drafts.

The spelling adopted for the names of various ethnic groups and their languages is based primarily, for purposes of simplification, on the English phonetic interpretation of the Afghan pronunciation. For example, Pashtun is used instead of Pushtun, and, to denote the language, Pashto is used instead of Pushtu (or Pushto). For the same reason, the plural of all groups, whether the name ends in a vowel or a consonant, is formed by adding the letter "s" to the group designation.

A glossary is included as an appendix for the reader's convenience. Wherever possible, the place names used are those established by the United States Board on Geographic Names.

AFGHANISTAN

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


Figure 1. Position of Afghanistan in Southwest Asia, 1973

SECTION I. SOCIAL

CHAPTER 1

GENERAL CHARACTER OF THE SOCIETY

Afghanistan, the "land of the Afghans," was founded as an independent nation in 1747 by Ahmad Shah Durani, a tribal chief of the Pashtuns. It has been a kingdom of considerable mystery to the West; only since the beginning of the twentieth century has it emerged from cultural and political isolation into world affairs. Under the effective leadership of its King, Mohammad Zahir Shah, it was in 1967 slowly developing into an increasingly modern state.

Afghanistan is a landlocked country lying between the Soviet Union, Communist China, Pakistan and Iran (see fig. 1). Great mountain ranges cover approximately three-fourths of the nation's total area and are dominated by the Hindu Kush which rises to meet the western end of the Himalayas near the border with Communist China. As the mountain mass spreads westward, it gradually ends in a series of low ridges and treeless plateaus which slope into a rocky desert region of sun-baked sand along the border with Iran.

Within a distance of 700 miles, altitudes above sea level vary between 20,000 feet in the east and 500 feet in the west. Wide differences in altitude and in resultant climatic conditions have a major impact on the daily life of the people. The population, estimated at nearly 16 million late in 1967, is predominantly rural in character, but only about 20,000 square miles, or less than 10 percent of the country's total area of 264 000 square miles, is under cultivation. Much of the noncultivated countryside, however, provides summer grazing land for large herds of sheep, goats, and camels, all important sources of income.

The society is a heterogenous collection of ethnic groups linked by blood and history with the peoples of neighboring areas. Each of these groups, whether settled or nomadic, is largely concentrated in particular sections of the country. This diversity of ethnic groups uses more than 20 languages and dialects. Many people can speak at least two languages, but only a small proportion, estimated to be about 10 percent, can read and write. Consequently,

illiteracy is a serious problem which retards the nation's progress in training needed specialists, technicians and professional personnel.

Since 1747 the government has been controlled by the dominant Pashtun group. Two lineages, each belonging to a tribe of the Durani confederation, have ruled successively. The Sadozai lineage of the Popalzai tribe was in power until 1835, when, after a quarrel, members of the rebelling Mohammadzai lineage of the Barakzai tribe took over the throne. This typifies the importance of tribal attitudes in determining the degree of authority exercised by the incumbent ruler over the country. The government in 1967, as directed by King Mohammad Zahir Shah, is backed by the armed forces and the loyalty of tribal leaders and has been the most stable and progressive in Afghan history.

Although Afghanistan has been a state for over 200 years, it remains a land of separate peoples not yet molded into a strong national society. Each tribal group, and each tribe and village within each group, tends to be a separate society in itself.

Only a small proportion of the population, consisting mainly of people living in the larger urban communities and in nearby tribal areas, is actually affected by or is conscious of the national government's presence. The government however, under the influence of the King and his Prime Minister, Nur Ahmad Etemadi, is vigorously attempting with considerable success, to reach an increasing number of people, particularly those living in isolated areas. The King and his advisers have made special efforts to visit and consult with the people in remote communities. His government in 1956 initiated a series of economic and social development programs, commonly known as Five-Year Plans. They are designed to improve living and public health standards, to raise literacy levels throughout the land and to encourage a sense of national unity through participation in a common cause.

For more than 2,000 years the country has shared historical ties as well as cultural and ethnic affinities with the peoples of the Middle East, Central Asia and the Indian subcontinent. The strongest cultural ties, however, are with Iran. Parts of that area have been ruled at times by Afghan Kings, but at other periods parts of Afghanistan have been ruled by Persian Kings. Most Afghans have at least some knowledge of the Persian language, as spoken in Iran. Dari, the Afghan variant of Persian, and Pashto, spoken by the Pashtuns, were declared the country's official languages by the Constitution of 1964.

The northern part of the country has close relationships with the people of Soviet Central Asia. The people, descendants of tribesmen who over the centuries moved southward from the Asian

heartland to the Hindu Kush, speak Turkic languages and have ethnic qualities similar to those of the Turks or the Mongols. As with Iran, Afghan Kings have sometimes ruled parts of what is now Soviet Central Asia, and Turkic chiefs have controlled parts of Afghanistan.

Afghanistan is also closely linked with the Indian subcontinent. The estimated 8 million Pashtuns of Afghanistan are part of a larger Pashtun society that spreads into Pakistan on the east and south. At times in the past, Afghan chiefs have ruled northern India, and Indian Kings have ruled the peoples of the Hindu Kush.

The cultural characteristics of most Afghans are predominantly influenced by their tribal way of life and by Islam, the official religion of the state. Both are closely intertwined; both give a sense of security and self-esteem to the individual, but the influences of both are being gradually diminished by increasing secularization and nationalization. The process is slow; when rulers, such as King Amanullah Khan in the 1920's, have tried to hasten it, they faced rebellion from both religious and tribal leaders.

Most Afghans are Moslems and agree on certain universal Moslem fundamentals. Religious attitudes permeate all spheres of activity and all manifestation of thought from urban to rural official and nonofficial, settled and nomadic, in good fortune and in calamity and from birth to death. While most villagers are not concerned with doctrinal matters, their daily observance of religious rituals, as well as the advice and teachings of local *mullahs* (Moslem religious leaders) constitute an integral part of their daily lives.

In a society which has had limited contact with scientific concepts, belief in God's omnipotence covers so wide an area that Afghans tend to give the impression of being fatalistic. The Koran, as they understand it, or as the local *mullah* interprets it, gives clear-cut rules of behavior which have been upheld by custom and time. Many regard the attempts by certain Moslem intellectuals to reinterpret the Koran as sacrilegious. Typical examples include giving women secular education, discarding the veil, permitting the use of alcoholic beverages, collecting interest on loans or separating government courts from religious courts.

Just as all but an insignificant minority of Afghans are Moslems, nearly all are tribal except some 3 million village and urban Tajiks. Afghan society, in effect, is largely a collection of separate tribes, generally independent of others, both economically and politically. The individual's role is within his tribe; his occupation is part of the tribe's economic system; his status is determined by the status of his family and tribe. He asserts his influence through the tribal *jirgah* (council of elders) which, theoretically, gives every

tribesman a voice in tribal affairs. His voting district is his lineage within the tribe rather than a geographical area.

The process of welding the many tribes of the many ethnic groups into a nation began in the nineteenth century and has proceeded very slowly, but its pace has increased notably since 1933, when Zahir Shah came to the throne. The strongest unifying influence is the King to whom tribal leaders generally pledge their fealty. In some instances tense situations, usually arising from intertribal rivalries based on economic, political or military determinants, have resulted in breaking the pledge or in refusal to make it. Actions of this type indicate hostile attitudes which on occasions, have developed into open rebellions. Nevertheless, the king, supported by the military establishment, has successfully used the traditional loyalties of these leaders to help maintain governmental stability and to win support for the modernization of its government.

The Afghan economy is basically agricultural and, except for sugar, tea, and wheat, the country was self-sufficient in food production in 1967. Industrial enterprises were limited to a few engaged principally in processing agricultural products. Efforts were being made, however, to create new plants and to increase the output of consumers goods. Nevertheless imports of manufactured products, petroleum, building materials, machinery, and other items were needed to carry out the Third Five-Year Plan (1967-71).

A large majority of the people, possibly as many as 90 percent, are engaged in farming and stockraising. By working hard they are able to feed themselves adequately and follow a life which satisfies them. About 2.6 million are nomads who, using their camels and donkeys for transport, move from their winter habitations, usually over the same general routes, to their respective summer pastures in the uplands. At the end of the grazing season they normally return over these same routes. Meanwhile, they engage in raising and trading cattle, sheep and goats or in carrying goods to trade with villagers along the way. A somewhat smaller number, about 1.6 million, are permanently settled in towns, cities and nearby rural areas. Their income is derived from trade, industry, crafts, government service, or intensive cultivation, usually on irrigated land. The rest, about 11.8 million are settled on the land to cultivate crops, but most of them raise animals and need, therefore to range over wide areas to find adequate pastures and water.

Social separation is most distinguishable between the nomads and the settled groups. All groups are imbued with a spirit of independence. Individuals have no feeling of inferiority, and each is

inclined to regard himself socially and spiritually as equal to or better than all the others.

The most generally shared beliefs which serve to impart a sense of common identity regardless of cultural and social differences stem from the teachings of Islam. The teachings stress equality of individuals before Allah. Moreover, the country's rugged mountainous terrain which contributes to the creation of isolated communities promotes a spirit of self-reliance among its individual members. Living under these conditions, individual loyalties tend to be concentrated primarily on the family, secondly on the community or tribal group and lastly on the nation. This spirit of independence and equality, however, has led to varied and sometimes contradictory interpretations of Islam. Furthermore historic rivalries among the numerous tribal groups hamper the development of a sense of national unity.

Both tribesmen and nontribal villagers in the majority of instances have lived in a circumscribed social unit, and their economic life, therefore, has been independent. Nomadic tribes depend for their livelihood on their animals and the few fields they cultivate when not on the move. Settled families live together in villages and cultivate nearby fields; they work their lands as cooperative economic units, growing what they need for themselves plus a little more to trade with nomads for animal products or for pots, pans and clothing in the bazaars of larger villages. Each living unit is relatively self-sufficient and needs only a few imported items.

Economic development has not advanced enough to change significantly the long-established self-sufficiency of the living unit, village or nomadic tribe. Turkomans in the north raise sheep in order to export karakul skins abroad. It is from this source that the country earns much of its foreign exchange. Other areas raise surplus fruits and nuts to export to India, and this provides the other major source of foreign exchange.

To lessen the country's need for consumer imports, the government is encouraging the development of small industries and hydroelectric power plants are being constructed to run them. By the end of 1967, however, the effect of this industrialization was limited mostly to dwellers of urban communities. The economy continues to be relatively unintegrated. Each tribe and village supplies most of its own needs, and most economic areas operate with limited cooperation with the others, mainly because of an inadequate road network and insufficient transport facilities. A bountiful harvest in one area has little effect in other areas; conversely, drought or flood brings only local disaster. Water shortage is a major problem in many regions for those engaged in land cultivation and animal husbandry.

There are no overpopulation complications in rural areas to force individuals to move to the city. The hard work required to make an adequate living is generally accepted by rural people, almost all of whom subsist on the same economic, social and cultural level. Most people are on comparable living standards, and ostentatious display of wealth is commonly disapproved.

Development of energy sources, particularly coal, natural gas, and hydroelectric installations, has been stressed under successive Five-Year Plans beginning in 1956. Coal is the only mineral being commercially exploited on a significant scale. Exploitation of sizable deposits of iron ore, beryl, gold, barite and other minerals is hindered by lack of transport and shortage of capital.

Most industrial items needed for carrying out the Five-Year Plans must be imported. Most other imports include articles of basic consumer commodities in addition to some agricultural products, such as sugar.

Carrying out the Five-Year Plans also requires large-scale support from foreign sources, especially in the form of capital and technical assistance. By 1967 the United States, the Soviet Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Nations were the principal sources of loans and advisers.

Foreign relations are influenced strongly by economic, political and ethnic factors. The necessity for acquiring foreign assistance virtually imposes a policy of nonalignment in the East-West issues. This policy is reinforced by consideration of the country's strategic landlocked position. In this situation, insurance of continued outside aid probably is of major concern to government leaders, resulting in an effort to maintain the country's independence and avowed neutralism. Relations with other nations have been friendly. The Afghan dispute with Pakistan, popularly called the Pash-tunistan dispute because it arises from conflicting viewpoints over the future of the Pashtuns living astride the boundary between the two countries, was no longer a critical issue in 1967. Nevertheless, the country's continued advocacy of self-determination or statehood for these people has been consistently opposed by Pakistan.

Political power is in the hands of King Zahir Shah and his Cabinet Ministers. A relatively small group of high officials participates in formulating government policies. The King's government, backed by the armed forces, is the primary stabilizing force in this loosely built society and through its administrative laws and services it is forging links between the separate units and making an increasingly integrated structure.

The central government controls the armed forces, police, civil service and, to a great extent, the economic power of the country.

Several groups play political roles of varying importance. These include the entrepreneurs, livestock breeders and landowners, among whom only the entrepreneurs maintain contact with appropriate government officials regarding various development programs; tribal leaders, whose opinions commonly prevail in their respective areas; the intellectual and industrial leaders, whose influence is increasing with the progress in educational and economic fields; and the *mullahs*, whose influence is gradually diminishing with the advancement in modernization and secularization policies. The rural population, by far the largest portion of the country's inhabitants, has virtually no interest in national affairs.

The government is encouraging the expansion of political activity, as evidenced by the adoption of a liberalized Constitution in 1964 to replace that of 1931, which was too restrictive for the modernization policies envisaged. Accordingly, under the new constitution voting rights were given to women, provisions were made for parliamentary elections and in 1967, preparations were under way for the establishment of the first political party system.

The rules by which most Afghans live are the customs of the individual's tribe and the commands of his religion; the written codes of conduct are affecting them very slowly. Their customary codes (called *Pashtunwali* among the Pashtuns) demand hospitality to strangers, revenge against enemies, the keeping of promises and strict adherence to an elaborate code of honor.

CHAPTER 2

PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT

Afganistan, covering an estimated area of 260,000 square miles, lies in Central Asia. Completely landlocked, it is surrounded by the Soviet Union to the north, Iran to the west and by Pakistan to the south and southeast. The nearest seaport is Karachi, Pakistan, 727 miles away. Its extreme length from west to east is 770 miles including a narrow corridor-shaped extension (Wakhan) in the east. Its greatest width from north to south is approximately 350 miles.

The main pitch of the land is from the northeast to the southwest, following the general trend of the Hindu Kush massif from the Pamir Knot on the border with Communist China to Iran. To the north, west and southwest there are no mountain barriers toward neighboring countries. The northern plains pass almost imperceptibly into the plains of Soviet Turkistan. In the west and southwest the plateaus and deserts merge into those of Iran (see figs. 1 and 2).

Since much of the country is covered by deserts and receives little precipitation, water has been a dominant factor in determining the location and distribution of human settlement. Villages, oases and many of the historic towns are located near rivers and streams. Kabul, the country's capital and a meeting place of trade routes from east, west, north, and south lies on the well-watered plains of the river by the same name.

The boundaries that exist in 1967 were established in the late nineteenth century as the British and Russian empires approached each other in their expansionist periods. The greater part of the border with the Soviet Union and a small section of the border with Pakistan are marked by rivers; the remaining boundary lines are political rather than natural.

The frontier with the Soviet Union extends approximately 1,050 miles southwestward from the point where the Pamir Knot touches Communist China to the desert and hilly region at the eastern border of Iran. Along the Amu Darya (classically, the Oxus) River, the boundary line has been established at the deepest con-




Figure 2. Natural Regions and Place Names of Afghanistan

tinuous channel in the navigable portion and at the median line farther upstream.

The border with Iran runs generally southward almost 510 miles from the Hari Rud River, across the swamp and desert regions bordering Iranian Khorasan and Sistan before reaching the northwestern tip of Pakistan. Its southern section crosses the Helmand River which occasionally changes its course in this area, causing boundary disputes between Iran and Afghanistan.

The border with Pakistan, totaling 1,125 miles, runs eastward from Iran through the Chagai Hills and the southern end of the Registan Desert, then northward through mountainous country to a point near Chaman, the terminus of the railroad from Quetta in Pakistan. The boundary then follows an irregular course in a northeasterly direction some 175 miles before reaching the Durand Line established in 1893 by agreement with British authorities. This line, which defines the border, continues on through mountainous regions to the Khyber Pass area. Beyond this point it rises to the crest of the Hindu Kush which it follows eastward to the Pamir Knot.

The last section of the border runs roughly parallel to the eastern end of the northern border and with it forms the Wakhan corridor, the narrowest portion of which is only 7 miles wide. The extreme northeastern part of the Wakhan forms a 50-mile-long common border with Sinkiang province of China.

The Durand Line divides Pashtun tribes between the two nations cutting off migration routes to important pasturelands. Its creation has caused much dissatisfaction among Afghans and has given rise to bitter border disputes between Afghanistan and Pakistan (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups; ch. 16, Foreign Relations).

The country is made up of regions and provinces which have attained prominence in the historical past. The fertile northern stretch between the mountains and the Amu Darya, for example, was once part of Bactria the seat of a rich and ancient civilization, and is still often referred to by that name. Other regions, notably Nuristan, eastward from Kabul, and the Hazarajat to the west were named after the people inhabiting the areas. In some instances, as in Badakhshan, in the northeast, the traditional names of natural or geographical regions, correspond with the names of current administrative units (provinces). Their geographical boundaries, however, do not necessarily correspond (see fig. 2).

Administratively, the country is divided into 28 provinces (see fig. 3). These in turn are subdivided into divisions, districts and subdistricts or cantons. The number of provinces was increased twice during the 1960's, from 14 to 17 between 1962 and 1964 17 to 29 in March 1964 and decreased from 29 to 28 in 1965. His-




Figure 3. Provinces of Afghanistan

torically, the provinces have served as an extension of the central government in the outlying areas. The determining factor in changing the number of provinces appeared to include administrative convenience, population density and economic considerations (see ch. 14, The Governmental System).

The dominant physical feature is the mountainous Central Highlands formed by the Hindu Kush and its subsidiary ranges (see fig. 4). Traversing the country for 600 miles from east to west, the towering peaks alternate with precipitous gorges and barren slopes. In the eastern portion some of the ridges have spectacular forest cover of cedar, pine, and larch. Farther west the forest cover yields sparse grass covering sought by nomadic shepherds when they ascend from the parched plains of the south.

Small crops are cultivated in some of the narrow valleys, watered by swift-running snow-fed streams. Stretches of grassland affording good pasture are found in some of the higher valleys. The mountains are threaded by numerous passes. Some of these, including the Anjuman, Salang, and the Hajigak, have been used by conquering armies and by caravans in historical times.

North of the mountainous divide the land descends gradually into the plains of the Amu Darya. The area was once famous for the ancient city of Balkh a trading center and meeting ground of caravans on their way to China along the historic silk route. The land is fertile but requires water to make it cultivable and productive. The easternmost portion is mountainous, settled only in the valleys which are isolated among the tangled ranges. The Kunduz Valley, north of Salang Pass, however, has become an important center for growing sugar beets and cotton. To the west are rich pasturelands where large flocks of sheep are raised. Still farther west along the foothills of the Hindu Kush is the fertile Hari Rud Valley.

The southwestern plateaus comprise desolate, arid deserts and steppes, covered with sand dunes, dry streambeds and salt lakebeds. Around the northeastern rim of the Dasht-i-Margo and Registan Deserts in this region, high, serrated ridges rise precipitously from the desert floor. Northeast of the Registan, the area becomes more fertile with dense orchards and vineyards. Cultivable oases are found mainly around the city of Kandahar, from where agricultural commodities move to Pakistan and India.

A semiarid steppe climate prevails in general throughout the country. Depending on the region, however, the climate varies considerably from subarctic conditions in the northeastern mountains to the relatively milder and more moist weather in the area bordering Pakistan. The rainfall is scanty, with estimated annual averages for the country ranging between 11 to 15 inches.




Figure 4. Landforms and Drainage of Afghanistan

Earthquakes are frequent, occurring as often as 50 times a year in some areas. They are most violent and most frequent in the northeast, where in 1955 the town of Faizabad, capital of Badakhshan province, was almost totally demolished. In 1956 violent tremors shook the area of the Central Hindu Kush, including the provinces of Bamian and Samangan.

The snow-fed rivers and streams arising in the mountains provide ample water in the spring but run dry in the summer or are reduced to tiny rivulets. The cultivation of plains and deserts has depended on irrigation. The Helmand River project, begun in 1957 with assistance from the United States, represents the first major effort in modern times to restore the southwestern region to full productivity.

Topographic conditions favored physical isolation and hampered the development of internal transportation routes. The country has no railroad lines. Until the mid-1950's travel was mostly by caravans of pack animals on tortuous roads, restricted to the dry season. Since 1956 the government, with extensive aid from the United States and the Soviet Union, built a basic network of highways which connect most of the urban centers and link the northern and southern provinces. River transportation is negligible. There are only a few navigable rivers and they are suitable only for the use of flat-bottomed boats and rafts during the rainy season. Air transport, both domestic and international, has great potential importance and, since 1955, has developed with relative rapidity. Terrain and weather characteristics pose special difficulties in the building of serviceable runways and present a challenge to the skill of pilots.

MAJOR REGIONS

Central Highlands

The country's mountainous core, the Central Highlands, is part of the great Alpine-Himalayan mountain chain. An intricately interwoven pattern of ridges and valleys, the Central Highlands extend over an area of approximately 160,000 square miles. The mountains fan out from the Pamir Knot in the east toward Iran in the west and enclose several arid plateaus. Transverse ridges point toward the Northern Plains; the southern ridge complex crosses over to Pakistan (see fig. 4).

The east-west trending mountain axis is composed of three high ridges with the altitudes descending toward Iran. The main ridge begins in China and runs southwestward some 300 miles as the Eastern Hindu Kush with peaks over 21,000 feet high, and mountain passes at altitudes vary between 12,000 and 15,000 feet. Most

important of these is the Weran Pass (15 000 feet) which connects the valley of the Kunar River on the south with the Kokcha River on the north. At the 13,000-foot Anjuman Pass, crossed by a trail leading from Kabul northeastward to Faizabad, the Eastern Hindu Kush becomes the Central Hindu Kush. The former is a cold desert highland with snow-covered peaks and practically no vegetation. The climate of the Central Hindu Kush is less severe, and part of the mountains are forested. Flanked by huge, longitudinal valleys, the highest crest (16,650 feet) of the Central Hindu Kush is just west of the important Salang Pass (approximately 12,000 feet) on the main road from Kabul to the Northern Plains.

The Koh-i-Baba Range with peaks at 15,000 feet runs parallel to and south of the western end of the Central Hindu Kush, to which it is connected by two transverse ridges. Together with the Hindu Kush, the Koh-i-Baba extended westward by the Band-i-Bayan and the Kasa Murgh ranges south of the Hari Rud River constitute the country's main watershed. Other important ranges include the Koh-i-Hisar (extending northward from the upper reaches of the Murghab River), the Firoz Koh and the Paropamisus north of the broad Hari Rud Valley. The city of Herat is situated near the western end of this valley which runs into an intermontane plateau situated astride the boundary with Iran. The Zarmast Pass (elevation 8,200 feet) on the road from Herat to Maimana is the major pass in the barren, deforested Paropamisus Range.

A similar series of ranges, at lower altitudes, runs parallel to the Paropamisus-Hindu Kush axis along the southern rim of the Northern Plains. They are broken by deep valleys of rivers which start in the Koh-i-Baba or in the western part of the Central Hindu Kush. Only the westernmost of these lower ranges, the Band-i-Turkistan, represents a real barrier to northward cross-country movement.

Several mountain chains fan out southwestward from the Koh-i-Baba, the Band-i-Bayan and the Kasa Murgh Ranges. These decrease in altitude as they approach the Southwestern Plateau Region where they yield to gently undulating deserts. Two of the ranges, the Koh-i-Mazar and the Koh-i-Khurd, are of special importance since they enclose the valley for the upper course of the Helmand River which collects the waters needed for irrigating the arid areas along its banks in the Southwestern Plateau Region. South of the Koh-i-Baba and the Band-i-Bayan lies a maze of ridges, plateaus and valleys, known as the Hazarajat.

Southeast of the Koh-i-Mazar Range, a series of lower ridges enclose long valleys which run parallel to the boundary with Pakistan. These mountains converge in the west-east trending Safed

Koh along the Pakistan frontier southeast of Kabul and turn northeastward at the 3 400-foot Khyber Pass. Bounded by this range system and the Hindu Kush is the intermontane valley region with Kabul, the capital city. Several tributary ranges of the Hindu Kush lend this area a rugged appearance in spite of the lush vegetation.

Northern Plains

North of the central mountain core are the Northern Plains, stretching from the Iranian border to the western foothills of the Pamir Knot. The area, a part of the Central Asia steppe, is demarcated on its eastern half from the Soviet Union by the Amu Darya River. Extending over an area of approximately 40,000 square miles, the Northern Plains are situated at an average elevation of 2,000 feet, except for the Amu Darya valley floor where it drops to as low as 600 feet. A considerable portion of the area consists of fertile, loess-covered plains. Intensely cultivated and densely settled, these plains are of outstanding agricultural importance and provide food for a considerable portion of the country's population. They also have rich natural gas resources. A flat strip of desert and steppe extends along the banks of the Amu Darya. Desert and desert-like steppe areas are likewise found west of Badakhshan along the foothills of the Central Hindu Kush and also west of Mazar-i-Sharif. The southernmost fringe of the area passes gradually into elevated plains which provide excellent pastureland (see ch. 20, Agriculture).

The Southwestern Plateau

The Southwestern Plateau, situated southwest of the Central Highlands is a high, arid plateau country extending into Pakistan in the south and into Iran in the west. With an altitude of about 3,000 feet, it slopes gently to the southwest. Comprised of deserts and semideserts, it is crossed by a few large rivers among which the Helmand and its major tributary the Arghandab are the most important. The region covers approximately 50,000 square miles, a fourth of which forms the Registan Desert. The latter is bounded by the Helmand and Arghandab Rivers, the Pakistan frontier and the easternmost portion of the Sistan depression. Sand ridges and dunes alternate with expansive desert plains, devoid of vegetation and covered with windblown sand changing here and there into barren gravel and clay areas. West of the Registan Desert lies the Dasht-i-Margo, a desolate steppe with salt flats. To the south the region is bounded by the slowly flowing Helmand River, its water depleted by evaporation and by the irrigation canals in

the area of Girishk. The Khash Rud River forms the northern boundary.

On the northwestern rim of the Plateau, between the Khash Rud and Farah Rud Rivers, lies Khash Desert just south of the road from Kandahar to Farah. Both the Khash Desert and the Dasht-i-Margo steppe, slope southwestward almost imperceptibly into the Sistan depression the seat of an ancient civilization before Timur-i-Lang (commonly known as Tamerlane) destroyed the extensive irrigation system of the Helmand River. The lowest portion of this depression is covered by the salt flats of Gaud-i-Zirreh. When precipitation in the northern mountains is abundant, the Gaud-i-Zirreh becomes dotted with shallow ponds. In such years the overflow of Hamun-i-Saberi Lake, which straddles the Iranian border, runs into the Daryacheh-ye-Sistan Lake in Iran. The latter, in turn, overflows and discharges into the Gaud-i-Zirreh.

RIVERS

The drainage system is landlocked. Only a few rivers, all in the eastern part of the country and drained mainly by the Kabul, reach the ocean after emptying into Indus River in Pakistan. Most of the rivers and streams end in shallow desert lakes or oases inside or outside the country's boundaries.

About 10 percent of the surface area of eastern Afghanistan has no rivers. In the western part of the Northern Plains many rivers disappear in the soil before emptying into the Amu Darya. In the west the sandy deserts along the Iranian frontier have no watercourses.

Nearly half of the country's total area is drained by watercourses south of the Hindu Kush-Kasa Murgh ridge line, and half of this area is drained by the Helmand and its tributaries alone. The Amu Darya, the country's other major river, has the next largest drainage area.

In the south regions without drainage cover about 21,600 square miles. Nearly half of this area is formed by the great sand desert of Registan, the rest by the Dasht-i-Margo and the Khash Deserts and by other smaller deserts in the Sistan depression.

Melting glaciers feed the rivers in the northeast. The water yield of rivers in the rest of the country depends on the seasonal pattern of rainfall or on sudden torrential downpours. Many of the smaller streams flow only for short periods following a rain. Because of their variable water levels the rain-fed rivers are unsuitable for waterborne communication. On the other hand, there is no need for bridges on the roads crossing them since the majority are fordable during most of the year. The exceptions are the

roads crossing the Amu Darya and the lower course of the Kabul.

Rivers rise at the end of the winter. Their minimum yield is at the end of summer or the beginning of autumn. Some small rivers carry no water from April to May and November to December. The dry period is often prolonged by various forms of irrigation which causes many tributaries to disappear before reaching their principal river (see ch. 20, Agriculture).

The flow of rivers which collect the runoff from the mountains along the northeastern border is affected by the summer rains sent by the monsoon of India. Their maximum yield, therefore, occurs twice a year, notably from July to September, and again from January to April.

Rivers which spring in the glaciers of the Pamir Knot or in Nuristan (the mountainous region along the Pakistan border northeast of Kabul) have a minimum yield in the winter during severe freezing. The maximum yield occurs in July and August, when the snows have melted.

Because of the great variation in the water yield during the different seasons and because of the absence of large lakes which may be used as reservoirs, the rivers are generally unsuitable for the generation of hydroelectric power. Only a few power stations have been built, mostly during the 1930's, including the plant on the Panjshir River, a small tributary of the Kabul, which provides electricity for the capital.

The 1,654-mile-long Amu Darya originates in the glaciers of the Pamir Knot. Some 600 miles of its upper course constitutes the Afghanistan-Soviet Union border. Nearly half of the surface area of area of its tributaries are in Afghanistan. Two of the larger tributaries, the Kokcha and the Kunduz, rise in the mountains of Badakhshan. Flowing in rapid torrents in its upper course, the Amu Darya becomes calmer below the mouth of the Kokcha, 60 miles west of Faizabad. Along its banks there is often abundant vegetation of trees and bushes. During its flood period the upper course of the Amu Darya, swollen by snow and melting ice, carries along much gravel and large boulders. In the central and lower courses the flow diminishes because of evaporation during the summer months and because of the extensive use of the water for irrigation (see ch. 20, Agriculture).

Attempts have been made in the course of the Second Five-Year Economic and Social Development Plan (1962-67) to exploit the modest navigational potential of the Amu Darya by improving the river port of Sher Khan (Qizil Qala) north of Kunduz and the port of Dagla Arasa, northwest of Mazar-i-Sharif.

Two important rivers of the northern region are the Murghab and the Hari Rud. Their respective drainage areas are separated

by the Paropamisus and Firoz Koh mountain chains. The Murghab flows about 200 miles in a northwesterly direction from the eastern end of the Firoz Koh watershed before entering the Soviet Union. It drains the large, high valley between the Paropamisus chain and the Band-i-Turkistan, a parallel chain farther north. The Murghab has few fords and usually must be crossed by boat or ferry.

The Hari Rud rising at an altitude of 9,000 feet on the western slopes of the Koh-i-Baba Range takes a steady westerly course, first in the alpine valley between the Paropamisus and the Firoz Koh chains on the north and then in the Kasa Murgh and the Band-i-Bayan chain in the south. The river continues across a broad plateau valley and flows south of Herat through a fertile oasis district which thrives under artificial irrigation from its waters. About 80 miles west of Herat, the Hari Rud turns north and constitutes the border between Iran and Afghanistan for 65 miles before it crosses the junction of the Afghan-Soviet boundaries.

In the southeastern region, the Kabul River, flowing eastward from the northern slopes of the Koh-i-Mazar chain, has the largest drainage area. Its major tributary on the south is the Logar. On the north are three additional important tributaries, the Panjshir, Alingar and the Kunar. They originate in the northeastern slopes of the Hindu Kush, in the region of Nuristan. The Kabul after traversing the capital city turns southeast, crosses the border into Pakistan, and becomes a major tributary of the Indus River east of Peshawar. The Kabul has a steady flow of water, and together with its north-bank tributaries, is intensively used for irrigation. The upper course of the river has many rapids, but downstream from the capital city it becomes navigable for rafts and flat-bottomed barges although water levels tend to be low during summer.

The Helmand is the principal river in the southwest; with its many tributaries the most important of which is the Arghandab, it drains more than 100,000 square miles. Starting some 50 miles west of Kabul in the Koh-i-Baba mountains, the Helmand is approximately 870 miles long. In its upper and central course, the river cuts through deep alpine valleys. Before entering the Registan Desert about 50 miles northwest of Kandahar, the waterflow is collected in a large natural valley reservoir. A similar reservoir exists on the Helmand's main west-bank tributary, the Arghandab, about 25 miles northeast of Kandahar. The two dams and the irrigation canal systems were constructed by the Helmand Valley Authority, the country's only important hydrological project (see ch. 20 Agriculture; ch. 23, Domestic Trade).

Below its confluence with the Arghandab, the Helmand becomes

a slow, meandering stream without affluents. It crosses the desert-lands of Registan and Dasht-i-Margo, continues its course to the desert lakes of the Sistan depression. Three major rivers form part of the Helmand drainage basin: the Khash Rud, Farah Rud and the Harut Rud. All originate in the Band-i-Bayan and Kasa Murgh Ranges and flow into the Sistan depression. The longest of these rivers, the Farah Rud, irrigates the oasis of Farah.

There are few lakes in the country. The largest are the Daryacheh-i-Namakzar, the Hamun-i-Pusak and the Hamun-i-Saberi, all situated on the southwestern border. Most of the surface of the Daryacheh-i-Namakzar and of the Hamun-i-Saberi are in Iran. The swamps of the salt-steppe of Gaud-i-Zirreh rarely carry a sheet of open water. Lake Sar-i-Köl (Zorkul) is located in the Wakhan corridor near the border with the Soviet Union. Ab-istada, situated on a plateau about 120 miles northeast of Kandahar, is a salt lake.

CLIMATE

Information about climate is based on the rainfall and temperature recordings of a few meteorological stations established since 1946. Estimates for the inaccessible mountainous areas in the easternmost portion of the country are usually based on precipitation and temperature data available for the adjoining areas in the Soviet Union and Pakistan.

In general, the country has a semiarid steppe climate with cold winters and dry summers. A subarctic climate with dry and cold winters dominates the mountain regions of the northeast. In the mountains bordering Pakistan a divergent fringe effect of the Indian monsoon, coming usually from the southeast brings maritime tropical air masses which dominate the climate in that area between July and September. At times, these air masses advance into central and southern Afghanistan, bringing increased humidity and some rain.

On the intermontane plateaus the winds do not blow very strongly, but in the Sistan depression there are severe blizzards during the winter. In the western and southern regions, a northerly wind blows with much force and persistence during the summer months. Known as the "wind of 120 days" it is usually accompanied by intense heat, drought and sandstorms and brings much hardship to the inhabitants of the desert and steppe lands. Dust whirlwinds frequently occur during the summer months on the flats in the southern part of the country. Rising at midday or early in the afternoon, they advance at velocities ranging between 60 and 110 miles per hour, raising high clouds of dust.

Temperature and precipitation are controlled by the exchange of air masses. The highest temperatures (over 95° F.) and the lowest precipitation (less than 5.9 inches annually) prevail in the drought-ridden, poorly watered Southwestern Plateau Region which extends over the boundaries with Iran and Pakistan.

The Central Highlands with its higher peaks ascending toward the Pamir Knot, represents another distinct climatic region. From the Koh-i-Baba Range to the Pamir Knot, January temperatures may drop to 5° F. or lower in the highest mountain areas, whereas July temperatures vary between 50° and 79° F., depending on the altitude. In the mountains the annual mean precipitation, much of which is snowfall, increases eastward and is highest in the Koh-i-Baba Range, the western part of the Pamir Knot, and the Eastern Hindu Kush.

Precipitation in these regions and the southeastern monsoon area is about 15.8 inches a year. The Wakhan corridor, however, with temperatures ranging between 48° F. in the summer to below —6° F. in the winter receives less than 4 inches of rainfall annually. Permanent snow covers the highest mountain peaks. In the mountainous region adjacent to northernmost Pakistan, the snow is often 6 to 7 feet deep during the winter months. Valleys become snow traps, as the high winds sweep much of the snow from mountain peaks and ridges.

The climate of the Northern Plains represents a transition between mountain and steppe climates. Aridity increases and temperatures rise with descending altitudes, becoming highest along the lower Amu Darya and in the western parts of the Plains.

Temperature and precipitation data have been measured between 1959 and 1967 by meteorological stations located in areas with representative climates (see table 1).

VEGETATION

In the southern portion of the country the plant cover is sparse in the dry regions, becoming more dense in the north where precipitation is more abundant. Luxuriant vegetation, however, occurs only in the mountainous region north of Jalalabad along the Pakistan border, an area which is affected by the monsoonal climate of India (see fig. 5).

Pine and fir forests with tree heights up to 180 feet are found in the highest mountains. The fir line is at an average altitude of 10,500 feet. Cedar is abundant at altitudes of about 5,400 and 7,200 feet. Below the cedar and fir lines, at altitudes of about 3,600 feet, oak is prevalent, often in the dense undergrowth found along the streams. In the northern regions, open juniper forests are com-

mon. Such forests also grow in the southern regions, although more sparsely. Mulberry trees provide the main foodstuff for the people living in the mountainous district north of Kabul. In the loess areas of the Northern Plains, pistachio trees form open forests, mainly at altitudes between 2,400 and 5,400 feet, with trees growing up to 15 feet. Along the rivers of arid zones, notably along the Amu Darya, willows are common. Citrus, wild olives and sugarcane grow in the mountainous area east and south of Kabul, under the climatic influence of the rain-bearing winds of summer. Date palms are common in the southwestern region around Farah.

Sparse vegetation and low growth prevail in many areas, including the southern plateaus, large portions of the Hindu Kush and in the northern foothills near the border with the Soviet Union. Along the streams, however, the vegetation is dense and luxuriant, interspersed with high trees and meadows covered with "flower carpets" for which the country is famous.

ANIMAL LIFE

The formerly abundant stock of large mammals has been drastically decreased by hunting. Tigers, once common in the southeast have disappeared. Wild goats and sheep are confined to the Pamir Knot, although wild sheep are common in the ranges of the Central Hindu Kush. Deer are found only in the forests of Badakhshan. The inhospitable mountains and glaciers of Wakhan are the habitat of the *ovis poli*, a Mediterranean wild sheep. Gazelles, wolves, foxes and jackals may be seen or heard at night throughout the country. Indigenous species of wildcats and donkeys are widespread. Hares and small rodents, mainly mice, abound. Vultures roam the skies in great numbers. Migratory birds, including ducks, are common during the spring and fall and are hunted for food. Pheasants are rare, but the quail stock abundant.

Snakes, including some venomous species, are found everywhere. Lizards are common as are iguanas, some of which are 3 feet long and resplendently colored. There are relatively few fish in the rivers. On the northern slopes of the Hindu Kush, however, the rivers are well stocked with trout.

Millions of crickets sing in the oases. Grasshoppers are very common; insects, including the malaria-carrying *anopheles* mosquito, appear in clouds along the rivers. Some venomous spiders and scorpions occur, although they are far less dangerous than the *endamoeba histolytica*, a parasite which spreads dysentery.

MINERAL RESOURCES

The country has a fair mineral potential although little is mined and used (see fig. 6). The first mineral survey by the Institute of Geological Survey was completed only in 1965. The scope of mining is modest because of transportation difficulties and the lack of capital (see ch. 21, Industry; ch. 23, Domestic Trade).

Coal is mined at Kharkal, 50 miles northeast of Baghlan, where reserves amount to approximately 4 million tons, and Aishpushta near Pul-i-Khumri; both mines are in the Kunduz Valley. Moreover, reserves of more than 10 million tons of coal with calory contents between 7,000 and 8,000 per kilogram have been found near Herat. Some cokeable coal has been found farther north near Mazar-i-Sharif, but the reserves are small. Of far greater importance are the natural gas occurrences around Shibarghan about 75 miles west of Mazar-i-Sharif, near the boundary with the Soviet Union. The reserves are estimated at 60 billion cubic meters (1 cubic meter equals 0.0283 cubic feet). The actual reserves may be far larger since intensive explorations with Soviet financial and technical assistance have been in progress only since 1956. Petroleum-bearing rocks have been traced in the same area, but no oilfield of importance has yet been found.

Among metallic minerals iron ore occurs in important quantities at Hajigak Pass, 22 miles southeast of Bamian, where 2,200 million tons of ore with an iron content of 63 percent and low sulfur-phosphorous ratios have been traced. Economically significant quantities of lime, quartz clay, and sand have also been found in the same locality. Other iron ore occurrences are in the Kabul Valley, the Central and Eastern Hindu Kush, and in the valleys of the Amu Darya tributaries. Most iron ores, including the 2 to 3 million metric ton deposit found near Kandahar, are high quality magnetites and hematites. Manganese ores are found southeast of Kabul in the Safed Koh Range, chromite in the Logar Valley south of Kabul, and nickel ores in Badakhshan. All are of good quality but are not found in large quantities.

Other metallic ores occur in various places in the Central Highlands. Copper is found just west of Kabul, the Central Hindu Kush and in the Logar Valley. Gold in river sand is panned locally and also occurs in quartz veins near Kabul and north of Kandahar. Lead and zinc ores are found in the Central Hindu Kush, especially in the Kokcha Valley, some 60 miles east of Kunduz, where antimony has also been traced. Most of these occurrences, however, are small and of little economic importance.

Among the nonmetallic minerals, sulfur occurs in the provinces of Takhar, Balkh, and Kabul. Rock salt and alumite as well as

Table 1. Temperature and Precipitation Data in Afghanistan, 1959-67

Location	Mean Temperatures (in degrees Fahrenheit)			Precipitation (quarterly averages in inches)				Annual	Number of frost-free days per year
	January	July	Annual	March- May	June- Aug.	Sept.- Nov.	Dec.- Feb.		
Herat	37	83	61	4.1	0	0.6	4.0	8.7	226
Jalalabad	40	92	70	5.7	0.3	0.9	2.7	9.6	315
Kabul	27	77	52	8.6	0	1.4	4.1	14.1	208
Kandahar	42	89	65	3.6	0	0.6	3.0	7.2	259
Mazar-i-Sharif	38	90	63	3.6	0	0.9	3.3	7.8	248
North Salang at Salang Pass	15	50	32	32.2	0.9	4.7	15.0	52.8	93

Source: Adapted from J. Matthai, *Climate Statistics for Afghanistan*, 1967.




Figure 5. Natural Vegetation of Afghanistan

- Legend:**
- Deserts
 - Salt Steppe
 - Brush Steppe
 - Mountain Grassland
 - Deciduous Forests
 - Coniferous Forests
 - Irrigated Land
 - Glaciers and Eternal Snow
 - Mountainous Steppe




Figure 6. Mineral Resources of Afghanistan

- Legend**
- | | |
|----------------------|---------------------------------|
| Metallic Ores | Nonmetallic Mineral Occ. |
| Sb Antimony | ● Barite |
| Cr Chromite | ■ Beryl |
| Cu Copper | * Coal |
| Au Gold | □ Graphite |
| Fe Iron | ▨ Gypsum |
| Pb Lead | ▲ Jade |
| Mn Manganese | ★ Lapis Lazuli |
| Ni Nickel | △ Marble |
| Zn Zinc | □ Natural Gas |
| | ∩ Petroleum |
| | ☆ Ruby |
| | ○ Salt |
| | ● Sulfur |

gypsum salts have been found in the Northern Plains. Salt deposits are mined at Andkhui, 75 miles north of Maimana; Tashkurghan, 35 miles east of Mazar-i-Sharif; at Kandahar; and Lake Daryacheh-i-Namakzar on the Iranian frontier. Barite occurs in the Ghorband Valley, northwest of Kabul, and graphite is common in the Kabul area.

The country is rich in lapis lazuli, one of the preferred gems in the Middle East. It has been mined for more than 4,000 years in the province of Badakhshan at Sar-i-Sang. Important quantities of lapis lazuli have also been found in the Pamir Knot. Beryl is also common and of good quality in Nuristan and in Kunar province approximately 125 miles east of Kabul. Among the less valuable but popular gem stones is alabaster, a variety of gypsum of which nearly 80 tons per year are mined near Galichah in southwestern Registan near the Pakistan border. Alabaster is then cut and polished by craftsmen in Kabul. Kaolin for porcelain ware is of very good quality in Takhar and neighboring provinces in the northeast. Marble, granite, porphyry, quartz, mica and asbestos have also been found in the mountains of the Central Highlands.

SETTLEMENT PATTERNS

Rural

Settlements are concentrated near or around bodies of water. Oases of cultivated land and the more densely settled village communities are located where rivers and streams have carried water from the narrow mountain valleys into the more open regions of the north and southeast, or where the water supply has permitted the use of manmade irrigation systems. In the southern Hazarajat along the spurs of the Koh-i-Baba Range and in the areas between Kunduz and Balkh, and west of Mazar-i-Sharif, farmsteads and villages appear on the edge of plains and deserts where rivers fed by snowmelt seep down the side of mountains and hills.

The country's extensive mountainous heartland and the southern and southwestern deserts and plateaus are sparsely settled, and in some portions, uninhabited.

Urban

The small towns, settlements with populations of 5,000 or more, are built around a core which had originally been an oasis village with narrow, winding streets. The mosque, government buildings and in some places, the school or a bus station are located in the newer sections where the streets are somewhat wider and relative-

ly straight although unpaved. Caravansaries, simple hostelrys built in historical times to provide rest stops for caravans and travelers, are nearly always found in the towns located along formerly prominent trading routes. They consist of a large court surrounded by a rectangular building which contains sleeping quarters. By the late 1960's most caravansaries had become dilapidated and where used as prisons or observation posts.

The four major cities (Kabul, Kandahar, Herat and Mazar-i-Sharif) are of great antiquity and have had an important place in the historic events of the past. They are strategically situated at the intersection of intercontinental trade routes, locations where water is plentiful for cultivation and where they are easily accessible for neighboring countries. The orientation of these cities has been dependent on their geographic position: Kabul and Kandahar toward India; Herat toward Iran; Mazar-i-Sharif toward Soviet Turkistan. Each of these cities at some time in the past has been the capital of a past dynasty or the object of conquest by invading armies. Frequently, possession of a city carried with it dominion over contiguous areas.

Since the 1930's, the government's policy of modernization has introduced public high schools, hospitals, electrification, and new suburbs with wider streets, although only Kabul has paved streets. The most modernized city is Kabul, the capital and most vital center since the eighteenth century. It had a population of approximately 450,000 in 1966. Although known in prehistoric times, Kabul was long overshadowed by the famous city of Kapisa (at the site of the present Begram, east of Charikar, about 50 miles north of present-day Kabul) and did not become a center of history until the Mongol conquerors established themselves there on their way to India (see ch. 3, Historical Setting).

Kabul is the center of the government and also the home of some of the highest government officials. There is a large business community and a large corps of civil and military government personnel, as well as hundreds of students, tradesmen, and visitors. There is also a large population of servants, clerks, factory workers, mechanics, and shop hands. The people of Kabul are primarily Pashtuns and Tajiks with a recent influx of Hazaras. Many have forgotten or discarded their tribal affiliations and are known in other parts of the country as "Kabuli" (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups).

Kabul is a picturesque mud-brick city of no architectural pretensions divided by the Kabul River and dominated on the southeast by a hill on which stands the Bala Hisar, the old citadel of many historic and sinister memories. The old city lies astride the river. Hemmed in by mountains which make expansion to the

south and east impossible, the new Kabul is expanding northwestward. The old city is a densely packed mass of flat-roofed houses cut by covered bazaars and winding, narrow alleys. The houses are made of sun-dried brick, clay and wood, as a rule, without windows on the street and with high walls.

Many of the old bazaar areas have been demolished, and broad, new streets lined with shops and business houses have taken their place. As in all cities of the East, the bazaars occupy certain sections of the town. Traffic is dense, and people from all parts of Afghanistan as well as foreigners mill through the bazaars in the daytime. Through the wider streets horse-drawn tongas, trucks, jeeps automobiles, horsemen, donkey and camel drivers with overloaded animals, some cattle, and an occasional flock of sheep move amid the milling mass of shoppers, messengers, bicyclists and children. Only drivers of wheeled vehicles, which are kept to the side of the street by traffic policemen, observe traffic rules. Most government buildings, legations and embassies, schools and colleges, the few banks, the Royal Palace and the residences of most government officials and diplomatic personnel are located in Shar-i-Nau, the New City.

New construction is going on ceaselessly. The streets are wide and asphalted, most of them straight and in the residential area, lined with trees. Near the river are many stores, brokers' offices and one of the city's two cinemas. Numerous villas and comfortable homes line the streets outside the central office area, but nearly all are surrounded by gardens hidden from the public by high walls. Only the homes of the tradespeople open onto the streets.

Kandahar, with a population of about 100,000, is the seat of the government of Kandahar province. The city lies in the fertile valley of the Arghandab where the roads from Kabul, Quetta (Pakistan) and Herat converge. According to some historians, Kandahar was founded by Alexander and named after him, Alexandria-Arachosia. The present city was built in the eighteenth century by Ahmad Shah Durani, the founder of modern Afghanistan, and is surrounded by the lands held by the Durani tribes. The city was originally encircled by a wall which, in 1967, was almost entirely destroyed. This area forms the center of modern Kandahar. It is here that the great bazaars are located. Another bazaar, specializing in trade with nomads, is outside the old walls. The tomb of Ahmad Shah Durani stands in the exact center of the old town. Nearby is the Masjid-i-Jami Kherqa Mubarak, or Friday Mosque of the Blessed Cloak, which shelters a most holy relic, a cloak which is said to have been worn by the Prophet Mohammed.

The city is important as a center for the collection and export of fruits and wool, including the produce of a fruit canning and drying industry which has developed in the city and its environs. The streets of Kandahar are wide, and the houses are often white-washed or painted. Gardens are much larger than in Kabul, and the "purdah wall," to hide women from view, is in the rear of the house; this feature gives Kandahar a more open and modern look than the capital. The inhabitants of Kandahar are about evenly divided between Tajiks and Pashtuns with an infiltration of the Baluchis (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups). The language of the town is Pashto, unlike Kabul, where Dari is generally spoken.

Herat, with a population of about 90,000 lies in the extreme northwest of the country, close to the Iranian and Soviet borders at the junction of the roads west into Iran and north through the low passes of the Paropamisus to the Soviet railroad terminus at Kushka, just across the boundary with the Soviet Union. It is a very ancient town, the classical Areia, where Alexander founded Alexandria-Ariana, lying north of the Hari Rud in one of the most fertile valleys in the country. It derives its name from the Aryans who passed it on their migrations to India. Although guarding the road to eastern Afghanistan and to India, Herat is vulnerable to invasions from the north and west.

The city has endured 2,000 years of fortune and misfortune. It had particular significance during the Mongol and Timurid periods when it was an important halting station on the main road leading from Central Asia to the Mediterranean Sea. All roads coming from China and Central Asia converged here before proceeding by way of Iran to Europe. Although destroyed by the Mongols, the Timurids under Shah Rukh made Herat their capital after the death of Timur. To heal the wounds of conquest, Shah Rukh and his queen, Gauhar Shad adorned the city with many magnificent buildings. Already a metropolis of Central Asia, it also became an elegant urban center of art and learning. Babur and the Moghuls of India inherited its humanity, Iran its art. Although frequently ruled by Iran, Herat was included in the Kingdom of Afghanistan by Ahmad Shah Durani, but succeeding kings had to fight for its retention.

The city is flat, mud-walled, and dominated by the mighty bulwark of the ancient citadel. The only remains of glory are the fifteenth-century mosque, the Timurid tombs and the seven tall minarets that survive to remind Afghans of the Musalla, once the most beautiful shrine and school in Central Asia. An important center for hides, wool, silk carpets, fruits and nuts, it is the main trade link with the countries bordering the eastern Mediterranean. The people are largely Tajiks, and there are some Turkomans and

Uzbeks (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups). Many of the Jews, once in Herat, have migrated to Israel and Iran.

Mazar-i-Sharif, the fourth major city, and capital of Balkh province, lies some 60 miles south of the Soviet border among irrigation canals from the Rud-i-Band-i-Amir or Balkh River. With a population of about 50,000, it derives its name from its mosque built in the typical Persian style of the sixteenth century. Of green-blue tile and mosaics and considered the most beautiful mosque in the country, it is supposedly built over the grave of Ali fourth caliph of Islam, which was discovered in the city in the thirteenth century. Many small shrines are located 6 miles from Mazar-i-Sharif among the ruins of Balkh (Wazirabad), the ancient capital of Bactria, where the first Aryan civilization was believed to have flourished several millenniums B.C. Afghans visit these shrines annually on pilgrimage.

The city is the center of one of the country's most fertile regions, and it derives its productivity from an extensive irrigation system. The area is famous for its melons and grain crops. The city is on the major caravan route from Termez (across the Amu Darya in the Soviet Union) and is, therefore, a center of Afghan-Soviet commerce. Its fur bazaar is renowned throughout Central Asia. It is also known for one of the best schools of technology in the country. The people of the city are Uzbeks, Turkomans and Tajiks (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups).

Nearly all of the other larger urban settlements are located on or near the road which roughly traces a circle from Kabul southwest to Kandahar, northwest to Herat, northeast to Mazar-i-Sharif, thence southward to Kabul. Four cities in the north (Maimana, Andkhui, Tashkurghan and Khanabad) each have populations of about 30 000. The other larger cities in the north (Shibarghan, Aq Chah, Balkh, Pul-i-Khumri, Baghlan and Faizabad) have populations ranging between 15,000 and 25,000. In the east only Ghazni and Gardez (both south of Kabul) have populations of about 25,000 and 20,000, respectively. Jalalabad, east of Kabul, also has an estimated population of 25,000.

TRANSPORTATION

Roads

Highways are the principal means of transportation. Government-financed highway construction began during the late 1920's, but because of wars and internal crises little was accomplished. Caravans of pack animals (camels, horses and donkeys) transported persons and goods on narrow, unsurfaced roads and trails which were regularly washed out during the rainy season.

A large-scale highway building project, with substantial financial and technical aid from the United States and the Soviet Union, was launched within the framework of the First Five-Year Economic and Social Development Plan (1956-61). The main arterial roads in the south were built by the United States; those in the north and the east were built by the Soviet Union. By 1967 the country had more than 6,200 miles of roads, of which 1,250 miles were paved, primary highways; 3,400 miles were secondary routes, mostly unsurfaced but partially improved by gravel. In addition, there were 2,060 miles of feeder roads—generally only trails, impassable during most of the year. The number of secondary and feeder roads is inadequate, and most of them urgently need resurfacing and other improvements. Rapid erosion because of weather, mountainous terrain and repeated heavy floods at spring-time continues to pose difficult technical and financial problems to those responsible for highway construction and maintenance.

The principal land route is a semicircular highway which connects Kabul, Kandahar and Herat. The 300-mile stretch from Kabul to Kandahar has been built with the assistance of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). By 1964 more than half of this road was asphalt-surfaced. The Soviet Union provided technical personnel and finances for the 460-mile road from Kandahar via Herat to Tor Ghundai on the Afghan-Soviet border (see fig. 7). Of obvious strategic importance this road bypasses the major settlements, including the city of Farah, thereby cutting the distance between Herat and Kandahar by some 60 miles. Completed in 1965, the road is surfaced with concrete and has a number of bridges capable of carrying extra heavy loads. From Herat a road branches off to the west, to Islam Qala on the Iranian border. Construction of this road was begun in 1964 with a \$38 million grant from the United States. A good, surfaced road leads from Kandahar southward about 100 miles to the frontier towns of Spin Baldak on the Pakistan border, thence crosses the border to Chaman (in Pakistan) and continues to Quetta.

From Kabul an important highway runs in a southeasterly direction via Jalalabad through the border town of Tor Kham at the foot of the Khyber Pass and continues through the Pass to Peshawar, a railway center in Pakistan. Surfacing was completed in 1966 and the road was reported in good condition in 1967.

North of Kabul, a new, asphalt-surfaced road traverses the Hindu Kush and continues north via Kunduz to the riverine port of Sher Khan on the Amu Darya River. Following an approximately straight line, the road crosses the mountainous divide through a 1.7-mile tunnel that runs some 1,000 feet underneath the Salang Pass. Built by Soviet engineers, the road was open to

- Legend:**
- Principal Roads
 - Main Secondary Roads
 - ✈ Airports
 - ✚ Airfields
 -) (Passes
 - ⌋⌋ Tunnel




Figure 7. Major Roads and the Airfields of Afghanistan, 1967

traffic in 1964 and represents a major thoroughfare between the southern and the northern provinces. In 1965 the Soviets also began the rebuilding of the road leading from Pul-i-Khumri (about 100 miles north of Kabul) via Mazar-i-Sharif to Shibarghan, about 60 miles west of Mazar-i-Sharif, near the Soviet border. Originally asphalt-surfaced, this road was in bad condition in the summer of 1967. Another road leading from Kunduz across desert country to Mazar-i-Sharif was washed out by floods in the spring of the same year.

An older road through the Hindu Kush branches off to the west at Charikar 50 miles north of Kabul, passes through the mountains to Bamian, then turns northeast and follows the gorges of the Kunduz River to Doshi, where it joins the direct north route about 90 miles northward from Kabul. Although built in 1933, the road is well designed and has 12 iron bridges to facilitate the passage of heavy loads. In 1966 it was safely passable during most of the year.

Another road runs approximately 400 miles in an almost straight line westward from Kabul across the southern slopes of the Koh-i-Baba Range and then follows the north bank of the Hari Rud to Herat. Traversing numerous high-altitude mountain passes, this road is lightly traveled, poorly surfaced and frequently impassable.

In spite of the extension and improvement of the road network, passenger transport is irregular and difficult. In 1965 there were about 1,250 buses in the country. A few of these belonged to the Post Office Department which operates the only scheduled long-distance service. The buses accommodate only a fraction of the passengers, most of whom must secure rides on commercial trucks and travel precariously perched on top of heavy loads. For short-distance travel the population still relies on camels, and in the north, on horses and donkeys.

Airfields

The first air landing facilities were completed in 1953. By 1964 airfields were at Kabul, Jalalabad, Khost (Matun), Kandahar, Shindand, Herat Maimana, Mazar-i-Sharif and Kunduz. The fields are maintained by the domestic Ariana Afghan Airlines Company, Ltd., founded in 1955. Ariana also flies to New Delhi, Karachi, Teheran, Beirut, and Tashkent. Various international airlines, including those from Pakistan, Iran, India and the Soviet Union, regularly fly into Kabul.

The Kabul airport, completed in 1960, has a landing strip with a length of about 9,000 feet. Located in difficult terrain, it is only

conditionally suitable for landing jet-powered aircraft. The airport and the terminal building were constructed and financed by the Soviet Union.

The airports at Kandahar, Herat, Mazar-i-Sharif and Kunduz were built with United States assistance. Kandahar, completed in 1964, is the best equipped with a landing strip about 10,500 feet in length in addition to large, modern hangars and workshops and a luxurious terminal building. Located about 19 miles from Kandahar, it is the country's first international airport designed to serve as a stopover for aircraft on their way from the Mediterranean area to India. In 1967, however, most international airlines preferred to stop at Karachi airfield in Pakistan, where refueling facilities were available, and the traffic at Kandahar was negligible. The airport at Jalalabad has also been used infrequently because of its proximity to Kabul airport and to the airport of Peshawar in Pakistan.

Maimana airport, built in 1957 to encourage the economic development of the remote northwestern regions, also suffers from infrequent use.

There are no railroads within Afghanistan's boundaries, but the country is accessible by rail through the railroad networks of neighboring Pakistan, Soviet Union and Iran. Mazar-i-Sharif in the north is near two branches of the Soviet railroads at Termez where the Amu Darya River becomes navigable. Kushka, another Soviet railroad terminus, is about 65 miles north of Herat. The Iranian railroad at Mashhad, 195 miles northwest of Herat, may be reached by road. In the south the Pakistan railroads are accessible at Quetta, 130 miles by road from Kandahar.

Although river traffic is negligible, the provisions of the Second Five-Year Economic and Social Development Plan (1962-67) called for improvements of the riverine ports of Sher Khan on the Amu Darya River to facilitate trade with the Soviet Union.

CHAPTER 3

HISTORICAL SETTING

For centuries the course of historical events in Afghanistan has been linked with, and strongly influenced by, the activities of peoples and rulers beyond the country's present borders. Afghanistan continues to share cultural, linguistic and ethnic ties with the people of Central Asia immediately across the Amu Darya River (classically, the Oxus) on the north, with Pakistan on the east and south and with its western neighbor, Iran (Persia). As a result of a history complicated by invasions, foreign rule and tribal movements across its borders, no single ethnic group in the country stands out as its authentic, original population.

Because of the country's position as a strategic meeting area of expanding cultures and clashing empires, early Afghan kings were deeply involved in the dynastic struggles of neighboring powers and principalities. In the modern era (the nineteenth century) of turbulent colonial expansion, Afghan rulers were embroiled, as pawns of conflict, in a shifting game of power politics as the British and Russians contended for control over the area comprising Afghanistan.

The Afghans strove to protect their independence either through noninvolvement or by expediently playing one foreign power against the other.

The year 1747 marks a significant point in the nation's history. Before that date Afghanistan did not exist as an integrated political entity; each tribe ruled its own territory; foreign conquerors—and occasionally a domestic despot—fought over the few population centers, usually hoping to control the Hindu Kush. It was an era of invasion and retreat with little continuity to mark the progress of the Afghans. In 1747, Ahmad Khan Sadozai, an Abdali (later known as Durani) tribal chief within the largest ethnic group, the Pashtuns, established a distinct political entity to be known as Afghanistan ("the land of the Afghans"). Nevertheless, it was not until 1919, when Great Britain recognized Afghanistan's independence in the Treaty of Rawalpindi, that the Afghans for the first time could regard their country as fully independent of foreign control.

Until the beginning of the twentieth century the country was mainly a confederation of tribes, held together by the intrigue and force of the ruler and subject to the machinations of rival chieftains and foreign governments, each trying to control the three centers of power—Kandahar, Herat and Kabul. It was a period in which the Afghans demonstrated a fiercely independent spirit, acknowledging the power of rulership only when the ruler had a legitimate right, defined by their own tribal codes, to apply the controls of authority (see ch. 7, Social Structure). Throughout this period Afghan rulers tried, with increasing success, to remove the nation's destiny from the hands of foreigners.

Afghanistan became what its present-day people call a "modern" nation during the reign of Amir Abdur Rahman (1880-1901), a powerful ruler who drew authority away from tribal chiefs and centralized it in Kabul. After his rule, Great Britain and Russia recognized the existence of Afghanistan as an independent state, delimited many of the country's borders (some without Afghan consent), and agreed that the country would be a buffer state between the two empires.

The evolution of national unity and development was a slow and painful process. An area inhabited by various linguistic and ethnic groups with conflicting loyalties and with no clearly definable areas of settlement, Afghanistan had for centuries been a battleground for Tajiks, Pashtuns, Turkomans, Uzbeks, Baluchis, and Mongols (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups). Within the ethnic groups various tribes fought for ascendance either over the group itself or over the entire nation.

The word "Afghanistan" has been applied to the area by foreigners only since the beginning of the nineteenth century; to outsiders particularly the British, "Afghan" was synonymous with Pashtun. Many Pashtuns regard themselves as "Afghan" in an ethnolinguistic sense; others refer to themselves as "Afghans" only when talking to foreigners, generally identifying themselves by their tribal or ethnic names (see ch. 18, Political Values and Attitudes).

The historical themes of developing national unity and preserving independence have continued. The leaders have attempted to regain or acquire hegemony over all Pashtuns including many in what became Pakistan, and to steer a neutral course in the power conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States (see ch. 16, Foreign Relations).

HISTORIC ORIGINS

The oldest elements of the Afghan population appear to be people of ancient Aryan stock, among them the Tajiks, Pashtuns, and

the people of Nuristan (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups). Yet in relation to the long history of human life around the Hindu Kush, these groups are new, because they began their habitation there after the eastward migrations of Aryan peoples in the second and first millennia B.C. Little is known of the peoples who lived in the area before that, but undoubtedly many of those in eastern Afghanistan were of Dravidian extraction as were most of the early inhabitants of the Indian subcontinent.

The movements of Aryan peoples some 3,000 to 4,000 years ago from central and western Asia onto the Iranian Plateau and into the Indian subcontinent laid the foundations of the present population and gave it an Indo-European language base and racial characteristics of the people of the West. It was from these ancient peoples that the Vedas, part of the sacred literature of the Hindus, developed (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups; ch. 6, Languages and Communication). By 600 B.C. they had either settled in or acquired rule over those Asian lands from the Aegean Sea in the west to the Indus River in the east, and from the Black and Caspian Seas and the Pamirs in the north to the Arabian desert and the Arabian Sea in the south. The area around the ancient city and present town of Balkh in the north-central province of Balkh (formerly, Mazar-i-Sharif) was one of their major centers of settlement.

Afghan historians like to feel that this was the "Aryan capital of the world"—they term it "The Mother of Cities"—and that Afghanistan was known as "Aryana." Present-day Iranians, on the other hand, like to believe that Iran, which means "land of the Aryans," was the center of Aryan civilization.

THE PRE-ISLAMIC PERIOD

The Achaemenid Empire (c. 550–331 B.C.)

Northern Afghanistan known in ancient times as Bactria (later as Afghan Turkistan), first entered recorded history around 550 B.C., when it was incorporated into the Achaemenid empire by its founder, Cyrus the Great (c. 550–530 B.C.), after whose tribe the empire was named. One of several satrapies, Bactria remained an integral part of its strategic borderland until 331 B.C., when the empire fell to Alexander the Great. The northern part of Bactria figured prominently as the home of the great religious teacher Zoroaster (Zarathustra), the "Sage of Bactria," and the founder of Zoroastrianism, one of the first monotheistic religions. Vestiges of this faith still survives in parts of Iran, Pakistan, India and among some hill tribes on the Hindu Kush.

Greek Influence (325-50 B.C.)

Alexander, after conquering the Achaemenid empire in 331 B.C. and occupying the area of Afghanistan for several years reached the Indus (in modern West Pakistan) in 325 B.C. and died 2 years later in Babylon. Although his expedition to the Aryana region was short lived, he and his band of Greeks left behind a Hellenic cultural influence that lasted for centuries. The land east and south of the Hindu Kush fell to the Indian Mauryan rulers, who introduced Indic culture, including Buddhism, into the area. Faithful descendants spread the religion throughout Aryana, carved Buddhas into the cliffs at Bamiyan, northwest of Kabul, and built many stupas and sanctuaries in valleys, such as the Kabul. The land to the north and west was dominated by feuding Greek-descended satraps (provincial governors), most of whom had lost touch with their homeland and intermarried with Iranians. From these feuds the Graeco-Bactrian kingdom (c. 225-55 B.C.) arose north of the Hindu Kush. Demetrius, one of the greatest Graeco-Bactrian kings, who ruled about 187 B.C., expanded its boundaries eastward through Kabul across the Indus into India. He is credited in some histories with having conquered the Mauryan capital of Pataliputra (Patna) in the Ganges Valley. however briefly.

The Greeks brought their mythology, philosophy, art, and system of government to the people of the area. For a while, the Greek script and language dominated official life from the Mediterranean Sea to the Indus. Under Menander (c. 150 B.C.), who fused Hellenic and indigenous Indic forms to make a new "Indo-Greek" culture and empire, Buddhism and Graeco-Buddhist art flourished as did the commercial life of northern India and Afghanistan. After Menander's death Indo-Greek rule declined and was overrun by a fresh influx of Aryan-descended barbaric tribes, among them the Sakas (Scythians) and Pahlavas (Parthians). By 50 B.C. the Greek influence had lost much of its initial vigor and virtually all control.

Kushans (50 B.C.-A.D. 425)

Toward the middle of the first century B.C. five nomadic tribes from Central Asia, called Yueh-chi by the Chinese, invaded Bactria and drove the last of the Indo-Greeks into India. It was the last invasion of Aryan-descended tribes into Afghanistan. One of them, the Kushans, gained supremacy and established a dynasty that was to dominate the Hindu Kush for nearly four centuries. They supplanted the Pahlavas to the south (Kabul) and the Sakas in India (Gandhara). Kanishka I (c. A.D. 110 or (120-162), the Kushans' most famous king ruled an empire containing present-

day Afghanistan, Kashmir and much of northern India, with capitals at Kapisa (near Kabul) and Purushapura (Peshawar). It was a period of great artistic and intellectual development; the Kushan kings, after Kanishka I, adopted the Mahayana form of Buddhism, promoted its propagation to China over the land routes of Central Asia and took over what remained of Graeco-Indian culture. In the first century A.D. however, Greek as an official language had already begun to disappear and was being replaced by Iranian tongues.

The brief expansion of the Iranian-Sassanian empire (c. A.D. 224-641) into Afghanistan and India greatly reduced the Kushan power. The empire was finally destroyed around A.D. 425 to 428 by the Ephthalites or White Huns, a Mongol people who dominated Central Asia from 400 to 553. Sassanian power reasserted itself in the sixth century and regained control of most of Afghanistan; by the beginning of the seventh century, most of the country was under Sassanid control, divided into provinces governed by White Hun satraps chiefly in the north and Kushan satraps south of the Hindu Kush.

THE COMING OF ISLAM (672-870)

In the seventh century Arab invaders and the tide of Islamic propagation reached Afghanistan, then considered by the Arabs as part of Iranian Khorasan. By the ninth century the Arabs had gained more or less full control of the region, and Islam triumphed over Zoroastrianism, Buddhism Hinduism and various forms of pagan worship which for centuries had been practiced in the region.

The first Arabic attempts to conquer Afghanistan directly were unsuccessful in spite of a temporary occupation around 672 of Kabul, Herat and Balkh. Two centuries later, an Arab general, Yakub ibn Layth, again occupied Kabul, then ruled by either a Buddhist or a Hindu king, and established Islam permanently in Afghanistan. The inhabitants were gradually converted to the Sunnite branch of Islam, which was soon to dominate the whole country (see ch. 12, Religion).

During the eighth and ninth centuries, partly to obtain better grazing land, ancestors of many of the Turkic-speaking groups now identifiable in Afghanistan settled in the Hindu Kush area. Among them are believed to have been the Khiljis, pastoral nomads who moved southward across the Amu Darya and in the tenth century spread across the country. Some of these Turki tribes settled in Ghor Ghazni and Kabul, and after a long period of cultural contact with existing Pashtun-Iranian tribes, apparently as-

simulated their language and characteristics. Some scholars hold that the Ghilzai Pashtuns may have descended from these tribes. A few of the Khiljis passed on into India and in 1288 founded the Khilji dynasty in Delhi.

GHAZNEVID DYNASTY (962-1140)

In the mid-tenth century Alptagin, a former Turkish slave and commander-in-chief of the army of the Samanid dynasty (874-999) in eastern Persia, gained control of the principality of Ghazni and founded the Ghaznevid dynasty, (962-1140), the first great Islamic empire in Afghanistan. The most renowned among his successors was Mahmud of Ghazni (998-1030), recognized by the Caliph of Baghdad as the temporal heir of the Samanids. Known as a conqueror and destroyer of idols, he led 17 expeditions into India and set a pattern of Sunnite ascendancy, and successfully prevented the Shiites of Iran from acquiring a dominant position in Afghanistan and India (see ch. 12, Religion). Mahmud expelled the last of the Hindu rulers from the Kabul River Valley and also tried to subdue some of the eastern mountain Pashtun tribes, who were then referred to as "Afghans" by Iranian historians. At his death his rule extended from western Persia to Kashmir and from the Amu Darya to the Ganges. A patron of the arts and of learning, he founded a university with the distinguished historian al-Biruni at its head. Among Mahmud's some 400 resident poets were the famous Khwaja Abdullah Ansari and Firdawsi (see ch. 11, Artistic and Intellectual Expression).

The empire survived for some 125 years after Mahmud's death, but its power had declined by the twelfth century. In 1152 the city of Ghazni itself, symbol of an empire noted for its plundering fury as well as for its intellectual attainments, fell to a neighboring Afghan principality, the Ghorid (southeast of Herat), climaxing a long feud between the Ghaznevids and the Ghorids.

The Ghorids, believed to be descendants of earlier Turkic-speaking people, lived in the mountains of Ghor. They ascended to dominance over Afghanistan under Muizuddin, known as Mohammad of Ghor—the most famous of the rulers of what became known as the Ghorid dynasty. Unlike his Afghan predecessors who invaded India chiefly for plunder, Muizuddin attempted to establish a permanent empire in India. In 1192 he led a strong force against the Hindu Rajputs (warrior caste group of northwestern and central India) and won a decisive victory that laid the foundations for the first Islamic empire east of the Indus. One of his generals, Kutbuddin Aibak, a former Turkish slave, established himself as sultan at Delhi—the first of a long line of the so-called Turko-Afghan sultans.

MONGOL RULE (1220-1504)

In the early thirteenth century Mongols from the eastern plains of Central Asia invaded Afghanistan and brought abrupt change to the social and dynastic history of the country. Under Genghis Khan (locally "Changez") they captured Herat and swept destructively eastward to the Indus by 1222. Genghis Khan's grandson, Hulagu took the title of Il-khan and ruled over Armenia, Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan. Under the Il-khans a local Tajik dynasty, called Karts, was established and for nearly two centuries ruled the greater part of western Afghanistan. In the latter part of the fourteenth century, Timur (c. 1336-1404)—known to the West as Tamerlane—son of a Turki tribal chieftain and a putative descendant, through his mother, of Genghis Khan, ended the Tajik rule. This represented the last effort of the Persian speaking people of Ghor and Herat to establish an independent domain in the area; no native dynasty, in fact, arose to rule the country until the ascendancy of the Pashtuns in the eighteenth century.

In the centuries preceding the first Mongol invasion of Afghanistan, the Pashtun tribes of the Sulaiman Range (between modern day Afghanistan and Pakistan) had begun to emerge from their isolated valleys, making the best use they could of their rugged country to harass passers-by. Timur found them in such strongholds as Bannu and Kohat, now towns in Pakistan, as well as in their mountain fastnesses. Their fierce resistance not only to the Mongols and Turks but also to the inept attempts of the Turki sultans of Delhi to establish control over the passes of the Sulaiman Range, established a reputation of Pashtun independence that remains today. The hatred of the Pashtun for Central Asian invaders persisted throughout the heyday of the Moghul empire of India (1526-1707).

Timur went on into India to build an empire, but dissension among the Timurid princes and the rise of Uzbek power under Shaybani Khan in Central Asia caused the decline of this dynasty. A young descendant of Timur, called Babur (1483-1530), who fled from his homeland in Central Asian Ferghana under attack by the Uzbeks, moved south to Balkh, took Kabul in 1504 and laid claim to Timur's empire.

His failure to reconquer Turkistan from the Uzbeks probably caused Babur to focus his attention on India, which was then ruled tenuously by Ibrahim Lodi, the Afghan sultan of Delhi. In winning the historic battle of Panipat near Delhi in 1526, Babur shattered the forces of the Lodi sultan and laid the cornerstone of the Moghul empire in India. Babur died in India in 1530 but, as he had requested, was buried several years later in Kabul which he claimed to have loved more than the Indian plains.

MOGHUL-IRANIAN RIVALRY (1526-1747)

Afghanistan entered a period covering two centuries during which it was fought over by the two great powers, Moghul India and Iran. The conflict set a pattern of foreign rivalry over Afghanistan that continues to affect the nation's position in the world (see ch. 16 Foreign Relations). From Babur's capture of Delhi in 1526 to the collapse of Moghul power at the death of Aurangzeb (1658-1707), the rulers of Delhi sought to extend their control over Afghanistan either for territorial aggrandizement or to block the historic invasion routes into India across the Hindu Kush and Sulaiman Ranges. They were seriously concerned over the control of Kabul and Kandahar and over the fiercely independent tribes between these towns and the Indus Valley, essential to the safety of their domain. This was a strategic consideration later subscribed to by the British in India.

In Iran, the growing empire of the Safavids, beginning in 1502 and reaching its climax under Shah Abbas the Great at the turn of the seventeenth century, rivaled that of the Moghuls. The northwest and southeast of Afghanistan, with Herat and Kandahar as centers, lay in Iran's sphere of influence; the east, with Kabul, Ghazni and Jalalabad its centers, and sometimes also Kandahar, lay within the claims of the Moghuls. The Uzbek tribes in Central Asia contested for northern Afghanistan, particularly Badakhshan and Herat, where neither Persian nor Moghul power was ever strong.

Throughout this period of Moghul-Iranian rivalry the Pashtun tribes were steadily increasing in numbers and influence, and it was probably during this time that the Abdali and Ghilzai tribes spread from their mountain habitations over the more fertile lands of Kandahar, Zamindawar and the Tarnak-Arghandab Valleys. Their rise in power was facilitated by the decline in the position and influence of the Iranian Tajiks who had borne the brunt of the Mongol invasions. The need for grazing land led the expanding pastoral tribes to spread westward from their mountains, while those remaining behind continued practically independent of all but local tribal rule. The Moghul government of Kabul ruled them only nominally, and its actual power was confined to the valleys and plains (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups).

Under Aurangzeb the governor of Kabul had to attempt to subsidize the tribes and create jealousy and distrust among them to keep open the road between Kabul and Peshawar. By deliberately stimulating the natural suspicions and dissensions among tribal peoples emerging from an isolated existence into the mainstream of events, Aurangzeb's policy destroyed whatever chance there

might have been for a spirit of national unity among the eastern Pashtuns. By fostering the isolation of the frontier from the relatively advanced areas around it, he ensured the continuance of the "no man's land" that manifests itself even in modern times—a land whose people are united chiefly by their common hostility toward outsiders (see ch. 18, Political Values and Attitudes).

In Kandahar, an important trade center which was regarded by the Moghul emperors as their "indispensable first line of defense," the frequent shifts from Iranian to Moghul control and back again promoted dissensions and intrigue and enabled the powerful tribes in this area to play off one power against the other. Thus the Abdali tribes near Kandahar succeeded in obtaining concessions from the Iranian Safavid ruler, Shah Abbas the Great, and having one Sado Khan an Abdali, recognized as chief. Sado's descendants, the Sadozai, became the ruling group and rebelled against the Iranians after Shah Abbas II reconquered Kandahar in 1648. To break Abdali power in Kandahar the Safavid shah forced many of the Sadozai to migrate to Herat, where they eventually became powerful. This removal led to the ascendance of Ghilzai tribes near Kandahar, and their power increased as that of the Safavids' weakened. Under the Hotaki chief Mir Mahmud ibn Mir Wais the Ghilzai conquered Isfahan (in Iran) and came to rule most of southern Afghanistan and Iran, while the Sadozai Abdalis spread their control from Herat to much of the rest of Afghanistan, west of the Hindu Kush.

The Ghilzai overextended themselves and soon lost not only Iran but also Kandahar itself to Nadir Shah (1732-47), one of Iran's greatest monarchs, who, after defeating the Abdali, secured their support and broke Ghilzai power as well. Many Ghilzai fled to Kabul province, which gave Nadir Shah an excuse to capture Kabul and sever it from the Moghul empire in 1738. Nadir Shah, founder of the Afshar dynasty, used Abdali as well as Iranian troops and moved on to plunder the great riches of India and to annex further territory including Baluchistan, Sind and the Derajat.

EVOLUTION OF AFGHANISTAN AS A NATION

Ahmad Khan Sadozai, a chief in the Sadozai *kheyl* (lineage group) of the Abdali tribe, rose to a high position in Nadir Shah's army, and, when the shah was assassinated by plotting officers in Iran, Ahmad Khan with a strong contingent of Abdali troops seized a treasure convoy and marched to Kandahar. In 1747 he was elected by the chieftains of the Abdali tribes as ruler of all Afghans and assumed the power of the late shah in Afghanistan. He obtained possession of the whole eastern portion of Nadir Shah's

empire, to which he added Kashmir and most of the Punjab by conquest. He made Kandahar his capital and in 1748 took the title of Dur-i-Duran (Pearl of Pearls); since then the Abdali have been called Durani, and Ahmad Khan used the throne name of Ahmad Shah Durani.

By the time of Ahmad Shah Durani's enthronement, the Pashtuns included many groups whose greatest single common characteristic was their Pashto language (see ch. 6, Languages and Communication). Their origins were obscure; most were believed to have descended from ancient Aryan tribes, but some, such as the Ghilzais, may once have been Turki. To the east, in the impregnable hills of the central Sulaiman Range, the Waziris and their close relatives, the Mahsuds had been known to have been located since the fourteenth century. By the end of the sixteenth century and the final Turki-Mongol invasions, such Pashtun tribes as the Shinwaris, Yusufzais and Mohmands had moved down from the upper Kabul River valley into the valleys and plains around Peshawar, near where Afridi Pashtuns had long been established around the Khyber Pass. By the end of the eighteenth century the Durani Pashtuns, whose main *kheyls* were the Sadozai and Mohammadzai, had blanketed the area west and north of Kandahar. Each Pashtun tribe was to play a role in the development of Afghanistan as a united national state. By producing men who excelled in battle or politics, or both, and who therefore were capable of wresting recognition from rivals or rebellious chieftains, the Pashtuns were able to achieve a measure of national unity and maintain independence. Since the middle of the eighteenth century, Durani leaders have held the title of *amir* (Arabic: chief or king) or its equivalent over all tribal leaders.

Ahmad Shah Durani brought to the nation not only the skill of a conqueror but also the genius of an administrator. Although he followed the time-honored customs of raiding India, his main interest was consolidating the tribes under his rule. By levying light taxes and ruling through a council of noblemen (*sirdars*) who represented the Pashtun tribes, he forged the beginning of a unified state based on the ascendancy of the Pashto-speaking peoples. Ahmad Shah's son, Timur, was less of an able administrator, and internecine wars among the various Durani *kheyls* brought a return of near anarchy; Timur moved his capital to Kabul, where the population was mainly Parsiwan (of Persian descent and Persian-speaking). An assassination attempt on Timur in Peshawar brought reprisals, and many border chiefs, particularly among the Mohmands, were deeply alienated. At Timur's death the Sadozai Durani dynasty was severely weakened by the quarrels of his 23 sons over succession to the throne.

The Sadozai family quarrel was ended in 1818 by a revolt of the Mohammadzai *kheyl* of the Durani. Led by Dost Mohammad Khan (1793–1863), the Mohammadzai extended their control over Kashmir and Peshawar. Dost Mohammad ascended the throne in Kabul in 1826 and declared himself *amir* of Afghanistan in 1835. The outer provinces of the former Sadozai empire however, were all lost; the Uzbeks of Balkh had claimed independence as had the people of Baluchistan and Sind; the Sikhs, an ethnoreligious group in the Punjab, in northern India, had retaken Peshawar; and Herat was ruled by Kamran, the last of the major Sadozai chiefs. To regain this territory—particularly Peshawar, which the Pashtun rulers of Kabul had long claimed—became Dost Mohammad's chief aim.

The Beginning of European Intervention (1809)

While Durani Pashtun ascendancy was a prime factor in the evolution of a national state, European interests also played a contributing role. When British dominion over India began to expand while Napoleon looked covetously eastward, the East India Company, as Great Britain's representative, approached the Amir of Afghanistan for an alliance, and concluded the Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1809. Dynastic strife in the ensuing decades once more isolated Afghanistan until 1837 when Dost Mohammad took firm control and appealed to the British for aid against Iran, which, with Russian approval, had besieged Herat.

British distrust of Russia had been growing since the Tsar signed the Treaty of Tilsit in 1807 with Napoleon, subsequently attacked Iran, signed the Treaty of Turkmanchai in 1828 with the Shah of Iran, supported the siege of Herat and began diplomatic maneuvers in the court of Dost Mohammad. Yet the British declined Dost Mohammad's plea for assistance on the grounds that he had sought Russian support to help regain Peshawar from the Sikhs.

Instead, the British invaded Afghanistan in 1838 in what became known as the First Anglo-Afghan War (1838–42)—the first of three wars between them. British troops took Kandahar and Kabul and drove Dost Mohammed north; then they installed Shah Shuja ul-Mulk, a Sadozai rival who had held the throne from 1803–10, as *amir*. Dost Mohammed surrendered in 1840 and was exiled to India. Shah Shuja, who had in his earlier reign permitted the British to assist in organizing Afghanistan's first professional armed service, again depended upon British troops to protect his throne. British occupation of the country aroused tribal rebellions which ended in 1842 in complete disaster as the Afghans massacred all but a few of the expeditionary force. Although the British returned the same year to burn Kabul in retribution and re-

stored Dost Mohammed as *amir*, enmity had been born; British occupation and destruction left a heritage of enduring hatred and suspicion of the British and other foreigners.

From then on, Afghanistan's relations with the world were dominated by the Anglo-Russian rivalry in Asia. As these two powers moved closer to Afghanistan from opposite directions Afghanistan's main concern was to prevent the country from being swallowed by either or being crushed into oblivion between them (see ch. 16, Foreign Relations).

On his return from exile, Dost Mohammad set out to unite his people and consolidate his lands. He based his power on the willing political support of tribal chiefs and devoted his reign to pacifying the country, which included putting down two serious Ghilzai uprisings. In 1848, in expectation of recovering Peshawar, he joined the Sikhs in battle against the British, only to lose in the battle of Gujerat the following year all that he had gained. Between 1850-55 he recovered Afghan Turkistan, Balkh, Kunduz and Badakhshan, and in 1855 he regained Kandahar, which had been lost to Kabul as a result of his exile.

Anglo-Afghan relations were cool during the initial years of Dost Mohammad's return to power, but events in other parts of the world forced both the British and the Afghan amir to come to an understanding. Russian ambitions in the Crimea and the threatening attitudes of Iran toward areas of British interest forced Dost Mohammad to conclude in 1855 the Treaty of Peshawar with the British. In 1856, however Iran, with Russian support, captured Herat; in the Treaty of Paris between Iran and Great Britain in 1857, Iran gave up its claim to, but not its occupation of, the city.

In signing the treaty at the end of the Crimean War (1854-55) the great powers (Great Britain and Russia) recognized both Iran and Afghanistan as independent and named Great Britain as the arbiter in all future disputes between the two. The effect of the treaty and Dost Mohammad's faithfulness to his pledged word were soon apparent; despite considerable pressure from Moslems throughout Afghanistan, the amir refused to join the Indians in the rebellion of 1857 (called the Sepoy Mutiny). With British approval he captured Herat from the Iranians in 1863, shortly before his death.

The Russian Advance

During the next decade Russia advanced steadily southward and reached Samarkand (in Soviet Uzbekistan, north of Afghanistan) in 1868. Bukhara, immediately north of the Amu Darya, became a vassal state, and Russian influence was thus brought to the border of Afghanistan.

British policy at the time was one of noninterference. Amir Sher Ali's (1863-79) request for British guarantees against Russian encroachment was refused on the ground that by the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1873 the Russians had formally accepted the Amu Darya as the limit of their southward extension. Sher Ali was able, with British subsidy, to start modernizing his army, but Anglo-Afghan relations deteriorated when a political shift in England inaugurated once again a "forward policy" of intervention. So, Sher Ali sought help from Russia.

The Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878-79)

Sher Ali's acceptance of a Russian envoy while refusing to allow entry to a British mission led to the Second Anglo-Afghan War. British troops drove Sher Ali out of Kabul and once more brought Afghanistan under foreign occupation. The bitterly hostile population and the relaxation of Anglo-Russian tension in Europe made it advisable for the British to withdraw and leave the country to Sher Ali's son, Yaqub Khan (1879-80). To ensure their future control of Afghanistan's foreign relations, the British dictated the Treaty of Gandamak in May 1879. This agreement left the new amir free to rule internally but bound him to follow British advice in all his relations with other powers; in effect this treaty restriction made the country a virtual British protectorate serving as a buffer between Russia and British India. The Afghan ruler also consented to the British occupation of the Khyber Pass. Abdur Rahman, who was placed on the throne by the British after Yaqub was deposed, reaffirmed the treaty.

In delayed reaction, the Russians invaded Afghan-held territory for the first time in 1885 by occupying Panjdeh, a Turkmen village less than 100 miles north of Herat. The British rushed in with aid for the defense of Herat and mobilized two army corps in India. For a while the two great powers were on the brink of war, but in September 1885, a compromise acceptable to Abdur Rahman was reached. By the Anglo-Russian Agreement of St. Petersburg in July 1887 the Russians agreed to make no further advance southward. The Anglo-Russian Pact of 1895 made the Wakhan (the eastern panhandle of Badakhshan) a permanent part of Afghanistan by establishing the border with Russia. The northern frontier was now clearly drawn and demarcated except for an exact definition of the boundary along the Amu Darya. Not until 1946 did a Russo-Afghan agreement define the mid-channel of the river as the boundary line.

After gaining control of the Amir's foreign relations, the British strove also to lay down the eastern and southern limits of the Af-

ghan domain. In November 1893 Sir Mortimer Durand persuaded Abdur Rahman to sign an agreement fixing the border of Afghanistan along an irregular 1 200-mile line running from Sinkiang (Western China) to Iran through territories which Afghanistan had regarded as its own. The agreement pledged each signatory not to interfere in the affairs of the other across the line. Both sides repeatedly violated the pact, but since the line was only partly surveyed, violation was sometimes unavoidable.

The splitting of Pashtun tribal areas by this "Durand Line," as it came to be called, cut Pashtun tribal areas in half and was exploited by Afghans to arouse anti-British sentiments; Afghans still are strongly inclined to regard the line as having been imposed on Abdur Rahman by the British. Now constituting the international boundary between Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Durand Line remains to trouble relations between the two countries (see ch. 16, Foreign Relations).

MODERNIZATION AND NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE

Abdur Rahman Khan (1880-1901)

The surrender of control of foreign policy was the price Abdur Rahman paid for British recognition of his right to a free hand in the internal affairs of his country. A skilled general and statesman, Abdur Rahman set forth with British assistance to pacify the tribes and unite the country. He wrote in his autobiography:

The country exhibiting a rebellious spirit, I appointed private detectives and spies to report to me all that went on among the people, thus finding out with abundant proofs those who were loyal and friendly . . . the ringleaders and worst offenders were the fanatical *mullahs* (Moslem religious leaders) and headstrong chiefs who had been partisans of the late Shir Ali's family. . . .

In 1881 Abdur Rahman captured Kandahar from Ghilzai rebels, secured Herat and put down numerous tribal rebellions. In 1895 he invaded Kafiristan, later called Nuristan, "the land of light," and converted the inhabitants to Islam (see ch. 12, Religion).

Abdur Rahman stressed "the value of unity; unity and unity alone." Violating the Pashtun code that the king is essentially the "first among equals" he ignored the existence of tribal councils, set about to destroy the independent power of the tribal chiefs and religious leaders; and weakened tribal autonomy by transferring most of their military and administrative functions to the central government—moves which had the support of the British Government of India. He established the royal prerogative of appointing and dismissing tribal chiefs. He built an effective administrative

machine and secured the power and prestige of his position by developing a standing army and a police force. Above all, he departed from tradition by placing his sons in responsible positions in Kabul instead of appointing them governors of distant provinces (see ch. 15, Political Dynamics). He redrew the boundaries of provinces to destroy the domains of tribal chiefs and issued new laws that would apply universally (see ch. 14, The Governmental System). Although harsh and autocratic, Abdur Rahman placed the nation on the road to progress, though many Afghans accused him of having pursued his policies at the behest of the British. His son, Habibullah, who succeeded him peaceably on his death in 1901, though less forceful, continued his policies.

In the early years of Habibullah Khan's reign (1901-19), Russia and Great Britain intensified their rivalry. Frontal clash was averted, however, because of their mutual interest in counteracting the growing German influence in Europe. In addition Russia, deeply shaken by its shattering defeat at the hands of Japan in 1904-05 and beset by internal unrest, was amenable to a conciliatory, comprehensive settlement with Great Britain concerning major areas of friction, such as Afghanistan, Persia and Tibet. The result was the Anglo-Russian Convention of St. Petersburg, signed in 1907, under which Afghanistan was formally recognized by both powers as a buffer state whose integrity would be respected by each; Russia also agreed that Afghanistan would be excluded from its sphere of influence. The agreement was to be ratified by Afghanistan before being implemented, but Habibullah was so incensed at not being consulted before the Anglo-Russian negotiations that he refused to endorse the convention. Nevertheless, Russia indicated in 1908 that, with or without the Amir's approval, it would honor the agreement.

Habibullah's later years showed a diminishing hostility to Western influences. He introduced European medicine, surgery, automobiles, telephones and telegraph and even opened a school organized on European lines (see ch. 10, Education). Modern ideas from Europe also began to reach the country through small numbers of Afghan intellectuals, among whom the writer and journalist Mahmud Beg Tarzi was the best known (see ch. 11, Artistic and Intellectual Expression).

After the Japanese victory over Russia, an increasing number of educated Afghans were moved by nationalist sentiments. Headed by Mahmud Beg Tarzi, nationalists, some of them leading religious figures, pressed for release of Afghanistan's obligations to Great Britain and closer ties with the Ottoman sultan in Turkey. World War I further accelerated the nationalist agitation because the war presented the Afghans with the prospect of winning complete inde-

pendence by fighting against the British. Nonetheless, Habibullah chose neutrality throughout the conflict, apparently in the hope of obtaining full sovereignty through British goodwill. In February 1919, at the height of popular resentment over his stand, Habibullah was assassinated under mysterious circumstances. He was succeeded briefly by his brother, Nasrullah Khan who was soon displaced by one of Habibullah's younger sons, Amanullah Khan.

Amanullah (1919-29)

Nationalistic, and regarded as anti-British, the new *amir* was deeply interested in social and economic reform at home and thereby antagonized the conservative, religious leaders of the country. Partly to divert internal discontent toward an enemy and partly because of his belief that an Indian nationalist revolution against the British was imminent, Amanullah, in May 1919, attacked the British forces in what came to be called the Third Anglo-Afghan War (May-August 1919). Afghanistan was not victorious despite some successes in Pashtun territory by an enterprising army commander and Mohammadzai chieftain named Nadir Khan. When Amanullah asked for an armistice in June the war-weary British, already exhausted from World War I and troubled by growing political unrest in India, elected to give the Afghans freedom of action in foreign relations and recognized their complete independence for the first time through the Treaty of Rawalpindi, signed on August 8, 1919. This treaty was supplemented and reaffirmed in November 1921. To the Afghans Amanullah emerged as the triumphant hero who had wrested independence from the world's mightiest empire.

Amanullah rose on an anti-British wave to heights of popularity. The sentiment was helped considerably by repeated overtures from the Soviet Union which had backed Indian revolutionaries, and by Turkey, which had sent General Jamal Pasha to reorganize the Afghan army. In February 1921 Afghanistan and the Soviet Union signed a treaty of friendship, and the Soviet Union granted a subsidy of 1 million gold rubles (see Glossary) and a supply of ammunition to Amanullah.

The Afghan *amir* pro-Soviet ardor cooled, however, because of Soviet mistreatment of Central Asian tribes, and in November 1921 he concluded a treaty with Great Britain reaffirming Afghan independence, accepting the Durand Line and agreeing to exchange diplomatic representatives. Amanullah's relations with the Soviet Union cooled further when in 1922 the Turkic-speaking Basmachi tribes in Bukhara, led by Enver Pasha, rebelled against the Soviet Government. The revolt failed; Enver was killed; and

many Central Asian Moslems fled to Afghanistan. By 1926 the Soviets had regained their influence and signed a treaty of non-aggression with Afghanistan.

Amanullah was an imaginative ruler who dreamed of bringing Afghan society out of its traditional tribal ways, in which religious proscriptions dominated, to what he believed to be modern social behavior. In 1924 he organized the Royal Afghan Air Force and brought in Soviet technicians and Turkish officers to train his military forces. A trip through Europe, Turkey and Iran in 1928, the first ever taken by an Afghan *amir*, imbued him with ideas of Western social and military reform. On his return to Kabul he ordered the emancipation of women by outlawing polygamy and decreeing compulsory education for both sexes. He set forth rules for the separation of religious and secular authority, established the first Afghan parliament and ordered Afghans, even visiting tribesmen, to wear European dress in Kabul (see ch. 14, The Government System).

Afghanistan was not ready for such drastic changes. The *mul-lahs*, who were among the most powerful persons in the country, backed by tribal chiefs, especially among the Shinwari Pashtuns, reacted violently to the innovations. Amanullah attempted to back-track and cancel many of his reforms, but he was too late. On January 14, 1929, faced with open revolt, he abdicated in favor of his elder brother Enayatullah who in turn fled the capital after a Tajik bandit leader, Bacha-i-Saqo ("Son of the Water Carrier"), attacked Kabul. Both Amanullah and his brother, after attempting a comeback from Kandahar but failing largely because of Ghilzai enmity in Kandahar and Ghazni, fled to India and eventual exile in Europe.

Nadir Shah (1929-33)

Under the brief and turbulent rule of Bacha-i-Saqo, Durani fortunes and the status of Afghanistan as a nation sank to the lowest depths since the advent of Ahmad Shah Durani. The ignorant, illiterate Tajik ruler faced the enmity of most Pashtun tribes, but they were so divided among themselves that united action against him was virtually impossible until a dynamic new leader appeared. His name was Sardar Mohammad Nadir Khan, great grandson of one of Dost Mohammad's brothers.

Nadir Khan had exiled himself to France under circumstances still obscure after a distinguished military and diplomatic career under Habibullah and Amanullah. Although he was sick when news of Kabul's capture by Bacha-i-Saqo reached him, he boarded a steamer for India to try to overthrow the usurper. Without funds, and at first without foreign or tribal support, he and his able

brothers Mohammad Hashim Khan, Shah Mahmud Khan, and Shah Wali Khan, eventually won over enough support of the eastern Pashtun tribes, especially the Wazirs and Mahsuds, to defeat the forces of the Tajik ruler. Nadir Khan entered Kabul as a hero, and in October 1929, a gathering of tribal chieftains proclaimed him king, henceforth to be called Mohammad Nadir Shah. The Tajik ruler was executed along with his leading lieutenants.

Nadir Shah faced a bankrupt country in which the animosities of the people against established government had grown considerably. A zealous patriot and a pious Moslem, he disassociated himself from the modernism of Amanullah, proclaimed the supremacy of the Hanafi School of Islamic law and repealed many of the laws and constitutional reforms instituted by his Durani predecessor (see ch. 14, The Governmental System). His tribal forces put down brief rebellions among the Tajiks of Kohistan, northeast of Kabul. After the Soviet-Afghan Treaty of Neutrality and Mutual Non-Agression signed in 1931, he proscribed the activities of troublemaking followers of Russian counterrevolutionaries along the Amu Darya and returned Afghanistan to a semblance of peace.

Following tribal traditions, which Abdur Rahman and his sons had generally ignored, Nadir Shah restored tribal rule whereby the king becomes "chief among chiefs" who consults with the best available advisers before making major decisions. He had come to power with tribal help alone and hoped to preserve that power by means of consultations. To this end he promulgated a constitution which recognized by implication the national gathering of chiefs and notables, the *Loe Jirgah*, as the highest power in the land (see ch. 14, The Governmental System). He shared his executive power with his able male relatives, appointing as prime minister first one brother, Shah Wali Khan, then another, Mohammad Hashim Khan. He made another brother, Shah Mahmud Khan, minister of war, and a relative, Fazi Mohammad Khan minister of foreign affairs. His accession adhered to the tribal, religious and dynastic traditions of Afghanistan.

Nadir Shah had received some of his education in British schools in India and, though he lacked the progressive zeal of Amanullah, hoped to modernize many of his country's institutions partly along European lines. With the aid of his brothers, who also had come in contact with European ideas, he set forth a program to "reeducate" the society's more conservative elements, particularly the *mullahs* and tribal chiefs. He planned new hospitals and clinics and brought in foreign advisers.

THE CURRENT MONARCHY

Nadir Shah's reign came to an end on November 8, 1933, when he was assassinated by a youth who was apparently motivated by personal revenge. He was succeeded by his son, Mohammad Zahir Shah, then 19 years of age. The new shah generally continued his father's policies in matters of pacifying the tribes, pursuing economic and social development and maintaining normal foreign relations, particularly with the Soviet Union, Iran, and India (see ch. 16, Foreign Relations).

Of many problems inherited from Nadir Shah's reign, tribal affairs loomed especially large in ensuring governmental stability, if only fragile; in this connection, W. K. Fraser-Tytler, a British foreign service officer in Kabul at the time, wrote later:

At Nadir Shah's death, the tribes remained powerful, fanatical, intractable; suspicious of progress, priest-ridden and unstable; liable at any time to destroy the delicate fabric of the nascent state, and should they ever combine against good government and orderly progress, capable once more of plunging Afghanistan into chaos and ruin . . . the task of gradually substituting for the tribal system the normal administrative framework of the civilized state was likely to be prolonged and difficult. There was therefore always a risk of too great a cleavage developing between the progressive minority and the static majority. . . .

The tribal problems also had a major impact on the nation's foreign relations; nowhere was this more pronounced than on the Afghan-British Indian border. The military and political history of the Pashtuns in Afghanistan is mainly a story of revolt—against the Mongol and Turki invaders, against the Sikhs and against the local dynasties of their own ethnic group, often including the rulers in Kabul. Most of all they rose against British India, an event not overlooked or impeded by most Afghan *amirs* who constantly used Pashtun hostility toward the British to help achieve or maintain Afghan security.

From 1933 to 1935 the Mohmands in the north were in constant ferment. In 1936, Haji Mira Ali Khan, commonly called the Faqir of Ipi, led a group of *mullahs* and some Waziri tribesmen into battle against the British. The talented and ubiquitous Faqir established a reputation for resistance and harassment, and continued his agitational activities, even after the departure of the British from India until his death in 1959.

Tribal unrest was sometimes directed against Kabul itself. In 1938, for example, Said al-Kailani, known as the Shami Pir, led an attack on Kabul allegedly to reinstate the exiled Amanullah to whom he was related. Gaining support from sympathetic Waziri and Mahsud tribesmen in the Sulaiman Range east of the Durand Line, he started for the frontier, attracting anti-Kabul Ghilzai tribesmen along the way. The attack was averted when the British,

after frantic appeals by the Afghan Government, bought off the Shami Pir. The near disaster prompted Prime Minister Mohammad Hashim Khan, Zahir Shah's uncle, to increase Kabul subsidies to Pashtun tribes along and across the Durand Line.

General resistance to the British in India led to a degree of Pashtun solidarity that had not previously existed. Probably the most dominant figure was Abdul Ghaffar Khan from the village of Utmanzai near Peshawar, east of the Khyber Pass. His professed goal, after 1927, was Pashtun independence initially by means of cooperating with the Indian nationalist movement of Mohandas K. Gandhi (popularly called Mahatma Gandhi). Known as the "Frontier Gandhi" himself Abdul Ghaffar Khan continued to champion the Pashtun cause. This factor offered new opportunity for the Kabul government to assert its claims to Pashtun allegiance. The hope of incorporating British-controlled Pashtun territory east of the Durand Line into Afghanistan—a dream nurtured among Kabul *amirs* since the Sikhs captured Peshawar and painfully strengthened by Afghanistan's failure to regain it in the Third Anglo-Afghan War—was particularly heightened as departure of the British from India became imminent after World War II. Afghan irredentism gradually became manifest in support for Pashtun independence after the partition of India and the creation of Pakistan in 1947. The "Pashtunistan" (land of the Pashtuns) issue calling for independence for the Pashtuns—but only those residing east of the Durand Line in Pakistan—came to the fore and continues to plague Afghan-Pakistan relations, although repeated efforts have been made, and continue to be made, to moderate the dispute and achieve a *modus vivendi* (see ch. 16, Foreign Relations).

From the beginning of his reign, Zahir Shah, prompted primarily by the need to control restive tribes began strengthening his army. For economic development he needed foreign assistance from many sources; in the years before and especially after World War II, the question of aid and foreign ties became increasingly important in Afghan affairs. In July 1937 Zahir Shah formally bound his nation with other Islamic states by participating in the Saadabad Pact signed in Iran under which Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq and Turkey agreed to observe noninterference in each other's internal affairs, to respect border integrity and to abstain from aggression on any member state. After World War II Afghanistan continued the traditional policy of nonalignment and generally maintained a neutralist posture in foreign relations (see ch. 16, Foreign Relations).

In 1953 the elderly Shah Mahmud Khan, who had assumed the Prime Ministership in 1946, resigned, and Mohammad Daud

(1953–63) a cousin of the Shah, succeeded him. The government's support of the "Pashtunistan" issue, strongly advocated by Prime Minister Daud, was accelerated. Under his direction the country's armed forces and economy were given greater attention—a policy continued by successor Prime Ministers Mohammad Yusuf (1963–65) and Mohammad Hashim Maiwandwal (1965–67).

CHAPTER 4

POPULATION

The total population of the country in late 1967 was officially estimated at nearly 16 million persons. This figure however, like all other demographic indices for Afghanistan, was uncertain. The relative inaccessibility of many years and the secondary importance of females in the culture tended to reduce the reliability of estimates. No census had even been taken, and such figures as were reported were based on limited surveys and samples.

The population was characterized by a high degree of mobility. Rural inhabitants, especially those from the Hazarajat region in the central highlands, were shifting in substantial numbers toward the towns and cities. In addition, persons who, in conformity with time-honored tribal ideals and tradition, pursued a more-or-less nomadic way of life represented probably one-sixth of the entire population, or some 2.6 million persons.

Population density, while strikingly less than that of Pakistan and India, was nearly equal to that of the Middle East. Distribution of the population, however, was highly uneven and concentrated along rivers and streams where there is sufficient water. The eastern part of the country, south of the Hindu Kush, from Kabul to Charikar was heavily settled compared to other areas. Concentrations of population were also found in the northwest in the Herat oasis and along the Hari Rud and in the northeast along the Kunduz River. The vast mountainous heartland, on the other hand, and the southern and southwestern deserts were sparsely settled, and some portions were without human habitation (see ch. 2, Physical Environment).

The area of relatively high population density along the frontier with Pakistan coincided with the traditional homeland of the Pashtuns, the largest and most influential of the country's many ethnic communities. More than half of the total population was of Pashtun tribal origin including the great majority of the pastoral nomads, or *koochis*. Besides the Pashtuns there are substantial minorities of Tajiks, Hazaras and Uzbeks. Tajiks inhabited principally the area from Charikar north to the Amu Darya River including the Badakhshan region, the Herat oasis and the villages

stretching some 55 miles eastward along the Hari Rud to Obbeh. Hazaras traditionally settled in the eastern part of the central highlands. Uzbeks lived in the north in the irrigated areas between the oasis in the Mazar-i-Sharif region eastward to Talian in Takhar Province. In addition, many smaller groups representing a variety of ethnic origins and cultural traditions were scattered throughout the country (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups).

DYNAMICS

In the mid-1960's estimates of the total population ranged from 10 to 16 million persons; the majority of estimates were near the higher figure. For example, the most recent official population reckoning, as reported by the United Nations for March 1966, was 15,909,000. Manpower resources studies by the government in connection with the Third Five-Year Economic and Social Development Plan 1967-71 calculated the total population to be approximately 13.8 million persons in 1960 and 15.7 million in 1967 and gave a projection for 1971 of 16.9 million.

Official interest has been expressed in having a census taken, but many problems would be faced in implementing the project. Census takers would have to get to countless hamlets accessible only by difficult pack trails. Religious barriers and the strong insistence on family privacy discourage inquiry into the number of females in a household. Village reports on population have been underestimated since taxation and military conscription quotas have been based on them.

Official Afghan reports indicated that men formed 52 percent of the total population. Numerical comparisons of various age groups were not available. Casual observation suggested, however, that, as in other parts of South and Southeast Asia, children and young persons predominated. According to projections based on several regional surveys the working-age group (15 to 60 years) comprised approximately 50 percent of the total population.

Measures of population dynamics, such as birth, death and fertility rates, were also unavailable. An estimated annual rate of increase of 1.9 percent per year is anticipated by Afghan officials in their plans for the 5-year period 1967-71. This compared with 2.4 for southern Asia as a whole, the lower rate for Afghanistan reflecting the effects of widespread enteric and other children's diseases on death rates and the extreme scarcity of modern medical care outside the urban centers. An estimated 40 percent of infants died before reaching 2 years of age. The ratio of physicians to the population as a whole for the mid-1960's was about 1 to 30,000.

DISTRIBUTION

Population density, excluding nomads, whose enumeration is made difficult by their movements, varied from an estimated 13 persons per square mile in the extreme northeast to 155 persons in the valleys of the Kabul River and its tributaries. For the entire country the density was approximately 50 persons per square mile, about the same ratio as in Jordan and Iraq. The six most densely inhabited provinces, and their estimated population (excluding nomads) in 1966, were: Kabul (1,150,000), Parwan (800,000), Nangarhar (750,000), Ghazni (710,000), Kandahar (680,000) and Herat (620,000). Supporting the fewest of inhabitants were Samangan province, with 190,000 persons, and Chakhansur, with 100,000 persons.

Urban dwellers probably represented approximately 10 percent of the population. Nearly all urban settlements developed on or near the road which roughly traces a circle leading southwest from Kabul, in the east, to Kandahar, then northwest to Herat and northeast to Mazar-i-Sharif (near the site of the ancient Kingdom of Bactria) in the north.

Of these four settlements only Kabul can be classified as a modern, cosmopolitan city. It is the seat of the government, the business and banking center of the country and the residence of most foreigners. Apart from these four largest cities, Kunduz, Jalalabad, Faizabad, Baghlan, Andkhui, Maimana, Ghazni and Pul-i-Khumri are more or less prominent, either because of location, developing industry or importance to trade (see ch. 2, Physical Environment). Some towns have declined from their ancient importance while others are growing rapidly as modern economic centers. The larger centers owe their size to their location at a major intersection of trade routes and their possession of abundant water.

As of late 1967 the country could not support a significantly larger number of inhabitants without further development of the economy. To live even at minimum standards the cultivator and pastoralist had to work extremely hard. If improved methods of cultivation, irrigation and stockbreeding were introduced, however, the population could expand, even to double or triple its numbers, without economic stress. Land in the north and northeast could be brought under irrigation. The same was true for the irrigable areas of the south and southwest where, in the Kandahar and Girishk areas, a beginning had been made with large-scale reclamation.

Approximately 75 percent of the population may be described as wholly or largely sedentary, moving only if forced by outside

circumstances. Some families owned several domestic animals, but they allowed hired laborers or one or two family members to care for them and to take them to the highland pastures in summer. The rest of the family stayed behind.

The nomadic segment of the population included herdsmen who moved in a group from summer to winter pastures and back again and seminomadic herdsmen who besides breeding animals also raised a few crops. Some nomads engaged in highly profitable trading activities. Communities of seminomads divided themselves into two groups, one of which remained in the winter location to tend the crops while the other accompanied the livestock to the highlands. This pattern reflected that Afghan nomads had traditional grazing rights to the land which they had long occupied, but did not actually own. With increased pressure for land use, some nomads have begun to leave members of their groups behind in winter camps to protect their claim to the home areas, while the remainder moved with the livestock to summer pastures.

Information was lacking on the numbers of Afghans in each of the mobile categories, but it was estimated that nearly 2 million were wholly nomadic. Most of them were Pashtuns, but there were also nomadic or seminomadic Turkomans, Kirghiz and other groups. By virtue of their historical migration patterns and the more recent efforts of the government to settle them in the north, the Pashtun nomads occupied a territory which roughly forms a ring around the central and eastern highlands. During the winter they camped in the steppes and low-lying mountain valleys; in summer, they lived in the highlands. Farthest to the south were the Baluchis, a marginal group whose members moved seasonally across the sparsely inhabited southwest portion of the country.

CHAPTER 5

ETHNIC GROUPS

The country's estimated 16 million persons represent many ethnic communities. On the basis of their origins, most persons fall into one or the other of two groups—the ancient Indo-European and the descendants of relatively recent emigrants from Soviet Central Asia.

In the first group the great majority, including the Pashtuns and the Tajiks, speak an Iranian variant of the Indo-European language family and have cultural characteristics linking them to the area west and southwest of Afghanistan. Those of the second group, including the Uzbeks and the Turkomans, speak a Turkic language belonging to the Ural-Altaic family. They have cultural ties with Central Asia and Mongoloid physical traits. There has been some fusion occurring between the two main groups. Hazaras and the Chahar Aimaks, for example, speak Iranian languages but display Mongoloid physical characteristics and have cultural traits associated with Central Asia.

Of the various ethnic groups, the largest are the Pashtuns and the Tajiks, followed by the Uzbeks, Hazaras and Chahar Aimaks. Pashtuns make up over half the total population and dominate the national political scene, furnishing the ruling family, most members of the Cabinet and a majority of provincial governors. Tajiks wield considerable economic power owing to their success in commerce and finance. Many of them are urban-dwellers and, together with the Pashtuns, they make up the bulk of the educated elite.

The degree to which an Afghan identifies himself as a member of an ethnic group rather than with his family, village or tribe depends upon the individual and the circumstances. Ethnic identity is relatively important to such groups as the Tajiks, who are not tribally organized and, therefore lack tribal identification. When questioned as to his group affiliation, a Tajik will usually say first he is a person from such-and-such a locality, then he will say he is a Tajik. To the Pashtun, tribal identification is more important, and when asked who he is, he is apt to answer that he is a member of a particular Pashtun tribe, such as the Shinwaris or the Mahsuds. When asked to relate himself to an Uzbek, however, he is first of all a Pashtun.

The government's ethnic policy has never been clearly stated but its actions indicate that it is seeking to eliminate tribal localism and to bring the various groups into its scheme of social and political integration. It is relying increasingly on a modern administrative structure rather than traditional tribal organization to exercise its authority. At the same time the government is promoting economic and social development in non-Pashtun areas, as exemplified in its school construction program in the Hazarajat and its improvement of karakul-breeding techniques among the Turkomans (see ch. 10, Education; ch. 20, Agriculture).

Many educated urban Afghans are aware of ethnic identity but attach little importance to it for fear of belittling the national policy of unity, which most of them support. On the other hand many uneducated rural Afghans are equally unconcerned with ethnic identity, but for a different reason; they know nothing of other ethnic groups and identify themselves with their family, village, or tribe.

INDO-EUROPEAN SPEAKERS

Pashtuns

The Pashtuns speak Pashto, an Iranian variant of the Indo-European language family (see ch. 6, Languages and Communication). Persons who speak Pashto and trace descent from a known Pashtun ancestor number over 8 million, including about 2.5 million who are nomadic or seminomadic. Their precise origins are uncertain. The forebears of the Pashtuns probably include some of the original Aryan occupiers of the region as well as later Greek, Persian Turkic and Mongol invaders who swept across the areas of modern Afghanistan. Many Pashtuns themselves attribute their ancestry to the children of Israel, through Qais, a descendant of Saul, Israel's first king.

Recent archaeological discoveries in the mountains near Kandahar, a traditional Pashtun area, indicate relationships between the sedentary villagers of the region and those of the Iranian plateau. The sites date back more than 4,000 years B.C. The Pashto language shows structural elements traceable to the period following the last Aryan invasions, shortly before the beginning of the Christian era. Written references to Pashtuns as tribes inhabiting the Sulaiman Range in Pakistan (some 200 miles southeast of Kandahar) are found in the works of tenth century Arab geographers.

Between the thirteenth and sixteenth centuries, various Pashtun peoples left their mountainous territories in the east and spread westward down to the more fertile plains of the Kandahar area

and the Tarnak and Arghandab Valleys to the north. From Kandahar as a base point, several of the Pashtun tribes moved on to positions of considerable political power. Among the tribes in this category were the Yusufzais, the Ghilzais and the Abdalis (later Duranis).

The Yusufzais invaded the Peshawar Valley in Pakistan (185 miles southeast of Kabul) in the sixteenth century, and they eventually took over the petty states of Swat and Dir to the north just south of the border with modern Afghanistan. The Ghilzais and Abdalis, in the eighteenth century, laid the basis for the modern Afghan nation (see ch. 3, Historical Setting).

The traditional homeland of the Pashtuns lies east, south and southwest of Kabul and in contiguous territory on the Pakistan side of the frontier. Six million Pashto-speaking tribesmen live east of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Since 1885, however, increasing numbers of Pashtuns have been settling in the peripheral regions of the north and west, which now contain pockets of Pashtun settlement as well as camp sites of nomadic Pashtun tribesmen.

Most Afghan Pashtuns live in villages near water sites or as nomads in the region extending roughly from the eastern highlands south and west of the Khyber Pass through the Helmand Valley and westward to the Iranian frontier. A few live in urban centers.

The mixed origins of the Pashtuns are revealed in their physical appearance. Basically they are of Caucasoid stock, but innumerable permutations and combinations of physical type appear. Typically a Pashtun is relatively tall and well built, with olive skin, dark hair, fine bones and a prominent often hawklike nose, but blond, blue-eyed individuals with relatively light skin are found among them.

The Pashtuns form a major component of the dominant religious group in the country—the Sunnite Moslems. Sunnite Islam of the Hanafi rite is the official religion, and the king is required by the 1964 Constitution to be a Moslem and a follower of the Hanafi school.

Generalizations about Pashtun culture beyond matters of religion are particularly hazardous under the increasing impact of social and economic change. Not only do cultural observances vary from tribe to tribe but also from locale to locale within tribes. Whatever their tribes, however, Pashtuns believe that they are the core community and that the country belongs more to them than to anyone else. Ahmad Shah Durani who first organized the people into an independent country in 1747 was a Pashtun chief, and educated Pashtuns are aware that their ancestors first acquired the name Afghans from early Iranian historians.

Pashtuns (Pakhtuns in the northern dialect) is the term used by most members of this group to distinguish themselves from Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turkomans and other minority communities. A few prefer to call themselves Afghan, a name which came into usage through Iranian and English writers. Afghan, however, also designates anyone holding Afghan nationality regardless of his ethnic origin. The 1964 Constitution states that the Afghan nation is composed of all those individuals who possess the citizenship of the state in accordance with the provisions of the law and that the word Afghan shall apply to each such individual. The British and Indians refer to the Pashtuns as "Pathans," a term which the Pashtuns regard as derogatory.

Out of their tribal and nomadic background, the Pashtuns have developed a strong sense of individualism—the intensity of which distinguishes them from most other ethnic groups. They look upon themselves as warriors and ownership of a rifle is their traditional symbol of manhood. They are romanticists, whose poets have extolled in musical verse the heroism of their leaders and the glories of their beloved mountains. Khushal Khan Khattak and Abdur Rahman, both famous seventeenth century poets, are as well-known and have as much influence among Pashtuns as ancient political figures (see ch. 11, Artistic and Intellectual Expression). Perhaps the feature which is most clearly a part of Pashtun culture is the Pashtun traditional code of conduct, Pashtunwali (see ch. 13, Social Values).

Pashtun social organization is highly developed. It is based on a hierarchy of confederations, tribes and subdivisions of tribes or lineage groups (*kheyls*). There are two main Pashtun confederations or families of tribes—the Duranis and the Ghilzais. Most tribes belong to one or another of these confederations, but a few remain independent. Each tribe (*kaum*) is divided into a number of smaller units, each based on the principle of descent in a single line from a known common ancestor. Persons who trace descent through a Pashtun lineage number more than 8 million, of whom perhaps 2.5 million are nomadic or seminomadic.

Each tribe—a social group, not necessarily organized politically, which is distinguished by language and culture from other such groups—has its own proud traditions. Nonetheless all Pashtuns, regardless of their particular lineage or tribal affiliation, retain a sense of common identity reflecting their shared code of conduct and tradition of descent.

The Durani confederation includes two major groupings of tribes, the Ziraks and the Panjpaos. The Zirak branch is made up of four senior tribes: the Alikozais; the Achakzais; the Popalzais, whose Sadozai line ruled the country from 1747–1818; and the

Barakzais, whose Mohammadzai line has ruled since 1826. The Panjpao tribes include the Nurzais, the Alizais and the Ishaqzais.

Pashtuns claiming Durani descent probably number more than 2 million. A fraction of these, all belonging to the Mohammadzai lineage of the Barakzai tribe, comprise the nucleus of the country's social and political elite. They occupy most of the top positions in the government and in many instances have large landholdings. King Mohammad Zahir Shah, who has been on the throne since 1933, belongs to the Yahya Kheyl family of the Mohammadzai line within the Barakzai tribe. With a single exception, all the reigning monarchs since 1747 have belonged to the Barakzai tribe and since 1816 have been members of the Mohammadzai lineage. It is decreed in the 1964 Constitution that all future kings must belong to the Mohammadzai line of descent.

While many Duranis are found in Kabul and Jalalabad, and major Durani groups were resettled in the north, this component of the population is nevertheless still concentrated primarily in the southwestern portion of the country. Their principal diffusion lies south of a line drawn between Shindand south of Herat, and Kalat-i-Ghilzai, 75 miles northeast of Kandahar on the road to Kabul. Many Durani pastoral nomads migrate between winter encampments in the steppes and lower mountain valleys and summer encampments in the western portions of the Central Highlands. Like other Afghan nomads, they are often regarded as *koochis*, a term which they themselves regard as pejorative.

The Ghilzais, the second of the two major tribal confederations, are more numerous than the Duranis. Their population is estimated at between 2.5 and 3 million persons. Like the Duranis, they are divided into two major groups of tribes—the Turans and the Burans. Among the senior tribes of these two groups are the Hotaks, Ahmadzais, and the Babis.

Ghilzai tribes are found roughly southeast of the line drawn between Kalat-i-Ghilzai and Kabul. The territory of the Sulaiman Kheyl, south of Ghazni, is considered the focal point of Ghilzai culture. While the Ghilzai are partially settled down, they are essentially a nomadic people comprising the great majority of the so-called *koochis*. Like the Durani nomads, they winter in the lowlands moving each year to summer encampments in the highlands; their economy is far less dependent on purely pastoral activities than is that of the Durani nomads, and they have developed a highly profitable trade with the Hazaras in the eastern portion of the Central Highlands. The Ghilzai nomads often find themselves in the position of extending credit to the Hazaras who, rarely able to wipe out their debts, eventually turn over sheep, cows and finally land to their Ghilzai creditors (see ch. 23, Domestic Trade).

Traditionally many Ghilzai nomads engaged in periodic migrations across the Durand Line into Pakistan, but the Pakistan Government, when diplomatic relations with Afghanistan were severed in September 1961, refused to allow the entry of Ghilzai and other nomads. Trade relations were reestablished in July 1963, but entry into Pakistan continued to be forbidden to Ghilzai nomads and their flocks who used to go in search of winter grazing grounds. Pakistan authorities had earlier voiced concern that some of these animals were unhealthy and had been spreading disease. Interference with this traffic reportedly imposed severe economic hardships upon the Ghilzais, but no information is available as to the seriousness of the consequences.

Besides the two major confederations and several lesser ones, the best known of which is the Yusufzai, there is an agglomeration of unaffiliated tribes, found mainly along the border with Pakistan, from a point 100 miles northeast of the Khyber Pass to 200 miles southeast. These include the Mohmands who, like the Yusufzais, are found in the mountains north of the Khyber Pass; the Afridis in the same general area; the Shinwaris on the northern slopes of the Safed Koh, some 30 miles southward from Jalalabad. Other small tribes include the Waziris, the Mangals and many more.

Several of these small tribes reportedly engage in the smuggling of lumber into Pakistan. It is they who gave the British in India so much difficulty and caused conflict after conflict with them up and down the boundary with the North-West Frontier Province. To keep order and discipline among them and to persuade them to refrain from pillaging caravans coming through the area, the British for 30 years before the 1947 partition of India paid them a fixed annual remuneration.

Tajiks

Persons classified as Tajik, numbering more than 2.5 million, include various predominantly sedentary Moslem peoples, all of whom speak Dari (formerly, Farsi). Dari, like Pashto, belongs to the Iranian branch of the Indo-European language family (see ch. 6, Languages and Communication). The term Tajik has social, rather than ethnic, significance. Persons generically described as Tajik belong to at least four separate ethnic communities distinguished from one another in varying degrees by speech and cultural observances.

The earliest inhabitants of the modern Afghan area were Persian-speaking peoples among whom Tajiks were the most numerous. Tajiks trace their ancestry to the Greco-Bactrian dynasties which flourished in the valley of the Oxus, now the Amu Dar-

ya) from the fourth to the first centuries B.C. Historical research indicates a later diffusion over the entire territory extending from the Paropamisus Range north of Herat, northeastward to the Pamirs bordering western China.

In the modern period Afghan Tajiks are found mainly in the region extending from Charikar, some 50 miles north of Kabul, to the Soviet frontier and eastward as far as Badakhshan. Others live in the Herat oasis region and in villages strung along the Hari Rud River from Herat eastward some 50 miles to the town of Obeh. Some 1.4 million Tajiks live in adjacent areas of the Soviet Union and Communist China.

Physically, the Tajiks are akin to Indo-European peoples and some fair-skinned, blond individuals appear within their groups, but most have black or brownish hair, oval faces, straight or aquiline noses and medium-sized mouths with full lips. Inter-marriage with other ethnic groups has resulted in the infusion of a considerable amount of Mongoloid blood among the Tajik inhabitants of Mazar-i-Sharif Kunduz, Baghlan and other northern towns.

In general, the Tajik peoples adhere to Sunnite Islam. There is, however, a minority of Shiite Tajiks, many of whom are found around Herat; a few pockets of Tajik Ismaili adherents are found in areas of isolated mountain settlement (see ch. 12, Religion). In a country where the dominant ethnic group and most of the lesser ones are tribally organized, the Tajiks are outstanding exceptions to this practice. Typically they are sedentary village or town dwelling peoples engaged in farming, handicrafts, shopkeeping or administrative work. Although a minority are nomadic, most live in permanent settlements. Skilled in techniques of farming, especially irrigation, they are important in the agricultural sector of the country's economy.

Of the four distinct peoples generally referred to as Tajik, the so-called mountain Tajiks are the most widely dispersed. They are concentrated in the northeastern sector of the country, especially in the provinces of Badakhshan, Takhar, Baghlan and Kunduz, but they are found also across the entire region extending from the southwestern Paropamisus eastward to the Pamirs. Their settlement patterns are diverse. Some mountain villages are stratified in layers clinging to the hillside with an array of flat roofed, two-storied houses made of raw brick and mud. Others, however, such as those in the Bamian region, give a different impression as they are dominated by the enormous fortified compounds of former rulers. Nearly all the mountain Tajiks are sedentary farmers who own a few head of livestock. Most adhere to the Sunnite branch of Islam, but a few Ismaili Moslems are found among those in the Pamirs. In general the mountain Tajiks are a hardy, self-reliant

and peaceful people, although unruly and warlike behavior is sometimes manifested. Bacha-i-Saqo, the "Son of the Water Carrier" who briefly succeeded King Amanullah Khan in 1929, was a mountain Tajik (see ch. 3, Historical Setting).

A second Tajik group is composed of those sedentary, Persian-speaking Moslems who are known colloquially as Farsiwans or Parsiwans (see Glossary). Nearly all of them are urban dwellers, found in Kabul and the large towns of the Northern Plains, where substantial numbers live in the oasis villages as well. The villagers are farmers, but the more typical urban Farsiwan makes his living in commerce, small industry or administrative pursuits.

Those living in the Herat oasis region and in villages of the Hari Rud Valley represent the third major agglomeration of peoples commonly called Tajik. They bear a strong resemblance to the dominant population across the border in Iran, with whom they speak the same Persian dialect and share a common cultural heritage. The Herati are the easternmost of the peoples who might rightfully be called Persian. Together with the Farsiwans they comprise the bulk of the country's literate and educated people. The urbanity of their mental outlook is manifested in such characteristics as dress and architecture. The Heratis admire Persian culture.

A fourth and generally little-known community commonly classified as Tajik is that of seminomadic farmers and herdsmen living in the Hindu Kush between the Shibar Kotal Pass and the town of Doab, north of Charikar. These people are farmers and herdsmen who move their large flocks twice annually between summer and winter pastures. They call themselves Tajik, but some anthropologists regard them as originally a Turkic group which has abandoned its earlier language for Persian. This view is exemplified by the strong resemblance they bear to their Hazaran neighbors.

Others

Other Iranian languages and dialects are spoken by the Baluchis, numbering some 70,000; the Kizilbash, numbering about 30,000; and various small minorities inhabiting the Pamir region. The Baluchis are a marginal group, mainly nomads ranging across the southwest borderlands adjoining Pakistan and Iran. Some live in the villages of Chakhansur province, along the Iranian border south of Herat. Moving seasonally across the uninhabited southwest portion of the country, they have little contact with other Afghans, except for occasional Pashtun tribes, with whom they clash over water and grazing rights. Although there is a latent nostalgia for an independent Baluchistan (in the eighteenth cen-

tury there existed a Baluchi confederacy), most Baluchis lack the unity for concerted action.

The Dari-speaking Kizilbash are urban and live largely in the Kabul region. They trace their ancestry to Turkish troops sent to occupy Kabul and other urban centers in the eighteenth century. They are Shiites, whose intellectual leaders provide the principal alternative to the prevailing Sunnite tradition.

Living in the high, isolated valleys of the Wakhan corridor in the extreme northeast are small groups of people speaking different Iranian languages and dialects, usually named according to the village the speakers inhabit. They include the Wakhnis, the Sughnis and the Munjanis. These groups have not been studied extensively, and little is known about them. Their economy is on a subsistence level.

Languages of the Indic branch of the Indo-European family are spoken by the Hindus and Sikhs, some of whom are descended from persons who migrated from India several centuries ago. Many Sikhs, however, have come to Afghanistan in recent times, following the disturbances which accompanied the partition of India in 1946. A small community, the Hindus, are primarily urban and are found mainly in Kabul, Kandahar and Jalalabad. Trade, moneylending and teaching are common pursuits.

The Dardic branch of the Indo-European family is represented by the Nuristanis, numbering about 90 000 and by some 10,000 Pashai-speakers in the Laghman Valley. The origins of the Nuristanis are obscure. Centuries ago, a people referred to by outsiders as Kafirs (Arabic for heathen) lived south of the Hindu Kush in the northeastern frontier area, where they formed a cultural enclave surrounded by communities of Moslems.

Some students of the area believed that these persons were relatively unspoiled descendants of ancient Aryans who settled in this region some 3,000 years ago. Another theory, more widely accepted, was that they had evolved from a splinter group of Indian-Ceylonese extraction. Until conquered by Abdur Rahman Shah in 1896, they retained much of their original culture; their religion was tribal and akin to other Aryan pantheistic, animal-sacrificing faiths. Following their enforced conversion to Islam, Kafiristan, land of the heathens, became known as Nuristan, land of light and the people themselves were henceforth referred to as the Nuristanis.

The Nuristanis vary in physical type, but many are tall and fair-skinned, with blond hair. They speak four main languages which belong to the Dardic group, a branch of the Indo-European language family (see ch. 6, Languages and Communication). Pashto, however, is the common medium of communication. Nuristani

villages are composed of rough-hewn log houses, plastered with mud and usually piled one on top of another up the mountainside. From May to September, when taking their animals to high mountain pastures, they live in *ailoqs*, clusters of stone cabins and roofless shelters. Women not only tend to such domestic chores as cooking, cleaning, knitting and sewing but also work with their men in the fields ploughing, watering and harvesting crops. They cultivate various grains (wheat, maize, sorghum) on their small terraces and irrigated fields. Most of their subsistence, however, comes from the cattle, sheep and goats, from which they derive *ghee* (clarified butter), hides and wool. These are exchanged for rice, tea, sugar and salt.

Taking pleasure in music and dances, the Nuristanis play reed pipes, drums and a three- or four-stringed, harp-like instrument of ancient design; their often melancholy melodic patterns differ from other known music of the area (see ch. 11, Artistic and Intellectual Expression).

The Pashai-speakers, both in their physical appearance and their economy, differ little from the sedentary Pashtuns of the same region, although Pashai fields are less fertile and their houses smaller. The traditional division of labor decrees that women till the fields while the men raise the animals. Converted to Islam following their conquest by Abdur Rahman in 1896, the Pashai are Sunnite Moslems.

INTERMEDIATE GROUPS

Two large ethnic minorities constitute intermediate groups; they speak Indo-European languages but exhibit Mongolian physical traits and Central Asian cultural characteristics. These are the so-called Chahar Aimaks, an agglomerate of seminomadic tribes in the extreme northwest, and the more than half a million Hazaras in the central mountain region.

Chahar Aimaks

It remains uncertain whether the Chahar Aimaks are of Indo-European descent, or of Turkic or, more distantly Mongolian, descent. The weight of current opinion, however, appears to support the theory that despite their Persian speech which presumably was adopted long ago in place of their native tongue, the Chahar Aimaks are of Turkic or Turko-Mongolian origin. Substantiating evidence for this opinion is to be found in their basically Mongoloid physical appearance, in their seminomadic way of life and in their use of yurts (round, felt tents) or yurt-type tents. Some scholars assert that tribes categorized as Chahar Aimaks include persons of Turkic, Persian, Mongol and Arab extraction.

Estimates of the number of Chahar Aimaks vary widely, ranging from 300,000 to more than three times that number. Size of the major tribes are also unknown, but there seems to be a consensus that probably no single Aimak group exceeds 100,000 persons. The tribes speak slightly different Dari dialects, but otherwise they are culturally quite close. In contrast to the sedentary Tajiks and the fully nomadic Pashtuns in the same region, the Chahar Aimaks are more or less seminomadic. They profess Islam according to the tenets of the Sunnite branch of the faith. Their economy is based on agriculture and cattle breeding. During the winter they live in permanent villages but move annually to summer camps with their flocks of sheep and goats. With the exception of one group, they use as their summer shelter the Central Asiatic yurt of a local type rather than the black tent associated with the nomads of the eastern, southern and southwestern parts of the country.

The Chahar Aimak area taking in most of the western end of the central mountain region, was brought under direct rule by Abdur Rahman in the late nineteenth century. Since that time, much of the area has become grazing land for Pashtun nomads belonging to the Durani tribes. Relations between the local population and the incoming Durani nomads have been generally quiescent, at least in contrast to the far more disruptive effects of the intrusion of Ghilzai nomads into the Hazarajat, at the western end of the central Hindu Kush. Both the Chahar Aimaks and the Durani Pashtuns are Sunnites, and this probably contributes to the relatively peaceful situation.

The Chahar Aimaks are tribally organized, and like many pastoral peoples of this section of the country, they divide themselves into four basic groups. There are several methods of classifying the main tribes. The names given by the Chahar Aimaks themselves, and probably the most accurate, are Jamshidi, Firuzkuhi, Taimanni, and Hazaras. The Hazaras are culturally distinct from the far more numerous Hazaras of the Hazarajat region and are apparently of different ethnic origin. Generally grouped with the Chahar Aimaks are the Taimanni and several other small Persian-speaking communities living in the same area, but little is known of them.

Westernmost of the four major Chahar Aimak peoples are the Jamshidis (50,000-80,000) who are concentrated around the town of Kushk, 40 miles northeast of Herat. Like other Chahar Aimaks, their physical appearance indicates an admixture of Caucasoid and Mongoloid ancestry. They speak the Herati dialect of Dari, and they profess Islam. A Shiite minority has been rumored, but no evidence of its existence has been uncovered. Legend has it that the Jamshidis, whose name is derived from that of a legendary

Persian king, are descendants of a tribal group which was moved to its present location from Sistan in the southwest by Timur (commonly known as Tamerlane) in the fourteenth century. This notion is belied, however, by their yurt-type tent culture. Dry farming plays an important role in their economic life.

The Firuz-kuhis (estimated 40,000) are seminomadic farmers and cattle raisers living in the valley and upper reaches of the Murghab River (Badghis and Ghor provinces) east of the Jamshidi-dominated area. Their own tradition uncorroborated by history attributes their ancestry to members of a Persian garrison posted in the area by Tamerlane. Like the Jamshidi they live in permanent villages during the winter but move to the outlying fields and hills in summer.

Immediately to the south of the Firuz-kuhi area are the Taimannis (estimated 40,000) who live north and south of the Hari Rud and its tributaries roughly from Daulat Yar (Ghor province) in the east to Chesht-i-Sharif (Herat province) in the west. Culturally the Taimannis may be divided into two distinct groups, which have been named the Northern and Southern Taimannis. The Northern Taimannis resemble other Chahar Aimak groups and show affinities with Central Asian culture; the Southern Taimannis live in black goat-hair tents, as distinct from the yurts of the other Chahar Aimaks, and share cultural affinities with the Pashtun nomads to the south. The origins of the Taimannis (Northern and Southern) are highly uncertain. Their own traditions assert that they are of Pashtun extraction which may be partially true. Pashtun tribal names are encountered among them and persons who physically resemble Pashtuns are also found, particularly among the Southern Taimannis. Tribal organization is extremely loose and seems to have lost most of its social and political significance.

The Northern Taimannis raise mainly wheat and barley, and almost always use irrigation. Most land is held by independent small farmers; herds are also individually owned. Their villages are loosely knit clusters of simple, flat-roofed houses. Southern Taimannis villages are of a similar pattern, but their houses are more substantially constructed. During part of the summer season, both groups erect tents on their fields. The Southern Taimannis, however, usually remain in close proximity to their villages throughout the summer, but the Northerners go off into the hills 5 or 10 miles away.

The Hazara Aimaks (40,000-50,000) are a mixture of Caucasoid and Mongoloid physical types and speak Dari interspersed with strange words of Turkic or other origin. Their characteristic way of life is seminomadism and agriculture predominates. They are

all Sunnites and reject vigorously any connection with the Shiite Hazaras. A typical Hazara Aimak village is an agglomeration of scattered houses, generally built in the domed-roof style of Turkistan. Between dwellings and villages there are ample open spaces in which the animals can roam. In summer, the village is vacated almost completely except for a few persons left behind to guard the fields. The remainder of the population moves to the hills with the flocks, which are relatively large. Individual family herds usually number from 10 to 100 animals.

Hazaras

The estimated total number of Hazaras ranged from 500,000 to 2 million; most ethnographers favor a figure of 1 million or less. Like the Tajiks and Chahar Aimaks, the Hazaras speak a Dari (Farsi) dialect. Their ancestry, however, as indicated by their physical appearance, is Mongolian or Turko-Mongolian. Many Turkish and purely Mongolian words occur in their dialect, known as Hazaragi.

In contrast to the Sunnite majority, which includes all other major ethnic groups, the Hazaras adhere to the Shiite branch of Islam. The Hazaras became Shiites rather than Sunnites because their conversion to Islam by Persian conquerors occurred relatively late, at a time when Shiism had replaced Sunnism as the dominant branch of the faith in that country.

How or when the Hazaras came into their present area, commonly called the Hazarajat, in the highlands of the upper Helmand Valley westward from Kabul, is not precisely known. According to legend, they are descended from the armies of Genghis Khan who invaded from the north and captured Herat early in the thirteenth century before moving on toward the Indus River. The Hazaras themselves maintain elaborate genealogies to support this theory, but outside observers generally give little credence to it.

Written records verify the presence of a Hazara community in the eastern portion of the Central Highlands by the early fifteenth century. Over the next two centuries these Hazara groups gradually abandoned their Mongol speech and nomadic way of life in favor of permanent settlement in fortified villages, where they supported themselves by farming and raising small herds of cattle. Dari became their adopted language (see ch. 2, Physical Environment).

Entrenched in their mountainous enclave, an impoverished area covering some 15,000 square miles, they remained independent of Pashtun control until the end of the nineteenth century. Narrow, winding valleys and high altitudes made access to their country

difficult, and the few trade caravans and travelers attempting to traverse the area frequently encountered raiding and plundering bands.

Pashtun penetration and conquest of the region occurred in 1892 under Abdur Rahman, who solidified his hold on the territory by replacing the local leaders with Pashtun administrators. Thereafter, Pashtun nomads, confident that the Mohammadzai rulers in Kabul could maintain their authority in the area, began periodic migrations to the Hazarajat. Some of these Pashtuns were herdsmen in search of summer pasturage for their flocks, others were both grazers and traders. As competition from truck transport over a developing modern road network began to cut into the activities of these trading nomads, they expanded their commercial enterprises into the mountainous Hazarajat where the roads were poor or nonexistent. In the mid-1960's thousands of these trading nomads were migrating into the area each summer. For example, observers reported that more than 60,000 Pashtuns frequented the largest open-air bazaar each season.

The Hazaras exploit their area by irrigation and intensive cultivation of the valley floors, a little dry farming of the upland slopes, animal husbandry and some hunting. They are largely self-sufficient, although they must acquire such items as tea sugar, kerosene, cloth, some tools and utensils and luxury items from outside sources. These trade goods are usually obtained from nomadic Pashtuns, in turn for which the Hazaras sell rugs, saddle bags, a woolen cloth called *barak* and *ghee*.

The northern limit of the Hazarajat traditionally was held to be the Koh-i-Baba Range, which runs parallel to and south of the western end of the Hindu Kush (see ch. 2, Physical Environment). Long hard winters and a land inheritance system, which fragments holdings, combined to push the limits of Hazara settlement in the mid-twentieth century well beyond this region. Substantial numbers of Hazara cultivators were to be found in the Northern Plains. A community, for example, forms a significant proportion of the populations of Khanabad Kunduz and their surrounding areas.

Other Hazaras have emigrated for economic reasons to the towns and cities of the east, southeast and west. Soviet sources claim that there are about 220,000 Hazaras in the vicinity of Ghazni, 140,000 in Bamian, 170,000 in Herat, 80,000 in Girishk and smaller numbers in Kabul and other urban centers. Some bring their families with them and remain permanently, others return to the Hazarajat on a seasonal basis. Most of the migrants obtain work as streetsweepers, domestic servants, shopkeepers or water carriers; a few acquire some education and have been absorbed in the new middle

class. Several Hazaras have amassed substantial fortunes from commercial enterprises.

In the twentieth century, relations between the Hazaras and the Pashtuns were generally amicable. There has been some intermarriage between the two groups as well as between Hazaras and Tajiks. An undercurrent of ill-feeling has remained, however, and neither Pashtuns nor Hazaras hold the other in high regard. Hazara resentment at the political and economic predominance of the Pashtuns has been exacerbated by religious differences between the two peoples. Minor disturbances among the Shiite community in Kabul have given the government cause for concern at various times. The Hazaras are a religious minority in a country where Sunnite Islam of the Hanafi rite is the official faith and their literacy rate is particularly low. The Afghan Government has made a vigorous effort under the First and Second Five-Year Plans to establish schools in the Hazarajat, but despite these recent efforts most adult Hazaras are still illiterate (see ch. 10, Education).

The Hazaras are divided into a number of tribes, of which the Jaghuris, Uruzganis, Dai Zengis, Dai Kundis and Besudis are the best known. Each tribe is differentiated from the others by locality, variations in Persian dialect and slight cultural changes. Along some of the important roads and trails the villages are fortified. Some Hazaras in the Northern Plains use yurt-type tents or huts during the summer. All give the impression of being hardy, devout, industrious, mountain people who will readily accept technical innovations when given the chance.

URAL-ALTAIC SPEAKERS

The principal groups speaking languages of the Turkic branch of the Ural-Altaic family are the Uzbeks and the Turkomans both of whom are concentrated in Afghan Turkistan, the region co-extensive with the region north of the Hindu Kush, centering on Mazar-i-Sharif. Ethnically both groups are closely related to their respective Uzbek and Turkoman kinsmen in the Soviet Union, and their language and culture corresponds with that of the Soviet groups in all important respects.

Uzbeks

The Uzbeks, numbering about 1 million, are the largest Turkic-speaking people in Afghanistan. They are Sunnite Moslems and speak Uzbek as their first language, but many also know Dari. Traditionally nomadic, many Uzbeks are now settled in the towns and villages where they are merchants, craftsmen and cultivators.

Uzbek artisans and merchants form an important component of the population of several northern towns. Their specialties include carpentry, weaving, pottery-making and copper and iron work. While most Uzbeks are sedentary farmers, a small minority in the foothills of the northern slopes of the Hindu Kush, west of Maimana pursue a seminomadic way of life. Tribal organization has disappeared among the settled Uzbeks but still survives, to some degree, among the nomadic group. Although there is evidence of intermarriage with other peoples, they are basically Mongoloid, the high incidence of Mongoloid physical traits being more pronounced among the nomadic Uzbeks than among the oasis dwellers.

The Uzbeks played an insignificant role in the country's affairs until the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries at which time minor Uzbek khanates proliferated across the entire Northern Plains region. These khanates were the precursors of the large estates which in the modern period provide employment for the majority of Uzbeks in the country.

Turkomans

Living in Afghanistan along the Soviet border and numbering approximately 400,000, the Turkomans have not intermixed with other ethnic groups to the same extent as the Uzbeks or others. They have maintained their Turkic language, literature and way of life more completely than the others (see ch. 11, Artistic and Intellectual Expression).

They are chiefly tribal nomads, but some do occasional cultivating. Almost all possess large herds of sheep, goats, horses and camels. The major tribes are the Tekkes concentrated in Herat; the Saraks, living some 90 miles west of Maimana near the Soviet border; and the Erseris, distributed throughout the Northern Plains. Traditionally horsemen, they engage in caravan trade, using both the *yabu* (pack pony) and the camel. Raising karakul sheep and producing high quality carpets are their primary economic contributions to the country. The Tekkes and the Saraks are noted for making exceptionally fine carpets. Men and boys as well as women and girls work as weavers.

Turkomans are Sunnite Moslems, although those in Afghanistan are not particularly noted for their piety. They are generally of medium, slender physique, with dark, sometimes red, hair and Mongoloid features.

Like the Pashtuns, they are highly independent and a bit contemptuous of other groups, although they have established commercial relations with certain Pashtun tribes settled in the north. With their kinsmen across the Soviet border, they have an acute

awareness of their Turkic background and the large fraternity of Turks throughout Asia. Older Afghan Turkomans are particularly proud of the role their fathers and grandfathers played in delaying Russian colonization of Central Asia and of their own part in the final battles against the advancing Bolshevik armies in the early 1920's.

Others

The Kirghiz live in the Wakhan mountain area, shunning the lower valleys. A mountain nomadic people, they move in their seasonal migrations across the unpatrolled mountain borders of Afghan Wakhan, Soviet Kirghiz and Chinese Sinkiang. They number about 15,000 in Afghanistan and more than 800,000 in the Soviet Union. They are Sunnite Moslems and are Mongoloid in appearance. They live in yurts, and their language is a Turkic dialect.

Other Turko-Mongolian groups in the country include small numbers of Moghuls, Kazakhs and Karakalpaks. The Moghuls live near the Hazaras in western and northern Afghanistan. Numbering only a few thousand, they call themselves Mongols and claim to be descended from Genghis Khan. In addition to these three Turko-Mongolian groups, a few other Indian minorities are represented.

DRAVIDIAN AND SEMITIC SPEAKERS

The Brahuīs, who speak a Dravidian language, are sedentary farmers and nomads living in Baluchistan and in the Chakhansur area. While the Brahuīs were earlier arrivals in the area than the Baluchis, Baluchi speech and customs predominate and many Brahuīs know Baluchi as well as their own language. Some Brahuīs are employed as farmers on property owned by Baluchis who strongly prefer a nomadic way of life themselves.

Small Jewish enclaves are found in the towns and cities especially Kabul, Kandahar, and Jalalabad. Afghan Jews live chiefly by trade and moneylending. A number of Arabs, some of whom still speak an Arab dialect, are found in Badakhshan and Afghan Turkistan as far west as Maimana. Some are settled agricultural workers, but most are partially or wholly nomadic, moving seasonally with their herds and living in their yurt-type tents, summer and winter, except in extreme weather.

CHAPTER 6

LANGUAGES AND COMMUNICATION

More than a score of languages are spoken in the country. Most of them belong either to the Indo-European or to the Ural-Altaic language family. Farsi (Persian) in its Afghan variant, officially known as Dari since 1964, and Pashto are the two principal languages. Both are Indo-European. Uzbek and Turkoman, the most important minority tongues are part of the Ural-Altaic family.

Farsi, or modern Persian, emerged in a direct line of descent from an ancient form of the language known as old Persian, through the so-called Middle Persian of the Sassanians and Parthians, to its present stage of development. The modern language has a number of variants, including that spoken in Afghanistan and the dialect adopted as the national standard in Iran (Tehrani). The Afghan variant of Farsi represents a different, and possibly less evolved, form of the modern language than does the standard dialect of Iran. Since 1964 it has been officially known as Dari, a term which was adapted in support of government efforts to promote a sense of national pride and cultural distinctiveness among the people. The 1964 Constitution states that "from among the languages of Afghanistan, Pashto and Dari shall be the official languages."

Most of the Pashtuns, who comprise the dominant ethnic group, speak Pashto. The Tajiks numbering about 4 million, speak Dari, as do a small number of the urban-dwelling Pashtuns. The Hazaras speak Hazaragi, a Dari dialect. Persons who speak Pashto as their mother tongue outnumber native Dari speakers. Many persons speak Dari as a second language.

The distribution of languages and dialects follows a clear pattern. For example, in the southwestern plateau Pashto predominates; in the Central Highlands communication is in Pashto, Hazaragi and other Dari dialects; in Northern Plains, Dari, Uzbek and Turkoman are most often used; and in the northeastern sector Dari and various languages of the Dardic branch of the Indo-European family are spoken.

Dari, rather than Pashto, generally serves as the means of communication between speakers of different languages. Under the

reign of King Mohammad Zahir Shah (1933–), the Afghan Government has made vigorous efforts to promote the spread of Pashto. Dari prevails, however, apparently because of its pre-eminence as a literary medium and because of the leading role played in the nation's commercial life by persons who speak it as their first language.

All the major languages are shared with other countries. Not only is Farsi spoken in Afghanistan in Iran variants of the same language, but the Uzbek and Turkoman languages are also directly related to the speech of the people living in Soviet Central Asia. Pashto is also spoken by many people in Pakistan. Baluchi is spoken by Baluchi tribesmen living principally in Pakistan and Iran but also in Afghanistan.

The major languages are all divided into dialects varying in pronunciation, vocabulary or special usages. Except in cases of extreme dialectical variation, speakers of varying dialects of the same language can understand one another. Afghans who are not native Dari speakers usually know enough of the language to enable them to convey their thoughts to persons who speak a language other than their own.

All languages are written from right to left in the Arabic script with its characters supplemented as needed by the addition of diacritical marks to represent sounds nonexistent in Arabic. Thus a person who has acquired a knowledge of the expanded alphabet knows the script used for the major languages.

The prevalence of bilingualism reflects the geographic mobility of much of the population. Pashto-speaking nomads travel in Dari-speaking areas to graze or to trade, or they come to do business with Dari- or Uzbek-speaking townsmen; nomads who are primary speakers of one language meet nomads speaking other languages on their migratory cycles. The pattern of life demands an ability to communicate with speakers of other languages. The ability to use a second language may amount to as little as the capacity to make oneself barely understood or to genuine fluency.

INDO-EUROPEAN FAMILY

Over 10 million Afghans speak languages of the Indo-European language family. Among them are the Pashtuns, Tajiks and Hazaras, the Chahar Aimak tribes, the Baluchis, the Hindus, the Nuristanis, the Pashais and foreigners of European, American and Russian origin (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups).

The Indo-European family of languages includes in its many branches the Iranian languages of the Middle East plus the Indic and the Dardic languages of India and Pakistan. Scholars believe

the Indo-European family group is derived from the languages of Aryan migrants, some of whom invaded the Iranian plateau about 3,000 years ago and penetrated the Indian subcontinent. All of the varied languages of this vast family resemble each other in structure; they also share some of their vocabulary—individual words are recognizable as stemming from the same linguistic matrix.

Iranian

The various languages of the Iranian plateau, principally Pashto, Dari, and Baluchi, are the dominant Indo-European languages in the country. They are generally divided into Western Iranian (or Persian) and Eastern Iranian groups; some of the latter, including Pashto and Baluchi, have been influenced by Indian languages.

Pashto

Pashto, an Eastern Iranian language, is spoken by the Pashtuns, whether in Afghanistan or Pakistan, as well as by some smaller ethnic minorities. The Pashto-speaking area covers most of the southeastern third of Afghanistan and overlaps into Pakistan to include much of the belt between the border and the Indus River. Generally, Pashto is not as common as Dari in the cities, with the exception of Kandahar and Jalalabad.

The language has certain limitations as a medium for modern cultural expression. Its vocabulary is inadequate to cope with aspects of the modern world of science and machines. The demand for new words is met largely by drawing on the Arabic and Persian languages, from which a number of nouns and verbs have been borrowed and incorporated into the Pashto vocabulary.

Within the Pashto language there are dialectical variations in pronunciation grammar and vocabulary. Using pronunciation as a criterion, two principal dialects are traditionally identified: western or Kandahari Pashto, and eastern or Peshawarin (after Peshawar in Pakistan), generally pronounced Pakhto. The Peshawari dialect shows phonetic and vocabulary influences from India, mainly from modern Lahnda, an Indic language spoken by people living in the Lahore area of West Pakistan and the nearby Punjab region of northern India. Generally speaking the Peshawari pronunciation dominates the Pashto spoken in Pakistan, whereas the Pashto speakers among the upper class in Kabul speak with a modified Kandahari pronunciation.

Pashto is written in a modified Arabic script. In addition to the four letters which carry special diacritical marks in the Dari adaptation, Pashto uses an additional eight diacritical marks for peculiarly Pashto consonants. The spelling of Pashto words is often undecided, but increased standardization is taking place.

The spread and stabilization of Pashto has been a focal point of official concern since the beginning of Zahir Shah's reign in the early 1930's. Measures introduced to promote its use have included a requirement that all civil servants undertake a course of study in the language, upon completion of which they could expect a 10 percent salary increase.

Another measure involved the making of decisions on orthography, the intention being to do away with the multiplicity of spellings which resulted from varying pronunciations of a given word in different dialects. Still another measure proposed but never implemented, was the notion of replacing existing surnames with terms having particular Afghan significance. For example, among the Pashtuns proper names suggested were tribal designations, such as Waziri, Shinwari and Khattak, the names of flowers and names of mythical heroes. An article in the 1964 Constitution stated that it was the duty of the state to prepare and implement an effective program for the development and strengthening of Pashto as "the national language."

Dari

Dari, as the Afghan variant of Farsi (Persian) is officially called, differs from the national standard dialect of Iran. When an Afghan speaks, an Iranian who speaks Tehrani feels that he is hearing an older form of modern Persian than his own, since many of its constructions are still like those of the written language of nearly a thousand years ago. Numerous Iranian Farsi dialects other than Tehrani, however, bear many resemblances to Dari, the form of Farsi spoken in Afghanistan.

Several variations occur in Dari. Best known of these is the Kabuli dialect. Spoken by most of the residents of Kabul this dialect is used by the bulk of the educated elite by the ranking officers in the civil service and military forces, by the merchants and small traders in Kabul and by artisans and servants who must learn it as a second language.

Tajiki, the Dari dialect spoken by most of the Tajiks in northern and northeastern Afghanistan—from Kabul north—varies from standard Dari principally in pronunciation. It is basically the same as the Tajiki spoken in the Soviet Union. Still another variant of Dari is the Khorasani dialect, spoken by Persian speakers in western Afghanistan and also in the area north from Kabul.

Other Dari dialects include those of the Chahar Aimaks and that of the Hazaras, known as Hazaragi. The structure of the Chahar Aimak dialects is Iranian, but the vocabulary borrows heavily from Turkic languages. Hazaragi contains many Mongol and Turkic words.

Dari speakers write their language as standard Persian in the adapted Arabic script. The Persian alphabet has four letters formed of Arabic characters with special sounds occurring in Persian but not in Arabic, and it differs in its pronunciation of some of the Arabic letters.

Other Iranian Languages

Baluchi tribesmen in Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan speak Baluchi which, like Pashto, is an Eastern Iranian language. The language is not known generally by other Afghans and is spoken in Afghanistan only by some 70,000 persons, many of whom probably know some Persian.

Various ancient Indo-European languages are spoken by small communities in the Pamir Knot region along the Afghan-Soviet boundary in Badakhshan and in the Wakhan corridor. The chief of these groups are the Sughnis the Wakhis, the Munjanis, and the Zebakis. Each local variant has only a few thousand speakers.

Indic

The Indic branch of the Indo-European family is represented by Punjabi and Sindhi and several lesser known languages. Punjabi and Sindhi are spoken chiefly by Hindus and Sikhs in the eastern urban centers, many of whom migrated from India to Afghanistan during the past 100 years. Hindu merchants sometimes use Urdu as a language of trade.

Dardic

The Dardic languages represent another branch of the Indo-European language family. Their relationship to Iranian and to Indic languages is a matter still to be decided, and they are not mutually intelligible with them or with each other. They are concentrated in eastern Afghanistan.

Within the Dardic group the Nuristani languages form the largest subgroup. They are spoken by about 90,000 people and include Kati (the most important), Waigeli, Ashkun and Prasun.

Pashai, another Dardic language, includes a number of dialects and has been, on that basis, divided into eastern and western Pashai. Ormuri and Parachi, spoken by only about 1,000 persons, form isolated linguistic pockets in otherwise Dari-Pashto-language territory. It is not clear whether they are Dardic or whether they are survivals of a southeastern branch of Iranian.

Still other small groups of Dardic speakers are also found. Gawarbarti and Tirahi, for example, both of which are related to Kashmiri (the language of Kashmir), are found within Afghan territory along the northeast boundary.

Other Indo-European Languages

English, French, German Turkish, and to a lesser degree Russian and Italian are spoken by foreigners and a few Afghans. All except Turkish are taught in some schools (see ch. 10, Education). In addition, small numbers of Afghans had part of their advanced or professional education abroad in these five languages or in Turkish.

The Afghan who knows English has no need for studying it formally in school courses; frequent contact between Afghans and the British in India resulted in the informal acquisition of some English by some Pashtun nomads or by persons who served in the British army. A few Afghans learned some English while working with Morrison-Knudsen Incorporated, an American construction company once engaged in developing the Helmand Valley, or on other United States projects. English instruction is now much more common in Afghan schools than is instruction in French. Peace Corps volunteers have been teaching English to Afghan "English teachers" for several years. Only speakers of English who learned it formally are likely to be able to read it.

Literacy among speakers of other foreign languages, especially French, is high because they nearly always learned these languages formally in Afghan schools or abroad. With the exception of former employees of English-speaking employers and of those who have picked up English in India, those who know foreign languages are generally members of the governmental elite. Those who know European languages or Turkish appear to derive little additional prestige because they generally are persons already endowed with high status through their connection with prominent families.

URAL-ALTAIC FAMILY

Northern Afghanistan people primarily speak languages of the Turkic branch of the Ural-Altaic family. These Turkic languages are a part of the vast Turkic-speaking area contiguous to northern Afghanistan, as well as of most of the Central Asia republics of the Soviet Union and Chinese Sinkiang province. Although written in Arabic script in Afghanistan, Turkic is written elsewhere in Cyrillic and in Roman scripts (as in Turkey).

The Turkic group is represented in Afghanistan by three major languages. Turkoman is South Turkic, akin to the modern Turkish (or Osmanli) spoken in Turkey; Uzbek is Central Turkic; and Kirghiz is of northeastern Turkic. The Kizilbashs, concentrated largely in the Kabul area, now speak Persian rather than Turkic; their original speech was related to Turkoman. Of the approximate-

ly 1.5 million Turkic speakers, there are 1 million Uzbeks, 400,000 Turkomans and 15,000 Kirghiz.

Between the fourteenth and nineteenth centuries, Chagatai Turkic served as a lingua franca among Turkic peoples. Uzbek now appears to hold this position. Most Turkoman and Uzbek speakers are able to understand each other, and when communicating with non-Turkic speakers they use Dari.

OTHER FAMILIES

Dravidian languages, which originated among an ancient people of central India, are spoken by a few thousand Brahuis in the extreme south. Since the Brahuis live among the Baluchis, all understand Baluchi, Dari or both.

Various Semitic languages are spoken in special circumstances by small minorities. For example, Afghanistan's few thousand Jews speak Dari, but use Hebrew as a ritual language. A few Arabic-speakers are found in Afghan Turkistan and elsewhere, but some Arabs speak Dari exclusively.

LANGUAGE AND SOCIETY

The concept of a national language (Pashto) has been developing concomitant with the growth of national consciousness since the early twentieth century. The notion of Pashto as a national language received printed support even before World War II through the writings of a noted public figure, Mahmud Tarzi, in the newspaper *Seraj-ol-Akhbar* (Lamp of the News). Another early champion of the cause was Salih Mohammad, a well-known philologist. A Committee for Pashto was formed in 1922. It began urging the teaching of the language to non-Pashtun groups and the study of its literature.

As the most widely known language in the country and as the language of Afghan leaders, Dari might have been a natural choice, but use of it conflicted with the Afghan desire to stress independence from Iran. Pashto was selected as a national language by King Amanullah Khan (1919-29) because of the dominant role of the Pashtuns in the nationalist movement, and in 1964 it was again declared an official language along with Dari.

Although the government has encouraged the use of Pashto, it appears that few Persian speakers have actually switched to Pashto.

The government sponsors the Pashto Academy, a body of scholars whose function is to revitalize Pashto and to adapt it to the needs of a modern means of official communication. The Pashto Academy superseded a group formed by King Amanullah for a similar purpose (see ch. 11 Artistic and Intellectual Expression).

In accordance with plans announced in mid-1967, all cultural, linguistic and historical institutions have been merged into a single Afghan Academy. The new institution devotes itself to research in literature, history, language and culture and undertakes publications in Dari and Pashto of major Afghan works. In addition, a special committee has been appointed by the King to promote Pashto.

COMMUNICATION

Private communication takes place by mail, telephone, telegraph and personal exchange. A telephone and telegraph network links all the principal cities and many smaller towns with an automatic dial system operating in Kabul and Kandahar. Telephones are in service in many government and commercial buildings and are available to the general public in street corner booths and hotels. Telegraph land lines connect with neighboring countries, and direct international service by cable is available to these countries as well as to Europe and the United States.

The postal system is used by many persons, some of whom, unable to write themselves, engage the services of friends, relatives or professionals to handle their correspondence for them. Outside the major urban centers, the bazaars and marketplaces provide a meeting ground for social conversation and the conduct of business.

CHAPTER 7

SOCIAL STRUCTURE

In this country kinship sets the pattern of social organization. Who an Afghan is, what he does and what he can expect to do, are matters primarily of his membership and position in a particular family, lineage and tribe. Except in the cities social mobility scarcely exists. The stress on kinship and genealogy reflects the strong tribalism which has been retained to a far greater degree in Afghanistan than in most middle Eastern countries. More than two thirds of the population has some tribal connection; even for the remaining third, relationships between people are primarily based on family ties and obligations.

Through the kinship system, each individual member of the tribe has connections with his extended family, lineage, tribe, and ethnic community. His strongest feelings of identity and loyalty relate to his extended family, then in diminishing degrees of intensity, to the larger social units. As a focal point of loyalty the national society comes last. Feelings of allegiance to the nation are filtered through the family and its extended relationships, tending to become meaningful only if they happen to coincide with the interests of the smaller groups.

Among the Pashtuns and other tribally organized groups some lineages have higher status than others. This is partly a reflection of their genealogical priority, partly a matter of their relative wealth and armed strength. Senior lineages, based on the line of descent from father to eldest son and to the latter's eldest son, have the highest status. In most cases, they have become wealthy and politically powerful over the years as well, and collectively form what might be called the tribal aristocracy.

Despite these variations in social status the equalitarian influence of Islam makes itself felt to some extent in the society. Respect for persons distinguished by birth or age is inculcated from earliest childhood and rendered and accepted as a matter of course. Familiarity between persons of widely different social status is not always accepted. There is, however, a general awareness of human dignity; in the mosques everyone worships together; in the teahouses, rich and poor, tribal and nontribal, Pashtun and Hazara may take tea in the same group.

The government is making intensive efforts to weld tribal and nontribal groups into a more cohesive national society. For the vast majority of the population, rights and obligations still center on the village, tribal or nomadic group. The literate elite, however, is increasingly turning away from the village-tribal matrix and orienting itself toward the urban life and the outside world. In urban society this trend is reflected in increased rates of social mobility notably among persons whose rise can be attributed to success in business or government service. Along with this, family connections are slowly losing their dominant importance and individual achievement is becoming more influential.

TRIBAL NOMADS

The Kinship System

The tribal structure and the lineage system on which the kinship system is built is the key form of social organization among nomads. The tribes are in effect large kin groups consisting of all persons allegedly descended through the male line from a common male ancestor. The major lineages are segmented into smaller lineages—the smallest or minor lineage being composed of a number of extended families (see ch. 8, Family). The genealogical relationship between the major lineages of the tribe may not actually be traceable but usually such a relationship is assumed.

One of the most common mechanisms for relating these major tribal components is to assume that each was descended from one of several brothers. Thus, the individual may not actually be able to trace a genealogical connection between himself and his fellow tribesmen, but he generally believes that he is related to them in some way and tends to deal with all of them primarily as kinsmen. Similarly, authority and status within the tribe are based on kinship principles, which ramify from the family through the minor and major lineages and finally from the tribe as a whole.

The Tribe as a Socio-Political Unit

The nomadic tribe as a whole, however, is more than a large kin group. It is a semiautonomous political unit which occupies certain territory and must be prepared to defend its right to exploit it. Thus, it has some of the characteristics of a military organization, and in fact certain tribes still reflect a military organization in their nomenclature. The word Hazara, for example is the Persian term for a unit of 1,000 soldiers, a fundamental tribal-military unit in Mongol society. As a semi-independent unit, the nomadic tribe is responsible for the maintenance of law and order among

its own people, for imposing punishments and for dealing with the other tribal units in affairs of mutual concern.

Traditional Leadership

The nomadic tribes are led by *khans* (chiefs). The *khan* is elected by open acclamation by the tribal *jirgah* (council), composed of the heads of the various lineages and sublineages. The *khan* is nearly always a member of the senior lineage (*khan kheyli*) of the tribe and is usually the eldest son of the previous *khan*. In some instances where the eldest son is considered unfit or some other individual has demonstrated superior capabilities, another choice is made. Within each nomad encampment, leadership is furnished by the head of the senior lineage.

The tribal leader is expected to make his authority felt, but at the same time he is expected to be guided by tribal customs, mores, and precedent in the execution of his duties. In general, he exercises his authority loosely except during the annual migrations or in cases of intertribal warfare, when stricter discipline is in order. For major decisions for which there is no precedent or which run counter to earlier practices, he is expected to consult the *jirgah*. He is, therefore, first among equals rather than a ruler in the usual sense. This pattern reflects the Afghan view of authority and is often referred to as "tribal democracy." It is viewed by some Afghan intellectuals as being the seed for future democratic development. Those who attend the *jirgah* are themselves the heads of lineages or sublineages to whose members they carry back the decisions of *jirgah*.

Status Within the Tribe

Individual status in the tribe is defined initially by position within the tribal genealogy. In the extended family the elder brothers are generally accorded higher status than younger brothers. In theory at least the eldest son succeeds his father as head of the household, and although the inheritance is equally divided among sons, the eldest normally receives the best of the shares. Younger brothers are expected to show somewhat the same respect to an older brother as they show to the father. Individual status also reflects the position of the extended family within the lineage and of the lineage within the overall genealogy of the tribe. The line of descent from father to eldest son and to the latter's eldest son is considered to be the senior line, and families descended in this line have generally higher status than those in junior lines. This seniority status is expressed in the succession of the chieftainship of the various lineage groupings and tribes, and for the individual

it means that belonging to such a family line gives him greater status than people in collateral lines which do not have first claim to chieftainship roles.

Criteria other than relative age and seniority also play a part in this essentially kin-based status system. Apart from holding a political office the two most important elements are wealth and armed strength. Wealth is either in animals, land or both, depending on the economic pursuits of the tribesmen.

Considering all of the various aspects of tribal status, the highest status is accorded the individual who is a member of the senior lineage, holds a recognized position of tribal authority, is the senior person in his family and lineage and supports this status with wealth in animals and land and a large group of well-armed men.

The kinsmen of such an important tribal personage are regarded as having a special status. In many cases the size of the tribe gives status to the tribe and its leader, though size may be mitigated by quality. A small tribe with good fighters or one that has great wealth may equal or surpass the status of a large tribe.

There are limited ways of showing status in a tribal society, and most of them do not normally involve much display of wealth. A man with status must offer hospitality; the tribal leader is expected to entertain his tribesmen lavishly and frequently, and his hospitality is measured in the amount of food he provides.

The Nomad Camp

Nomads tend to move along regular routes, much like the sea lanes of commercial navigation, and they have their regular ports of call, which are the traditional encampment sites at which they stop in their migration cycles. These sites are always determined by the availability of water, the accessibility of adequate pasture, the nearness of the site to settled persons with whom trade is possible and the suitability of the site from the standpoint of defense. This last consideration also dictates the manner in which the camp itself is set up. The leader's tent, and that of his immediate relatives, is usually near the center. The others place their tents around that of the leader.

VILLAGE SOCIETY

The Village as a Social Unit

A vast majority of the population are village dwellers who spend at least part of the year in permanent quarters. As an economic unit, the village is largely self-sufficient but certain necessities, such as iron, cloth, tea, and sugar, may have to be purchased from nearby towns. Its inhabitants are peasant farmers, and there are

no full-time specialists in nonagricultural pursuits among them. Regardless of size, the village is a social unit, and its people feel a sense of common identity. Whether tribesman or not, the villager's life revolves around his family and lineage, and his place in society is acquired through his kinsmen.

The majority of the people in a single village nearly always belong to a single ethnic community or tribe. Within the village, kinship groupings are important; a man inherits land and social position from his father, and he farms near or with his father and brothers. As a result, the inhabitants of a particular village are usually linked by a complex network of marital and kinship ties. In certain parts of the country where village organization prevails, adjoining villages are usually inhabited by members of the same ethnic group. This is true, for example, in the Hazarajat, where the Hazaras are predominant, and in the eastern portion of the Hari Rud Valley, where the principal tribes of the Chahar Aimak group are represented. In the north where Pashtuns, Tajiks, and Uzbeks live in separate, adjoining villages, their village councils meet to consider common problems.

For those who are still tribally organized, the outward form of the tribe remains the same as that found among nomads. The tribal structure extends over several villages, and the connecting links are provided by the kinship system. Relationships between the villagers differ somewhat from those between nomadic tribesmen. These differences may be attributed primarily to three circumstances.

First, to most nomads land is important only as it provides a migration route, camp site, pasture for flocks or occasionally as a source of additional income. To the settled tribesman, however, land is a direct source of wealth when combined with his own labor. He is eager to acquire as much as he can since land is as important for him as flocks are to the nomad tribesman. All this brings forth a new aspect of competition between members of the same tribe for use of a piece of land. Second, in tribal villages in which a landlord-tenant farmer relationship exists, the tribal chief may seek to obtain personal title to tribal lands which heretofore were registered only in his name as the tribal chief. Third, a settled population also develops greater occupational complexity, as a result of which gradations in social status tend to develop.

Leadership

The usual term for a selected local chief of a village is *malik*. The village chief, chosen by the villagers, is the main channel of communication between them and the central government. Where the entire population of a village belongs to one tribe or lineage of a

single tribe. the position of chief tends to be the hereditary privilege of the senior lineage. Usually, an oldest son inherits the office.

Status in a village begins with an individual's membership in a family. Tribal or not, a villager's life revolves around his family or extended family, and he first acquires a place in village society through his kin. Beyond the family the individual may acquire status from his occupational role, his wealth or his position in religious or educational circles.

Status Within the Village

Large landowners, such as are often found in other Middle Eastern countries, are relatively uncommon. A few large landholdings exist, but the marked difference between wealthy absentee landlords and landless peasantry is not a feature of Afghan social structure. Small holdings of individuals and property held jointly by the tribe are the more usual types of land tenure. Wealth in land or animals is nonetheless a criterion of high social status in the villages; positions of status often devolve from lineage, as for example, one lineage may provide all the *mullahs* (Moslem religious leader). Literacy is another criterion of status in the village. The ability to do some reading and writing is both an economic and a social asset.

URBAN SOCIETY

The elite group, concentrated in Kabul, forms an extremely small circle. Its core consists of the royal family—the Musahiban family of the Mohammadzai line of the Durani Pashtuns; its outer periphery, with rare exceptions is made up of other Pashtuns of the Mohammadzai lineage, principally those closely related to the ruling house. Other Pashtun tribal leaders, especially the chiefs of the great tribal confederations, have at one time made their influence felt within this elite group, but in general their power has been confined to their own localities. Similarly, the influence of Uzbek and Turkoman chiefs, while considerable, is confined to their own tribal groups.

Beneath this elite, the dominant group is composed of intellectuals who live mainly in the urban centers, especially in Kabul and other focal points of government and commerce. They are professional men, top religious leaders, military officers large landowners, tribal chiefs, intermediate and high government officials, professors and university students. In terms of ethnic composition, the group includes not only Pashtuns but also a substantial Tajik component as well as a few Uzbeks, Kizilbashs and others. Collectively they number about 10,000 persons. Additional young

persons enter the group each year by virtue of the increased educational opportunities at home and abroad. Within this group education now ranks equally with family connections as a qualification for good marriage and enhancement of status.

The middle-income group numbering about half a million persons is made up mostly of Tajiks, but includes some Pashtuns, Uzbeks, Turkomans, Hindus Sikhs, and Jews. Its members are government officials and military officers in the middle grades, merchants, policemen, tradesmen, accountants, artisans, teachers, and literate religious leaders. The symbols of prestige among them are varied; some may wear Western clothes while others wear the traditional clothes of their ethnic community. Increasingly, education is a mark of status as are success in the job and accumulation of wealth. The group has few organizations to promote the mutual interests of its members or sense of cohesiveness, although there are some trade guilds.

Drawn in increasing numbers to the urban centers, particularly Kabul Ghazni and Kandahar, are a lower-income group who are unskilled workers, mostly young men from the Hazarajat. These people are without assured income and often move in with foreigners or upper class Afghans as domestic servants. Others crowd into huts, earning a living as porters or cleaners. Most of them maintain close ties with their villages, and those who have left wives and children behind return to visit as often as possible. Carpenters, porters, blacksmiths, entertainers, and a growing number of factory workers also constitute an important segment of the lower-income group. Unlike other sectors of the urban population, no emergent sense of social cohesion is discernible among members of this group.

TRENDS

Clearly defined social classes are not to be found in tribal or village societies, and they are scarcely discernible in urban areas. Among the tribes certain lineages enjoy higher status than others, and serious rivalries often prevail between those in different positions. There is no class consciousness, however, in the Western sense. Occasionally some segments of the educated elite in the cities form a common front to press for a matter of common interest but this elite in no way forms a closed and cohesive class.

Traditionally, there has been little or no social mobility. Social position has been ascribed at birth, and achievement has played little part in determining a man's social level. Lack of economic means and of access to education has precluded members of most minority groups from improving their circumstances well beyond

those of their families. Most persons have had neither the means nor the expectation of rising above what they consider their birth-determined place. This is particularly true of the tribal elements.

The most certain way to move upward in the social system is to amass a fortune. In terms of occupational choice, government service probably offers the best prospects for upward mobility. Family, ethnic and tribal connections are important both in getting a civil service position and in enhancing opportunities for promotion. Nonetheless, even without them, an individual can rise on his own merit, at least to the ranks of officials just below the top. The top portions are mainly held by capable Pashtuns, but throughout the rest of the civil service, Pashtuns are a minority and Tajiks predominate.

CHAPTER 8

FAMILY

Nearly every aspect of Afghan society relates in some manner to the structure and function of the family system. To a large extent the family determines the social rank, religious adherence, marriage partner, and personal standards of behavior of each of its members. The family also reveals itself in a broad area of activities which in more complex societies are the province of other institutions. Kin groups for example, are frequently identical with political units. Often they comprise a social neighborhood, since close relatives tend to settle in the same locale, and frequently they constitute an economic group, jointly owning land and livestock while cultivating the crops and tending the animals on a co-operative basis.

The kinship system is based primarily on the extended family, comprised usually of a man, his wife, their married sons and their families, and their unmarried daughters. The preferred marriage partner is the father's brother's daughter, or failing this, someone in the same large kin group. Young married persons generally live in the household of the husband's father, who is the dominant authority. An orderly disciplined family life is considered socially proper and gives a man a good name. On the other hand, transgressing the generally accepted standards for family manners and customs related to family life brings disgrace upon him and his kinsmen.

STRUCTURE

Afghan society is comprised of many different ethnic groups, each with its own customs governing family affairs. Fundamentally similar principles, however, appear in their various family systems, partly as a consequence of a common heritage of Islamic culture. Moslem males are permitted to have as many as four wives, but monogamy generally prevails throughout the country. Most men find it economically impractical to support more than one wife.

Until the early twentieth century, polygamy was fairly common among upper class Afghans. This practice disappeared with King

Amanullah Khan (1919-29) partly because of Western influence. Polygamy is encountered most frequently among the Turkomans where the income a second wife produces through rug weaving tends to offset the cost of her support. Moreover, in the cities there has been a trend recently toward taking an additional wife by young men who have left their first wives in their native villages.

Kin Group Organization

The basic unit of the family is not the nuclear household—father, mother, children—but the extended family, which consists of a senior couple, their grown and married children, unmarried daughters and the grandchildren. This larger unit is regarded by the Afghan as his family, and it is with this larger unit that he lives and carries out his social and economic functions. The extended family is traditional in the country and is widely accepted as an ideal. Only among the few Westernized Afghans is there a movement away from the extended family and toward the nuclear family as the principal operative family unit. If these nuclear families have additional persons attached to the household, they are most often working adults related closely to the head of the household.

In tribal society families are organized into a variety of kin groups beginning with the nuclear family and ending with the tribe. In between these two levels the basic social unit is the lineage—a group of people tracing descent in a single line from a known ancestor through a determinate number of generations. Among the nontribal Afghans, common descent, traditions, and kinship organization do not go beyond the lineage.

The tribal structure is based on a theory of common descent shared either by all the members of a specific group or by members of the principal tribes of a tribal grouping. The ties of kinship between members of the larger groups may be theoretical, and so may function only to back up the affiliation of the individual or of his lineage with the group's traditional progenitor. In some cases the lineage group has taken the name of its traditional forebear, as in the case of the Timuri, one of the Chahar Aimak tribes (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups).

Minor lineages exist among both tribally and nontribally organized groups. Among the tribal groups, however, minor lineages converge upward into various degrees of major lineages. Between the minor lineage at the bottom and the tribe at the top, the individual is able to trace his kinship through groups which are based solely on kinship and which may or may not actually be organized like the minor lineage and the tribe. Among Pashtuns a lineage group is called a *kheyl*.

For most Afghan tribesmen, the minor lineage is the most significant kinship group beyond the household. It is the largest group in which kinship is not only theoretically recognized but also is of practical significance, regardless of what common descent is believed to be shared with still larger groups. Usually the oldest members can still personally remember the individual from whom common descent is traced; most adult members describe him as their great grandfather. Among the mountain Tajiks, for example, whose knowledge of genealogical relationships is scant, kin group awareness rarely extends beyond a single village comprised of six or eight closely related households.

A lineage can break up into two or more new lineage groups as a result of a quarrel, the failure to recognize a successor after the death of the lineage head or the permanent shift of part of a lineage to another area. The remaining part usually keeps the old name, and the new group takes another, but the lineage traditions are maintained by both. Among the Pashtuns the terminology involved in labeling kinship units is flexible, the same term denoting units at different levels. A man who says that he is of the Ahmad Kheyl of the Barak Kheyl of the Yussef Kheyl is saying that his extended family now operates within the lineage relationship of those who are the decendants of Ahmad, but that before it became an entity it was part of the Barak Kheyl, whose founder, a few generations earlier, was a member of the Yussef Kheyl. This explains why lineage groups of the same name are found within the same tribe or within different tribes.

At the upper level of the tribal structure are the few large units, tribes and confederations of tribes, which make up the ethnic group. Among the Pashtuns the pattern of social organization below the tribal level varies considerably. One tribe may have a great number of lineages and subdivisions while another may have less than half a dozen.

While tribes are based primarily on theoretical kinship in many instances the indigenous people living in an area seized by a tribe later came to be thought of as legitimate members of that tribe. The subjugators usually found it advantageous to establish close ties with the original inhabitants, who themselves found it advantageous to be accepted as tribesmen. In this sense, then, tribes need not be a pure kinship group.

Residence Patterns

Residence patterns show considerable uniformity. New households are not usually set up until many years after the initial recognition of the marriage. In general the wife moves in with the bridegroom's parents, so that several generations are living under

one roof. The typical household thus consists of several nuclear families living together in the same house or tent. Sometimes the extended family lives in proximity within the same compound or encampment section. It lives where the senior male member lives; he is usually the grandfather of the youngest members of the household.

As long as this senior male is alive, he is the head of the family and the owner of the property. When he dies, married sons sometimes stay together forming joint family households comprised of themselves, their wives, and their children. This may eventually require the construction of additional living space, or of an attached dwelling. The physical crowding and forced coexistence, however, tends to foster tension in the household, sometimes leading to breakups of the family and to permanent separations. The third generation usually dissolves the common household, if this has not happened earlier.

The actual number of persons who make up the household is determined by the family's economic condition, pattern of living, and mode of habitation. Among those living in the long-settled river valleys which have become the sites of several urban centers including Herat and Kabul where most land and dwellings are privately owned, the nuclear family is the most likely household. A newly married son lives for a few years in the house of his father but gets a house of his own as soon as it can be afforded. Loyalties and social pressure help preserve traditionally strong ties of solidarity among members of such families.

In the villages of the mountain valleys, where tribal ownership is still prevalent, the household compound is a fortresslike construction. Several nuclear families related by common male descent from the living titular head of the family often live together as an extended family either under one roof or in a compound. Among nomads, the extended family occupies either one tent or a cluster of tents situated around the tent of the family head.

FUNCTIONS

Family and Society

Kinship groups are the basic social unit, regulating many activities that in other societies are governed by political, economic, religious, or neighborhood groups. Rights and obligations center on the extended family, the lineage, or the tribal group.

The 1964 Constitution, in general, gives modern legal codes priority over Islamic *shariat* law (which covers all aspects of human conduct) but makes no specific mention of rights and duties of family members. Presumably family matters, including marriage

and inheritance, continue to be governed by religious law and social custom.

Given the importance of the family in the scheme of social relationships, good behavior is regarded as the supreme obligation of family members. The worth of the family name depends on the individuals who constitute it. While family names, as such, are novel and still rare except among the upper class, the family affiliation of a person is well known in his community and, perhaps, even in more distant localities. The acts of the individual bring merit or demerit to the family as a whole. Information regarding his deed is received with pride or shame by the extended family, if not the entire lineage. The greatness or gravity of his act determines how far up or down the lineage his act has repercussions. An individual acquires status in society through his descent from an especially well-known and highly regarded individual; it is a severe social obstacle to be the descendant of a person held in disrespect, especially if kinship to one or more socially approved persons cannot be used to offset this handicap.

Authority within the family is determined by lineage and sex. In theory the father has absolute authority over the activities of the members, both within the household and outside. He decides what education his children will receive, what occupations his sons will enter, and, in consultation with his wife, whom his children will marry. He rules patriarchally over the entire household. His authority extends not only to his wife but also to his single daughters, his sons, married or single, and to the wives and children of his sons. At marriage, the wife comes under the jurisdiction of her husband, who is in turn under the head of the household to which he belongs. Traditionally, the wife has functions within the family but no authority. Nevertheless, many Afghan women have a weighty voice in running the household, and in practice, the father may delegate to his wife certain responsibilities.

Within the family, decision-making is always the primary responsibility of the father, but he may use a family council as a means of reaching a decision affecting his entire household. Depending on the nature of the decision, he will enlist the advice of grown sons or his wife. The wife in turn may consult with her daughters.

The father is the spokesman for his household in seeking the counsel of the lineage head as well as its representative in the lineage *jirgah* (council). There his stature and the weight of his opinion may depend on his personality, on the number of his sons, on the status of his sublineage within the lineage, as well as on the reputation of his family within the lineage.

Status of Men and Women

The 1964 Constitution made a major break with Afghan tradition in granting women equal social status with men, but in fact, men continue to hold superior social status. Despite the Moslem emphasis on egalitarianism, nowhere in the country do women have genuine equality with men. In any household, the senior male has supreme authority, and great respect is given to men, particularly to older men. It is customary, for example, in educated families for sons to use forms of speech denoting special courtesy when addressing father and older brothers. All children receive attention from their parents, but sons are given the major share of it since they personify the future.

Women identify completely with the family into which they marry. Except in Westernized households, the seclusion of women (*purdah*) is upheld as an ideal, but only a husband in fairly affluent circumstances can afford this practice. Village women and women of the nomad groups are needed for tending animals and work in the fields making seclusion impractical. Most Afghan women, however, are restricted in their social life and take part in mixed gatherings only if they involve close male relatives; when other male visitors appear, the women of the family retire to another part of the house.

Traditionally, women have been expected to be veiled when appearing in public. But because most women were required to work in the fields, wearing of the all-enveloping garment known as a *burqa* was essentially an urban phenomenon. By the mid-1960's, however, the custom of wearing a *burqa* spread to outlying towns, especially in the north, as a symbol of prestige. By wearing a richly embroidered silk *burqa*, a wealthy townswoman can hope to demonstrate her worldly sophistication before village women and tribal nomads, who go unveiled. Poverty as well as wealth however may enter into the decision to wear a *burqa*. In Kabul and other urban centers, they are worn by many women of lower economic status, to conceal whatever is worn underneath.

The position of women has been steadily improving in recent decades. Their growing freedom was noted in a symbolic gesture of public unveiling by prominent women in Kabul in 1959. The number of educated young women is rising. They include physicians, members of other professions, many nurses, health officials, and clerical workers. The Ministry of Public Health is headed by a woman, and four members of the National Assembly are women. Many Westernized young married couples in Kabul meet regularly for small social gatherings in their homes, representing a significant departure from the traditional social segregation.

Marriage and Divorce

The nuclear family is established through the marriage ceremony which combines the Moslem legal and religious procedures with local customs. A stable married life is the Afghan ideal, and among all groups, with the possible exception of the Nuristanis, divorce is frowned upon and rare. This is true despite Moslem laws which make divorce relatively easy.

As in other Moslem countries, young men and women are given little opportunity to get acquainted except within the extended family household. Much of Pakistan folklore and poetry however, deals with romantic love affairs. Courtship in the Western sense scarcely exists. The strict moral code prescribes chastity for unmarried men and women, and infractions by women are severely punished, legally as well as socially. Previously unmarried brides must be virgins, and illegitimate children bring disgrace not only to the mother but also to her family. Prostitution is rare and severely punished by law; Pashtuns in the border areas reportedly take advantage of their migration across the Pakistani border to have contacts with prostitutes there.

Marriages are usually arranged, sometimes years before they take place. A man does not marry until he is 18 or 20; if he is poor but of a family in which lavish weddings are the rule, he may not be able to afford marriage until age 30 or 40. Girls may marry before 16 or 18, and unmarried girls of 25 are rare.

Standards for selection of marriage partners vary among different ethnic groups, but nearly all prefer that the potential mates be related in one degree or another. Cousin marriages, for example, are widely regarded as ideal, since the question of religious differences or social disparity does not arise. In addition, the property transferred to the bride remains in the family.

Turkomans, who forbid marriage between members of some closely linked lineages are a notable exception to this general preference. While in-group marriage is the usual choice, intermarriage between members of different ethnic communities is quite common, as evidenced by the frequency with which composites of various physical types are encountered. Some types of mixed marriage are more common than others. For example, unions between Pashtuns and either Uzbeks or Turkomans are relatively rare. Moslem girls may marry outside their religion only if their husbands are converts to Islam, but Moslem males are not restricted in this regard.

Personal preferences of young, unmarried men and women themselves were suggested in a survey of university students taken in Kabul in the mid-1960's. Among the participants, a majority of

both sexes reported that they would prefer to choose their marriage partners themselves without advice from their parents, the men indicating particularly strong feelings in this matter. Both men and women tended to regard education as among the most important criteria, if not the most important, in selecting a mate. Men wanted their education to be higher than that of their wives and women wanted their husbands to have more education than they themselves had. The traditional preference for marriage to a kinsman was upheld by male students from outlying provinces, but those born in Kabul indicated a trend away from this pattern of selection.

In general, the channels of communication within and between families in matters of matchmaking are fairly well defined—initially they lead through the mothers and through the fathers and the family conclave for subsequent decisions. Even when the bridegroom has taken the initiative and suggested a match first through his mother, then through the bride's mother, the bride's family has the final word on approving or disapproving a marriage. Disapproval usually ends the matter, but the situation may change with a threat of elopement, which would bring disgrace to the family as an indication of the breakdown of its authority. The family can also compel an eligible son or daughter to marry the person of its choice. A girl must accept the bridegroom chosen for her by her father, and a boy can only refuse a bride chosen for him by leaving the parental home.

Islam gives a husband the right to divorce his wife on terms easy to himself; he has only to say to his wife, three times before witnesses: "I divorce you." Divorce, however, is rare and is discouraged by social pressure. Moreover, the possibility of plural marriage offers an alternative. Financial considerations reinforce the social opprobrium attached to divorce, for the husband loses the bride money if he remarries.

An engagement is a formal event with legal connotations. Often it takes place only after protracted negotiations about the bride money, a payment made by the bridegroom's family to that of the bride. It is spent for gifts for her and for the expenses of the engagement and marriage. Among the educated it is considered highly dishonorable for a family to enrich itself from the bride money, but among the lower economic groups it always includes an appropriate amount of cash some animals, and usually a piece of land. The funds involved normally amount to at least 20,000 afghanis (see Glossary) and sometimes more. The dowry, often equivalent in value to the bride money, becomes the joint property of the married couple. Wealthy families consider a good dowry to be five expensive dresses, five moderately expensive dresses and as valu-

able a set of jewelry as can be afforded. A high bride price can burden a family, discourage an early marriage or force young men to sell their inherited land and other valued property.

Once these matters are arranged an elaborate engagement celebration is held, generally attended by the entire lineage. Further gifts are usually exchanged, including jewels and clothing for the bride. Before the wedding, both the bride and the bridegroom are bathed ceremonially at public baths, where, in accordance with religious rules, all body hair is shaved. This is followed by feasting and in the afternoon by dressing the bride in veil and rich garments. The night before the ceremony is usually given over to celebration, with banquets music, and dancing, but the bride does not participate. Afterwards, as a climax to the festivities, the hands of both the bride and bridegroom are ceremonially stained with henna.

The wedding ceremony in the home of the bridegroom is essentially a business transaction. The marriage contract is signed by both fathers, four witnesses, the bridegroom, and the attending religious officials. It specifies both the bride price and the amount of the valuables given to the bride by her family in order to secure her financial position in case of divorce. The ceremony includes a formal inquiry by the *mullah* (Moslem religious leader) about whether the bride wishes to marry the bridegroom. The bride's presence is not required. If she is absent, a male relative may answer in her behalf. At the end of the ceremony the bridegroom calls at the home of his bride, where he is given a hand mirror. Bride and bridegroom are supposed to have their first sight of each other in the mirror. Afterwards, the bridegroom takes his bride to his home, where they remain in seclusion for several days.

Childrearing

Children of all ages, as well as adult sons and daughters, owe their parents respect and obedience just as younger children owe respect to older children. The family is the primary in fact often the sole, unit for the socialization of the small child. Later most children attend school. Physical punishment of children is rare and mild; it usually takes the form of rebuke and accompanying social pressure to refrain from the offending behavior. This carries over into adulthood, and family pressure is utilized to keep the members behaving in what is regarded as an acceptable way. The direct threat is exclusion from the family.

Children are usually born at home. Many customs are followed varying with the particular locality in an effort to safeguard the woman in labor, but the mortality rate in childbirth is high. Wom-

en with children, especially those with sons, often take steps to avoid having additional offspring. Since contraceptives are generally unknown, they take drugs in the hope of becoming sterile or, after conceiving, resort to abortion at the hands of midwives.

The birth of a son is cause for much celebration, whereas the arrival of a girl generally causes disappointment. About a week after birth, the child is given a name. Family names have existed for only a few decades. Heretofore, the son's name was added to that of the father, and sometimes also to that of the grandfather, to give him adequate identification.

Babies are usually breast fed by the mother. Generally they are weaned when able to chew, but some mothers breast feed practically until the next baby is born. Babies are swaddled; later they wear pants rather than diapers. In warm weather a baby boy may be allowed to go naked, but a girl is always kept dressed. Boys and girls of the extended household play together up to about age 10. Children normally help in household activities or work in the fields. As in all Moslem countries, every Afghan Moslem male is circumcised. The rite occurs at varying ages and much family rejoicing and feasting follows this ceremony.

Family Economics

The family is a basic unit in the traditional economy. Among the nomads, seminomads, and sedentary farmers, the land, herds, tools, and other capital assets are jointly owned by the family. The family also assigns to its males and females the roles which they are to play in its economic activities. The father manages the household economy as a whole and usually coordinates its economic activities with those of the larger kin group. He is assisted by his grown sons; younger sons are assigned auxiliary tasks. The same pattern exists among artisans and tradesmen, although here the household is usually an independent unit.

In tribal society the land is generally held in joint ownership by the entire lineage. Individual families share rights to use this land, but do not have ownership rights to any particular plot or area (see ch. 20, Agriculture).

The property of the extended family may be subdivided with the death of its oldest male, but usually it continues to be held jointly by the grown sons. It is subdivided only with the death of one of these heirs. If division takes place under Islamic law, the widow inherits one-ninth of the family property, sons receive equal shares from the remainder and daughters receive an amount equaling half a son's share; however, this distribution rarely occurs. In practice, the widow can count on being provided for by her son's or her

husband's brothers for the remainder of her life; any share of property she inherits will, at her death, go to her sons. The dowry is generally regarded as the daughter's share of family property, and she usually does not receive anything further upon her father's death.

When illness or misfortune strikes, the extended household absorbs the economic impact. Each family is expected to support its disabled. When economic requirements are beyond the ability of the extended family to cope with, the nearest extended families within the lineage, if not the entire lineage, is expected to assist. Failure to do so reflects discredit on the entire lineage.

As a matter of course, the economic solidarity of the extended family also provides for the old-age care of parents. The father remains titular manager long after age prevents him from effectively functioning as head of the extended family. The oldest son normally assumes those of the father's duties which he can no longer carry out.

CHAPTER 9

LIVING CONDITIONS

The general standard of living in 1967 was modest. The Afghan, whether cultivator, stockraiser, nomad, mountaineer, or desert dweller, shows a remarkable ability to adapt himself to his environment in order to fulfill his family's needs for food, clothing, and shelter. The effects of poor sanitation and of limited water and electricity supplies are felt both in the countryside and in the cities. The only advantage for city dwellers is the easier accessibility to schools, medical facilities, and shops.

The welfare of most Afghans is the responsibility of the family, the tribal group, or the village to which the individual belongs. If a person becomes destitute, sick, widowed, orphaned, or otherwise distressed it is incumbent on the nearest relative to give assistance. Moreover, in a tribally organized society, private welfare is reinforced and extended by Islam, which is professed by most Afghans. This faith obliges its followers to give alms to the poor as a religious duty, in accordance with religious law and social tradition. In areas where the traditional system has changed because of modernization, the government or government-sponsored agencies have generally been able to provide rudimentary welfare services.

For the country as a whole public welfare problems are not a source of social unrest. Most people live in small, self-contained villages and semi-independent communities that are economically almost self-sufficient; behavior is still effectively controlled by social pressures exercised by the family, the tribal unit, and the *mullah* (Moslem religious leader). Overpopulation has not filled the towns with unemployed. Circumstances that place individuals in a position of extreme need, such as poverty, lack of work, and dependence, are comparatively few. Beggars are usually religious mendicants. Because the drinking of alcoholic beverages is prohibited by Islam alcoholism is rare. Drug addiction apparently is not a problem. Juvenile delinquency is virtually unknown except in the larger cities, and major crimes are relatively infrequent (see ch. 27, Public Order and Safety).

Only in the bleak mountain areas of the east, and in some desert regions, does poverty lead to lawlessness. Among the fiercer Pash-

tun and Baluchi tribes, especially the nomadic groups, brigandage is a way of life rather than a crime; when better ways of earning a living are offered to them, their recourse to highway robbery and raids into neighboring fertile territory diminishes rapidly.

The general level of health compares favorably with that prevailing in southern Asia. Most Afghans are proud that they are strong and hardy. Infant mortality, however, is high, estimated to be 30 to 50 per 100 live births in 1967. Intestinal and infectious diseases take a heavy toll of lives, especially among the young. The incidence of cardiovascular and other degenerative diseases, on the other hand is low. Polluted drinking water, poor sanitation and lack of personal hygiene are the chief causes of disease and death. Anemia and nutritional deficiencies, caused most often by insufficient vitamin and protein intake, are frequent underlying causes of debility.

Medical facilities are inadequate and their distribution uneven. In 1967 there was 1 hospital bed for about every 11,000 persons. Access to hospitals and clinics is limited since most of them are located in the capital, and many of those in the countryside cannot be reached by the population because of poor roads and inadequate transport. Moreover, provincial hospitals are severely understaffed and lack modern equipment. Medical care, therefore, is dispensed usually by traditional practitioners, even though most people are eager to receive modern medical care, which is available free of charge in the government-owned hospitals, outpatient clinics and pharmacies.

The ratio of physicians to population was 1 to about 40,000 in 1967. There was also a severe shortage of nurses, vaccinators midwives, medical technicians, and sanitariums. The lack of such personnel severely impedes the progress of preventive medicine, including vaccination campaigns, the operation of mother and child care clinics, and instruction programs in community sanitation and hygiene.

During the Second Five-Year Economic and Social Development Plan (1962-67) the government allocated 10.2 percent of its total expenditures to social services, including health, housing, and urban and rural development. In many provinces hospitals have been enlarged and new ones built. Public health laboratories have been opened in Kunduz and Kapisa provinces.

Vaccination campaigns against smallpox and cholera continued although their scope is limited when compared to the total population. Vaccines against typhoid, rabies and tuberculosis, and treatment against trachoma also were available free of charge, but the number of persons protected were few, compared to the high incidence of these diseases. The malaria eradication program was

more successful, and the incidence of this disease has been reduced to a minimum. Official efforts in the field of health education included the dispatch of teaching teams to rural areas and special broadcasts by Radio Kabul on health topics.

Since the beginning of the Second Five-Year Plan in 1962 municipal services in Kabul and in some other cities were also improved by asphaltting the main thoroughfares, increasing the supply of electricity and building communication lines. In Kabul a start has been made to improve drinking water supplies and to build low-rent housing units in the new sections of the city.

The Rural Development Program, which has a high priority in the government's social and economic planning, accomplished much in improving crop yields, education, community sanitation, and in stimulating the traditional crafts in several rural areas. By late 1966 some 47 projects were in operation with a budget equivalent to more than \$4 million for that year. Within the Third Five-Year Economic and Social Development Plan (1967-71) the number of development projects is to increase to 97.

The government's efforts to improve health conditions, urban development, and rural living standards received substantial assistance in the form of supplies, funds, and expert personnel from foreign countries and from United Nations' agencies. The World Health Organization (WHO) has been especially active in malaria eradication; the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) has provided supplies for mother and child care programs; and the Cooperative for American Remittances to Everywhere, Inc.-Medical International Cooperation Organization (CARE-MEDICO) helped to build and equip hospitals and train medical personnel. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the United States Peace Corps assisted in rural and urban development and education.

STANDARDS OF LIVING

Because agricultural and stockbreeding techniques are relatively inefficient rural Afghans must work hard to maintain even a minimum standard of living. When a particular crop fails, other foods are substituted. In the cities poor distribution facilities occasionally cause scarcities of food, but the majority of families have an adequate diet throughout the year.

Materials for house and tent construction are generally available; the exception is poplar beams for roofs, tentpoles and braces. These are the expensive items in house and tent construction; poor families may be unable to afford sufficient beams for a solid roof. In cases where floods or landslides resulting from earthquakes

cause widespread village destruction, houses are rebuilt by the Royal Afghan Army. Rebuilding is financed either by the Afghan Red Crescent Society or by the government.

The shortage of poplars is only one manifestation of the country's general shortage of wood, mostly as a result of extensive deforestation. The supply of other types of fuel is also inadequate. Coal is found north of the Hindu Kush, but it must be trucked to Kabul before snows close the Shibar Kotal Pass. Therefore, it is very expensive throughout the entire eastern and southern regions. Small local pits supply some coal to the northern towns and villages. The forests of Paktia province and of Nuristan supply some wood to Kabul. Common fuels, even in the urban centers, are dung cake and brush. These are adequate for cooking but not for heating. Braziers are used for heating, but they require expensive charcoal.

Quantity production of cotton, silk, wool, and leather in the north, combined with the skills and enterprise of the population, results in a more than adequate supply of clothing, boots, and sandals suitable for winter and summer wear. Since raw materials are usually produced and processed by the family, costs are lower in the north than in the south and east, where neither raw materials nor silks are available. In the south and east clothing is usually cotton and must be purchased at the bazaar for cash, or may be bartered for hides, butterfat, or other animal products.

Urban dwellers may have to work less for food, shelter, and clothing than villagers, but they are rarely able to buy luxuries or to save money. To those who can afford more than the basic necessities, however, the city offers a certain variety in consumers' goods and recreational facilities. Urbanites may also benefit by the proximity of schools and of medical services. Frequent price increases for essential foodstuffs, including wheat, rice and oil, represent a growing concern to the city population. The price of wheat, for example, rose by 8 percent in Kabul and by 10 percent in Pul-i-Khumri between January and February 1967. Private industry and government workers, however, are protected from rising living costs by their purchasing privileges in commissaries, where basic commodities are sold at reduced prices (see ch. 22, Labor).

Villages

Most people live in villages of varying sizes. In general, the number of houses depends on the number of families who can be fed from the produce of the nearby fields and on the amount of water available throughout the year.

In the smaller villages the houses and huts are generally strung along a single street. Access to dwellings located off the main street is provided by narrow passageways. Occasionally, narrow passageways also lead from one house to another. Villages built on oases often have a rudimentary network of narrow, treacherous streets, many of which end in blind alleys. There are few, if any, public buildings although some of the villages have a teahouse, the equivalent of a men's club. Mosques, however, are usually found even in the small villages of 200 or 300 inhabitants.

Some villages, notably those of the mountain Tajiks east of the Paropamisus Range and in the Badakhshan region, have a compact pattern whose nucleus consists of a group of dwelling units built tightly together. In many cases the inhabitants of these dwelling units are members of the same lineage.

The average village consists of 10 to 35 farmsteads. The farmstead itself comprises a house with living quarters and a number of outbuildings such as toolsheds, stables and small granaries. In many cases the living quarters and the storage, supply and stable areas are under the same roof. When living quarters and outbuildings are separated, usually by a courtyard, the entire unit is surrounded by a rectangular wall. Sometimes the building containing the living quarters also has an upper floor designed for summer-time living. Ventilation holes in the walls of the upper room help the air to circulate on hot days.

Fortress villages, common in the broad valleys and plateaus between Pul-i-Khumri and Mazar-i-Sharif, are surrounded by mud walls 15 to 20 feet high, enclosing gardens, orchards, and the individual dwellings. The dominant building is a fortress-like structure which usually houses the ruling clan. This building may be part of the walls which surround the village. The individual dwellings, also surrounded by walls, are built closely together and connected by narrow passageways so that an aerial view of the settlement would show only a maze of passageways between high mud walls. In the mountainous area between Kabul and Kunduz villages are not clustered or fortified but are erected on the slopes, each dwelling with its outbuildings situated above the other at successive levels.

The settlement of the seminomadic Hazara Aimaks in the Paropamisus Range and in the area southwest of the Herat is scattered in pattern. The villages tend to be relatively large, and ample space left between the dwellings allows animals to move among them freely.

Closely built, compact, as well as scattered-type settlements are found from within the mountainous area west of Kabul to the eastern boundary of Herat province. Many villages are dominated by

one or more fortresses with a group of dwellings built closely around them. The scattered-type villages are inhabited mostly by landowning peasants whose houses are built near the fields extending alongside the streams or rivers.

Village house construction depends on the climate and on the building materials locally available, such as wood, stone, mud bricks, or pressed mud. In the deforested mountain areas some village houses are made of rough-cut stone. The most common type village hut is made of mud or sun-dried bricks. Of varying shapes and sizes it may be square, oval, or circular. Sometimes its shape resembles that of a beehive, with a door-like opening and with an opening in the roof for the passage of smoke. Almost all village houses have earth floors; wooden floors are a rarity. The roof may be of reed matting plastered with clay and supported by beams. In areas where poplars are scarce, notably north of the Hindu Kush, the dwellings are roofed with mud-brick domes. To build a house a villager hires, by the day, local carpenters and masons. The professionals are assisted by neighbors who receive their meals as compensation.

In Nuristan, the mountainous area north of Jalalabad, the village dwellings are fairly solid two or three story structures of wood or stone. They are covered with flat roofs which often serve as open porches. The roof is reached by a ladder fashioned from a log, with narrow notches at intervals. Some of the houses have galleries supported by heavy pillars decorated with basket-weave-like carvings. Doors and facades sometimes are also adorned with carving. The wealthier the owner, the more elaborate and abundant are the carvings on his house.

Dwellings in cold parts of the country have a fireplace in at least one room for cooking and heating in the winter. An opening in the ceiling in the center of the room lets out some of the smoke. Some houses are warmed by flues built under the floors. In the north a mud-brick fireplace outside the dwelling is used for cooking during the summer, and in the south and southwest, it is used throughout the year. Dung cake and thornbush, adequate for cooking but not for warmth, are the usual fuels. In the summer throughout the country, houses are covered with dung cakes, put there to dry in the sun, and in the fall families spend their spare time collecting brush for winter fires. Illumination usually is provided by a burning wick floating in a container holding locally pressed vegetable oil. The Nuristanis use the wood of resiniferous trees as torches for lighting their homes.

Each village household has a few copper and iron pots; a few brass, copper, and tin trays for serving foods; a few pottery water jars; and a basin or ewer either of copper for washing hands

both before and after meals. These are purchased in the bazaars or from craftsmen and are generally available throughout the country. Also purchased in the bazaar are the china teapots cups and saucers which are a necessity in every Afghan home. Even the poorest family has at least one teapot and a few cups and saucers. Most families have a number of small teapots, for it is a custom to offer each guest a small pot of tea. The chest in which each woman keeps her personal possessions is usually of tin or leather (because of the shortage of wood) and is part of her dowry.

Other household furnishings in general use are floor coverings of wool or felt; pillows and bolsters of cotton, wool, or down which are used everywhere instead of chairs; and blankets, quilts, and mattresses which make up the family's bedrolls. These usually are made by members of the household. They are cheaper in the north, where the raw materials are available in greater supply.

Most village men and cityfolk who are not well-to-do wear the Afghan national dress—a loose-fitting, wide-sleeved shirt over very full trousers. Underclothing, if any, is a single large piece of muslin wound around the body. Village women wear baggy trousers and a long chemise. The *burqa*, a loose garment which covers a woman from head to toe, has an embroidered, latticed eyepiece. Because the *burqa* allows little movement it is not worn by village women since it would interfere with their work. Village children dress like their parents. Babies are swaddled in lengths of cotton until they are 6 months old. Clothing worn in the villages thus requires large quantities of cotton cloth. This is readily available in the north where cotton is likely to be grown, spun and woven by the household. In the south and east cotton cloth or clothing must usually be purchased in the bazaar or from itinerant merchants and is liable to be more expensive and less durable than homespun cloth.

Most men wear a coat or cloak of cotton, wool, raw silk, felt, or camel's hair padded with wool in winter. In the north men wear a great coat (*khalat*) with sleeves so long they can be used as a muff in cold weather. Especially heavy *khalats* are fur-lined overcoats. Among the Tajiks of Badakhshan the border of the sleeves and the front opening of the great coat are decorated with embroidery. Under the coat Tajik men in the high mountain valleys wear a relatively narrow pair of trousers and a waistcoat made of the same felt fabric as the coat. In addition, long, wide wool scarves are worn during the wintertime, as well as socks and gloves knitted of dyed wool. On the higher altitudes in the southern and eastern portion of Badakhshan, the winter wardrobe also includes sweaters and round, knit caps. A cummerbund, usually red with white designs, is worn around the waist.

South of the Hindu Kush, in very cold weather, men wear an embroidered, heavy sheepskin coat called the *Pushtin*. The fleece is worn turned outward to shed rain or snow and is turned inside when the weather is warmer. The cost of these coats varies with quality and workmanship, and they are generally available because of a surplus of skins in this stockbreeding country.

Both men and women in the village wear leather clogs or sandals out of doors, or they go barefooted. In the north men and women wear soft leather boots. Most children go barefooted. The type of footwear worn in various regions is found in the bazaars, where the cobblers are located.

The Nomads

Most Turkic-speaking nomads live in yurts which are round, closed and vaulted felt-tents stretched over ribbing consisting of poplar and willow branches. The cost of a yurt is about 50,000 afghanis (see Glossary). It provides good shelter against the heat of the steppe in the daytime and the cold at night and offers protection against wind, rain, and dust. The floor is also of felt, sometimes in many layers. An opening in the roof lets out the smoke of the fires. In the summertime the covering felt mats are usually exchanged for mats made of cane or rattan in order to promote ventilation. An opening is left in the frame to serve as a door. A simpler form of the yurt, called the *chapar* is found mainly in the northern valleys of the Hindu Kush. The frame of the *chapar* is built of bent reeds which are gathered on top to form a vault, covered with hides or mats. Women make the felt used for the yurt by using the poorest quality of wool and hair from the animals belonging to the tribal group. The men make the wooden ribbing.

Pashtun nomads do not use a closed tent. Their characteristic tent of black goat's hair, supported by the upright posts for the Ghilzais and by transverse arches for the Duranis offers protection against the day's sun and the night's cold but can be quickly and easily opened to make the most of every breeze, or it may be closed against the wind and the rain. The Baluchis require no protection against extreme cold. Their black tents of camel's hair are so constructed that three sides can be set up and the fourth left open. A curtain can be let down on this side for privacy or to keep out flying sand and gravel. During the summer the tent features a roof cloth which is extended by means of stays over two or three parallel hoops dug in the ground and placed at right angles to the direction of the cloth. Within any nomadic group the tents may vary slightly during the winter and summer. The winter tent is generally larger and more stably built; its sides are reinforced

with mats, and the interior contains a hearth and a place for storing fuel. Summer tents are smaller, airy, and of slight construction for easier movability.

The nomad constantly seeks water for his household needs and for the flocks on which his livelihood depends. Whether a waterhole or a stream, water is used by the nomad family as by the village family, but if water is short at one place the nomad has a wide area in which to search for more, whereas the villager must cope with the shortage as best he can. The nomad can also live in cleaner surroundings; he can move on and leave the debris on the encampment behind him. The nomad's tent furnishing, utensils for cooking and serving food, and clothing are much the same as among the villagers in the same geographical region.

Among Turkic tribal groups all the woolen and felt products used by the nomad household are usually made by the women, including clothing, rugs, bedding, saddlebags, saddle pads, sacks, and decorations for saddles and bridles. They also make soap and tan hides. Nomadic Pashtun women do not produce as many of the articles needed by the household. They make carpets, cloaks, and leather sacks for water and for churning. Tent cloth, camel trappings, bedrolls and all the cooking utensils and other gear are purchased from the same bazaars and artisans patronized by the villagers.

Towns and Cities

Living conditions in the old parts of provincial towns differ very little from those in the villages which they resemble. The streets are narrow, winding and unpaved, often built around a core which had originally been an oasis. Because of the shortage of wood most houses are constructed of mud brick although a few are made of roughcut stone or cement. Orchards surrounded by high mud-brick walls are found next to the homes of the wealthier people. Public life is centered in the mosques, teahouses and bazaars. The school, the bus station and government buildings are located in the newer sections which have been built around the old town.

In Kabul and in the major cities, including Kandahar and Herat, the homes of the wealthy are rectangular flat-roofed villa-like structures, surrounded by a garden and hidden behind high mud walls. Every house has a reception room for guests where the men congregate, another room for the women, and a small kitchen with a fireplace. The larger houses with a number of rooms are divided into separate sections. The men's section and courtyard are usually at the front of the house; the women's section and the courtyard are at the back. In the old section of cities the mud-

brick huts of the poorer people differ little from similar dwellings in the villages.

Some sections of Kabul and of the major provincial cities have electricity, but most houses are not wired; oil lamps are the usual type of lighting used. Only a few houses in the new section of Kabul have central heating. Well-to-do families in the cities use iron stoves which burn wood or coal; these items are both expensive and in short supply. Others use charcoal braziers.

The water supply in Kabul has been inadequate to meet the needs of the city's growing population and of industrial plants. The limited water distribution system supplies only some sections of town, and frequently the water pressure is too low to force water into the rooftop tanks. Some of the wealthy homes have their own wells in the compound which supply water for cooling and washing. The newer homes in Kabul and in other cities have cesspools or septic tanks, but in general latrines are primitive or nonexistent.

European furniture is becoming widely used by those who can afford to buy it in the urban centers, and local carpenters turn out fairly well-made chairs and tables. Many Afghans use a bed (*charpoy*) made of rope strung between sideboards which fit into head and baseboards, but most use bedrolls, consisting of a cotton mattress and blankets or quilts which can be rolled up and put away when not in use.

More Western-type clothing is worn in urban centers than in the country at large. Government employees are encouraged to wear Western suits to the office, and many of the well-to-do have adopted Western dress. Karakul caps are widely worn with modern dress. A wide variety of quality clothing is available in the bazaars, and local tailors usually are good. Prices are low in comparison with a comparable quality of merchandise and workmanship in other urban centers of Western Asia. Shirts, undershirts, shorts, and socks are imported, but as their use has multiplied, small domestic industries which meet some of the demand for cheaper qualities have been established. Most Western-type shoes are imported and expensive. Those made at the local boot factory are of poor quality.

Books, cars, toys, and tools are regarded as luxuries; few families have them. Radios, however, are owned by an increasing number of urban residents. Western clothing for men and women, the ownership of a car, and the use of Western furniture in the home have become prestige items during the 1960's. Larger and better-built homes and fine gardens are a sign of wealth in the towns. In the rural areas prosperity is signified by fine horses and one or more watchtowers built on the walls of the enclosure

containing the dwelling and outbuildings. The extension of hospitality to more people at more feasts with more kinds of food is the traditional manner of showing wealth.

Islam frowns on conspicuous consumption. The king and prime minister repeatedly call for restraint in luxury spending, and even the palace and the villas of the wealthy in the new urban suburbs are relatively unostentatious. Laws enacted in 1949 and 1950 are designed to restrain excessive spending on such ceremonies as weddings, funerals, and circumcisions (see ch. 13, Social Values).

All groups still hoard coins, foreign currency or commodities which can be expected to retain their value or rise in value. In some tribal groups the women's silver jewelry, the coins sewed on their headdress and the bibs of their dresses represent their husband's wealth. Increasingly, however, Afghans are depositing their savings in banks.

TRADITIONAL WELFARE

When social or economic problems arise, the family or tribal group is usually able to absorb the impact of distress, since individuals are for the most part integrated into a self-protective, co-operating group. Neglecting to care for the widowed, the orphaned, the handicapped and the aged would reflect shame on the good name of the family. The insane, the maimed and the deformed are considered afflicted by God, so that it is the duty of the devout to feed and care for them. Widows who according to Islamic law inherit one-ninth of the husband's property, are assured a home and maintenance from the deceased husband's brothers or from their sons. If the deceased has no brothers, some male relative of the husband usually will take care of the children and administer the property of the deceased.

All relatives and neighbors help in case of temporary disability, childbirth, and illness. Family obligations also require that wealthier members or all the members contribute, if necessary, to provide feasts at circumcisions, funerals, weddings, and dowries.

Afghans are deeply religious, and charity to the poor and unfortunate is one of the basic tenets of Islam. One of the five duties required of all Moslems is *zakat*, the alms requirement which the individual must give to the poor (see ch. 12, Religion). Usually assessed at one-fortieth of a man's income *zakat* is levied as a tax by the *mullah*. In villages and small towns the *mullah* may collect the tax in money or goods from each family and dispense the alms to the poor himself. In the larger towns the *mullah* gives the suppliant a note addressed to a wealthier follower of the *mullah* asking that all or part of the follower's contribution be given di-

rectly to the suppliant. Some families support on a permanent basis certain charities by caring for a certain number of orphans, paying dowries for a certain number of daughters of poor families each year, and by distributing money, clothing, or food on feast days or holy days.

The *waqf*, the equivalent in Moslem society of a charitable foundation, seems to be no longer in existence in Afghanistan. Abdur Rahman Shah (1880-1901), during his reign, confiscated all the properties of the *waqfs* then in existence and supported mosques, shrines, religious schools, and *mullah* from the public funds (see ch. 3, Historical Setting).

PRIVATE WELFARE AGENCIES

The Afghan Red Crescent Society is the major private agency for public welfare services. Founded in 1951, it is affiliated with the International League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. Prince Ahmad Shah, the eldest son of King Mohammad Zahir Shah is honorary president. The Red Crescent is supported by donations from other Red Crescent and Red Cross Societies and from private individuals. The king is a major contributor.

Activities of the Society include the recruitment and training of volunteers and hospital orderlies for manning relief missions in disaster areas and in other emergencies. Through its relief missions it provides medical care and relief supplies, such as food, clothing, blankets and tents, to victims of earthquakes, floods, and epidemics. Red Crescent relief missions rendered major assistance to villagers after the disastrous flood of the Helmand River in May 1956 and to the inhabitants of the many villages demolished by earthquakes in the area of the Central Hindu Kush, particularly in Bamian and Samangan provinces. Relief personnel and supplies are also dispatched to neighboring foreign countries in case of emergency. During the annual Red Crescent Week, in October 1967, Prince Ahmad Shah delivered a radio address calling for more volunteers to staff Red Crescent Society programs in public health and social services. Various cultural and sport events were held to help raise funds for the organization.

Organizations to promote the welfare of women as well as maternal and child welfare were first founded during the late 1940's. The Women's Welfare Institute in Kabul offers courses on the primary school level and gives free instruction in home economics, child care and needlework. The Rozantum Society cares for needy mothers and their children. The Maristun Society operates under the authority of municipal offices in the larger towns and cares for orphans and destitute persons whose families are unable to shelter them.

GOVERNMENT WELFARE EFFORTS

Several government agencies are involved in the planning and administration of projects designed to improve living conditions in the rural areas and in the cities. The Ministry of Public Works and its various subdivisions, including the departments of city planning, housing construction and of prefabricated housing, are in charge of urban renewal. The Rural Development Program is under the Ministry of the Interior, but the Ministries of Planning, Agriculture, Education, Public Health, Interior, Mines and Industries, and Public Works each administers its own functional groups participating in the program. A high council under the direct control of the prime minister supervises and coordinates the activities of the various Ministries involved.

Model Towns and Urban Reconstruction

The model town of Pul-i-Khumri, built for the Afghan Textile Company (Shirkat-i-Nasaji) by the Germans before World War II to accommodate the company's employees, was Afghanistan's first experiment with town planning. Streets are wide, lined with shade trees, and well kept. Buildings and dwellings are of concrete and wired for electricity, which is plentiful and cheap. Dwellings are set back from the street; most have grass lawns, and many have gardens; water is also plentiful. Houses are the typical Afghan box-like structure. Most consist of four rooms separated by a hall which runs the length of the dwelling; a reception room, a sleeping room for women, one for men and a kitchen. A stairway leads to the roof, which is used for sleeping in the summer. Attached to each house is a courtyard, surrounded by a compound wall. Latrines are located in the compound. Some of the larger houses, the hotel, the hospital and the club for company officers and guests have western plumbing.

The newest model town is Lashkargah, the administrative center of the Helmand Valley Authority, located near Girishk. It has modern residences, an office building, a staff house and community center, pure piped water supply and a modern sewage system. Houses combine such features as the purdah wall, behind which the women retire to avoid the view of strangers, and an American bathroom. They have electric outlets for the use of such electrical appliances as refrigerators, air conditioners, washers and dryers.

The government has also encouraged the rebuilding of the larger towns. Kabul, Ghazni, Kandahar, Jalalabad, Mazar-i-Sharif, Herat, and Faizabad are engaged in urban modernization programs. The municipalities are endeavoring to meet the needs of the population for drinking water by boring wells, building reservoirs, and laying

pipelines. Plans include the laying of sewers and the erection of modern toilet facilities and baths.

The asphaltting of Kabul's streets was started in the mid-1960's and, according to official plans, most of the main thoroughfares in the city will be covered by 1972. The supply of electricity for the capital will also be increased by the same year. Low-cost housing facilities have been planned for several of Kabul's suburbs, including Sayed Nour Mohammad, Shah Maina, Siah Sang, and Kharikhana. In 1966, 250 low-cost housing units had been completed in Siah Sang, and ground had been broken for Karikhana, the largest of the housing projects. Plans were announced in 1967 to use the waters of the Kargha Lake dam, about 6 miles west of Kabul, to relieve the water shortage in the capital. Filtering and sedimentation plants were to be built for purification purposes, and about 50 miles of water pipes were to be added to facilitate distribution.

Municipal services in the provincial cities are also to be improved by 1972. The supply of electricity for Jalalabad and Pul-i-Khumri is to be increased, and six additional towns are to be supplied with electricity. Asphaltting of the main streets of Herat, Kandahar, Mazar-i-Sharif, and Jalalabad began in 1967. The construction of water distribution systems to improve the drinking water supply for these cities was started during the same year.

The Rural Development Program

The purpose of the Rural Development Program is to instill in villagers the desire for a better standard of living and the determination to work toward such a standard. The intention is that it shall be a people's program with government participation and that government expenditure shall be used to support contributions of the villagers in cash or voluntary labor in off hours or off seasons. In order to achieve a better standard of living, the government proposes that its officers, assigned from the appropriate ministries, work with the villagers to improve agriculture, handicrafts, housing, public health, sanitation, social welfare, and education. Digging wells to provide clean water for drinking and the construction of latrines have first priority. The program further includes the introduction of improved farming practices and new tools through practical demonstration; the establishment of marketing cooperatives and of an organization to advance loans to farmers for the purchase of tools and seeds and for improvements in irrigation facilities; and the encouragement of handicrafts.

The program started in 1954 in the Logar Valley with the assistance of the United Nations and United States International Cooperation Administration (ICA), called Agency for International

Development (AID) since 1961. The initial project involved two villages comprising about 800 families. Popular demand caused the program to spread from 2 to 360 villages by 1961, and the initial 2 villages became the training centers for project workers in other areas. When first approached, the village elders treated the proposals of the government representatives with suspicion, made requests for government gifts of radios, animals and money and refused to cooperate. At later meetings, however, landlords, *mullahs*, schoolteachers, and village chiefs agreed to work together in solving village problems, giving priority to the establishment of a health center and the organization of an agricultural cooperative.

The health center was established in 1961 in Shewaki, one of the two original Logar Valley villages. Staffed by three physicians, three midwives and six nurses it treated an average of 100 patients a day. The staff also treated patients at health subcenters which were established later in the area.

By 1963 the Shewaki project had 10 village schools offering 3-year courses in subjects designed specifically to complement rural development programs, including agricultural and stockbreeding techniques, health, handicrafts and civics. A model cattle farm was started, and new crops were planted. Outside the school, experts gave courses in such ancient crafts as pottery, metalwork, knife making, carpentry, and leatherwork. A veterinary clinic and plant protection center were also opened (see ch. 10, Education).

The Rural Development Program of the Helmand Valley Authority arose from a different set of circumstances. Its purpose was to provide farm homes for nomadic and landless people and to raise the economic and social level of both the new settlers and those who had been long resident. The Helmand Valley, thought to provide a large area of reclaimable land, was chosen as the site for settlement of the nomads and for complete development. During the 1950's the government settled some 1 300 families, mostly nomads of the Pashtun tribes, in five villages in the Nad-i-Ali project area, between the Boghra Canal and the Helmand River, just south of Girishk. Each of the families received 15 acres, a house, a garden, farm animals, equipment, seed and a cash advance of 1,000 afghanis. Each of the Nad-i-Ali villages was equipped with latrines, and a program to educate the nomads in using and building them was started. A sanitation expert taught health measures in training centers established in the project area. Motion picture and lecture programs were conducted in some of the villages although women and older persons rarely had access to them. Some primary schools have been started, and a center was established for the training of village-level workers in the fundamentals of agriculture, community sanitation and adult education.

Because of inadequate soil surveys, which preceded the project, the settlers encountered serious difficulties in growing crops. Vegetable gardens and fruit trees originally planted on the homesteads had to be abandoned because of the salinity of the soil. Families who brought animals with them were forced to dispose of them because of restrictions on grazing. By 1967 most families had left the area, and those who remained represented a serious welfare problem to the government.

In 1967 rural development programs also operated in many villages of Kunar and Nangarhar provinces. These programs extended medical help, agricultural assistance, and primary schooling to more than 46,000 persons since 1961. Centers and subcenters had been established even in the remote areas of these provinces. The main center for Kunar province is in Nanghlan, located in the Dare Pech Valley. It has a health clinic, a veterinary department and an agriculture department where a full-time expert teaches the use of modern equipment and fertilizers. The health center has a resident physician who treats diseases and dispenses vaccinations. The veterinary department, however, was inactive in 1967 because of the lack of medicines and equipment. Eighteen village schools on the primary level with an enrollment of 810 in 1967 also operated in the area.

Village development councils assist the government in implementing the development programs. Council members, elected by the villagers, help government officials to determine priorities for local public work projects needed most urgently in their respective villages. For these projects, which may include the building of roads and bridges, the villagers contribute labor and local materials. Usually local contributions amount to about 75 percent of the total cost; the rest is paid by the government with allocated funds or by providing materials not locally available.

Special women's centers have been organized in several rural development areas. The centers offer literacy courses as well as instruction in hygiene, child care, home economics, and sewing. Youth clubs help to recruit new groups interested in improving their communities. The clubs show films, hold discussions on village needs and give practical advice on the methods of starting public works with local labor and material.

The scope of many rural development programs must be reduced because of the lack of qualified personnel to implement them. There is one training course for village workers, but it has few graduates. In 1966 only 81 persons had completed their training in community development courses.

PUBLIC HEALTH

Nutrition

The diet of the population as a whole is generally adequate in quantity. People can usually afford to trade for or buy the foods which their own gardens or herds do not provide so that severe undernourishment and cases of death by starvation are highly unusual. Hardships are sometimes encountered by people in remote mountain districts because of inadequate transportation facilities (see ch. 20, Agriculture). When food is in short supply in accessible areas, such as in the south, the government provides emergency rations.

The diet is limited in quality. Deficiencies of vitamin A and vitamin C are common in mountain and southern areas, where fruits and vegetables are more difficult to obtain. Scurvy is widespread in the southern provinces, and rickets is not uncommon among children from lower-income families in both rural and urban areas.

Fruits, vegetables, and bread, along with cheese, curds, or other animal products are the principal foods of all but wealthy families. Except among the Hazaras, most Afghans are able to find fruit to eat, even though it is often of poor quality. Vegetables, cooked or raw, are popular. It is not unusual to see a man walking down the street with a handful of radishes. Cucumbers are offered anywhere, along the street or in a bus, just as a cigarette or a piece of candy might be in another country. Afghans mix cooked vegetables with boiled rice and add butter and chunks of lamb or chicken if they have it. This dish called *chelan*, but known in other Asian countries as *pilan*, has many varieties. Carrots, tomatoes, turnips, and eggplants are used, but Afghans believe potatoes have little or no food value and do not particularly like them. Hazaras particularly like broad beans, lentils, and chick peas.

The annual per capita wheat consumption was estimated at 319 pounds a year in 1966. One of the main staples, bread (*nan*) is made of unleavened whole wheat or barley flour. It is formed into large, flat cakes and baked in special ovens. Wheat and barley grow everywhere from altitudes of 1,000 to 13,000 feet, and corn is grown in the eastern valleys bordering Pakistan. Except among the Uzbeks, who make a small, round loaf, bread usually is baked in an almost flat oval dish, about a foot long, 9 inches wide, and less than an inch thick. Among the Tajiks of Badakhshan, *nan* is sometimes made of fermented dough.

In areas where wheat is scarce people either trade animal products for it or substitute something else. Poorer Nuristanis make bread from corn. Hazaras grind up peas, beans, or chick peas (which have been boiled to remove their bitter taste) to add to

their scant supply of wheat and barley. In Kohistan, northeast of Kabul, people dry mulberries and grind them up for flour. Rice is a staple for many Afghans except in the Hazarajat, where transportation costs make it too expensive.

Milk and milk products are the chief sources of animal proteins. Many Afghans, especially the Nuristanis, live mainly on curds, cheese, bread, and occasionally butter. Hazaras live on a similar diet, but they do not make cheese. Milk is generally preserved as yoghurt or dried in curds rather than drunk whole. *Qaimaq* is made from the skim of boiled milk. *Roghan-e-zard* (yellow fat) is made of boiled, slightly fermented sheep's milk and is preserved as clarified butter in goatskin bags. The buttermilk is drunk as a refreshment, sometimes mixed with water. Dried milk curds eaten with bread and butterfat are a favorite snack. Hazaras produce clarified butter in surplus quantities, and take it to market in Kabul.

Nomads who are regularly on the move live mainly on meat and animal products, but meat is generally considered a luxury among settled peoples. Sheep and goat are the favorite meats. A popular form of cooking fat, *roghan-e-dumba*, is made from the fatty portion of the sheep's tail. Afghans are not very fond of beef although some like a spiced, jellied broth made from it. Islamic laws forbid Moslems to eat pork.

Typical daily meals among rich and poor alike consist of bread with a soup or sauce. Among the Tajiks of Badakhshan, soups are made of dried, ground chick peas, beans, or peas which are cooked in boiling water with a little fat. When these legumes are in short supply the soup is made of wild vegetables, fat and a little flour. Three to five meals are eaten a day, depending on the season. Breakfast consists of a beverage, usually tea or milk with bread. For the noon meal soup and bread are served, although these foods may be substituted by milk products, such as curds, buttermilk, or butter, eaten with bread. A snack of water and milk or tea and milk, sometimes fresh fruit, is taken in the afternoon. The main evening meal is approximately the same as the meal served at noon. On festive occasions, or when guests are entertained, elaborate meals are served consisting of a meat broth, a variety of *pilaws* with several sauces one of which is made from meat and bones, spices, and large amounts of fat. In general, the wealth of the host is judged by the amount of fat used in the preparation of dishes intended for festive meals. The meals are taken sitting or squatting on the floor around a rectangular cloth. In general two people are served from the same dish, and the food is eaten with the fingers. Spoons are used only for the consumption of soups or sauces.

Tea is the customary drink, and although it is expensive, people usually try to procure it at any cost. It is black or green, taken usually without milk or cream but with sugar. The Tajiks of Badakhshan drink their tea with salt and milk. Pashtuns fill the first cup nearly half full of sugar, then for the second and third cups add only more tea. They call this drinking "from the sweet to the bitter."

Afghans are very fond of sweets, and when a little extra money is available to spend on food a villager buys some candy or pound-cake. All kinds of hard candies are available. Sugar, preserves and canned goods are also much-desired luxury items. Corn, roasted almost to a crisp, is another delicacy.

The diet of upper-middle income and wealthy families in the towns is overloaded with rich and fatty foods. They are especially fond of fried and spicy foods and pastry. At a big banquet there are 20 or more different dishes, each to be sampled by the polite guest. *Kabab*, cubes of meat roasted on a skewer, is a popular dish, but at a banquet the variety comes from the many different *chelaus*. One may be a combination of tomatoes, peppers, peas and lamb, another of chicken, pistachios, almonds, and raisins. *Chelan* and its sauces vary among the many different peoples, but caramel is a common flavoring ingredient. Breakfast in wealthy households normally includes tea, honey, eggs, bread, cheese, and milk; lunch consists of rice, soup, and something fried; at dinner, rice, meat, and more fried food are served. Sherbets made with ice stored underground or with snow carried from the mountains by donkeys are very popular. So are very sweet drinks; one of these is made from pomegranates, another from rose leaves.

Although refrigeration is almost nonexistent, winter cold provides a natural means of preserving food, and spoilage is a problem only in summer. Root cellars, where less perishable items are kept are of some help. Village and town women dry fruits and onions, make eggplant and cucumber pickles (sealing them in clay jars) and boil a thick, sweet preserve of apples or peaches which is eaten for dessert. Wheat and rice, kept in large storage bags, are sometimes not used for several years after they are harvested.

Sanitation

Lack of sufficient water and the pollution of available water resources represent the greatest sanitation problem. Melted snow is the major source of water supply. Rainfall is sparse in all parts of the country except in the forested areas east of Kabul, and in the basin of the Amu Darya River. Rivers, streams and underground irrigation canals (*karez*) carry the flow from the high mountains

into the adjacent hills and valleys below. In the mountains there is snow during part of the year, and the higher altitudes get snow the year around so that the water supply is usually ample. Fast-flowing streams provide relatively healthful water for many mountain people. If the season's snows are light, however, the low-lying plains and desert regions are the first to suffer from water shortage as the flow of water slows and the wells run dry.

When water does flow near a community, the distribution systems are highly inadequate, permitting considerable waste and contamination. Piped water systems are rare. The usual arrangement for water distribution in towns and villages is a system of river-fed canals, leading into *juis* (irrigation ditches) or public tanks which run alongside the street. *Juis* also serve as receptacles for sewage and refuse since there are no sewer pipes even in the cities, except for the model towns of Lashkargah on the Helmand River west of Kandahar and Pul-i-Khumri in the north. Shafts of makeshift latrines empty into these roadside ditches which thus become a major source for spreading diseases. Septic tanks and cesspools exist only in some homes and hotels in the modern sections of Kabul, Kandahar and Herat. Some villages under the Rural Development Program have installed latrines, but in most parts of the country designated places outdoors, separate for men and women, are considered suitable.

Uninformed about what distinguishes pure from impure water, people are constantly exposing themselves to infection by drinking unclean water, frequently from roadside ditches and using it for washing utensils, fruits, and vegetables. Educated townspeople and occasional villagers who do boil water and sterilize their dishes are an exception. At the root of much of the misunderstanding on this subject is an old, but still prevalent interpretation of one of the passages in the Koran which implies that running water at a certain distance from a polluted source is pure.

The great majority of the population is unacquainted with rules of personal hygiene. Although the Koran prescribes daily ritual and ablutions most people comply with the rule only in the form of token gestures. If water is used for personal cleansing it usually comes from the roadside ditches or polluted rivers. Soap is generally unknown, except to city dwellers. To clean their teeth most Afghans use a little twig which lathers like soap when crushed.

• Diseases

In the absence of vital statistics and data reflecting the prevalence of diseases, health statistics are based on reports mainly from foreign medical personnel traveling within or on temporary

assignment to the country. Hospital admission records provide a random sampling of hospitalized cases of contagious diseases and causes of death. The Ministry of Public Health publishes figures on the number of persons vaccinated against smallpox, cholera, tuberculosis and those treated for malaria.

In the late 1960's the chief causes of debility and death were gastrointestinal infections, tuberculosis, communicable diseases of childhood, venereal diseases, trachoma, and malaria. Nutritional deficiency diseases, often due to lack of protein, as well as anemia were frequent underlying causes of debility. Vaccination campaigns have reduced the incidence of formerly dreaded epidemics of smallpox and cholera. Although more than a million persons were vaccinated against smallpox, government vaccinators have difficulty in reaching some groups of the population, especially the nomads. Among the nomads there were still many cases of the disease during the late 1960's. Vaccinations and other health measures helped to contain an outbreak of cholera in 1960 to the Kandahar area. In 1965 another outbreak of major local proportions occurred in the northern provinces, but the disease did not spread to other parts of the country.

Gastrointestinal infections, including bacillary and amoebic dysentery, typhoid, and paratyphoid are the chief causes of death in infancy and childhood, and they take a heavy toll among the adult population as well. Frequent epidemics of whooping cough, measles, and other children's diseases occur. Leprosy is endemic in Hazarajat. There are a few leprosaria in the country, but generally those afflicted move about freely.

Poor sanitation, impure drinking water and infection-bearing insects are chiefly responsible for the spread of disease. The regular movement of hundreds of thousands of nomads throughout the country increases the danger of contagious infections.

During the 1950's several parts of the country were subjected to severe malaria epidemics each year. The western provinces of Farah and Chakhansur (where marshlands abound), the Kunduz and Amu Darya River Valleys and Nangarhar province, were especially affected. During the malaria season from late spring into September, it was formerly expected that 1 out of every 4 persons would contract the disease, and that more than 100,000 would die from it. The incidence of malaria has been cut sharply since teams of Afghan health workers assisted by personnel of WHO began spraying villages with DDT (dichloro-diphenyl-trichloro-ethane) powder in areas where outbreaks had been severe. The index of chronic infection of the population by malaria in two badly infected areas showed a reduction from 90 and 50 percent, respectively, during the late 1950's to 0.5 percent for both areas in 1965.

In 1966 the Malaria Eradication Department of the Ministry of Public Health announced that within the next year, 1.2 million persons would benefit from malaria surveillance programs, bringing the total number of persons protected from malaria to 9.5 million. Plans were made to establish three new malaria eradication units staffed by 250 health workers who would concentrate their activities in the provinces of Badghis, Logar, and Ghor.

Tuberculosis is widespread and often fatal. Natural toughness and the salutary outdoor life led by most Afghans probably keeps the number of infections lower than they might otherwise be, since the extremes of temperatures, nutritional deficiencies, and crowded living quarters experienced by many invite the spread of the disease. A British team studying health conditions in the country in 1964 reported that a survey of 214 boys in two local schools showed that 58 percent had positive reactions to tuberculosis tests upon entering school.

The incidence may very well be higher among women who remain indoors much of the time. Facilities for treatment are limited. Kabul has one small hospital and an outpatient clinic for tubercular men; a smaller hospital for women is nearby. In addition, there is a tuberculosis control and demonstration center established by the government with the help of WHO. According to a government survey, some 25,400 persons received antituberculosis vaccinations in 1966.

Reports on the incidence of venereal diseases are conflicting and unreliable. Spread by traders and migrants throughout the country, syphilis and gonorrhea are certainly found everywhere, but from all indications the incidence is substantially higher in major towns near the borders than in the central and mountainous districts.

Afghans consider venereal disease socially disgraceful, and because feelings against sexual promiscuity are particularly strong in this society, people will go to great lengths to hide the fact that they have contracted one of them.

A venereal disease clinic is operating in Kabul with the assistance of WHO. Here patients are examined, have blood samples taken, and get penicillin injections. When patients fail to complete their treatment, clinic officials search them out in their homes. Government hospitals also have venereal disease clinics.

Trachoma, gonococcal conjunctivitis, and other eye infections afflict a sizable portion of persons, particularly those of the poorer communities. Polluted road dust and generally unsanitary conditions contribute to infection. In 1965 the trachoma rate was up to 75 percent in some areas. A considerable percentage of infections results in blindness. The incidence of skin infection is also high.

Impetigo and scabies are common among children; boils and open sores are prevalent among persons of all ages.

Medical Services and Facilities

The Ministry of Public Health administers government activities in the field of public health. It has five major sections—three administrative, one for hospitals and equipment, and another for health services. The Department of Communicable Diseases, the Directorate of Statistics, the Public Health Institute, the Tuberculosis Institute, and the Institute for Vaccine Production also operate under the Ministry. Other government agencies involved in health administration are the Ministry of Education, which controls the training of medical personnel, the Ministry of Public Works, which provides some medical facilities for its workers employed on public work projects, and the Rural Development Department. Health services for members of the armed forces are administered by the Ministry of National Defense. The municipal authorities are responsible for the sanitation and water supply of their respective cities. In each province a provincial medical officer under the supervision of the Ministry of Public Health is responsible for the administration of hospitals and clinics, as well as for preventive medical services, notably vaccination campaigns.

There are only some 400 physicians in the country, and the great majority of these practice in Kabul. Nearly all physicians are employed by the government, but they also maintain private practices after working hours to supplement their salaries. Medical education is free, but graduates must give 2 years' service to the government. In 1965 the Faculty of Medicine at Kabul University graduated 74 students, including 18 women. During the same year 437 students were enrolled in the first year of medical studies of which 77 were women. A number of the professors on the Faculty of Medicine are foreigners. Most lectures are therefore delivered in English, French, or German. Another medical faculty was opened at Nangarhar University founded in 1962 at Jalalabad. At this school lectures are given in Pashto.

Outstanding medical students are granted scholarships for graduate study in the United States, France, Great Britain, West Germany, and the Soviet Union. Physicians on the staff of government hospitals are also responsible for the administration of the hospital. Virtually all graduates are engaged in clinical work. Because of the lack of facilities, there are no opportunities for research.

The shortage of paramedical personnel is severe. In 1964 an 85-bed hospital was staffed by four male nurses and four female assistant nurses. In 1965 the country had a total of 269 male nurses,

90 female nurses, 143 pharmacists and 50 laboratory technicians; most of these were employed at government hospitals in Kabul.

In 1965 the country had about 60 hospitals, with a total of approximately 2,000 beds. The death rate in hospitals is high since most people ask for admission only as a last resort. Outpatient clinics on the other hand are better attended and often overcrowded. Provincial hospitals are small, with 15 to 90 beds and often poorly equipped. Because of the reluctance of most Afghans to enter a hospital and because of the inaccessibility of provincial hospitals, many beds are unoccupied. The best equipped hospitals are the five in Kabul. The largest is the general hospital, Aliabad, with 500 beds. The 200-bed Akhbar Khan Hospital was built with assistance from Czechoslovakia and was opened in 1964. The Ibn Sinai Hospital receives support from the Mayo Clinic in the United States. The 80-bed Avicenna Hospital, run by CARE-MEDICO, was founded with the aid of a United States physician, the lately deceased Thomas Dooley, and is staffed by a United States-Canadian medical team consisting of two internists, a surgeon and five nurses. Mastoorat is a 200-bed hospital for women and children.

Popular Beliefs and Practices

The Afghan who falls sick customarily goes to his *mullah*, or to a *hakim* (traditional medical practitioner). *Hakims*, whose name derives from an Arabic term meaning "wise," are much respected. They prescribe treatments and remedies based on theories originally expounded centuries ago in Persian and Arabic medical literature. Some of these treatments and remedies have occasionally been found effective. Other types of traditional medical practitioners, including herbalists and experts in curing snakebite are numerous. Their treatments are drastic and frequently cause death. Bloodletting and the administration of harsh laxatives are the most commonly applied treatments. Animal skins worn around an injured part or used as wraps in the case of fever are also believed to have curative powers. The Timuris, a semi-nomadic people living west of Kabul, use hot irons to cure rheumatoid conditions. A patient with high fever is rubbed in flour, then wrapped in goat-skins to promote perspiration. Papers bearing certain inscriptions are stuck with egg yolks to the chests of children suffering from respiratory ailments. Deep cuts and bruises are sometimes treated with a mixture of motor oil and sugar.

Although scientific theories about health and disease have filtered down from educated groups to the rest of the population, most persons in both rural and urban areas attribute disease and death to *jinn*s (evil and impure spirits). When a woman dies in

childbirth it is often said that such a spirit caused her to have a hemorrhage. Even educated persons believe that mental illness is the work of *jinns*, and that only holy men can cure it. Mothers who have observed the Western custom of boiling a child's milk bottle sometimes believe that the process brings out a magic juice of the glass which keeps the child healthy. The wearing of prophylactic charms is universal. Their most frequent form is a portion of the Koran sewn in a triangle of red cloth and worn around the neck. Shrines and the waters around the tombs of holy men are thought to have special curative powers. Barren women often go to the shrines to pray for children.

Because many Afghans have heard of or have witnessed the effects of modern medicine, the help of physicians and other personnel trained in medical or first aid practices is sought whenever available. Foreign-trained physicians enjoy special respect. Many Afghans think that all foreigners are knowledgeable in matters of medicine and are in the possession of miracle drugs. Transient foreign visitors are therefore frequently approached for help when illness strikes among villagers. Persons living in the cities, especially those with education beyond the primary grades, usually go to a medical doctor in case of serious illness. Most urban residents also recognize the need for, and readily accept, smallpox vaccinations. Even in cases where modern medical help is accepted, however the belief prevails that an ill person is tortured by evil spirits. Traditional methods are often applied in combination with modern medicine, especially in the villages. A farmer or herdsman, impressed by the results of "the needle," may protect himself with a vaccination, but at the same time he may try to cure a headache by wearing a charm in his hair. Some villagers use traditional herbs and potions in conjunction with modern medicines which may be bought in pharmacies without prescription.

CHAPTER 10

EDUCATION

Since reform programs were initiated by King Amanullah Khan in the 1920's, education has been an important concern of the government. By the early 1960's after a gradual improvement in internal communications and increased contacts with foreign countries, much greater efforts were being made in the educational field. Secular education was being stressed, and religious influences, which had been dominant in the school system, were lessening.

Deep respect prevails for learning and wisdom, but the people continued in 1967 to relate them to religious and national traditions. Memorization of passages of the Koran and of the works of national poets was regarded as the equivalent of knowledge and education and command great respect. The inclusion of secular and practical subjects into the school curricula since the 1920's was, therefore, accepted with hesitation by many Afghans.

In spite of financial handicaps and the opposition of the traditional elements of society the government succeeded in establishing a limited network of schools which offered primary, secondary, and vocational education to approximately 450,000 students in 1967. The literacy rate in the same year was estimated at about 10 percent compared to about 6 percent in 1947.

In the Second Five-Year Economic and Social Development Plan (1962-67) education was the top item. More than 1.1 billion afghanis (see Glossary), or almost 5 percent of the total budget, was to be spent on expanding school facilities, training more teachers, and modernizing teaching techniques. In practice, however, the pace of expansion was limited and failed to keep up with the growth in the number of students. Between 1961 and 1965 the student population had increased by 148 percent, but the number of schools increased by only 30 percent.

The lack of facilities and the uneven geographic distribution of existing ones deprived many children from schooling. Students enrolled in the primary grades in 1967 represented only 17 percent of the school age population although primary education is compulsory and free. Many primary students attend the 3-year village

school courses, offering mainly religious studies, conducted by *mullahs* (Moslem religious leaders) in the mosques.

The great majority of students on the primary and secondary levels are boys. Religious and social attitudes disapproved of education for women are beginning to change but still tend to restrict especially in the rural areas, the number of girls enrolled. Most of the higher levels of education, however, have become coeducational since 1960.

The lack of teachers and the limited quality of teaching seriously impede the educational effort. In 1967 the number of teachers was more than 1,900 below the national need, and many of those in service were inadequately trained. Special efforts have been made to attract more persons to the teaching profession through the granting of salary raises, exemption from military service and by honoring outstanding teachers in public ceremonies. The upgrading of teacher training through the revision of curricula in teacher training institutions has been in progress since 1954.

Education is provided by the state through a centrally controlled school system arranged according to primary, secondary (middle), and senior high school levels. Kabul University is autonomous, but the rector is responsible to the Minister of Education. The government regards education as an important instrument for the promotion of the country's economic and technical development and for promoting national welfare in general. National unity is stressed and ethnic differences are deemphasized in official statements on education, but the distribution of school facilities and the policies governing scholarship grants tend to favor the dominant Pashtun group.

The urban-dwelling Tajiks (Parsiwans or Farsiwans—see Glossary), who speak Dari (traditionally called Afghan Farsi), are noted for their consistent efforts to secure admittance to the secondary and higher educational institutions of education to counteract Pashtun predominance in government service. Because of the government's efforts to make Pashto the national language study of it figures prominently in the curricula, especially in primary grades, although instruction is given in the language spoken by the majority of students in the respective areas (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups; ch. 6, Languages and Communication).

The Third Five-Year Economic and Social Development Plan (1967-71) reflected official concern with the quality of education and the lack of trained manpower. The percentage of school-aged children enrolled in the primary grades was to be raised from 17 in 1967 to 23 percent by 1971. Major efforts were to be made to transform traditional village schools into 6-year institutions offering a revised curriculum with emphasis on vocational subjects in-

cluding agriculture and handicrafts. Secondary and vocational school facilities were to be substantially expanded in order to expedite the training of urgently needed manpower in industry and administration. It was envisaged that the enrollment in these institutions would increase by 61 and 53 percent, respectively.

Since modern schools were first opened during the 1920's, extensive assistance has been received from foreign countries in expanding and improving the educational system. The United States, France, Germany, and Austria helped to staff the first senior high schools and Kabul University. Since 1956 the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has made significant contributions in funds, teaching equipment, school supplies and consultant services. Major education projects completed with United States assistance include the establishment of the Afghan Institute of Technology and the expansion of Kabul University campus facilities. The University of Wyoming and Columbia University Teachers College helped with teacher training and with establishing standards for academic entrance tests. During the late 1950's a major plan to reform teacher training was launched with the assistance of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).

West Germany financed the establishment of, and sent teaching staffs to, several vocational schools. France, the United Arab Republic, and Japan have assisted various faculties of Kabul University. The Soviet Union, since 1965, has financed the establishment of a major vocational school and organized training courses for technical personnel. Numerous scholarships for senior high school and for university students have been granted by countries of the free world and by the Soviet Union and certain other Communist countries. A considerable number of Cabinet members, high government officials, teachers, and administrators have been trained in the United States.

BACKGROUND

Until the early 1900's mosque schools provided the only education available in most parts of the country. Habibullah Khan (1901-19) founded the first modern school in Kabul in 1901. He met the objection of many top-ranking *mullahs* by asserting that the Prophet Mohammed regarded education as an obligation of the faithful. Called Habibia, after himself, the school was at first patterned on the Aligarh Moslem University, about 100 miles east of Delhi, India. Most of the school's faculty members were Moslem religious scholars, but its curriculum included secular subjects as well as the religious subjects usually taught at the h

level of religious schools. Before World War I foreign teachers were added to the staff, and the curriculum was modernized. Habibullah also founded a military academy, a school for army officers, and a teacher training college.

Education made rapid gains under King Amanullah (1919-29) who initiated many social and economic reforms. During his reign a number of schools were opened, including vocational schools as well as government-run primary schools for boys in urban centers and in some of the rural areas. Habibia, which had become an academic high school, was patterned on the French *lycées* (secondary schools). Its first class graduated in 1923. The other three *lycées* in Kabul, Istqlal, and Nijat opened their doors during the same year, and a fourth, Ghazi, was added in 1928. Istqlal was staffed by French teachers; Nijat was staffed by German teachers. English was taught as a foreign language at the Ghazi school.

The first school for girls, under a French headmistress, was founded in Kabul in 1924. The Constitution of 1931 made primary education free and compulsory for all children, but by 1967 the government had not been able to provide enough facilities to reach the goal. By 1940 there were only about 250 primary schools for boys throughout the country.

After World War II the Habibia school received extensive technical and professional assistance from the United States International Cooperation Administration, since 1961 called Agency for International Development (AID). Ghazi received substantial aid from Great Britain through the British Council (see Glossary). The curricula of many rural primary schools were expanded to cover 6 years, and secondary schools were opened in some provincial towns. During the early 1950's the government also opened a number of primary schools for girls in spite of persistent opposition from religious leaders.

Foreign educational systems, notably French and German, influenced the structure and curriculum of the early schools, especially on the secondary level. A conscious attempt was made to prepare students to attain the baccalaureate certificate (terminal certificate of the senior academic high school course), a prerequisite for entrance into European universities. Since the mid-1950's United States influence has asserted itself mostly in the organization and curricula of village and vocational schools, and in teacher training.

THE SCHOOL SYSTEM

Administration

The Constitution of 1964 reiterates the provisions of the Constitution of 1931 for free and compulsory primary education for

all children. It stipulates, furthermore, that every citizen is entitled to free secondary and higher education. It also specifies that "the State alone has the right and duty to establish and administer the institutions of public and higher learning." While citizens are permitted to establish technical and literacy schools, the curricula and the conditions of learning in these schools are to be determined by law. Foreigners also may establish private schools in accordance with law, but for the exclusive use of foreigners.

Government leadership and control in the field of education is exercised through the Ministry of Education, headed by Mohammad Osman Anwari in 1967. Departments of the Ministry include: Primary Education; Secondary Education; Vocational Education; Inspection; Teacher Education; Pashto Courses; Sports; Health; Planning; and Construction. A directorate of Foreign Relations is in charge of arrangements for visiting professors and teachers from foreign countries.

The Ministry in 1967 published *Erfan* (Knowledge), a monthly magazine dealing with education. The Institute of Education of Kabul University assisted the Ministry in planning and evaluating reform programs especially those pertaining to teacher training.

In each of the provinces a provincial Director of Education supervised primary, village and secondary schools. A staff of assistant inspectors under the provincial Director was in charge of inspecting schools to insure adherence to the prescribed curriculum, budget administration, and supply management. The staff also rated the teachers for rewards, promotions or reprimand. When a provincial Director was unable to furnish a suitable candidate for a teaching position, the Ministry ordered a teacher to go to the vacant post in the province, and the teacher could not refuse.

Primary and Secondary Education

Village, primary, secondary (middle) and senior high schools (*lyceés*) in 1967 were the intermediate steps in education. The great majority of pupils about 397,000 in 1967, attended primary and village schools, and the education of most terminated at this level. The attrition rate between grades 1 and 6 of primary schools was considerable, especially among girls. In 1962, for example, 39,655 boys and 7,916 girls were enrolled in grade 1; in grade 6, however, there were only 1,668 girls as compared to 14,582 boys. The rate between the primary and secondary level on the other hand has improved, and in 1967 about 60 percent of primary school graduates proceeded to secondary school, as compared to 30 percent in 1960.

The lack of truancy officers and the limited number of education inspectors prevented the effective enforcement of compulsory

school attendance. The attendance of children in rural areas was especially irregular since many villagers were unwilling to forego their children's help in farming and herding chores, and kept them at home. Because of prolonged vacation periods and numerous holidays, the school year averaged barely 180 days of attendance. In most areas the schools were closed for 3 months during the winter (from December 10 to March 10) because of the lack of fuel. In some southern provinces, including Kandahar, Helmand, and Farah, the vacation period was between May 10 and August 10.

Language studies constitute a major problem. The country has two major languages, Dari and Pashto, each for about 50 percent of the population. The study of Pashto has received greater emphasis since the 1950's although Dari has been the major language of education, commerce, and administration. According to official regulations, the language of instruction in a school is to be that which represents the first language to the majority of students. In many cases, therefore, nearly half of the students must take their grade 1 instruction in an unfamiliar language. They face an additional language problem in schools where passages of the Koran are taught in Arabic.

The country's 2 million nomads, among whom there are presumably several hundred thousand children of school age, present a difficult problem. In 1959 the only schooling available to them was provided by a few mobile units and by a middle school with boarding facilities located in Kabul. In 1967 there were 10 mobile schools for children of nomads; each was under the direction of a teacher who moves along with the tribe and holds classes in a tent.

Primarily education is available in 6-year primary schools and in village schools offering a 3-year course. In 1967 there were 724 primary schools with a total enrollment of about 308,500. In that year village schools numbered 1,391, with 88,600 pupils enrolled; of these schools, approximately 90 percent were exclusively for boys.

Village schools are the successors of the traditional mosque schools. They are single-teacher units which still provide the only education in many rural areas. Taught by a *mullah* or some other literate person, they follow the traditional curriculum of memorizing and reciting the Koran. The student's ability is judged by the length of Koran passages he is able to memorize. In some of the schools writing and arithmetic are also taught.

The text of the Koran is studied in the original Arabic. Reading is taught by memorizing the Arabic characters which are the same as in Pashto or Persian. Lay teachers were assigned to some of the village schools during the 1950's. Most of them have only a grade 6 education and practically no training in teaching. The three grades

are often combined, and during the frequent absences of the teacher the class is proctored by a senior student. Instruction is entirely by rote. Questions are not encouraged, and student inquisitiveness is frowned upon.

Since 1951 village schools have been controlled and financially supported by the government. Official efforts to modernize the curriculum and the teaching methods in these schools have been only partially successful. Many village school graduates, therefore, have difficulty continuing their studies in regular primary schools even though officially they are eligible to enter grade 4 of these schools after completing the 3-year village school course.

Six-year primary schools operate in the towns and in the larger villages. A number of girls' schools have been built since 1951, but only 82 of a total of 568 primary schools were for girls in 1963. Government plans, since 1960, have called for the establishment of primary schools in every village having at least 50 children of school age. In 1967, however, schools were lacking in many areas or were inaccessible because of the absence of transportation. When new schools are built, government funds must pay for construction materials, labor, school equipment and teachers' salaries because the rural population has no resources to contribute toward the expenses.

Schools in 1967 were overcrowded and had rudimentary furnishings. Tables and chairs were often battered the woodwork was unpainted or the windows missing. School supplies, including desks, textbooks, slates and pencils were provided by the government but were not easily obtainable. Paper was very scarce, and pupils generally used slates and chalk rather than pencils and paper. Three or four pupils shared a textbook.

The curriculum in primary schools covers 28 hours a week of instruction in grades 1 through 3, and 29 hours in grades 4 through 6. During the first 3 years, 4 hours a week are devoted to religion, 12 to language studies, 4 to arithmetic, 4 to writing, 3 to drawing and handicraft and 1 hour to physical education. In the upper three grades, fewer hours are spent on language studies and on writing, and the time saved is used for arithmetic history, geography, and natural sciences. Girls' schools have additional courses in sewing and knitting.

Since 1959 the curriculum of primary schools has been revised mainly to relate the course of studies to community development programs. Agricultural and other vocational subjects have been introduced, and pupils have been encouraged to transmit their acquired skills to other members in their community. In reading and writing exercises the theme of national unity has received new emphasis. Since the wearing of the veil is no longer compulsory, phys-

ical education courses have been started for girls. Because properly qualified teachers are lacking, however, the reform of the primary curriculum had not been fully implemented by 1967.

Secondary schools (also called middle schools) offer a 3-year program, including grades 7, 8, and 9. They prepare students for admission to *lyceés*, vocational schools, and low-level administrative positions in provincial governments. In 1967 there were 164 secondary schools in Kabul and in the provincial capitals. The total enrollment was 35,227. In 1962 only 2,400 of a total of 8,700 secondary school students were girls, and the proportion between the two sexes probably had changed little by 1967.

In 1962 a total of 633 students (480 boys and 153 girls) were graduated from secondary schools. Because of rigorous examinations procedures the dropout rate is high. Only about 20 percent of the students entering grade 7 graduate from grade 9. The curriculum of secondary schools includes history, geography, economics, physics, chemistry, biology, mathematics, and religion. A Western foreign language, usually English or German, is taught throughout the 3-year program. Senior high schools prepare students for the University of Kabul or for higher technical training. They offer a 3-year academic program (grades 10, 11, and 12) which, in general represents an extension of the secondary school curriculum with the addition of some natural science courses and a course in logic. English is the Western language taught in provincial senior high schools. In Kabul the language may be French, German, or English.

In 1967 there were 40 senior high schools with 7,712 students. Only about 25 percent of those who enter graduate, but nearly all those who do enter Kabul University. In Kabul there are three senior high schools for girls, but provincial high schools enroll only boys. Facilities are limited, and the financing of studies on this level, including the cost of boarding, constitutes a major financial burden for the government. Therefore, a rigorous selection procedure precedes admission to senior high schools. Each province is assigned a quota of students who may apply for admission. Selections are made from those who perform best in locally administered examinations. These examinations, however, fail to reveal naturally bright students, basic abilities or vocational aptitudes. They are judged by local standards and the examiners have no way to take into account the wide divergence between academic standards of the respective schools which the applicants attended. With the assistance of experts from Columbia University Teachers College plans were in progress in 1962 to improve testing and selection methods.

The four top-ranking senior high schools, all in Kabul, are Habibia, Istqlal, Nijat, and Ghazi, all founded in the 1930's. They are considered foreign schools since the staffs are respectively, American, French, German, and English. The faculty teaches in its own language, and the schools are run on the basis of the educational system prevailing in the respective foreign country. The government however, finances and controls them. Nearly all government officials have graduated from one or another of the four. The standard of education offered by regular secondary schools is not as high as that of the foreign *lyceés*, but the government hopes to remedy the inequality by implementing reforms as soon as qualified teachers become available.

Vocational Training

Vocational training is given on the secondary school and on the senior high school level. Enrollments in vocational schools increased from 3,400 in 1957 to 14,515 in 1967. Attempts are being made to increase the number of students, since the enrollment and the number of graduates fail to meet even a fraction of the country's need for trained manpower (see ch. 22, Labor).

In 1967 some 58 vocational schools offered courses in agriculture, technology, commerce, economics, arts and crafts, tailoring, secretarial services, and home economics. Many schools however, lack facilities for practical demonstrations and workshop-type training. Some of the schools enroll graduates of primary grade 6 and offer courses on the level of grades 7, 8, and 9. Others offer courses on the level of senior secondary grades 10, 11, and 12. In addition, there are special training programs in civil aviation, community development, accountancy and finance, radio operation and nursing. Some technical courses have been organized by Soviet experts mainly to train personnel for Soviet-sponsored construction and research projects. There are also various academics which train religious scholars (see ch. 12, Religion).

The first school to offer technical training was founded in Kabul in 1937 with German assistance. Staffed in 1967 by German and Austrian teachers as well as by teachers from the United States, the school has courses in engineering and technology and an academic program on the secondary and senior high school level. Graduates may enter the Faculty of Technology at Kabul University. Two similar technical schools, also built with German assistance were opened in 1957 in Khost (85 miles south of Kabul) and in Kandahar.

The Afghan Institute of Technology was established in 1951. Staffed largely by instructors from the United States, it receives

assistance from AID and from the University of Wyoming. It has a large library and well-equipped laboratories and workshops. Courses in construction, civil engineering, machine building, electrical engineering, and civil aviation are taught on the level of grades 10, 11, and 12. Graduates are directly admitted to the Faculty of Technology of Kabul University. Another major technological school, built with assistance from the Soviet Union, was completed in 1966. Located in the vicinity of Kabul, the school has an enrollment capacity of 1,000.

The School of Agriculture in Kabul offers courses in soil chemistry, horticulture, animal husbandry and related fields. The courses are on the senior high school level and graduates are eligible to enroll in the Faculty of Agriculture at Kabul University. In the beginning the school was poorly equipped and lacked properly qualified instructors, but it received extensive assistance from the United States in 1952 and has since become one of the country's most important vocational training institutions. Another agricultural training school was opened in Baghlan in 1961, and others are planned in Herat and Nangarhar. In 1963 the two schools enrolled only 661 students, most of whom planned to enter employment at one of the few state-operated farms.

The School of Trade and Commerce in Kabul offers 6-year courses on the secondary level in economics, commerce, accounting, banking and statistics, taught mostly by foreign teachers. In 1963, 702 boys and 323 girls were enrolled. It graduates about 30 to 40 students each year, many of whom enter the Faculty of Economics at Kabul University. The curriculum and teaching method adopted since 1959, as well as course contents and methods of instruction, has been based on the curricula of business schools in the United States.

Secondary-level religious schools exist in the large towns. The Zahir Shah-i-Madrassa in Maimana the Jameé and Fakhrul schools at Herat run by the Ministry of Education, the Arabic Academy at Kabul, the Najmul Madrasa in Nangarhah province, operated at government expense, and the Madrasa Assadiyya at Mazar-i-Sharif, run by the municipality, offer comprehensive programs of theological studies to aspiring religious scholars and teachers. The Academy of Theological Sciences at Bagrami (moved from Paghman late in 1964) near Kabul is the largest and most progressive of the schools. Students, enrolled at age 14 for a 6-year course, receive a degree equivalent to Bachelor of Religion upon completion of their studies. Some continue with their work at the Faculty of Theology at Kabul University.

In July 1958 the Ministry of Information and Culture started a 3-year program in journalism. Officials of the Ministry, under

whose jurisdiction the courses are conducted, hope it will become integrated with Kabul University and set up as a full 4-year program, leading to a degree.

Teachers and Teacher Training

The shortage of teachers is chronic and serious. In 1963 only 749 persons were enrolled at teacher training schools in Kabul, Kandahar, Jalalabad, and Herat. In 1964 the country had 6,643 teachers for 308,200 pupils in village, primary, secondary, senior secondary, and vocational schools. In 1965 the student-teacher ratio on the village, primary, and secondary school levels was 64, 53, and 59, respectively. In 1967 the number of teachers was still insufficient to meet the demands of growing enrollment, especially on the primary and secondary (middle) levels. In the vocational and senior high schools, however, the teachers available were not fully utilized in many instances.

Teachers are handicapped by inadequate training. In the village and in some of the primary schools, many teachers have completed courses only through grades 6 to 9. Plans for reorganization of teacher training were drafted in 1954 with the assistance of UNESCO and of Columbia University Teachers College. The plans called for minimum schooling of 12 years for all teachers. The required training included practice teaching, and courses in social studies, pedagogy, and courses pertaining to community development. In 1967, however, the teacher shortage was so critical that many were pressed into service before completing the academic prerequisites for teaching.

Teacher training schools are secondary-level institutions. Most of them prepare teachers for primary and secondary (middle) schools. Pending the establishment of an adequate number of higher teachers' colleges, teachers for senior high schools attend university courses in the subjects they wish to teach, after completing 12 years of general education.

There are two teachers' training schools in Kabul, the Darul Mo'Allemein and the Teacher Training High School for Women. The Darul Mo'Allemein School trains male primary and secondary teachers. It accepts only scholastically top-ranking applicants, selected by competitive examinations, who have completed at least 9 years of schooling. Graduates become primary or secondary (middle) school teachers. The Teacher Training High School for Women founded in 1947, qualifies women to teach primary school. Those who wish to teach successive school levels enroll at Kabul University.

Other teacher training institutions were founded in Kandahar, Jalalabad and Herat in 1956-57. Since 1960 a number of workshop

and inservice training programs have been started by the Institute of Education at Kabul University. The Institute conducts winter training workshops which were attended by more than 500 teachers in 1967, and plans were underway in 1967 to establish additional teachers' colleges in the provinces, with the assistance of UNESCO.

The Higher Teachers' College in Kabul, affiliated with Kabul University, is coeducational and is open to graduates of senior high schools. In a 2-year course, it trains teachers for the secondary (middle) level. Additional higher teachers' colleges are planned in Kandahar and Mazar-i-Sharif.

All teachers are employed by the Ministry of Education and have civil service status. Six years of service as a teacher leads to exemption from military service. Low salaries, however, are a serious deterrent to entering a teaching career. A UNESCO mission investigating the status of teachers in 1952 reported that teachers' and professors' salaries averaged 150 and 712 afghanis, respectively. At the same time the minimum monthly income needed for a family of four was estimated to be 1,600 afghanis per month. Although teachers' salaries have been raised since, they have failed to keep up with the increased cost of living. In 1965 teachers' salaries averaged between 1 200 and 2,000 afghanis per month but were still inadequate to cover a family's basic needs. Most teachers must take afterhour jobs to supplement their income. Some of the senior high school teachers and university professors, however, are foreigners paid by their own governments, and receive salaries more in proportion to what they might earn at home.

Since 1960 officials efforts were made to improve the teachers' social status. An annual National Teachers' Day is celebrated every October and delegations of teachers have been received at the royal court.

Higher Education

Higher education began in 1932 with the foundation of the Faculty of Medicine. Faculties of law, science and literature followed in the early 1940's. Kabul University was established in 1946, and by 1955, included, in addition to the faculties established earlier, faculties of agriculture, technology, economics, social sciences, medicine and pharmacology, law and political science, theology, natural sciences, letters, home economics, and the Institute of Education. Originally, there were separate faculties of medicine and of science and letters for women; by 1960, however, all faculties had become coeducational. The Polytechnic Institute was added in 1967. Nangarhar University opened in 1962 at Jalalabad, but by 1967 it consisted only of the Faculty of Medicine.

Between 1946 and 1959 Kabul University graduated 1,142 students. In 1963 student enrollment totaled 2,043; graduates numbered 292. In 1966 the enrollment was 3,301, as compared to 800 in 1957.

A terminal certificate from a senior high school is the prerequisite for admittance to the University. Those accepted receive the same financial help as students in the lower schools (free tuition, supplies and boarding) and in case of need are given a clothing allowance.

Approximately 20 to 40 students each year are granted scholarships for studies abroad. In 1964 some 1,000 persons studied at universities in the United States, Europe, and at the American University at Beirut.

A major plan was launched in 1964 to enlarge and modernize Kabul University. All buildings, formerly dispersed in various sections of the capital, were to be consolidated on a new campus intended to accommodate 10,000 students. Classroom and administrative buildings, laboratories and dormitories were to be added. A new administration building and new classroom and laboratory facilities for the Faculties of Agriculture and Technology were completed in 1964. The total cost of the new campus was estimated at \$7.5 million, half of which represents a grant by AID.

Many of the university's professors are from foreign countries. In 1964 approximately 60 members of a faculty of 420 were from the United States, France, West Germany, and the United Arab Republic. Nearly all Afghan professors hold degrees from foreign universities. Foreign professors generally teach in their native language, and most of the university texts are written in these languages. The students are expected to understand and to read German, French, and English. Projects to publish texts for higher learning in Pashto and Persian have been slowed because of the difficulty of expressing scientific terms and concepts in these languages (see ch. 11, Artistic and Intellectual Expression).

The program of studies in each faculty is highly specialized. Students of physics, for example, are not required to take courses in liberal arts or any other science, such as biology. Class attendance is compulsory and varies between 30 and 35 hours per week. The Faculties of Medicine and of Law and Political Science are preferred. In most cases, however, the students are not free to choose their program of studies. They may indicate their preference by submitting a list of four faculties to the university authorities. In the actual assignment of the students university authorities are guided by national manpower needs, utilization of the applicants previous vocational training and space available in the respective faculties.

Kabul University has received substantial help from the University of Wyoming and Columbia University Teachers College in revising curricula and raising the level of instruction in general. The University of Wyoming has also offered scholarships to outstanding students and has sent its own staff members to teach in the University. Columbia University Teachers College assisted in the development and operation of the Institute of Education. Aid from West German and French universities has also been forthcoming. Faculty exchange programs and cooperative research projects have been undertaken with universities in these countries.

Adult Education

The Ministry of Education is interested in raising the literacy level, and maintains literacy centers throughout the country. The Women's Welfare Society in Kabul also holds literacy classes for women.

Adult education courses have been organized by the Ministry. Night schools on the secondary level, vocational, handicraft, and secretarial training courses have been organized by various ministries, including the Ministry of Mines and Industries. Few courses, however, are offered outside of Kabul, and qualified instructors are in short supply. Plans for adult education on a national scale had been made with the assistance of UNESCO in 1967. It was estimated that a minimum of 4 years are required to train instructors and to establish classroom facilities.

EDUCATION AND SOCIETY

Traditional reverence for the religious teachings of the Koran and for the heroic deeds of history and legend as told by the poets still exert a powerful influence. The works of national poets like Khushal Khan Khattak and of Firdawsi, the ancient bard of Ghazni, as well as passages from the Koran, are well known. They are memorized and recited by villagers and are considered to be sources of knowledge and inspiration.

Because of these traditions, many Afghans, especially in the rural areas, are not convinced of the value of modern education with its stress on factual knowledge and statistics. Equally alien is the concept of the application of learning to practical life. Years of association with mosque schools lead Afghans to think of education as a religious rather than secular matter. To many rural Afghans education is judged by a person's familiarity with the text of the Koran, by his philosophical wisdom, and his knowledge in matters of religion. Nevertheless, village development projects during the 1950's have shown that when taught skills relating di-

directly to their occupations, villagers have accepted instruction eagerly.

The difference between the traditional religious education and the new secular education has not yet been explained meaningfully to most Afghans, hence the development of the educational network depends to a considerable extent on government initiative. During the 1960's, however, demands for broader education have come increasingly from professional groups, notably from teachers.

Opposition of some religious leaders and of a substantial portion of the rural population to educating women have remained strong in spite of government efforts to encourage women to attend schools. Because of local opposition it is often difficult to enroll girls in primary and middle schools in many areas. On the other hand, qualified women may freely enroll in senior high schools, senior vocational schools, and university courses.

Education has assumed considerable importance with urban groups. Factual knowledge and scientific and technical information have come to be appreciated by those who have recognized their value in occupations leading to status and prestige, especially in the civil service. Because of its usefulness in commercial operations, education is in great demand by the children of merchants in Kabul and in the larger towns.

Study in foreign countries carries much prestige. Since the 1920's it has been customary among persons in the upper levels of society to send their children to study abroad. To these, foreign study has become a way of life which is combined with pleasure, and the degrees earned are often not put to use. During the 1960's the government financed generous scholarship programs for students from all walks of life, but they were obliged to serve in positions designated by the government upon their return.

The composition of the educated and professional groups is in many ways a reflection of the determination of the Mohammadzai lineage of the Durani Pashtuns to retain their power and of the Tajiks to improve their position in relation to the Pashtuns. The bulk of students at secondary and higher institutions of learning are of Pashtun or Tajik origin. It is government policy to bring the sons of tribal chiefs to Kabul so that they may acquire at least a secondary education and eventually be compelled in return, to go to work in a government ministry. In an effort to broaden the basis of education the government each year distributes many scholarships based on merit and academic standing to needy students, regardless of social or ethnic origins.

CHAPTER 11

ARTISTIC AND INTELLECTUAL EXPRESSION

During the 1960's reinterpretation of Islamic law in terms of modern legal and political concepts has dominated intellectual activity. The modification became necessary to provide a uniformly applicable criminal law and standards to govern commercial and financial contracts in the country's modernizing economy. Young, Western-educated members of leading families became prominent in the movement to hasten the reinterpretation of Islam in the light of modern social developments. In 1967 the country's leading judicial and religious scholars were involved in working out the practical and theoretical aspects of a new legal code (see ch. 12, Religion; ch. 14, The Governmental System).

To implement the provision of the 1964 Constitution which made Pashto one of the national languages, the Pashto Academy in Kabul has been active in preparing translations of school texts in science and other subjects and in compiling a Pashto scientific terminology.

Although the country has a rich cultural heritage covering more than 5,000 years, little new or original in art, literature, or architecture has been produced since the sixteenth century, when rivalry between the Moghuls and the Persians and then between the British and the Russians forced the country into ever-increasing isolation from which it emerged only during the late 1930's. Science has only recently been introduced into the schools, and laboratory staffs are foreign-trained.

Governmental cultural policies reflect strong official interest in artistic and intellectual activities. The Ministry of Information and Culture has encouraged archaeological research and the revival of traditional music, literature and crafts. To increase the volume of publication, a Book Publishing Institute was established in June 1966 within the Ministry. Celebrations honoring the country's outstanding poets are held regularly under government sponsorship. Many of the noted musicians, actors and writers are in the Ministry's staff. They assist in planning cultural events and also perform on the program of Radio Kabul (see ch. 17, Public Information).

Over the centuries, schools have centered on the study of the religious and poetic works of the country's outstanding forefathers. Literature pertaining to Islamic philosophy and theology is of the highest form of intellectual expression. Scientific thinking has influenced the small group of Afghans who have studied abroad, but basically the intellectual orientation has remained tradition-bound and inward-looking. Traditional literature and folksongs also tend to support long-established beliefs and to discourage individual departures from established patterns. The questioning, experimental approach which characterizes the study of natural sciences has begun to make inroads in higher learning, but to more Afghans natural phenomena are manifestations of divine will not subject to investigation or challenge.

Among the people each major ethnic group has developed a large body of oral literature, mostly in verse; artistic expression takes the form of songs and dances. Some of the ancient crafts and tribal arts have been preserved, and a small amount of archaeological scholarship is devoted to unveiling the pre-Islamic past. The Kabul Archaeological Museum, founded in 1919, directs research and maintains collections of Greco-Bactrian, Buddhist, and Nuristani art, as well as artistic objects of Ghaznevid (962-1140) and Timurid (1369-1506) eras (see ch. 3, Historical Settings).

Poetry is admired by all, and most scholars are poets. Classical poems and heroic tales of traditional literature are taught in schools and at home and are recited in public. Much of the literature and poetry written since 1940 also draws on themes of the past. Some poems and short stories dealing with subjects taken from the modern social scene have been published, but they are read by a very small group of educated urban readers.

HERITAGE

Within the country's borders are the sites of several Aryan and Greco-Buddhist civilizations, but Afghans are especially proud of the developments in Islamic thought and literature contributed by the scholars theologians and poets resident at the courts of Mahmud of Ghazni (988-1030) and of the Timurid princes of Herat.

Pre-Moslem

Of the invaders who traveled across Afghanistan, the Aryans were the first to leave a written record, the Rig-Veda, which became the most important sacred literature of the Hindus. Bactria, the land between the Hindu Kush and the Amu Darya River, was the homeland of Zoroaster (Zarathustra), and here the Avesta,

the bible of the Parsis, was composed. In 331 B.C. Alexander the Great passed through the Hindu Kush and left behind him a legend and a series of Greek kingdoms.

These kingdoms, conquered in the first century by the invading tribes of Yueh-chi, a nomadic tribe from Central Asia, left little record but their coins. A fine collection of these is on exhibit in the Kabul Archaeological Museum. Shortly after the arrival of the Yueh-chi one of their chiefs founded the Kushan dynasty. Under the rule of these kings Buddhism made great advances, and the valleys of Jalalabad and Bamian became centers of the faith. This was the most important cultural influence in the area until the coming of Islam. Many monasteries and shrines have been uncovered by a French archaeological mission, which has been working in Afghanistan since 1922 (see ch. 3, Historical Setting).

After the Moslem Conquest

Between the seventh and ninth centuries, invasions by Arab armies brought Islam to the peoples of the Hindu Kush. Arab control vanished in time, but Islam remained. From this time forward, Afghanistan took an important place in the development of Islamic arts, architecture, literature, science and philosophy, especially during the Ghaznevid era of the tenth and eleventh centuries and the Timurid of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.

Although the Arabs brought with them the dome, the minaret, and the mosque, it was not until the eleventh century when Mahmud of Ghazni established the first Moslem empire in Central Asia that Islamic architecture developed to any extent in the country. Mahmud and his successors spent large amounts on palaces, mosques and tombs at Ghazni, Balkh and along the Helmand River at Qala Bist, near the confluence of the Helmand and the Arghandab. Many sites have been excavated by the French archaeological mission and are being restored by the staff of the Kabul Archaeological Museum.

Mahmud also summoned renowned men of learning to his court. Among them were the great scientists, Abu Ali ibn Sina, known in Europe as Avicenna (980-1037) and Abu Raihan al-Biruni (973-1048). In addition to many books on astronomy and mathematics, Avicenna was the author of a famed medical textbook, *Al Qanun* (The Canon), which was used in European medical schools up to the seventeenth century. Al-Biruni's work on India remains a classic analysis of Indian civilization. Among the 400 poets resident at Mahmud's court were Khwaja Abdullah Ansari and Abdul Kasim, known as Firdawsi of Tus, whose works are well known

to educated Afghans through their books and through oral transmission.

Ansari, a devout practicing mystic and Sufi theorist, composed a number of devotional works in prose and verse which set the pattern for many greater and lesser poets in later centuries (see ch. 12, Religion). Because of his influence classical Persian poetry is, to a notable extent, Sufi in content and inspiration. At the Ghaznevid court Firdawsi composed his great epic, the *Shah Namah* (Book of Kings), heroic tales of four ancient dynasties. It was written in vigorous, direct Persian, which has changed so little that the present generation reads it with ease. A few of the Pashto poems and fragments of epics from this period survived and were included in the *Puteh Khazaneh*, published in Kandahar in 1729.

The second great period in art, architecture, and literature occurred at Herat, under the Timurid rulers. Timur, his son Shah Rukh, Shah Rukh's queen, Gauhar Shad, and Husayn Baikara, the last of this dynasty, ordered, encouraged, and supervised the building of palaces, mosques, and shrines (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). Many of these structures still remain and are regarded by scholars as among the world's best in artistic quality and workmanship. Timurid architecture was characterized by extremely tall minarets, bulbous domes, and brilliantly colored falence tile. Monuments of this period are the Masjid-i-Jami (commonly known as the Friday Mosque), the tomb of Gauhar Shad, the minarets of the Musalla at Herat, the shrine of Khwaja Abullah Ansari at Gazargah near Herat and the shrine of Ali at Mazar-i-Sharif.

At Herat the Timurids established an elegant urban center of arts and learning. Poets and prose writers at their courts composed in Persian, Arabic, and Turkic, and a talented school of painters illustrated and illuminated historical and poetical works. Of the scholars, Nurad-din Abdur Rahman Jami is the most celebrated; he wrote at least 46 major works in the fields of lyric and romantic poetry, mysticism, Arabic grammar, music, the lives of the Sufi saints, and a critical explanation of the Koran. Mir Ali Shir Nawai, friend and counselor of Husayn Baikara, wrote poetry in Turkic and was the creator of much Turkic literature.

Among the historians at the Timurid court, Nizam-ad-din Shami wrote the *Zafar Namah* (Book of Victory), which was the only account of Timur's victories to be completed while the conqueror was still alive. Hafiz Abru, who accompanied Timur on his campaigns, composed a universal history entitled *Zubat at Tavarikh*. A writer who used the literary name of "Mirkwand" wrote the

schools produced a number of important scholars, many of whom also held degrees from foreign universities.

France attracted Afghans studying archaeology, history, and literature; Germany and the United States, those interested in science, technology, and business administration. During the 1960's many Afghans, including members of the royal family and high officials in the government, were graduates of institutions of higher learning in these three countries (see ch. 10, Education).

The works of Afghan scholars have been published by the government-operated Afghan Academy established in October 1967 and published by the literary societies in Kabul, Kandahar, Herat and Mazar-i-Sharif, each of which occasionally publishes a magazine containing articles of particular historical and literary interest. In 1967 the Academy included the Historical Society (Anjuman-i-Tarikh), the Pashto Academy, the Ariana Encyclopedia Department, the Book Publishing Institute, the Public Libraries Department, and the Press Awards Bureau. Membership is limited to scholars who have distinguished accomplishments in academic and literary fields. Election is subject to approval by the king and those who are elected receive honorary titles.

The Pashto Academy founded in 1937 promotes the revival of Pashtun literature and knowledge of the Pashto language. Since the 1950's special efforts of the Academy have been directed toward the compilation of Pashto dictionaries and the translation of science texts for high school and university use. Progress has been slow, however, because of the difficulty in translating scientific terminology and in expressing scientific concepts in Pashto. By 1967 the Academy had not yet compiled dictionaries in Pashto and Western languages. A Pashto-Persian dictionary, however, was published in 1954. There is also a Pashto etymological dictionary, a grammar, a collection of proverbs, and several works on Pashtun literary history.

The Historical Society is devoted to disseminating information on Afghan history at home and abroad. It publishes *Aryana*, a literary magazine containing articles on Afghan history. For several years members of the Afghan Academy have been preparing a 25-volume Afghan encyclopedia, called *Da-iratul-ma-arif*. The Dari edition was published several years ago, and the Pashto edition is nearing completion. The Academy also published a three-volume edition of the Koran in both Arabic and Pashto.

Much modern historical writing describes the country's past greatness, the times and events in which Afghanistan encompassed famous civilizations and vast territories. Readers of such prominent historians as Ahmad Ali Kohzad, Ghulam Mohammad Ghulbar, Sayyid Qasem Rashtiya and Ali Ahmad Na'imi are made aware

of Balkh, once the capital of ancient Bactria, of the standing Buddhas of Bamian, of the great realm of Mahmud of Ghazni, of the literary achievements of the past, and of the founding of the nation by Ahmad Shah Durani in 1747. In writing about recent history, most authors deal with the events of the three Anglo-Afghan wars and the revolt of Bacha-i-Saqo leading to the flight of Amanullah Khan in 1929 (see ch. 3, Historical Setting).

Noted Afghan scholars include Abdur Rahman Pazhwak, Mohammad Ali, Najibullah, Kushkaki Burhan-ad-din, Salahuddin Seljuqi, Abdul Raouf Benawa, Sidiqullah Rishtin, Gul Patsha Ulfat, Mohammad Gul Mohmand, and the historians, Sayyid Qasem Rashtiya, Ahmad Ali Kohzad, and his brother Mohammad Nabi Kohzad. They are all members of the Afghan Academy. Abdur Rahman Pazhwak, permanent delegate to the United Nations since 1958, was for several years editor of *Aryana*, to which he contributed many articles on Afghan history.

Ahmad Ali Kohzad is Director General of the Afghan Historical Society and Director of the Kabul Archaeological Museum. He has been associated with many of the excavations and has written many articles on Afghan archaeology and history. Mohammad Nabi Kohzad is editor of *Afghanistan* and the author of many historical studies. Mohammad Ali is a professor of history at Habibia senior secondary school and the author of *Guide to Afghanistan*.

Najibullah, former ambassador to India and to the United States, is a noted poet whose latest book of poetry was published in English. He is famous for his studies on the contribution of early Afghan scholars to the development of Islamic thought. Kushkaki Burhan-ad-din is well known for his definitive work on the people of Badakhshan and Takhar provinces and their social and economic life.

One of Afghanistan's outstanding philosophers is Salahuddin Seljuqi, who in the 1960's was engaged in a reconciliation of the theories of Einstein with the principles of Islam. Sayyid Qasem Rashtiya and Abdul Raouf Benawa are both noted Pashtun poets; the latter was director of Radio Kabul during the early 1960's and was subsequently appointed Minister of Information and Culture in Prime Minister Mohammad Hashim Maiwandwal's Cabinet.

Sidiqullah Rishtin was on the faculty of Kabul University in 1967. Gul Patsha Ulfat has been president of the Academy since 1956. Mohammad Gul Mohmand is author of the first Afghan-Dari dictionary which was published in 1938.

Fewer than 100 books are published annually in either Pashto or Dari and are printed in very limited editions. Prizes are offered annually by the Ministry of Information and Culture for outstanding literary, historical, social, and scientific works in order to en-

courage scholars. The Aryana Award, a special certificate and cash award for the best work of the year, is bestowed by the King. The Khushal Khan Khattak Award is a triple prize given for the best work in Pashto, Dari, and a foreign language. The Ibnsina (Avicenna) Award is another triple prize for books translated from foreign languages into Pashto and Dari and vice versa. The Rahman Baba Award for Literature and the Fine Arts is a prize for the best work in drama or poetry, fiction, music, or painting.

LITERATURE

Poetry is generally considered the highest form of literary expression. Not only are most Afghan scholars poets, but each ethnic group and each valley has its own epics, short verses and songs. These and poems by well-known poets of the past have found their way into the lives of the people, transmitted orally by father or mother, village patriarch, or *mullah* (Moslem religious leader) or by professional minstrels who move about the country entertaining villagers at teahouses and by travelers at caravansaries. Much of this body of literature has only recently been recorded.

Epics and short verses regardless of ethnic source show considerable similarity. The most popular theme is war, followed by love and jealousy, then religion and folklore. All are more or less tinged with religious sentiment and quite a few are intended to instill courage or some other virtue.

Pashtun literature extolls the indomitable warrior as a just man, true to his word and a fervent patriot for whom death in battle is better than the shame of retreat. There are also many religious works in both prose and poetry; the most notable are the *Makhzan-ul-Asrar* and the *Makhzanul-Islam*. Interest in Pashtun literature is increasing, and with government encouragement Afghan scholars have been publishing new editions of old Pashtun works and bringing out of obscurity a considerable body of literature (see ch. 6, Languages and Communication).

Baluchi poetry excels in vivid pictures of Baluchi life and the country through which the Baluchis wander. The clouds, rain, lightning, and the flame of the log fire are favorite themes. The Baluchis exalt generosity as the greatest virtue and condemn greed as the worst of crimes.

The ethnological kinship of the Turki groups is apparent in the common themes of their respective folklores. Although originating with one group, their epics are now part of the literary inheritance of them all. *Alpamysh*, *Koblandy*, *Yer-Targyn*, and *Yedigy* are Uzbek epics. *Yedigy* is about a famous leader of the Golden Horde who attacked ancient Russia. An excerpt from *Manas* (The Great

Campaign) which was originally Kirghiz is saturated with Pan-Islamic and military adventurist ideas. In Turkic literature a common figure is the magically swift horse, the faithful friend and indispensable companion of the hero in his adventure. Heroes frequently have superhuman hearing or magical objects which bestow superhuman sight. The wolf—hungry robber of the flocks and herds—is always the villain and is viewed as the symbol of all evil.

Persian literature is usually well known to the educated, and Persian ballads and odes have been transmitted orally through succeeding generations. Parents and teachers tell the children tales from the *Kalilah wa Dimnah*, a collection of animal stories very much like Aesop's fables. Later they hear or read the legends from the *Shah Namah* and romantic tales of spiritual and romantic love. One such tale, *Adam aw Durko*, is a very ancient version of the Romeo and Juliet theme. Still later, all young Afghans learn classical Persian poetry.

Much of the contemporary prose and poetry written in Dari utilizes the heroic, religious-mystical, or lyric themes of classical Persian literature. Abd-al-Haqq Betab (1888-) and Khalilullah Khalili (1907-) are the most prominent among modern poets writing in the classical style. The lyric works of the young poet, Ziya Qarizada (1921-), extol the virtues of patriotism and study as the paths leading to a great future.

Elements of social criticism having appeared in the poems and prose of contemporary Pashtun authors, notably since the founding in 1947 of *Wish Zalmyan* (Awakening Youth), a literary-political group. Conservatism and the traditional social structure are frequently criticized by *Wish Zalmyan* authors whose dean is Abdul Raouf Benawa, the former director of Radio Kabul, and minister of Information and Culture. Benawa has encouraged young authors to deal with themes reflecting the contemporary social scene. He has criticized landowners and the custom of selling daughters into marriage to the highest bidder.

THE PERFORMING ARTS

Music and Dance

Afghans appreciate music and enjoy singing. In the cities there are public performances of both singing and dancing by professionals trained in Indian music. These troupes also travel through the country giving performances at weddings and fairs. During intermissions in theaters and motion picture houses there is music and the audience sometimes sings. The songs are always applauded.

The musical programs on Radio Kabul and on the Soviet Union's Radio Tashkent are favorites.

Although musicians are not held in high esteem socially, amateur performers carry no stigma. Many young men and boys play instruments, usually drums or stringed instruments. Moham-mad Hussain Sar-Aahang, who received a silver cup at the Indian Music Conference in 1958, is considered Afghanistan's national singer and is paid great honor. Other popular singers are Nacime, Charife, Achoufte, Taslime, Abdur Rahman, Armane, and Zamane Chauqi, who accompanies himself on the *tambur* (an Afghan lute).

In 1967 the most popular woman singer was Roxane. Sarmand, from Herat, who sings typical Herati songs, is very popular. Purween and Gherla are also popular women singers, as is Sarah Zelend who sings with her husband. Ustad (master) Sheida sings court songs, not folk music.

In the towns after the bazaar closes at sundown, visiting is the only amusement, so the young men gather at friends' houses to talk or sing folksongs to the accompaniment of musical instruments. They sing alone or jointly. Some songs are the verses of renowned poets set to music; others are original.

In the country the people sing mostly without accompaniment—the farmer on his way to town with his donkey loaded with vegetables, the shepherd with his flock, the young men returning from the teahouse in the evening. The mountain songs are different from those of the city; they are simpler and have undergone little or no foreign influence, whereas the urban songs reflect Indian or Western influences; the mountain songs also are proud and virile, strong and clear. Many resemble Moroccan chants or Spanish *flamenco* songs.

Afghan music differs from Western music in scales, note interval, pitch and rhythm but nonetheless has a greater resemblance to it than is usually found in Asian music. Orchestras include a number of stringed instruments, drums and a little handpumped harmonium.

Stringed instruments are of two types: purely Afghan and those of mixed origin. The purely Afghan instrument is the *saranda*, which has a flat, semispherical sound box, a short handle, and a small bow. Other stringed instruments are common to Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan. They include the light Indian *saran*; the Indian *madam*, with a single singing string, which resembles a ukulele; the long-handled *robab*, with six catgut strings activated by a *shabbaz*; the *delroba* with a very long handle, producing drawn and gliding sounds by barely touching the strings; the elongated *tambur*, with its round sound box often made of a dried gourd, and frequently seen in Persian miniatures; and the *santur*,

a zither with a harmonium keyboard, such as gypsy orchestras use. All these constitute a large orchestra.

Percussion instruments include a low *tablas* (two drums joined together, one slightly smaller than the other), beaten with the fingers and the palm. The rhythms of the *tablas* often represent the verses of a song, but, as is the case with the melodies, they can be varied endlessly while remaining on the same theme. The melody starts slowly and simply, but as it develops the *tablas* gain in speed and end with fortissimo. The *tablas* player beats time with his head; he raises his arms as high as he can, and his hands come down violently on the vibrating *tablas*. The entire orchestra vibrates; all its members move their heads in unison, everyone according to his own temperament and without direction. Every orchestra features the handpumped harmonium (said to have originated in India) which dominates the rest, giving tonality and guiding the singers, yet permitting variations and improvisations.

Another kind of music is that of the Pashtun tribes. Their instruments are very simple. The *dambura*, with two strings tuned in fifths is touched only by the fingers of the right hand without modifying the sound by the left hand, indicating simply the tone and dominant chord and marking the rhythm. The tribesmen's flute, or *tula*, is of metal or reed. The *dohol*, or heavy two-faced drum, resembles a barrel held horizontally, and it hangs from the neck by a strap.

All Baluchi poems with the exception of the love songs are sung to the accompaniment of the *dambura* and the *saranda*. Accompaniment is usually monotonous, with a range of a very few notes. The short love songs are sung to the *nar*, or Baluchi flute. These accompaniments are graceful and melodious.

Nuristanis play the viol, which has either three or five strings, drums and reed pipes. All Nuristani songs are tuneful with rippling but melancholy melodies. The chief musical instrument of the Tajiks of the Panjshir Valley is the tambourine. Among the Turkic groups there is no music which is not connected with poetry and storytelling. A stringed instrument known as the *dombra* and played pizzicato (by plucking instead of bowing) is very popular. An instrument with two strings played with a bow, and a kind of flute are also widely used.

In 1967 the country's most popular professional musician was the Pashtun drummer, Gul Alam. He was in great demand at concerts and on the radio. Ustad Mohammad Omer plays the *robab* and also enjoys great popularity. Ustad Mohammad Hoseini, another leading musician, is an expert in playing classical Afghan music. Khalil is a composer who also sings. There is also a very popular amateur group of student musicians who give concerts

in the schools; its members are Ahmad Wali, Zahir Howeida, and Masoud Jemal.

Public dancing is one of the activities by which Afghans celebrate religious or national feast days and weddings. For most dances a level piece of ground is selected, and a post is fixed in the center, around which the men revolve in ever-widening circles, keeping the center on their left so as to give greater play to their sword arms. The older and less nimble form the inner circles, while the young men dance round and outside, often with a gun in one hand and a sword in the other. Sometimes they dance with a sword in each hand which they wave alternately in circles around their heads. Around the outside of the circle the horsemen circle displaying their prowess in the saddle and their skill with sword, or gun, at the same time.

On one side the village minstrels play a tune on drums and pipes. This tune begins with a slow beat so that all the circles revolve with measured tread. Then the music grows faster until the dancers whirl in a frenzy, and the dance becomes a surging mass of waving swords and rifles. Often the rifles are loaded and their discharge from time to time causes the horsemen on the outside to gyrate more wildly. Suddenly the music ceases, and everyone stops to regain his breath only to start again after a few minutes. The dance goes on until all are tired out.

The *attan*, the national dance of the Pashtuns, apparently introduced by the soldiers of Alexander, is accompanied by a band of musicians, while songs are sung in chorus by the dancers and sometimes by the musicians. The dancers, usually numbered between 50 and 100, perform the *attan* in a circle, taking each other by hand or dancing around in circles of their own with free movements of their hands and swaying their bodies. The dance starts with slow steps and gains momentum.

Also in Pashtun areas, men and women participate in a dance performed as part of a marriage celebration on the way from the bridegroom's house to that of the bride, which may be between two villages. The leader is followed by the musicians, with the dancers bringing up the rear in lines of 10 to 12 people. Both men and women hold a colored scarf, usually bright red, which they wave in the air while dancing.

Theater

The country has four theaters; two in Kabul, one in Herat and one in Kandahar. In Kabul the Puhani Nandari (Theater of Learning) was established in 1942 and the Municipal Theater was founded in 1947 by the Mayor of Kabul, Ghulam Mohammad Farbad.

The Herat and Kandahar theaters were created more recently. Traveling companies take plays to provincial cities and appear sometimes at local fairs. On the tenth of Muharram, the day of Ashura, the anniversary of the martyrdom of Hussain the Shias hold mourning rites and present traditional passion plays (see ch. 12, Religion).

Secular plays, in Persian, are either original or adaptations of European classics or Arabic and Turkish comedies. Some of the original plays have moral themes, such as the folly of wasting time in teahouses; others are designed to appeal to the comic sense of the Afghan. A favorite Afghan dramatist is Muqades Negah. Foreign favorites include Naghibe, Raihani, an Egyptian, and Hazine, a Turk, both writers of comedies. Of European classics, Moliere's comedies are by far the most popular; Shakespeare's plays appear occasionally.

For religious reasons women's parts are played by men. Outstanding actors are Adhourrachide Gelia, Nike Mohammad Selime of the Pouhani Nandari, and Abouhamide of the Municipal Theater. None of the actors at the theaters are professionals because acting is not sufficiently remunerative. Afghan audiences are attentive and critical; they boo bad plays, whistle and stamp at mistakes, and discuss the productions thoroughly.

THE VISUAL ARTS

Painting

No great sculptor or painter has emerged in Afghanistan since the sixteenth century. One of the reasons may be that paints, paper, brushes, and palettes have been difficult to obtain. Of the graphic arts only calligraphy and illumination have survived but professional practice has become almost extinct with the introduction of the printed book.

An arts college, Maktab-i-Sanai Nafisa, was established in Kabul during the 1930's. It holds an annual exposition, the "Autumn Salon." Prince Ahmad Shah, the eldest son of the King, usually enters one or more paintings. Most of the works are oil paintings or water colors of scenes, gardens, mountains, or events in Afghan history. Senator Mir Mohammad Said Maashal Khan, formerly of Herat province and a chief of the Taimanni, is carrying on the tradition of miniature painting. He makes his own pens, paints and brushes and uses techniques described in ancient manuscripts. Abdul Ghaffour Breshna and Khair Mohammad were outstanding painters during the 1960's. The compositions of both men are noted for their use of strong colors.

Architecture

Although in architecture nothing original has been developed since the Timurid period, the traditional techniques of that period have been preserved, including the method of making faïence tile. The use of polychrome faïence mosaic to sheath the exterior walls of mosques and tombs is a characteristic of Timurid architecture. The principal elements in the patterns are curving stems, leaves, and blossoms in countless pieces of small, carefully cut and fitted segments of glazed tile.

Lapis lazuli and turquoise predominate, accented by deep green and bright yellow or black and white. Each cut piece is rubbed down with a rasp until the edges and sides are smooth and even and taper from the glazed surface to a ridge or point in the back. These fragments are placed face down in the outlines drawn on a plaster bed. When a section is complete, it is covered with a thick coat of plaster, which settles into the gaps left by the taper of the units. The units are so close that the plaster barely shows on the surface. The size of each section is determined by convenience in handling, and care has to be taken in assembling and joining these sections when they are raised to a vertical position on the wall.

Workmanship is so skilled, however, that it is impossible to tell from the finished work where the divisions occur, and the panel appears to be painted on the wall. Slight irregularities in the bed on which the pattern is assembled result in little modulations in the surface of the finished work, and as the tiles used are brilliantly glazed, these differences in angle make spots that gleam and sparkle in the bright sun. The tomb of Nadir Shah near Kabul, is a Timurid design and is being completed by tilemakers trained in the ancient methods. Until called to Kabul to carry out this work they were engaged in restoration of the tile on the Masjid-i-Jami at Herat.

The architecture of dwellings is generally undistinguished. Most houses and shops are box-like structures with flat roofs. Some of the modern government buildings are imposing structures built by the country's most prominent architect, Abdulla Breshna, son of the painter Breshna.

HANDICRAFTS AND TRIBAL ARTS

Handicraft work forms an important segment of the economy, and some handicraft products, especially carpets, are world famous. Leather goods and pottery are produced almost universally, although Istalif, about 15 miles north of Kabul, is noted for a particularly fine green-glazed pottery. Metalworkers produce trays, pots, ewers, and basins which are found in most bazaars. Metal-

workers of Badakhshan and Kandahar pattern intricate designs in copper utensils, and those of Ghazni and Kabul use bronze to make such household goods. Knives are made all over Afghanistan, but the knifemakers of Charikar, Laghman, and Shighnan are the best known.

Nuristan is important for woodcarving. The Nuristanis not only make furniture and cooking utensils such as dishes and milk pails of wood decorated with crude incised patterns, but also carve the doors and windows of their houses.

The most important handicrafts are the weaving of cotton, woolen, and silk cloth, feltmaking and carpet weaving. Using simple looms, cotton weaving is done in nearly every town of the north and northwest provinces. Most of the cotton cloth woven is of two types: a loosely woven undyed material and a finer material of a heavier thread count, consisting of rows of different colored threads. Woolen cloth is woven almost everywhere except in the south. Very fine woolens, rivaling cashmere, are woven in the northern provinces, especially Herat. A thin, fine woolen shawl, known for its warmth and light weight, is made in Kabul and its counterpart, a very heavy wool which is used for heavy jackets, topcoats, and trousers is woven in the Hazarajat. Silk weaving is also well developed in the north. The types most in demand are used for shawls, turbans, and handkerchiefs.

Felts for use in making tents, blankets, floor coverings and clothing are made in the Hazarajat and the northern provinces. Some are used in the natural colors; others are dyed or decorated with intricate designs.

Of the handicrafts only carpets are exported to any extent. Excellent in quality, they are famous throughout the world for their brilliant colors. The art of carpetmaking is highly traditional, and the majority of patterns are jealously guarded family secrets handed down over the centuries. The main patterns are striking geometrical shapes, generally hexagonal and subdivided into quarters with inner motifs. This type of design is known as "elephant-pad," as it is said to resemble the imprint of an elephant's foot. Sometimes the outline of a mosque or tree is introduced into the pattern.

The carpets known outside Afghanistan as Bukharas or Khurasans usually are a deep red with the design in black and white. Another famous carpet, the Tekke Turkoman, is deep yellow with a multiple flower design in many colors, with a bright blue predominating. The Baluchis make beautiful carpets, but they do not have an international reputation. These carpets are soft rose, greens, and blues with a geometrical design in black.

The Kabul Arts and Crafts School in Kabul has produced some fine carpet designs based on traditional Persian motifs, but apart from carpets, nothing in the way of household goods or decorative objects seems to be of notable artistic value. The government has encouraged improved standards of workmanship and higher output in order to expand the export trade.

CHAPTER 12

RELIGION

Islam, one of the world's major religions, is the dominant faith, providing a common spiritual bond among the country's diverse ethnic and tribal groups. Approximately 99 percent of the people are Moslems, the great majority of whom adhere to the Sunnite branch of Islam. Sunnites comprise about 80 percent of the Afghan Moslem community. The remainder are followers of the Shiite branch of the faith. Islam is the official religion of the country as prescribed in the 1964 Constitution, which also declares that officially performed religious rites must be conducted in accordance with Hanafi doctrine (one of the four schools of Islamic law upheld by Sunnites). Furthermore, it requires that the King be a Moslem and a follower of the Hanafi school.

Religious faith and practice play an important part in the Afghan Moslem's daily life. Moral and spiritual values derived mainly from Islam shape his notions of ethical conduct, and the observance of its rituals is an integral part of his routine. The devout believer says his prayers five times daily, keeps the fast during holy days and aspires to make a pilgrimage to Mecca, the holy city of Islam. Those who are prosperous give alms to the poor as prescribed by Islamic law.

All Afghans are strongly affected by Islamic belief and practice. In the traditional social order religious and secular affairs have been intimately interwoven, and the authority of the *mullahs* (religious leaders) has extended into all aspects of life. Besides their prerogatives in the religious sphere, the *mullahs* have administered large amounts of property in the name of religious foundations, have provided schooling for the young, and have been the ultimate judges of right and wrong in the courts.

In the latter half of the twentieth century gradual political and social changes have brought about a diminution of the *mullah's* role in the secular affairs of the country. Changes that encroach on the traditional domain of the *mullahs* include the burgeoning of secular education and the revision of judicial codes and administration. The schools attached to the mosques and run by the Moslem clergy are losing out to a rapidly growing number of public insti-

tutions. At the same time, proposals are being examined which would establish a priority of secular codified law over the Islamic *shariat* law (which covers all aspects of human conduct) in the judiciary (see ch. 14, The Governmental System).

Religious experience and expression take on a somewhat different character in the cities and in the outlying areas. Islam as known in educated urban circles reveals itself as one of the major world faiths, a sophisticated religion with a sound theological base. The typical villager however is unconcerned about its philosophical subtleties and focuses his attention on the scrupulous observance of its ritual. In rural areas, moreover, the influence of pre-Islamic beliefs, which have introduced many local animistic features into religious experience, is strongly apparent.

ISLAM

Islam is the faith of more than 400 million people, ranging from West Africa to the Philippines. Within 100 years of its revelation in the seventh century, the religion spread from Mecca in the Arabian peninsula eastward as far as Central Asia and northward and westward to Constantinople (now Istanbul), Spain, and the Barbary Coast.

Its founder, Mohammed, was an Arab, born about A.D. 570 at Mecca into a branch of the Quraysh tribe. Orphaned at an early age, he was brought up by his grandfather and then by an uncle; later he married a rich widow and engaged in trade. When he was about 40 years old he began taking contemplative walks along the slopes of a mountain outside the city, where according to tradition, he received a call from God through the angel Gabriel. He proclaimed his revelations and developed a faithful group of followers, among them his wife; his cousin (and son-in-law) Ali; Umar ibn al-Khattab, a warrior and member of a powerful Meccan family; and Abu Bakr, who later became the first Moslem caliph.

Mohammed's preaching in Mecca against prevailing practices and beliefs earned the hostility of important leaders who forced him to flee to Medina with his closest followers. From Medina he and his supporters launched a series of campaigns to convert the unbelieving pagans, Jews, and Christians around them, and ultimately they brought the entire Arabian continent under their control. Mecca became the Holy City of Islam.

Islam came to Afghanistan with the Arab conquerors, who sent an expedition as far as the Kabul River Valley in the middle of the seventh century. Other religions and animistic beliefs were firmly entrenched however, and the conversion of the local population to Islam was not fully accomplished for several centuries. In much of

the western part of what is now Afghanistan, the Arab conquerors met Zoroastrianism, one of the first monotheistic religions of the world; in the eastern part they came into contact with Buddhism. The area from the Kabul River Valley to the Indus River, formerly known as Ghandhara, was a center of Buddhist civilization, of which rich cultural and architectural remains still exist. As the conversion of the Afghans to Islam was accomplished, Buddhism retreated and nearly disappeared as a living faith in the area.

The Ghaznevid dynasty (A.D. 962-1140), the first Moslem regime to control a considerable part of the country, produced an outstanding figure in Afghan history, Mahmud of Ghazni. At home in Ghazni, Mahmud established a brilliant court, where he gathered the greatest poets and scholars of his time, including Khwaja Abdullah Ansari, a saintly mystic poet, whose tomb is one of the major shrines in modern Afghanistan. Abroad, Mahmud sought additional converts to Islam sending his warriors to India to punish the Hindus, whom he called idol worshipers. The Ghaznevid dynasty was strongly Sunnite, as were the Samanid rulers of eastern Iran during the same period, and the Sunnite Moslem character of Afghan society became firmly established at that time. The introduction of Shiite Islam into the area occurred at a later date when this branch of the faith had become predominant in Iran.

Despite the division of the Islamic community into Sunnite, Shiite, and Kharedjite branches, all people who call themselves Moslems have a core of common beliefs. These center about the oneness of God and the prophethood of Mohammed as asserted in the Moslem profession of faith: "There is no God but God (Allah), and Mohammed is the Prophet of God." This formula is acceptable to all Moslems, but different branches interpret it differently, and some expand it.

All Moslems believe further that Mohammed as the messenger of God, though not himself divine, received and transmitted direct revelation from God. The words of this revelation have been recorded in the Koran, but the Koran was not created or written by men; Moslems accept it as the earthly representation of the Divine Book which has existed for all time. The criterion which establishes one as a Moslem in his willingness to recite publicly the profession of faith. Beyond this concise creed, differences in beliefs and practices, often subtle, distinguish the various divisions of the Islamic community.

The basic instructions of Islam are relatively simple. The faith demands purity and sinlessness yet recognizes the weaknesses of man. The Koran permits a Moslem to have four wives if he can treat them equally, but few men can afford more than one. The Koran proscribes drinking alcohol, eating pork, practicing usury,

and committing adultery. Statues and pictures of living things are forbidden as idolatrous and do not exist in Sunnite mosques, although they are occasionally found in private houses.

Islam admits no mediator between the individual and his God and has no formally organized clergy. The individual submits wholly to the omnipotence of God. The basic tenet is embodied in the often-heard expression, "If God wills." The Afghan may venerate certain holy men, but his religion provides him no formal communion of saints, no holy orders and no formal clerical hierarchy or church as Christians know it.

Various forms of mysticism appear in the religious beliefs and observances of many Moslems. Sufism, the mystic trend in Islam which is predominant in Iran, has a number of adherents. Among rural ascetics this tendency to mysticism may reflect a carryover of Central Asian shamanism and animism which existed before the coming of Islam and was later added to the Islamic base.

In general, the religious beliefs of rural Afghan Moslems reflect the strong influence of pre-Islamic features. Magic, superstition, and legend are so closely interwoven with Islamic beliefs that at times Islam itself is almost obscured. Most villagers and tribesmen believe in good and evil spirits and take pains to placate them. *Jinn* (evil and impure spirits) are considered more threatening to children and to women, especially those in childbirth, than to men.

One common belief is that a woman whose child dies almost immediately after its birth is possessed of a *jinn* and must rid herself of it before giving birth again. A *jinn*, some say, can throw his shadow over any person except a *sayyid* (a descendant of the Prophet) and cause him to lose his mind. Someone who is particularly apprehensive of a *jinn's* attack will call on his *mullah* for help, but the *mullah* is not expected to offer much protection.

Ghosts, which can take the form of an animal, are believed to stay away from the populous areas and never show themselves in the daytime. When they do appear, however, their visits are regarded as very serious, especially if it is the ghost of a person buried ritually unclean or without a proper funeral. Some Afghans do not like to kill deer or pigeons because they fear them to be dead saints. Dead saints are also believed to keep their human forms and often to proceed together on Thursday nights through the local graveyard, accompanied by the hosts of Moslem warriors who fell waging battle against non-Moslems.

Sunnite Islam

At his death Mohammed left no precise instruction as to the basis on which his successor was to be chosen, and through this

omission he planted the seeds of a controversy which gave rise to the Sunnite, Shiite, and Kharedjite branches of Islam. The majority of the Islamic community felt that the leader should be chosen by the companions of Mohammed, be members of the Qura-ysh tribe and be approved by the community at large. Persons subscribing to this view came to be known as Sunnites—those who follow the Sunna, the way of the Prophet.

Others considered Ali, a cousin of Mohammed, to have inherited the Prophet's mantle. These partisans of Ali, who came to be called Shiites, established their own community under their own leadership. Still others, later known as the Kharedjites, felt the caliph could be freely elected by the whole community and could be any good man.. Kharedjites were only a small splinter group, but the Sunnite-Shiite split was a major schism in the Islamic community.

Faith and Beliefs

For Sunnites, the *shariat* has four major sources: the Koran supplemented by the perfect example of the Prophet; the Sunna, consisting of the Prophet's deeds and sayings as reported by witnesses; the consensus of the whole Islamic community, including its leaders; and reasoning by analogy. The Sunna is recorded in the Hadith, which is the narration of specific deeds or sayings of Mohammed, coupled with the names of authorities who have successively reported them from the time of Mohammed to the time when they were recorded. Of the two sources of law, the Sunna is more often referred to as the authority for belief and practice. This is in line with the Sunnite view that many prescriptions or commands given in general terms in the Koran are made more precise in the Sunna.

All Sunnite thought has the dual base of the Koran and the Sunna. In addition, Sunnites admit as divinely revealed the first five books of the Old Testament, the Psalms of the Old Testament, and the Gospels of the New Testament. They are thought, however, to have been corrupted and to transmit only imperfectly the message of God. Sunnites also accept other prophets before Mohammed, among them, Adam, Abraham, Moses and Jesus, but Mohammed is acknowledged as the greatest and the last, the so-called Seal of the Prophets.

Sunnites deny emphatically that any prophet, including Mohammed, had any divine qualities. They are messengers of God, who is one and immutable and cannot be incarnate as man. Sunnites believe the individual soul is immortal and determinate, different from any other, and that there will be a final judgment leading to heaven or hell.

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The Koran places upon all believers five duties, the Five Pillars of Islam. For Sunnites these are: testimony to the oneness of God and the prophethood of Mohammed; prayer which must be said in the prescribed way five times daily—at dawn, noon, midafternoon, sunset and dusk; alms which the individual on his own initiative must give to the poor; fasting from sunrise to sunset during the holy month of Ramadan; and the pilgrimage to Mecca, preferably in the twelfth month of the year, which must be made at least once in a lifetime unless health or lack of funds precludes it.

The Five Pillars are all individual duties, the fulfillment of which rests on the conscience of the individual. To them is added a collective duty of the Islamic community at large, that of *jihad* (exertion in the way of God), sometimes called the Sixth Pillar of Faith. In theory *jihad* is a permanent struggle to make the word of God supreme. The Koran emphasizes peaceful *jihad*; Christians and Jews, the so-called people of the book are not to be converted to Islam by force, and the sword is to be used on other religions only as a last resort.

Although many appropriate political compromises have been made in the past, the concept of *jihad* has often been invoked by Moslem leaders wishing for political reasons to wage war on non-Moslem states. The proclamation of *jihad* played upon the fighting spirit of Afghan Moslems on several occasions in the early twentieth century, including the instance in which King Amanullah Khan (1919-29) evoked resentment against the British in 1919.

Periodic ritual observances follow the Islamic calendar which began in A.D. 622, the year of Mohammed's flight to Medina. The Islamic calendar is based on 12 lunar months: Muharram, Safar, Rabi-al-Awwal, Rabi-a-Akhir, Jamad-al-Ula, Jamad-al-Ukhr, Rajab, Shaban, Ramadan, Shawwal, Zuqadah, and Zulhijjah. It is shorter than the solar calendar by about 10 days.

The most important Islamic commemoration, beginning on the first day of the ninth month (Ramadan), is known as the fast of Ramadan. It is a severe test of a Moslem's faith, for all but the sick, the weak, soldiers on duty, travelers, the extremely young and the extremely old are expected to abstain from food, drink, tobacco, and the indulgence in worldly pleasures between dawn and dusk. Tempers are often short, during Ramadan. The Id-al-Fitr which marks the breaking of the fast, is one of the two most important festivals of the year and is noted by public prayers and giving of gifts.

The other major festival is called Id-al-Adha and commemorates the willingness of Abraham to sacrifice his son who Moslems believe was Ishmael. It takes place on the tenth day of the twelfth

Islamic month. Celebrants generally try to sacrifice an animal, join in public prayer, and give to the poor.

A less important holiday is Id-i-Moulud, which marks the Prophet's birthday—the twelfth day of the third Moslem month. The Moslem New Year is another holiday and is followed 40 days later by the Red Tulip Festival.

Prayer holds a particularly important place in a devout Sunnite's life. Islamic tradition describes prayers as being like "a stream of fresh water flowing beside the gate of each believer." Moslems may pray either alone or together in the mosque, led by a religious leader. In a simple, quiet ceremony the congregation in unison faces Mecca, alternately standing and prostrating itself, listening to the leader appeal to the merciful, all-powerful, all-seeing God. Sometimes, especially on Friday, the head of the mosque, or a layman who has distinguished himself in Islamic scholarship, preaches a sermon. There is no formal liturgy or music connected with any part of Islamic worship, but prayers are often chanted.

Nearly all men, women and children wear amulets of one sort or another to ward off the evil or jealous eye. They can be little silver boxes containing Koranic verses or charms and trinkets sewed into clothing. A child will often wear a whole string of boxes across his chest. *Mullahs* specialize in making and selling charms. Their art is secret and is transmitted only to their most devoted disciples. Charms can be used as medication for the relief of pain.

Shrines containing the remains of heroes or holy men are numerous; they are attended mostly by women. Tombs of *sayyids* are highly revered. Those containing the remains of *pirs*, saintly men thought to have performed many miracles in their lifetime, are slightly less revered. All tombs are sacred, and no one would dare desecrate or steal from them. Most of the shrines are located near a spring or an old tree or in a cave. The grave is usually surrounded by a circular fence, with a mound of stones in the center. Frequently they are decorated with tall wooden poles, to which are tied rags of various colors.

To visit a particularly sacred shrine is said to bring a special blessing on the pilgrim. A woman, hoping to conceive a child, drinks a brew concocted from nearby trees. A sick man, hoping for relief from pain, drinks water from a neighboring stream. A child ties a strip of cloth on a stick, plants it in the ground near the shrine and makes a wish. An adult may make the same gesture while swearing to avenge the death of a relative or friend in a feud.

Inasmuch as many shrines are tombs of saintly men, they often become a meeting place for persons who, inspired by the holy man's piety or asceticism, were his followers during his lifetime. The dis-

ciples indulge in prolonged meditation, hoping to achieve mystical union with God. Throughout the Moslem world religious orders or fraternities, essentially mystic, have grown up around such especially venerated men.

Contrasted with the strict observance of Islamic rituals by the vast majority of Afghans is the tendency of a few university-educated young persons to drift away from traditional observances. Some such persons, for example, no longer keep the fast during Ramadan, care little or nothing about making a pilgrimage to Mecca, do not pray routinely five times daily or give alms to the poor. Although they adhere to a belief in the basic teachings of Islam, they may voice doubts about lesser points of belief.

Institutions

Of the several different schools of law which developed within Sunnite Islam, four still exist each named after its founder; their followers are known as Hanafites, Hanbalites, Shafiites, and Maki-kites. The schools are in agreement on the four recognized sources of law—the Koran, the Sunna, the consensus of the faithful, and analytical deduction of the intent of basic law. They differ only in the degree of emphasis they give to each source. All are held valid by all Sunnites. Although there is a tendency for one school to be dominant within a given area, any Sunnite may belong to any one of them.

The Hanafi school, the oldest, is predominant in western Asia, India, and parts of Egypt. Regarded as the least rigid of the four schools it was founded in Iraq by Abu Hanifah (died A.D. 767). He placed great emphasis on deduction, basing decisions more on what he, or the judges, thought was the intention of the Koran and Sunna than on literal interpretations of law. Hanafi jurisprudence is upheld in the 1964 Constitution, which states that its basic principle shall be applied by the courts in rendering decisions where no provisions exist in the Constitution or the laws of the date for a case under consideration.

There is no ordained clergy in Islam, but various kinds of religious leaders are recognized. Among these, the *mullahs* are the most important. A *mullah* is an individual who has had some religious training, either from another *mullah*, which is the usual arrangement or in a school of theology, such as the Faculty of Theology at Kabul University (see ch. 10, Education). The variation in the degree of religious learning and wisdom exhibited by the *mullahs* is considerable. Some have great stature and are consulted for their opinions on a variety of matters, both secular and sacred. Most villages have a government-paid *mullah*, who usually doubles as a teacher and judge, and a number of part-time *mullahs*, who

devote themselves largely to farming. *Mullahs* must learn many detailed rules for the conduct of private and civil life about which the ordinary citizen, if he wishes to conduct his life as a good Moslem, is compelled to seek his guidance.

The part-time *mullah*, usually paid through contributions raised by the villagers, performs a solely religious role. He presides over circumcisions, marriages, deaths, commemorations, and such other rituals as daily prayers. He also watches over the personal behavior of villagers to see that they conform to his own interpretation of proper Moslem behavior. Many of these *mullahs* want more than anything to perform a miracle, such as making a barren wife give birth to a son, so that their prestige will rise and, when they die, they may be immortalized as a *pir* by the villagers.

The role of the government-paid *mullah* is both secular and religious. In addition to leading prayers at the mosque and performing other religious duties, he provides a rudimentary education for village children; for many of the children this is the only schooling available. He teaches the Koran by rote and gives instruction in writing and counting.

The political role of the government-paid *mullah* can be important. Generally, he is in communication with religious leaders in the capital. By invoking his religious authority, which depends to a large degree on his personality, he can turn villagers against persons unpopular with the government and direct their sympathies. He can act as the government's listening post in villages too small to have regular civil servants and, in any case, is able to reach into village society better than other government officials.

Other types of religious dignitaries are connected with the judicial functions and are civil servants. These include *shariat* court judges, who are trained in religious law at various theological schools. Some have studied at Al-Azhar University, the renowned theological center in Cairo. Scholars in Islamic law act as counselors or advisers to the judges or, sometimes, as their prosecuting attorneys. A judge of the religious court will turn to such a scholar for a religious ruling to fit the case before him. Also judges of the religious courts have various assistants who maintain order in the court, sometimes questioning witnesses and occasionally carrying out sentences, such as flogging. These assistants also observe the religious behavior of individuals within the court's jurisdiction and see to it that offenders are brought before the judge of the *shariat* court.

Among the Sunnites the term *imam* refers to the lay person who leads the prayers in a mosque service when no *mullah* is present. The person selected for this role is usually someone who has read widely on theological matters and can be presumed to have a

sound base of Islamic knowledge. The person who preaches the Friday sermon in the mosque need not necessarily be a *mullah*; laymen are sometimes invited to perform this function. The *muezzin* is the crier who sounds the call to prayer from the minaret of the mosque.

A number of religious leaders, noted for their moral excellence and superior qualities of leadership, enjoy wide repute and wield considerable authority in both secular and religious spheres. Although anyone can become a *mullah*, there is a tendency for son to follow father and for certain families to supply theological students. A few Afghan families are noted for having produced a succession of outstanding religious dignitaries over the span of several generations. Among them are the Mojadadi family of Kabul, the head of which bears the title of Hazrat Sahib of Shor Bazaar, and the Jilani family, which has long resided near Jalalabad and has great influence throughout the area.

Shiite Islam

The Shiite minority is made up predominantly of the Hazaras but includes the Kizilbash ethnic group and many Tajiks as well. Ismaili Moslems, whose faith is an offshoot of the Shiite branch of Islam, usually are found among the mountain Tajiks, who live north of Jalalabad and in Badakhshan.

Although Shiites accept Mohammed's revelations, the preordination of actions and the Five Pillars of Islam they proclaim the divine nature of Ali, the Prophet's cousin and son-in-law, and recognize the rights of Ali and his descendants to the spiritual leadership of the Islamic community. Shiism is split into a number of subdivisions which have developed historically from disputes over the succession of *imams*.

The main body of Shiism is that of the Imamis or Twelvers, those who recognize the succession of 12 *imams*, the last of whom disappeared as a young boy in A.D. 878 and is expected to return as the Mahdi, the divinely guided one who will institute divine rule on earth. The Twelvers predominate in Afghanistan, as they do in Iran and Iraq.

Shiite Islam began as a political movement but, increasingly suppressed and defeated on this plane, it developed doctrinal positions of its own. The basic position is that concerning the *imamate*; whereas Sunnites regard Mohammed and his successors merely as temporal rulers elected by the faithful, Shiites hold that Mohammed's real successors were spiritually guided mediators between God and man, the sources of hidden truth, and

that their spiritual power overshadowed that of the Prophet himself.

To the basic formula for profession of faith, Shiites add "and Ali is the companion of God." They also believe that Ali is the preeminent saint of Islam; Mohammed is only the prophet, God's messenger. The *imams*, of whom Ali was the first, are essential to Shiism. They are chosen by God either directly or through the preceding *imam* acting with divine inspiration. Shiites accept the Sunna as a source of law, but they have their own body of narrations of the Sunna, which differ from that of the Sunnites and are based on the authority of Ali or his adherents. Most of them pertain to Ali's right to succession.

Shiism has had many martyrs, whose deaths help to add a large degree of passion into what otherwise had been a relatively dispassionate religion. Shiites have proportionately fewer shrines than Sunnites in Afghanistan. One, however, the beautiful Mazar-i-Sharif, or "sacred tomb," in the city of the same name, is the most famous in the country. Shiites believe that Ali's body is buried beneath it, and Mazar-i-Sharif has become their holy city.

Other Shiite offshoots include the Ismailis, the Aliilahis and the Roshanis. The Ismailis disagree with other Shiites in believing that the seventh *imam* should have been Ishmail, who was passed over in favor of his brother, Musa al-Kasim. Ismailis accept many Shiite doctrines, such as the esoteric nature of truth and the inspiration of the *imams*, but disagree with them on various other points. Aliilahis differ from other Shiites most conspicuously in their extreme deification of Ali, whom they regard as an incarnation of God; and they differ from other Shiites in that they do not attend the mosque or recognize ritual uncleanness. Because of the introduction of pagan elements into their system of beliefs and practices, conservative Sunnite Moslems do not always recognize the Aliilahis as Moslems. The Roshanis are highly secretive about their beliefs, hence little is known of them, but they are generally regarded as an offshoot of the Shiite branch of Islam. Roshani teachings originated many centuries ago under Bayazid Ansari, a famous Moslem heretic. Various nomadic Pashtuns have been reported to belong to this group.

For Shiites, the Moslem New Year opens a 10-day period of mourning for Hussain, Ali's son, who was killed on the tenth day of Muharram the first month in the Islamic calendar. On the first day those in the Kabul area, congregate at Aliabad on the slopes around the tomb of a saintly Shiite. They are permitted to celebrate this occasion but not to practice the self-torture which accompanies the observation in Iran. Instead, adults and children

gather daily at noon in the mosques. Prayers are read; a procession is formed, and everyone shares in a communal feast.

Islam and Society

In all matters connected with Islam or impinging upon Moslem beliefs, the government moves with caution and deliberation. The enforced abdication in 1929 of King Amanullah Khan, who antagonized conservative religious elements by his sweeping attempts at modernization, and the end of the liberal regime of Prime Minister Shah Mahmud (1946-53) are fresh memories. The Constitution of 1964 demonstrates the cautious and gradual approach to matters of modernization and reform adopted by the government since 1953. In setting forth the patterns of organization and authority in the various branches of government, the Constitution stresses the supremacy of the secular and at the same time upholds the values embodied in Islam (see ch. 14, The Governmental System; ch. 15, Political Dynamics).

By 1967 it was clear, however, that the influence of the *mullahs* in secular affairs was declining as a result of some of the reform measures introduced by the government. For example, the interest of high officials in promoting the spread of literacy and of expanding educational opportunity for all persons led to increases in secular educational facilities. The pervasive influence of the *mullahs* in education was thus diminished, as a child could obtain an education from alternative sources.

Although the secular role of religious leaders is slowly declining in importance, the government is beginning to utilize religious rites and celebrations as unifying symbols to further its nation building efforts. For example, the ceremonial flag raising which marks the start of the New Year ceremony at the tomb of Ali in Mazar-i-Sharif is now made the occasion for speeches by high officials publicizing national development efforts.

OTHER RELIGIONS

Historically, Zoroastrianism, Buddhism, Hinduism, Judaism, and Christianity have had some importance in the country. All but the Christians, who are foreigners, are scattered remnants of long-settled religious communities with roots far back into the area's past. In the mid-1960's non-Moslems made up only 1 percent of the total population. They are predominantly urban dwellers and are found in the major centers of Kabul, Herat, and Kandahar. A few Parsis travel around the country as musicians and dancers. Hindus and Jews have had a leading role in the country's com-

mercial life and are still active as money lenders and merchants in its bazaars.

These faiths are tolerated, and their practice, provided it gives no public offense, is protected by the 1964 Constitution. Fanaticism among most Moslems seems to be a thing of the past. Generally, the Moslem majority is cordial to non-Moslems and shows no aversion toward them either by implication or overt action.

CHAPTER 13

SOCIAL VALUES

prevailing values, those of the numerically predominant tribes, are shared in varying degrees by a majority of the population, despite the ethnic diversity of the population and the tendency of family, lineage, and tribal groups to keep largely to themselves. A fundamental community of values is established by common adherence to Islam, by the similarity of social organization among all groups, and by the dependence of most people on agriculture for their livelihood.

Pashtun social values derive primarily from the form of Islam practiced in the country, as modified by the Pashtun code of conduct known as Pashtunwali. They emphasize family loyalty and hospitality, respect for authority, hospitality to friends and strangers alike, individual valor, pride, honor, and chivalry.

Behavior in nearly all social situations is deeply influenced by an individual's strong emotional identification with his family and lineage. While his own opinions and feelings are important, he is likely to act less as an independent person, with the ability to make his own decisions, than as a member of a group in which decisions are made for him. His commitment to persons and groups other than his family and lineage is relatively uncertain and transient.

SOCIAL RELATIONS

Religious principles learned in the mosque and in the family circle have great major importance in shaping popular beliefs about the nature of good and evil and of forces controlling human destiny. The majority of the population tends to view fate or divine will as significant in influencing the course of human life. Strict observance of religious duties and proscriptions is a widely held ideal, and a reputation for religious devotion greatly enhances an individual's standing in the community. A Pashtun proverb declares that the man who never dies who leaves a good name behind him. Almost without exception Afghans are devout Moslems who believe wholly in the teachings of Islam and scrupulously practice the

rituals of faith. Even those few members of the educated urban elite who have expressed doubts on minor points of faith and no longer perform its rituals faithfully, nonetheless generally tend to retain their fundamental beliefs.

Values derived from the teaching of Islam are importantly modified by an older, often unwritten code of the hills of which the most prominent is the Pashtun code of conduct, the Pashtunwali. In practice, values rooted in the Pashtunwali may contradict Islamic principles. Pashtunwali, an oral code committed to memory by every Pashtun child, covers both moral and criminal matters. It is the code of an independent people who live hard and demanding lives. It sets up strict patterns of conduct and swift punishment for the transgressor. Its most important elements are *badal*, blood vengeance; *melmastia*, the obligation of hospitality and the protection given each guest; and *nanavati*, the right of asylum and the obligation to accept a truce offer.

Whenever he feels his honor or his interests affected, the Pashtun seeks revenge. There are no limitations in time or space on revenge, and the avenger is expected to spare no effort in realizing *badal*. The duty to avenge passes from the individual to the group; the group is expected to help the individual achieve his *badal*, and the group to which the offender belongs becomes a proper object of vengeance. Most serious is *badal* resulting from loss of life. This is always a group matter, and it is considered desirable to kill in *badal* a person of the target group who has the same social position as the individual to be avenged. *Badal* thus leads to feuds which can be carried out over a number of generations. Blood money, however, is acceptable in place of blood if this is agreeable to the families involved.

To entertain guests and to feed and shelter them in accordance with the obligation of *melmastia* is a matter of prestige. Among some Pashtuns it is normally the duty of the individual household; among others, each village maintains a guesthouse at which travelers are entertained. The ability to entertain is a socially approved manner of displaying wealth, and tribal chief's standing is often measured by his manner of entertaining guests. They may seldom be turned out or away, but they are not expected to stay longer than 3 days. Hospitality extended to kinsmen is taken for granted and does not count as hospitality. It must be extended to known enemies as lavishly as to friends or strangers. In turn the guest—no matter what reason he has to suspect that his hosts or their fellow villagers are hostile to him—is expected to behave in an entirely friendly manner as long as he is a guest.

Nanavati is a special form of hospitality and a palliative to the harsh concepts of *badal*. An individual pursued by his enemies, or

otherwise in apprehension for his life, can seek asylum with other Pashtuns, who are then required to protect him as if they had ties of kinship, which would make such protection mandatory. Asylum can be sought in the village, mosque or shrine or in the home of a tribesman. Breaches in *nanavati*, refusal to extend it or breach of its rules by either protector or pursuer are serious infractions of Pashtunwali. The code's provisions apply even in cases in which the person seeking *nanavati* is the sworn enemy of his protector or in which the protector has *badal* to execute against the protected person. A Pashtun folk story praises the woman who granted *nanavati* to the murderer of her son, when the murderer himself was pursued. *Nanavati* automatically applies to any guest.

A Pashtun is also obliged to defend to the last any property entrusted to him; to refrain from killing a woman, a Hindu, a minstrel or a boy not yet circumcised; to pardon an offense or to cease fighting, on the intercession of a woman of the offender's lineage or of a religious official or dignitary; to punish all adulterers with death; and to refrain from killing a man who has entered a mosque.

Family Solidarity

Afghans stress loyalty as the price for the privilege of belonging to a group. Loyalty to the many groups to which a man may belong from the nuclear family to the nation may imply conflict. The ordinary man, however, has little difficulty in this regard. He gives his first loyalty to his kin group, which is at once his source of livelihood, his social neighborhood and the origin of his moral standards. His loyalty is given also to his tribe and nation only to the extent that his family interests coincide with those of the larger groups. In view of the central position of the family, the avoidance of any kind of behavior that might cause a blemish on its honor is regarded as an overriding obligation.

Most people feel that kinsmen have a special obligation to be honest and helpful toward each other. Thus, the same man who deceives a stranger in a business transaction may be scrupulously honest in relations with his entire family. Similarly, the importance of an issue is often measured in terms of how much it involves his family—its honor or the welfare of its members.

Respect for Authority

Both tribalism and Islam have combined to make respect for authority basic to the value system. The tribal member is taught the supreme importance of showing proper respect to those who, because of their status, have the right to assert authority. The

head of the lineage and the head of the household have undisputed power over other individuals in the group for which they are responsible. The senior male in each household exercises strict discipline over all its members. Respectful obedience is expected of all children and any questioning of decisions on their part is regarded as rude and impudent behavior.

The concept of strict authority is tempered, however, by the equalitarianism of Islam. According to both tribal tradition and Moslem law all men are equal before Allah. In a strictly religious context even the person in highest authority is merely one of the believers. The ruler's authority is symbolically recognized in the Friday mosque service but derives from the consent of the ruled.

Hospitality

Hospitality is widely held as an ideal, not only by Pashtuns upon whom it is imposed as an obligation of the Pashtunwali, but also by all ethnic groups. Throughout the country unidentified strangers are generally regarded with some suspicion, and one whose business in the area is not obvious is sometimes suspected of being engaged in some nefarious activity. Once the stranger's good intentions have been established, however, he will receive hospitality on a wide scale. He is welcomed with warmth and given the best of whatever the host can afford, since Afghans generally try to outdo each other in the art of entertainment. To provide for the stranger is considered an honor, and lavishness enhances the host's prestige.

THE INDIVIDUAL

Fighting Spirit

The tradition of the tribal warrior gives rise to a wide range of ideal personal qualities, all of which verge on the heroic. In Pashtun tribal society, leadership is demonstrated by displays of passion, courage, toughness and readiness to do battle. The admired male is the statuesque tribesman, armed with bandoleer and rifle, whose erect posture and lithe movements dispel any doubt as to his effectiveness in hand-to-hand combat against his enemies. The tribesman tends to see issues in extremes, and if he feels that he has been wronged or insulted he is quick to retaliate. Problems of water distribution, cattle rustling, pasturage trespassing and wife stealing have set off violent blood feuds; others have been caused by nothing more than the desire of one man to enhance his reputation as a fighter.

Readiness to do battle is suggested not only by the traditional custom, now disappearing, of carrying daggers and firearms at all times, but also by patterns of village construction. The fortified village, with high defense towers, is seen in many regions throughout the country, particularly in Pashtun territory, but also in the traditional areas of most other ethnic communities.

Sports are rough, reflecting the value placed on physical vigor and a competitive spirit. Wrestling and games of horsemanship are common in the north. Hunting is especially popular with the Pashtuns, whose tribesmen are always on the lookout for mountain goats and sheep, gazelles, wolves, pheasants, and other wild game to shoot. Another form of amusement is viewing cockfights, fights between quails and pheasants, and occasionally, fights between rams or camels. Boys imitate their fathers by playing as hunters or in games in which they assume the roles of tribal chief and the members of his tribe.

Pride and Honor

The tribal warrior overcomes his enemies by moral as well as physical vigor. Integrity and honor are highly emphasized. A favorite theme of Afghan literature is that of the indomitable warrior who is always a just man, true to his word. Once a Pashtun gives his word he is expected to keep it, and breaking it is regarded as a serious contravention of prevailing principles. Much emphasis is placed on pride. Pashtuns have a strong sense of personal dignity and are sensitive to any form of insult or slight, especially when administered in public. Any person offending a Pashtun can expect speedy retribution in the form of verbal abuse or physical violence. The awesomeness of Afghan vengeance is reflected in the Hindu saying "Oh Gods! From the venom of the cobra, the teeth of the tiger and the vengeance of the Afghan, deliver us."

Constancy and Chivalry

Afghan society is very much a man's world, in which women are generally not admitted to leadership. Ideal feminine virtues are piety, beauty, and submissiveness. Pashtun men are protective of their women and place a high premium on privacy of the home, as symbolized by the thick walls behind which the house is hidden. Emphasis on female seclusion has been strongest among the wealthy urban elite, which has traditionally garbed its women in the all-enveloping *burqa*. Next to tales of battles, romances of bygone ages are the most popular themes of Pashtun literature. In prose and poetry such stories invariably relate a tale of passionate

love between man and woman. The heroine sings her love of the hero, while he in turn demonstrates honor, chivalry and devotion to win the woman he loves. In real life the brave fighter who can also deliver flowery orations and sentimental poetry recitations at tribal gatherings is bound to increase his stature as a hero.

SECTION II. POLITICAL

CHAPTER 14

THE GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM

In the governmental system in 1967 King Mohammed Zahir Shah, who has been on the throne since 1933, ruled as the constitutional monarch, but Prime Minister Nur Ahmad Etemadi governed as chief executive on behalf of the King. The system was reorganized under a Constitution promulgated in October 1964 at the instigation of the King who wished to bring about a stable transformation of the nation through a broadly representative form of government.

It included new features, such as the principle of constitutional monarchy, exclusion from important positions in the central government and political life of members of the royal family other than the King himself and separation of powers into executive, legislative, and judicial functions. Other new features were measures designed to establish the priority of codified, secular laws over Islamic *shariat* law (which covers all aspects of human conduct) and to bring about a sweeping reorganization of the judicial system. This effort was marked in October 1967 by the establishment of a Supreme Court (*Estra Mahkama*) after a 3-year preparatory period (1964-67).

The innovations were in sharp contrast to the pre-1964 system which reflected in many respects the supreme power of the King and the royal family. Although the previous constitution provided the framework for multiple responsibility in government, the King and his family members had ruled. Prominent among the top government leaders was the Mohammadzai lineage of the Durani tribe, and with few exceptions, the rule stated that only proven friends or relatives of the royal family could have executive, legislative or judicial responsibility.

The government, believing that a hasty change from the old to the new pattern could create frictions and instability, provided for a transitional period under the constitution. Wherever possible, care was taken to ensure the preservation of a link between past and present without negating the spirit of the new constitution.

The government has been highly centralized, with its authority represented locally in descending order: provincial governors, sub-governors and lesser local chiefs. The central government has made efforts to extend its welfare services throughout the land. As a result, the traditional importance of tribal and religious leaders is being gradually reduced in many areas, although in some areas the government continues to rely on local leaders for enlisting effective popular participation and support.

The top of the government structure continued to be dominated by the leading ethnic group, the Pashtuns. Many of the intermediate positions, however, were filled by members of other ethnic groups, chiefly the urbanized Persian-speaking Tajik, often referred to as Farsiwans or Parsiwan (see Glossary).

TRADITIONAL INFLUENCES

Tribal Authority

Respect for the authority of a chief is a tribal tradition which helps stabilize the government as long as the cooperation of the tribes can be secured or their submission compelled. Tribal codes, whether among Pashtuns, Uzbeks, Turkomans or other Afghans, recognize the need for an established authority in each family, lineage and tribal division. Between tribes, too, there is a customary code for mutual respect and some intertribal authority; the chief of chiefs is called the *amir*, the throne title that preceded the present-day *Shah* or King. This pattern of authority that operates through the *jirgahs* (tribal councils of family heads and notables) endured the ages and in 1967 continued to influence the operation of the political system.

At the lowest level, authority begins in the family, in which the head is the eldest male or his designated heir. The family heads find collective expression in the *jirgah* for each lineage and each tribal division up to the grand assemblage of chiefs (*Loe Jirgah*) at the national level. The authority with which a member speaks at various levels of the *jirgah* derives from many sources. It may come from age, personality or family status; his father, for example, may have been a local chief, variously called a *malik*, *khan* or *sirdar*, depending on the area. He may own much land and many animals or have other kinds of property that give him the status of wealth. He may also have proved himself a man of competence a good warrior, a sage, an arbiter and statesman between tribesmen, or an administrator. He may have the allegiance of a large number of people. He may be particularly pious and have religious status, or he may have the backing of other and higher authorities, perhaps even central government officials.

Within the *jirgah* the man with the best combination of these qualities usually speaks with the most authoritative voice and is elected by general acclamation as the chief of that particular council. He does not forget, however, that he owes his authority to the support given him from below. If he assumes too much independence or abuses his power, he is likely to be challenged by others. Important decisions in the lineage or tribe are made by the *jirgah*, usually by open acclamation rather than by secret voting. Once a decision is made, however, the chief has almost unlimited authority to see that it is carried out.

In the extension of this system to the national level, the *amir* calls the *Loe Jirgah* (great council) of *khans*, *maliks*, *sirdars* (noblemen) and *mullahs* (Moslem religious leaders), presents his problems and asks for their opinions. This pattern follows the Pashtun tradition under which the *amir* is theoretically the first among equals, and his duty is to take counsel with the best available advisers before making major decisions.

In the past the *amirs* have used or ignored this pattern, depending on varying circumstances. In their intense concern for national unity and modernization, Amir Abdur Rahman Khan (who reigned from 1880 to 1901) and his two successors, Amir Habibullah Khan (1901-19) and Amir Amanullah Khan (1919-29), departed from tribal rule by seeking to destroy the independent power of the tribal chiefs and by ruling as autocrats (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). Mohammad Nadir Shah (1929-33), who came to power largely with tribal help, tried to restore the balance. He proclaimed a constitution which recognized by implication the *Loe Jirgah* as the highest repository of power in the land and also sought to give the tribal as well as nontribal leaders a share in the governing of the country.

In providing candidates for chieftainship, certain families are recognized as having prerogatives, if not monopoly mainly because they count distinguished leaders among their ancestors. Among the Pashtuns, the Duranis provided the leaders for two centuries, and among their lineages the Sadozais and the Mohammadzais have produced the country's *amirs*. Of the Mohammadzais, the Yahya Kheyl, to which Nadir Shah belonged, is named in both the 1931 and the 1964 Constitutions as the royal line.

Islam conceives of no separation of church and state, since all political concepts derive from the Koran and the Sunna (see ch. 12, Religion). Islamic theory does not recognize the validity of manmade legislation; human rulers merely make derivative regulations for putting divine law into effect. The chief executive in Islam is theoretically the caliph, the protagonist of both church and state. Whether or not a particular ruler aspires to the explicit

title of caliph, his existence as ruler usually gives his position legitimacy.

Afghan history from the tenth century, when Mahmud of Ghazni received the approval of the Caliph of Baghdad to act as the Caliph's representative, to the present has demonstrated this theory and strengthened the tradition (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). The recognition of this divine sanction has been expressed by the mention of the ruler's name in the *khutbah*, or Friday prayers in every mosque, and by the acceptance of the coins and other currency bearing his name or image.

The support of religious leaders was indispensable to any ruler in the past, and *mullahs* inevitably attended the *jirgahs* of the monarch. Abdur Rahman tried to reduce their influence by having himself accepted as head of the faith, then taking over mosque properties and reducing stipends to *mullahs*; Habibullah cooperated with them; Amanullah made them bitter enemies. Nadir Shah, anxious to please them, gave them recognition in his constitution, and King Mohammad Zahir Shah, although careful not to offend them, has tried to minimize their political influence and enlarge their horizons by education. Their moral influence on the people is still undeniable, and their good will adds considerable strength to the throne and thereby to the government.

The influence of religion on the governmental system, past and present is especially pronounced in the administration of civil and criminal laws. The source of this influence is the *shariat*, a body of Islamic laws derived from the revelations of the Koran. This law applies to Moslems not only when they come before a judge (*qazi*) to obtain a decision but also in their daily activities, telling them what their religious duties are, what to eat and drink, how to treat their families and how to give gifts and bequeath possessions.

Since the earliest days of Islam, Moslem scholars have developed a body of jurisprudence that seeks to adapt the text of the Koran to the customs of the people. The result has been the growth of four major schools of law, based in varying degrees on the Koran and Sunna, on the consensus of learned opinion and on analytical deductions. The Hanafi school, the first to be propounded, is written into the 1964 Constitution as the official doctrine for judicial and legislative purposes. It emphasizes that regulations not adequately covered by the Koran must be deduced from the spirit and intention of the Koran. The school permits considerable personal opinion by the *qazi* in deducing that spirit and hence in administering justice.

Islamic law is strongest and most clear cut in the fields of family relationships, inheritance and religious endowments; weak-

est in criminal, fiscal, commercial and constitutional law. It sets forth specific prohibitions concerning whom a person can marry, and it describes obligations between husband and wife and the rights of children (see ch. 8, Family). It does not, however, give provisions of criminal law that can be applied uniformly or provide for commercial contracts and arrangements needed in a society with developing economic complexities.

The *shariat* has been increasingly supplemented by non-Moslem influences. From year to year, particularly in the fields of commercial, fiscal and criminal law, secular codes based on European models have tended to weaken total reliance on *shariat* (see ch. 27, Public Order and Safety). The 1964 Constitution seeks to establish the supremacy of codified secular laws over the *shariat*. It also specifies that the King must be a follower of the Hanafite doctrine and that religious rites performed by the state should conform to it.

CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

The basic law of the land in force in 1967, promulgated in October 1964, had been preceded by constitutions in 1923 and 1931.

Constitutional development, an integral part of the continuing efforts at modernization, began during the reign of Abdur Rahman, who incorporated settled communities into a territorial structure and cleared away the chaos of innumerable conflicting edicts of local chiefs by creating a large body of central law, which he sought to enforce impartially throughout his domain.

The first effort to codify the basic law of the land, however, was made under Amanullah. By the spring of 1923 his Constitution, based largely on Turkish administrative law and the Constitution of Iran of 1906, had been printed in Pashto and promulgated. This document provided for an absolute hereditary monarchy, a council of states and a number of partially elected consultative councils.

In 1924 Amanullah attempted and failed to proclaim that laws would be based on the Islamic faith, not just the Hanafi school. In 1928 he laid plans for a parliament consisting of 150 elected members, a body which would take over power from the Loe Jirgah, and a cabinet of ministers on the European model. Because of mounting opposition from conservatives to his policies of sweeping social, legal and political reforms, he was forced to abdicate in 1929 (see ch. 3, Historical Setting).

Upon his accession in 1929 Nadir Shah repealed the 1923 Constitution and announced that he would base administration on Hanafi doctrine partly to conciliate the tribal and religious ele-

ments. Nevertheless, he continued modernization efforts, but at a slower pace than those of Amanullah. He adapted the tribal, religious and dynastic traditions of the country to modern representative institutions. The result was the Constitution of October 1931, which had been approved by the consultative National Council (Majlis-i-Shura-i-Milli) of 105 delegates chosen from among the 286 notables of the Loe Jirgah which he had summoned in 1930.

The 1931 Constitution, which remained in effect until 1964 without any fundamental change, established the kingship in the family of Nadir Shah, legitimized monarchical supremacy in executive, legislative and judicial matters, and recognized the theory of parliamentarianism without yielding the substance of royal power. There were no provisions in the Constitution for curbing or limiting monarchical authority.

Retaining the principle that the King should consult with advisers, the Constitution provided for a rudimentary bicameral parliamentary system, in conformity with the Islamic commandment that the ruler of a state must consult with representatives of the people or the people themselves. The Parliament was divided into an elective lower house, the National Council (Majlis-i-Shura-i-Milli), and an appointive upper house, the House of Nobels (Majlis-i-Ali-i-Ayan). The lower house could initiate bills and enact them, but it was essentially an advisory body as was the upper house. In addition, the Loe Jirgah played a nominal role as the third advisory body, although it was not specifically mentioned in the Constitution.

The 1931 Constitution established the official state religion as Sunnite Islam, of which the King must be a follower, and declared the Hanafi school of Islamic law supreme (see ch. 12, Religion). Since the bulk of Afghan law derived from *shariat* and thus is adjudicated by Hanafite scholars, the Constitution said little about the judiciary. It confirmed the supremacy of the Hanafite doctrine and stressed the freedom of all courts from any interference.

The Constitution contained a limited bill of rights guaranteeing the sanctity of individual property, freedom from search without warrant, freedom of the press, and other provisions prohibiting slavery and forced labor. Women were not specifically mentioned in the document.

The 1964 Constitution

The chief innovator of the 1964 Constitution was King Mohammad Zahir Shah. In March 1963 he directed the government to prepare a new constitution which would express his personal decision to dissociate members of the royal family from the gov-

ernment, institute an evolutionary development of parliamentary democracy, and more effectively enable the government to embark on social and political reforms.

The 7-man Constitutional Committee, appointed in March 1963, completed a draft by February 1964, and the preliminary version was then reviewed by the 29-member Constitutional Advisory Commission. Endorsed by the Cabinet, the draft was submitted to a partly elective and partly appointive constituent *Lo Jirgah* of 452 delegates, representing a cross section of society, for final deliberation. Adopted by this body on September 20, 1964, without any major modification, the document was signed and promulgated by the King on October 1, 1964, and became effective on the same day.

The 1964 Constitution establishes the principle of constitutional monarchy and debars members of the royal family from party politics and from certain high government positions. It ordains the priority of secular laws over the traditional *shariat* and creates a governmental system of checks and balances based on separation of executive, legislative and judicial powers. All of these features are new to the nation, as are some of the other provisions relating to "the basic rights and duties of the people" and to those permitting the organization of political parties (see ch. 15, Political Dynamics).

Citizens are detained and tried only through due process of law. Torture is prohibited, and the right to defense counsel is recognized. The Constitution guarantees, within certain statutory limitations, the inviolability of residence, property, and personal communications. It affirms freedom of thought, speech, and association, and recognizes the right to form political parties and to obtain education.

Another provision establishes Pashto and Dari as official languages (see ch. 6, Languages and Communication). Still another provides that a state of emergency may be proclaimed by the King in times of serious internal unrest or threat to national security; under these circumstances the powers of Parliament are to be transferred by him in whole or in part to the executive branch of government.

Constitutional amendment procedures make changes difficult. The intent of the Constitutional Committee was to insure national stability during the formative phase of political activity.

The Constitution specifically exempts three provisions from amendment—the principles of Islam, of the constitutional monarchy and of "the values embodied in Article 8" which states that "The King shall be an Afghan national, a Moslem and a follower of the Hanafi doctrine."

THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

Afghanistan is a unitary state, whose central government is divided into executive, legislative and judicial branches; the King personifies the highest authority of the state (see fig. 8).

The King and the Royal Family

The 1964 Constitution, unlike its predecessor, imposes formal restraints on the royal powers; specifically, "the rights and duties" of the King are to be subject to "the limits prescribed" by the fundamental law. Nonetheless, the powers vested in the King by the Constitution are almost as pervasive as those provided under the 1931 version. Moreover, Article 15 stipulates that "The King is not accountable and shall be respected by all."

The monarch, who "personifies the sovereignty," reigns over all branches of government; as supreme commander of the armed forces, he controls the military establishment; as titular head of the state, he declares war, concludes peace, and contracts treaties. He has the power to summon the *Loe Jirgah*, dissolve Parliament and appoint the Prime Minister, the chief justice and justices of the Supreme Court and some members of the upper house of Parliament. His status is further enhanced by his reserve powers to proclaim a state of emergency.

To eliminate potentially disruptive consequences of succession struggles among competing lineages, the Constitution ordains that the accession to the throne "shall continue in the House of His Majesty Mohammad Nadir Shah." On the King's abdication or death his eldest son will normally succeed him.

Members of the royal family, who usually preempted almost all important positions in government in the past, are prohibited from participating in political parties and from holding the Offices of Prime Minister or Minister; they are also debarred from holding elective offices in Parliament and from sitting on the Supreme Court bench. To insure their permanent noninvolvement in affairs of state, the Constitution enjoins them from renouncing their royal status "as long as they live."

The Ministry of Court, headed in 1967 by Sardar-i-Ala Ali Mohammad, administers such royal affairs as those involving palace activities, audiences, travels and relations with other government agencies and with the people in general. Officials under his direct jurisdiction include the royal astronomer (or astrologer), the head of the mint and various aides-de-camp. Not a regular Cabinet member, the Minister is usually an older member of the royal family or other distinguished person. The King also has a Chief Secretary, who handles his personal affairs and the royal library.




Figure 8. Structure of Afghan Government, 1967

The Executive Establishment

The executive branch consists of the Council of Ministers and various Ministries. Headed by the Prime Minister, the Council functions as the Cabinet. In 1967 the executive establishment consisted of 14 ministries and one independent department with ministerial rank. These executive agencies were the Ministries of National Defense, Foreign Affairs, the Interior, Justice, Finance, Commerce, Education, Public Works, Information and Culture, Communications, Public Health, Mines and Industries, Agriculture and Irrigation, and Planning and the independent Department of Tribal Affairs, which mainly concerns itself with the Pashtunistan question in addition to its other duties (see ch. 3, Historical Setting; ch. 16, Foreign Relations).

Appointed by the King, the Prime Minister forms his own Cabinet, which is subject to a vote of confidence by the lower house of Parliament and to final royal confirmation. He directs, guides and coordinates the activities of the executive branch and is also responsible for maintaining liaison between the executive on the one hand, and the King and Parliament on the other.

The Cabinet members include the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, a Minister Without Portfolio and heads of the various ministries and the Department of Tribal Affairs. They are collectively responsible to the lower house, cannot engage in any other profession while in office and cannot concurrently hold elective offices in Parliament. The Cabinet must resign under any of the following circumstances: the Prime Minister's resignation or death; the passage of a vote of no confidence by the lower house; the impeachment by the lower house of the Prime Minister or of a majority of the Cabinet members on a charge of high treason; the dissolution of Parliament; and the termination of the legislative term.

The Prime Minister is the most powerful person in the executive establishment. He performs his functions through a number of subordinate departments placed within the Office of the Prime Minister. He has general control of the civil service since all appointments in the top four grades of the government service must be approved by him.

Each ministry's responsibilities are nationwide, and each has direct control over the representatives it places throughout the provincial establishments. Each has its own inspection department which scrutinizes the activities of its civil servants and which reports any irregularity to the Minister. All ministries are similarly organized; at the head is a Minister, below him an Assistant or Deputy Minister, followed by directors-general in charge of the various departments.

The Legislature

Parliament

Legislative functions under the 1964 Constitution are performed by the Parliament (Shura), which consists of two bodies the House of the People (Wolesi Jirgah) and the House of the Elders (Meshrano Jirgah). The House of the People, the lower house, has 216 delegates representing single-member constituencies who are chosen for 4-year terms through "free, universal, secret, and direct" electoral procedures. Of the 84 members of the House of Elders, the upper house (popularly called the Senate), one-third is appointed by the King for 5-year terms from among "well-informed and experienced persons"; another one-third is elected for 3-year terms by provincial councils from among their own elected members; and the remaining members are directly selected every 4 years from constituencies corresponding to the 28 provinces. To be eligible for the Parliament, persons must not have been deprived of "political rights" by any court order, must be literate, and must be at least 25 years of age for the lower house and 30 years of age for the upper house. They cannot engage in any other profession except "agriculture and other free enterprises." Under Article 47 of the Constitution the Prime Minister and other Cabinet members, judges, all members of the armed forces and the civil servants cannot be appointed or elected to the Parliament while in office.

The Constitution holds the lower house mainly responsible for overseeing the conduct of the executive branch; the House of the People has the power to question the prime minister or other Cabinet ministers on matters under executive jurisdiction. Ministerial replies, however, are privileged and may not be debated. If unsatisfied, the lower house may then counter by appointing an inquiry commission to "investigate and study the conduct of the government and the actions of the administration." It may also move, if demanded by more than one-third of its members, a vote of no confidence in the Cabinet. To insure governmental stability, the motion of no confidence must be passed by a two-thirds majority for the duration of the first two legislative terms (1965-73) and by a simple majority thereafter. The ultimate control of Parliament rests with the King, who has the power to dissolve it at any time and for any reason.

The Parliament convenes in October for 7 months; the lower house elects its own president, while the president of the upper house is appointed by the King. Bills may be introduced by members of Parliament or of the Cabinet; money bills originate only from the latter, and those relating to judicial matters are submitted by the Supreme Court. Bills are passed normally by a simple ma-

majority of those present. Laws enacted must conform to Islami principles and "the other values" embodied in the Constitution.

A bill introduced to Parliament is first referred to the appropriate committee in each house for examination and is then returned to that house for full debate. It is then voted on as a whole after two readings. If a bill passed by one house is rejected by the other, a joint committee of the two houses is formed to settle the differences.

Unlike other bills the Cabinet-sponsored budget bill must be submitted to the upper house for its "advisory comments" before it reaches the lower house. The intent of the Constitutional Committee was to reflect the traditional pattern of rulers consulting with the elders—as prescribed in the Koran—on important national questions.

The Loe Jirgah

The Loe Jirgah, the tribal institution which before 1964 had no constitutional status and was summoned by the Kings rather infrequently, is prescribed in the Constitution as an integral part of the governmental structure. Unlike the pre-1964 practice by which its members were appointed by the Kings at their personal discretion, the Constitution provides that the Loe Jirgah be composed of all members of Parliament and the chairmen of the elective Provincial Councils. It is to be chaired by the President of the House of the People.

Theoretically, the Loe Jirgah may exercise legislative initiative but only under extraordinary circumstances. In the event of the dissolution of Parliament, former members of Parliament retain their positions as members of the Loe Jirgah until a new legislature is formed, and they thereby enable the government to maintain legislative continuity. The Loe Jirgah is convened by the King if he decides to abdicate or when a state of emergency proclaimed by the King needs to be extended beyond the 3-month statutory limits. In addition, the Loe Jirgah plays a leading part in amending the Constitution; proposals for constitutional changes, to be initiated by the Cabinet or by either house of Parliament, must be submitted to the Loe Jirgah for deliberation and for preliminary endorsement.

Hence, the importance of this body lies mainly in its potential role as a national forum for assessing popular attitudes and also as a vehicle through which the King can appeal directly to the representatives of the people to obtain broader political support for any issue of national import.

The Judiciary

For years the government has realized the need of reform and uniformity in judicial practice, organization, jurisdiction and procedures of the court system. Therefore, in early 1964, it issued a decree designed to bring about an extensive reorganization of the judicial system which many educated Afghans felt did not meet "the social needs of the twentieth century." The Constitution promulgated in October 1964 sought to strengthen the judiciary by making it a separate branch of the government, independent of the executive (i.e. Ministry of Justice), headed by a Supreme Court appointed by the King. The 1964 decree was superseded in October 1967 by another law on the organization and functions of the judiciary.

The basic law of the land also stipulated that all cases are to be adjudicated according to secular, codified laws, except when a case under consideration is not governed by provisions in the Constitution or other statutory laws; in such instances, subject to constitutional limitations, a decision is to be rendered according to the "basic principles of the Hanafi jurisprudence" to secure justice "in the best possible way." To integrate and bring the manifold judicial systems of the past under a single authority, the Constitution also prescribes that no "case or sphere" is to be assigned to "other authorities" which refers presumably to various central government agencies, such as the Office of the Prime Minister and the Ministries of Commerce, Communications and the Interior; in the past these agencies maintained their own special courts to deal with violations under their respective executive jurisdiction. The military courts, are, however, exempt from this constitutional prescription (see ch. 28, The Armed Forces).

Under the October 1967 decree the judiciary consists of a three-tier structure of primary courts (courts of first instance) at the bottom provincial courts at the middle and the Supreme Court at the top representing the highest judicial authority of the land. Headed by the Chief Justice, the Supreme Court is vested with broad powers to regulate the organization and procedures of the court system and related administrative affairs. It is responsible for the recruitment, promotion, transfer and discipline of all judges and has the power to try civil servants and other administrative employees of the judiciary.

In addition, it is empowered to adjudicate court jurisdictional questions, to nullify "the enforcement of laws repugnant to the provisions of the constitution," and to order the investigation of charges brought against presiding judges of provincial courts and the Supreme Central Appellate Court (in Kabul) in their official duties. The Supreme Court also performs an appellate function

through its own cassation tribunal, though in late 1967 the actual relationship between the cassation tribunal and the Supreme Central Appellate Court, a separate tribunal, could not be readily determined.

A provincial court, presided over by a president and no less than three *qazis*, acts as the court of first instance for major civil and criminal cases, for cases relating to civil servants, tax claims, tort claims, expropriation disputes, as well as those relating to electoral disputes at all levels of representative institutions; in addition, the provincial court adjudicates commercial as well as labor-management disputes.

Several primary courts may be established under the jurisdiction of a single provincial court. Presided over by at least one *qazi*, the primary court may adjudicate minor civil and criminal cases. The decision of this court is considered final if the contesting parties are satisfied with the court's verdict or if the disputed rights involved no more than 5,000 afghanis (see Glossary).

In late 1967, the old *shariat* courts, which the government was planning to replace eventually with the secularly administered courts, were functioning with necessary modifications. Not specifically mentioned in the 1964 Constitution or in the 1967 decree, these courts applied *shariat* law in their deliberations as interpreted by *qazis* who were usually theologians rather than trained jurists in secular laws. The government hopes gradually to subordinate the application of the *shariat*, which had previously constituted the basis for the laws of the nation, to a body of secular laws; the judicial authorities find the *shariat* inadequate to cope with complex commercial, fiscal, civil, and criminal problems stemming from modern conditions.

As intended by the government, the judicial reforms are to be implemented uniformly throughout the country. By late 1967, however, it was unclear how the new system might affect the tribal system of justice still existing in a few areas in which violators are tried by family or tribal *jirgahs* based on their customary laws.

PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT

Until the reign of Amir Abdur Rahman (1880-1901), provincial government was primarily along tribal lines, and each tribe ruled its own territory autonomously, guided from the capital by whatever control the King could assert, usually through his army. To strengthen central government authority, Abdur Rahman drew up provincial boundaries that cut through tribal territory. Subsequent rulers stabilized the new system so that pure tribal government no longer exists (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups). As the result of a major realignment of provincial boundaries in March 1964 roughly

doubling the number of provinces, the tribal administrative pattern was further weakened (see ch. 2, Physical Environment).

As of 1967 the country was divided into 28 provinces (*wilayat*); each province was subdivided normally into districts (*woleswali*); and each district into subdistricts (*alakadari*). The key provinces of Ghazni and Nangarhar each had a major district, *loe woleswali*, an equivalent of the division that had existed before 1964 between the provincial and district levels.

Each province is headed by a governor (*wali*), usually a high ranking civil official (sometimes an army officer), appointed by the Prime Minister on the recommendation of the Minister of the Interior. Major districts are administered by a commissioner (*loe woleswal*); the districts, by a district-governor (*woleswal*); the subdistricts, by an *alakadar* (administrator), who is often the lowest government representative.

Governors are responsible directly to the Ministry of the Interior, which has primary authority to administer provincial and local affairs. As the chief agents of the central government, they maintain public order, insure the implementation of developmental projects in collaboration with various representatives of Ministries in Kabul assigned to their respective provinces and carry out orders as may be issued by the Prime Minister or the Minister of the Interior. Where strong leadership is required, as, for example, in the sensitive frontier provinces adjoining Pakistan, the senior military commander is appointed sometimes as governor.

Each governor is assisted by a provincial administrative assembly (formerly executive council) composed of the principal officials of the provincial administration. Assigned to the governor by their respective ministries or central government directorates, these officials usually are directors or commissioners of finance, police, gendarmery, education, public health, information and culture, communications, agriculture, and industry. These officials report directly to their particular ministry as well as to the governor concerned. The local military commander, a statutory member of the assembly, reports directly to his superiors rather than to the governor concerned.

Chaired by the governor, the provincial administrative assembly functions as the governor's Cabinet; in the absence of the chairman, the financial commissioner usually acts as deputy. Next in line are the commandants of the police and the gendarmery. The assembly meets on Mondays, and decisions ideally are by a simple majority of those present.

In addition, each governor is to be advised by a provincial *jirgah*, whose members are directly elected. As stated by the Constitution, the provincial *jirgah* is to "take part in the realization of the de-

velopmental targets of the state" and "advise the provincial government on matters pertaining to the betterment of the condition and the general development of the province." Legislative authority is not specifically vested in this body, which in mid-1967 was yet to be constituted.

Below the provincial level in areas where a major district exists, its commissioner is assisted by a commandant of the gendarmery, a customs official, a financial officer and a *qazi* of the primary court.

The key unit in the provincial administrative structure is the district, headed by the district governor. Except in areas of relatively dense population where there are also subdistricts, the district governor represents the lowest level of control; his duties are to collect taxes and maintain law and order through one or two gendarmes assigned to his office. Depending on the size of the population and the area, a district may be classified into one of four categories. Where they are needed or when the government has the personnel to fill the post, the *alakadars* provide administrative representation in subdistricts below the district level.

In some areas district and subdistrict authorities are responsible for administering the nomads (*koochis*). An official for nomads, frequently called *hakim-i-koochi*, collects caravan and camp fees on the main trails of nomadic movement.

Each level of provincial government is responsible to the next higher level and seldom acts without specific orders from above. Officials down to the district level are part of the unified central civil service and may be transferred from one province to the other at irregular intervals. Most of the higher officials are drawn from Kabul or the main Pashto-speaking areas—Kandahar, Paktia, and Nangarhar—and they rarely serve in their home districts. Lower officials, such as the *alakadars*, are, however, usually drawn from the area in which they serve and are not normally transferred elsewhere.

MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT

Theoretically, all provincial and district capitals and other population centers of over 500 houses have a municipal government. In fact, many towns of about 500 houses have neither the need nor the financial capability for establishing formal administrative organizations. Towns that do not have municipal government are, like villages, headed by an official chosen by the people to handle local affairs.

The self-governing status of municipalities is rendered meaningless in many cases because of omnipresent governmental controls. Municipal budgets are subject to approval by provincial governors. The central government, through its provincial counterpart, con-

rols the gendarmery, which, although its official area of responsibility is outside municipalities, can go into action in the city without effective opposition.

Urban governments are composed of an elected advisory municipal council and a mayor elected by that council. Ordinarily, municipal governments carry out functions relating to the maintenance of law and order, traffic control, issuance of assorted permits, zoning, weights and measures, vital statistics, firefighting, water supply, and similar activities.

Municipalities obtain funds from taxes on important goods and property and from license fees and fines (see ch. 25, Public Finance). The mayor's budget must be approved by the provincial governors, except in Kabul where the Minister of Finance gives approval.

In population centers too small to have regular municipal government, villagers elect a *malik* (in non-Pashto areas he may have another title, such as *jast* in Nuristan). In tribal areas he is probably the leading lineage chief, but he is nevertheless elected; in nontribal areas he is a respected elder, often one of the few literate men in the village. His duties are generally to collect taxes, apprehend criminals, and settle local disputes; he takes unresolved problems to provincial government authorities, beginning with the *alaka-dar*. *Maliks* are also responsible for carrying out certain central government regulations, such as supervising weddings and circumcisions, providing population statistics, and keeping village records. There is little systematic supervision over *maliks*.

TRIBAL RULE

Within the tribal *kheyls* (lineage groups), each has a leader chosen or approved as its representative (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups). Called *khan* among the Pashtuns and *beg* among Turkomans, this leader may owe allegiance to the chief of the entire tribe. Either at the *kheyl* level or at the tribal level, *khans* conduct the business of the group they represent; the action they take and the position they take before the governors' usually are predetermined by decisions arrived at by the tribesmen in the *jirgahs* or assemblies.

In consultation with other tribal leaders the *khans* judge the behavior of individuals according to the tribal laws settle disputes, provide recruits for the national army and workers for road and canal maintenance and arrive at tribal policy in regard to economic and political problems (see ch. 7, Social Structure). The group elects a *wakil* (an individual adept in figuring and accounting), who collects whatever taxes the central government requires of the tribe and delivers them to the governor of the province. With their own tribal forces the *khans* maintain order (or resort to tri-

bal warfare on occasions) not only for their own benefit but also sometimes in agreement with the central government (see ch. 27, Public Order and Safety).

The government's policy is eventually to replace tribal government with centrally administered provincial government. In areas where adequate personnel permit the government to install its own administration, it brings tribal leaders into the governmental system. Some are brought to the capital and given posts in the executive branch or the House of the Elders. Some are made officers in the army or sent as governors to provinces remote from their own area.

Administrative difficulties caused by the periodic migrations of nomads are surmounted, in some cases, by an itinerant administration whereby an official travels with the tribe. In general, however, nomadism favors the retention of the tribe's own chief. The settlement of the nomads is, therefore, one of the government's major problems, with psychological, social, economic, and financial ramifications (see ch. 20, Agriculture).

Under government pressure the larger tribes in the south-central and western regions have practically lost their organization as tribal units. *Khans* still exist, but their functions are greatly circumscribed. On the other hand the eastern tribes along the Afghan-Pakistan frontier have kept many of their own military, economic and administrative functions and still exist, though diminishing, as going concerns of considerable independence.

CIVIL SERVICE

The government has a unified civil service, but each ministry is responsible for recruiting, promoting and discharging its own personnel. Transfer from ministry to ministry is rare. By a law dated January 8, 1955, an attempt was made to standardize employment and performance requirements and to establish a system of promotion and retirement.

According to the law, a civil servant is anyone who receives a salary from the government's budget, including teachers, doctors, judges and diplomats. He must be an Afghan citizen, over 18 years of age, possessing civil rights and good morals (determined after an investigation by the police of the individual's community); he must be in good health; and, if he is between 24 and 29, he must have completed his military service or have been legally exempted. Civil servants are usually Sunnite Moslems, but there are some Hazaras and other Shias in the government (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups).

There are 21 grades in the civil service; grade 1 is the highest. Grades 1 through 13 are generally considered administrative; 14

through 21 are nonadministrative. Only grades 1 and 2 among career civil servants are eligible for appointment as ministers or provincial governors. Although qualifications for grade 13 include an elementary education, marginal literacy can sometimes suffice. The degree of education is one of the chief means of determining a civil servant's status. There are no schools for government servants other than those for such specialists as teachers, doctors or judges.

All civil servants are entitled to retire with pension at the end of 30 years of service; compulsory retirement is at age 60 to 65 for servants in grades 1 and 2; 55 to 60 in grades, 3, 4 and 5; 50 to 55 in grades 6, 7, 8 and 9; and 45 to 50 in lower grades.

Laws governing the civil service attempt to prevent nepotism by declaring that an employing officer may not hire any relative who would be under his direct control. Relatives consist of brothers, sisters, nephews, nieces and in-laws; uncles and aunts are excluded.

A salient feature of the civil service in the mid-1960's was the dominance of the Pashtuns. Nearly all of the top-ranking civil servants in the Ministries of the Interior, National Defense and Foreign Affairs were pashtuns, members of the dominant ethnic group, though many were Persian rather than Pashto speaking.

The middle and lower ranks of the civil service, on the other hand, are filled chiefly with Parsiwans, the city-bred Tajiks, who, since they are not tribally organized, have no tribal loyalties that might take precedence over loyalty to their government. Depending upon the ministry involved, a few Parsiwans can reach department head level, and there appears to be considerable lateral entry by Pashtuns.

ELECTORAL SYSTEM

Electoral machinery is patterned after Western practices and has been used once since its establishment by the 1964 Constitution for electing members of Parliament. It is also applicable to provincial *jirgahs* and municipal councils. Members of both sexes over 20 years of age are enfranchised. They are entitled to vote in "a free, universal, secret and direct election" unless disqualified by court order regarding their soundness of mind and "political right."

Computing on the basis of population, the size of the electorate may range between 3.5 million and 4.5 million voters.

Electoral Procedures

For elections to the lower house of Parliament the country is divided into 216 single-member constituencies, of which 6 are reserved for nomads in various localities (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups). For elections to the upper House one-third of its 84

members are to be directly chosen, each of the 28 provinces serving as a constituency.

To insure impartiality in electoral contests, the Chief Justice and other justices of the Supreme Court, as well as members of the police, armed forces, and gendarmery may not vote or stand for election to Parliament. Judges and civil servants must resign from their offices before announcing candidacy, but they may be reinstated to their former positions if not elected.

Elections are administered and supervised by election supervisory committees established at national, provincial, and district levels. These committees are subject to the ultimate control of the Minister of the Interior.

Voter lists are prepared by the district election supervisory committees 4 months before the start of an election campaign. Citizens who are nomads are required to register with the local committees established in their special constituencies. Voter lists must be posted for public inspection.

To help illiterate voters differentiate one candidate from another, voting symbols are assigned to candidates. These symbols are determined by the Central Election Supervisory Committee in Kabul and are allotted to respective candidates by each district election supervisory committee by drawing lots. Voting takes place for 5 days from 7 a.m. to 7 p.m. each day. A separate ballot box for each candidate with his name, photograph and voting symbol is provided in the polling station. In case of a draw the winner is decided by lot. Electoral disputes are settled by the local committees concerned; appeals may be presented to provincial committees and ultimately to an appropriate committee in Parliament.

CHAPTER 15

POLITICAL DYNAMICS

The government in 1967 continued its policy of gradual modernization and of nation-building by extending its authority and welfare services throughout the country, as well as by broadening the area of popular political participation. All major reform measures were initiated by the ruling elite under the influence of King Mohammad Zahir. In these efforts the government followed free world rather than Communist models as the basis for conducting political, social and economic affairs.

In efforts to encourage an expansion of political involvement, the government in 1965 accorded voting rights to women for the first time in the nation's history and held parliamentary election in late 1965, the first under the liberalized Constitution of 1964. In late 1967 the legislature was in the process of completing a political party bill designed to permit partisan politics.

King Mohammad Zahir was the focal point of national unity and exerted a powerful stabilizing influence through his ability to moderate various contending forces. Although he was vested with broad constitutional powers, the King chose to reign less as chief executive officer than as constitutional monarch; the management of state affairs was in the hands of Prime Minister Nur Ahmad Etemadi, appointed in November 1967, and his Cabinet Ministers. Members of the royal family, who had customarily held key government positions, were no longer at the forefront of decision-making processes. The 1964 Constitution debarred members of the Royal Family from holding positions in the Cabinet and in Parliament (Shura) (see ch. 14, The Governmental System).

The King and the Cabinet were supported by all but a very small portion of the politically alert individuals, who themselves constituted a fraction of the total population. There was no organized opposition to the government. The notion of politics as an organized activity for or against the government was still new to a large majority of the people.

In the absence of political parties, the function of channeling popular demands to policy-makers was performed by the 216-member House of the People (Wolesi Jirgah), the elective lower house of Parliament, and, to a lesser extent, by the House of the Elders

(Meshrano Jirgah) (see ch. 14, The Governmental System). Endowed with prestige and broad constitutional powers to check and balance the executive branch of the government, the House of the People came to represent the largest single concentration of influential personages. Elected in 1965, the deputies to this body represented such diverse segments of the population as former public servants, professional elements, business and landowning interests and tribal and religious communities.

The actual and potential strength of the various political elements both in and outside of Parliament could not be readily ascertained since none of them had been subjected to the test of engaging in open and competitive political campaigns. They shared little in common other than the unifying thread of the Islamic faith.

POLITICAL BACKGROUND

In the mid-1960's the government continued to play the leading role in bringing about political changes. This trend began during the early years of the twentieth century, but it has at least twice had unsettling effects—in 1929, when conservative elements forced the abdication of the reform-minded King Amanullah Khan (1919–29), and under the regime of Prime Minister Shah Mahmud (1946–53), when government controls were liberalized (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). These unsettling effects continued to account for the cautious pace of modernizing efforts pursued by successive governments up to 1963.

In 1946 Shah Mahmud succeeded his brother, Mohammad Hashim Khan who as Prime Minister from 1931 had ruled with a firm hand. There were, however, many in the government who felt that Hashim Khan had been too harsh, and they looked to Shah Mahmud, whom they considered less of an autocrat and more liberally oriented than his brother. Upon assuming office, the new Prime Minister released most of the political prisoners detained by the previous administration and sought to liberalize the government's stringent political controls. In 1949 a number of politicians sharing Shah Mahmud's views were elected to Parliament, which remained in session until 1952; meanwhile, they began to question Cabinet Ministers on the management of state affairs. Sessions of Parliament were opened to the public, which was an unprecedented procedure, and a number of independent newspapers began to be published under a press law enacted in 1951.

This liberal ferment also led to the birth of incipient political opposition. An organization called Awakened Youth appeared in 1947 and attracted small numbers of intellectuals in Kabul. A group of students organized a political debating forum at Kabul University and freely criticized government policies. The senti-

ments of these groups were echoed after 1951 in newly founded newspapers which called for the removal of the royal family from politics, for the accountability of high officials for their public conduct, for free elections, for a monarchy that would reign but not rule and for a representative system of government. The government countered the increasingly vocal opposition by sponsoring a National Democratic Party; although civil servants were encouraged to join it, the party failed to arouse any significant public interest.

Considering that the so-called "liberal experiment" had gone too far, the government arrested many opposition elements, including the prominent leaders Abdur Rahman Mahmudi and Mohammad Ghobar. It closed down critical newspapers and in the 1952 elections for Parliament moved to arrest or otherwise restrain some 40 former deputies from again running for office.

Shah Mahmud was unable to cope with the Pashtunistan movement, which advocated self-rule for the Pashtuns in Pakistan (see ch. 16, Foreign Relations). Resentment also arose because economic progress was considered to be slow and because the Helmand Valley developmental projects, which absorbed much of Afghanistan's foreign exchange reserves, were judged to have been mis-handled. By mid-1953 the financial situation had rapidly deteriorated (see ch. 20, Agriculture). Under attack from his own Cabinet Ministers, members of the royal family and other influential figures, Shah Mahmud resigned in 1953; he was succeeded by Minister of National Defense Mohammad Daud, who was a first cousin of King Mohammad Zahir Shah and a nephew of Shah Mahmud.

Prime Minister Daud, a strong leader, brooked no opposition to the government and sought to broaden the base of governing powers by bringing in able Ministers from outside the royal family and even from non-Pashtun communities. During his decade of rule (1953-63), he laid the foundation of stability and progress which aided the nation-building efforts of his successors.

Unlike his predecessor's laissez faire economic approach, Daud set up tighter controls over business and financial communities. He gave greater impetus to the Pashtunistan movement and accelerated economic development by enlisting foreign aid from the Soviet Union and the United States (see ch. 16, Foreign Relations; ch. 24, Foreign Economic Relations). He attempted to reform the civil service and to bring honesty and integrity into government. With Soviet assistance he improved the effectiveness of the Army and used it to secure allegiance of rebellious tribes (see ch. 28, The Armed Forces).

In addition, Daud pressed for social reforms, such as the removal of the veil from women and secularization of the school system (see ch. 8, Family; ch. 10, Education). On the other hand, his

inflexible, militant policy on the Pashtunistan issue led to economic difficulties because of disrupted trade with Pakistan and India (see ch. 23, Domestic Trade). The deteriorating economic situation and international position caused King Mohammad Zahir in March 1963 to obtain the resignation of Daud and to entrust the formation of a new government to Mohammad Yusuf, the first commoner ever appointed Prime Minister.

The policies of the new government were substantially in agreement with those of the old but Prime Minister Yusuf took a conciliatory stand on the Pashtunistan dispute and, backed by the King, also made the political system more responsive to popular needs (see ch. 14, The Governmental System). Yusuf was succeeded by Prime Minister Mohammad Hashim Maiwandwal (October 1965–October 1967) and by Prime Minister Nur Ahmad Etemadi from November 1967.

POLITICAL DIRECTION AND PROBLEMS

In the mid-1960's the King and government sought to bring diverse fragments of the population into a more cohesive national unity. In order to broaden the area in which more people could participate in political activities a new Constitution was promulgated in October 1964, recognizing the citizens' right to form political parties which are not antimonarchical, antistate, or anti-Islamic. In late 1967 a bill to permit the formation of parties was in the final stage of completion in Parliament.

The electoral law of 1965, enfranchising all adults, gave women their first political role as voters. The Supreme Court (*Estra Mahkama*) was established in October 1967 to give equal justice through uniform process of law, but many Afghans believed that it would take time before the independent judiciary could function fully as intended (see ch. 14, The Governmental System).

The government expanded secular and technical education, reformed school curricula, constructed better transportation and communication facilities, spread literacy, hastened the pace of economic development by means of increased aid from foreign nations and extended its authority to all parts of the land. These efforts were aided by continued internal stability but were hampered by such divisive forces as tribalism (see ch. 10, Education; ch. 19, Character and Structure of the Economy).

Each tribe is deeply attached to its traditions and resists interference from outside (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups; ch. 7, Social Structure). For the tribally organized people, their immediate surroundings constitute the limits of their worldly concern. Their daily lives and the areas which they cultivate or where they have established grazing rights are for all practical purposes miniature

states within the state. Their political allegiance seldom extends beyond the tribal and local level (see ch. 18, Political Values and Attitudes). Tribal people show little interest in the affairs of neighboring tribes, much less in events taking place in Kabul or in official policies emanating from the capital.

A sense of separation among the various ethnic groups also slowed official efforts to unite all Afghan subjects effectively behind the central government because of the continued Pashtun dominance in key decision making governmental positions. Although this dominance is gradually diminishing, minority groups on the whole believe that they are lacking in ability to influence the making of national policy at the highest level. In these circumstances a conception of mutually beneficial or national interests is slow to emerge (see ch. 18, Political Values and Attitudes).

Illiteracy (nearly 90 percent), coupled with the continued political inertia of the bulk of the population, hampered the government's efforts to eliminate a persistent popular suspicion and distrust of the governing authority. The meaning of representative government through free elections and adult suffrage eluded a large majority of the population. Consequently, politics continued to be the concern mainly of the educated minority in larger towns and in Kabul.

POLITICAL ROLE OF THE KING

In 1967 King Mohammad Zahir was the most important political personage in the country, although he stood above overt political involvement. Under the 1964 Constitution he retained a broad array of enumerated as well as implied powers. The Constitutional provision separating members of the royal family from key political positions does not apply to the monarch.

The King continued to personify the unifying authority of the state, moderating various conflicting forces at home and advocating prudence and nonalignment in external relations. His strength was derived in a large measure from the legitimacy of the ruling house and from the loyal support of the army, the National Police, and the paramilitary forces (see ch. 28, The Armed Forces).

The King maintained the dignity and status of a superchief of all tribally organized people and of all ethnic groupings. Educated in Western ways, he could meet the intellectuals on their own ground. He was a devout Moslem and as the head of state commanded high respect from the religious leaders (see ch. 12, Religion). He was frequently in the public view, attending parades and public festivals, touring the country and granting audiences to the local elders. He enjoyed great respect and personal popularity among all elements of the Afghan nation.

Since the mid-1950's the King has enhanced his influence not only by his extensive tours at home but also by frequent trips abroad and by active concern for national and international affairs. He has also influenced, if not inspired, the various liberalizing political measures undertaken by the government in the mid-1960's.

THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENTARY DEPUTIES

Because of the continued lack of organized political or special interest group activities, Parliament provided in 1967 the only legitimate forum in which leading political figures could freely express and present their views to the government. Formed in late 1965, Parliament was composed of the House of the People (Wolesi Jirgah) and the House of the Elders (Meshrano Jirgah). The lower House of the People enjoyed a larger measure of constitutional power than the House of the Elders (see ch. 14, The Governmental System).

Traditionally, most holders of power outside Kabul generally remained behind the local political scenes, controlling and managing local affairs through their agents. Even in dealing with governmental authorities they worked through such agents, except when they were called by the King to sit in a Loe Jirgah (national council of notables, tribal chiefs and *mullahs*) to deliberate policies or problems of the highest national import.

Since 1964, however, the government has sought to induce such leaders to compete in Parliamentary elections and work through the Jirgahs. The 1964 Constitution gave members of both houses of Parliament ex officio membership in the Loe Jirgah, thus giving prestige and a measure of power to Parliamentary members. The 1965 elections brought many of the local leaders to Kabul.

Elected largely on the basis of their personal appeal or local influence, these deputies represented every part of the population. On the whole, they supported the King's modernizing reform measures but remained fiercely independent of the government leadership. At times many of them disagreed with specific executive policy matters and were far from being docile or quiescent. Their political views ranged from ultraconservatism to self-professed Marxism. The deputies as a whole continued in late 1967 to act primarily as spokesmen for their respective constituencies.

MAJOR POLITICAL COMPONENTS

Traditionally, politics at the national level was the province of a few talented members of the royal family, who derived their strength from the support of tribal and religious leaders and the military. The principal determinants of politics, whether at the

national, tribal or village level, were social standing, force of personality and coercive power rather than principles or institutions. During the past three decades, however, a growing number of educated people came to believe that they should be allowed to participate in making and implementing public policy. In the mid-1960's several components appeared to possess actual or potential capability to influence the course of government and politics.

Entrepreneurs, Landowners and Livestock Owners

The merchant has long been influential in economic affairs, both in the larger towns and among the tribes. Along with the gradual modernization and integration of the domestic economy from a patchwork of local patterns to a national one, the most prominent of the local traders, as well as the landowners, have come to represent a concentration of wealth and have attained some national status. The ownership of livestock has also brought wealth to many, especially among leaders of the nomadic tribes; some of these leaders are among the most affluent members of society.

Taken as a whole, the financial and business leaders have favored a free enterprise system. The best known among them is a group of the managers of the privately owned National Bank (Bank Melli), the highly influential banking house and the largest single industrial owner in the country. The group has the best entrepreneurial talents in the country (see ch. 21, Industry; ch. 26, Banking and Currency).

As the government continued in 1967 to expand the scope and hasten the pace of economic development, the entrepreneurial group became more eager to invest in developmental projects. Leading business leaders maintained close contacts, usually on an individual basis, with Cabinet Ministers. They also increasingly joined the government in the procurement of foreign technical assistance in production and marketing. They continued to depend on the government to make the necessary social investments, such as roads, and felt confident that, given the proper business climate, they could continue to contribute to national welfare by playing their traditional role.

For most Afghans possession of land has been highly regarded as a safe investment. In many areas which benefited from the government's developmental projects, land value has soared and brought wealth and influence to many. Landowning, however, has not been confined to any single class of individuals. In the mid-1960's landowners represented diverse occupational groups, including former or active government officials, physicians, merchants and industrialists, tribal leaders and even religious leaders. Landholdings in Afghanistan in recent times have been generally

small. Individual proprietorships have been the rule, and there have been few persons who have wielded political power because of control of large tracts of land and numerous tenants.

Foreign observers often commented that many of the 216 elected deputies to the lower House of Parliament were landowners; Afghans, however, asserted that this term was misleading. Nonetheless, to many of the political elements in and outside of Parliament, landowning as such constituted the basis for their general conservative orientation—a potential meeting ground for many of them who otherwise had little in common.

Tribal Leaders

Until the army began to be modernized rapidly after 1956, tribal leaders and their tribes as a whole contributed the most powerful military force (see ch. 28, *The Armed Forces*). Their support or lack of support of the Kings was crucial in swaying the political fortune of a ruling house or maintaining national stability. In their respective territories, their power was not generally contested by the government; they, rather than the central government, commanded the primary loyalty of their followers. This factor gave them a powerful bargaining position within the government.

The gradual strengthening of the central government's military establishment, however, significantly altered the balance of power between the tribal chiefs and government authorities. Because of its own powerful armed forces, the government's dependence on tribal military support declined; this resulted in a sharp decrease of the independent power potential of the tribal leaders.

The tribal way of life for the villagers as a whole, however, could not be swiftly changed. Tribal leaders continued to retain their exalted position in their respective communities. Hence the government in the mid-1960's pursued a policy of gradual detribalization by extending material improvements to many areas. In addition, the government realized that the tribal chiefs as a whole, although they were seldom a united group because of suspicion and distrust among themselves, could speak for at least two-thirds of the population, and it sought their cooperation on a reciprocal basis. Important leaders in key tribal areas, for example, were appointed by the King to the upper House of Parliament.

Religious Leaders

Mullahs (Moslem religious leaders) derive their influence from the general devotion of Afghans to Islam and from their traditional role as interpreters of the Islamic *shariat* law which covers all aspects of human conduct and governs the daily lives of most villag-

ers. The *mullahs* in the mid-1960's had a political influence but a slowly diminishing power in secular matters (see ch. 12, Religion).

The leaders of the *mullahs* are the scholars of the Faculty of Theology at Kabul University and at the Madrasa Ulama-i-Sharia (Academy of Theological Sciences) in Bagram near Kabul; the *mullahs* of the large urban mosques, particularly in Kabul; and the heads of certain families which for decades have been noted for their learning and piety (see ch. 12, Religion). Below them are the *mullahs* of village mosques and other religious figures among the tribes, many of whom speak with authority among villagers. Representatives from urban religious leaders maintain contact with rural leaders and thus can communicate a general spirit of compliance or resistance on any government issue.

Like the tribal leaders, the *mullahs* have a history of influence in national affairs. The displacement of King Amanullah in 1929 was initiated largely by the religious leaders who were antagonized because of his sweeping reform measures (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). Until the early 1950's, therefore, the government generally avoided actions that would arouse their hostility; moreover, the all-pervasive influence of the *mullahs* in judicial administration and in education was not seriously questioned by secular authorities (see ch. 10, Education; ch. 12, Religion).

Since 1953, however, the *mullahs* have lost much of their secular influence, largely because of the gradual extension of the government's judicial as well as enforcement powers, the spread of literacy and gradual reform in the school system. An increasing number of villagers and other local elements became aware of the alternative source of authority filtering down through provincial and district officials. The reduced status of the *mullahs* was dramatized in late 1959 when civil disturbances touched off in part by ultraconservative religious leaders were quickly suppressed at Kandahar by army troops; this show of public defiance in protest against the government's modernizing efforts failed to evoke any significant public sympathy elsewhere in the country.

The government, however, has continued to recognize the integrative force of Islam and the constructive role which the *mullahs* could play. To make various reform measures acceptable to the *mullahs* and their devout followers, the government often asserted that its efforts were supported by the progressive spirit of Islam itself. In addition, the framers of the 1964 Constitution wrote into the basic law that the principles of Islam which permeate the document should not be amended under any circumstances (see ch. 14, The Governmental System).

The Intellectuals

Since the end of World War II the intellectuals, such as civil servants, teachers, doctors, and college students, have generally favored a liberalizing of politics, a broadening of the base of the government a more egalitarian economic system, and a diminution of tribal and other traditional influences. Although they are the most politically alert of the population, they have not been able to emerge as a cohesive, independent political body, largely because the overwhelming portion of the professionally educated or trained are members of the civil service. The number of intellectuals not under government control was very small, and institutional channels for independent political expression were slow in development.

The number of students in secondary schools and colleges increased as educational facilities were rapidly expanded. During the past two or three decades a growing number of college students, especially at Kabul University, sought to express themselves politically as critics and occasionally participated in public demonstrations. In 1967 most students appeared to support the government in its comprehensive program of orderly reforms, but a small number of leftist-leaning students in Kabul asserted that the pace of change should be further quickened. Government authorities cautioned that the students should concentrate on studies and stay out of politics.

The Military Officer Corps

Members of the officer corps are loyal to the King and are deeply rooted in Afghan tradition. They are followers of Islam, many are sons of tribal chiefs, particularly Pashtuns. Through the military profession they maintain their families' fighting tradition. On the whole, they are highly regarded people who take great pride in their tribal military heritage.

Army officers have had considerable exposure to foreign influences, probably more than any other informed group of individuals in the country. Many have studied abroad and have had contact in Kabul with foreign military advisers, and a few have served abroad in various diplomatic missions. A considerable number have a broad national outlook and support the government's reform measures.

Under the 1965 electoral law members of the armed forces are not permitted to run for office or even to vote. Nevertheless they are the only group capable of acting in force on a nationwide scale. Their latent political potential has been enhanced since the mid-1950's by former Prime Minister Daud's policy of creating an improved and more effective military establishment. They have served

as a prime force in curbing tribal unrest as well as major disturbances and in a gradual extension of the central government's authority throughout the domain (see ch. 28, The Armed Forces).

ELECTION RESULTS

Two separate elections took place in 1965 to organize the bicameral Parliamentary bodies set up under the 1964 Constitution. The separate contests were necessary because qualified supervisors were lacking. In the elections for the upper House of the Elders held August 26–September 9, 100 candidates competed for 28 seats; the remaining 56 seats were nonelective. For the lower House of the People contests held September 10–24, 1,358 persons, including six women, campaigned for 216 seats, of which 6 were reserved for the nomads. Four women were elected. Most of those elected were locally influential figures and came from the dominant ethnic group in their respective constituencies. The campaign was privately financed, apparently with no limitations on expenditure. This factor limited candidacy largely to the relatively more affluent members of society. Each candidate ran on an individual basis since there was no political party. There was little evidence of government interference.

Reliable information on the number of those who actually voted in the two elections was not available in late 1967. The estimated national turnout was about 15 percent, ranging from as little as 2 percent in some rural communities to about 37 percent in Kabul. Only a small number of women voted; of this number, most women voters were from the cities, rather than from the rural areas.

CHAPTER 16

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Surrounded for centuries by hostile and powerful neighbors, landlocked Afghanistan has been suspicious of foreigners, but defensively has sought to cultivate close and friendly relations with them. It has often played off one state against another in the hope that the balance of power between or among competing states would have the effects of restraining their ambitions.

The most pronounced feature of recent foreign relations has been neutralism, which has meant noninvolvement in East-West confrontations and nonalignment in military alliances. This policy was dictated partly by a tradition of neutrality as shown by the country's abstention from both world wars and partly by modern practical considerations to insure the entry of foreign capital and of assistance from wherever possible. Afghans have shown little interest in ideological and related issues which affect relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Until early 1963 the country's relations with other nations had been colored largely by its dispute with Pakistan over the status of Pashtuns living in adjacent areas across the eastern border. The degree of concern shown by foreign nations, either directly or indirectly, in what came to be known as the "Pashtunistan" (Land of the Pashtuns) issue influenced the thinking of government leaders. Afghans, for example, questioned the propriety of the United States supplying arms to Pakistan, which in 1954 joined the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). The common Afghan and Soviet antipathy toward Pakistan ushered in an era of close economic and political cooperation after 1954; Afghanistan became the first non-Communist uncommitted nation to which the Soviet Union extended foreign aid.

As the Pashtunistan issue receded into the background after mid-1963, however, Afghan relations steadily improved with Pakistan, the United States and Great Britain. The country turned increasingly to the United States and to a much lesser extent to West Germany and Great Britain for capital and economic as well as technical assistance; it also cultivated closer ties with Pakistan, whose territory traditionally provided transit routes for Afghan

goods to and from foreign markets (see ch. 24, Foreign Economic Relations).

Afghan relations with the Soviet Union and Communist China were friendly in 1967, as in the past. The Soviet Union was the principal trade partner, principal supplier of weapons and other defense needs and one of the two chief donors (along with the United States) of economic and technical assistance. Communist China was striving to enhance its position in the country but was unable to make any appreciable headway because of its limited aid capability (see ch. 24, Foreign Economic Relations; ch. 28, The Armed Forces).

As a small nation, Afghanistan relied heavily on the United Nations as the main forum for voicing its political views and for cooperating with other small countries. It continued to support the principle of self-determination for all peoples, oppose colonialism in any form, and call for a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem.

Foreign policy is decided within the inner circle of the ruling group, and the conduct of external relations is the function of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which in November 1967 was headed concurrently by Prime Minister Nur Ahmad Etemadi. Members of the diplomatic service come from the same ethnic and social groups that staff the upper levels of the civil service—Pashtuns principally, with a few Parsiwans (see Glossary) (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups; ch. 14, The Governmental System).

PRINCIPAL DETERMINANTS OF POLICY

Neutrality

Since the early nineteenth century the country has pursued a policy which, despite erratic moments, its rulers described as neutral. In the Anglo-Russian rivalry of the past century, it remained neutral as it did later in both world wars. Since the end of World War II it has asserted with great emphasis that it took no side in the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. In doing so the Afghans have chosen to maintain the buffer state status earlier imposed on the country by Great Britain and Russia (see ch. 3, Historical Setting).

Many educated Afghans are inclined to regard neutrality not only as an expedient means of obtaining foreign economic and military assistance but also as a desirable political objective. They are intensely proud of their heritage of independence which they feel has been safeguarded largely by a prudent policy of offending no one and of preventing any foreign power from becoming too influential in their internal affairs. To many Afghans independence and neutrality are intertwined and inseparable.

The country has not joined any formal alliances, military or political, that might have direct bearing on the balance of power between East and West, nor has it aligned itself with either the United States or the Soviet Union. In day-to-day diplomatic routines the government has shown concern for a balance between gestures favorable to one side or the other; similarly, in matters of exchanging official visits, concluding economic and technical assistance agreements or conducting cultural and educational exchange programs, care has been taken that no single foreign power could sway the nation's course. Afghans are insistent in typifying their policy as "positive" neutrality, and they often exercise their neutral position to work for compromise or positive solutions in world affairs.

Geography and Trade

As a landlocked country Afghanistan must depend for its trading routes and transit facilities on the good will of its neighbors (see ch. 24, Foreign Economic Relations). This factor explains the intense concern shown by the Afghans to keep their trading routes open on all sides. In addition, the government has been concerned especially about the right to import military supplies through neighboring territory. As early as 1879 the Afghans asserted and obtained the right from the British to trade with and through British Indian territories; in 1893 another treaty with Great Britain specified the Afghan right to import "munitions of war," a favor withdrawn by the British after the Third Anglo-Afghan War of 1919, only to be restored in 1921 along with the general freedom of transit for goods through British India.

Determination to insure the unobstructed passage of goods into and out of the country led the government to accept the Soviet offer of such convenience at a lowered freight rate in 1955, when Pakistan closed the traditional Afghan transit border points during an acute political crisis between the two countries (see ch. 24, Foreign Economic Relations). At that time Afghanistan attempted to negotiate a right-of-way across Iran to the port of Chah Bahar on the Persian Gulf to offset the Pakistan blockade, but when it was found that 3,600 miles of Afghan and Iranian roads would have to be improved—obviously no short-term project—Afghanistan accepted the Soviet transit facilities.

Afghanistan played an active role in the United Nations-sponsored conference on the law of the sea held in Geneva in February and April 1958. The position of Afghanistan and of 13 other landlocked states was expressed in a resolution which unsuccessfully sought to give coastless countries "an absolute right of transit across the territory of a coastal state, including free access to its ports and duty free entries of goods."

RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN

Relations with Pakistan in 1967 were normal mainly because, since mid-1963, the Pashtunistan dispute had faded into the background. Nevertheless, leaders continued periodically to affirm their support of the Pashtunistan movement, but in much milder language.

From 1947 to early 1963 Afghan relations with Pakistan were determined largely by the Pashtunistan question. The dispute arose in 1947 when Pakistan, as successor state, inherited from British India the territory east of the Durand Line, which had been demarcated in 1893 (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). The Afghans challenged the validity of this line as an international border which they alleged was drawn under duress; they further asserted that the area in question was never a part of British India and hence Pakistan could not claim to inherit it.

The Afghan Government demanded that an independent Pashtun state or Pashtunistan—possibly under its influence but not part of Afghanistan—be established in the area lying between the Durand Line and the Indus River; the territory would extend from Chitral in the north where its frontier borders on Kashmir to and including Baluchistan and Sind on the Arabian Sea in the south.

Pakistan countered by insisting that the Durand Line is an internationally recognized frontier and that in July 1947 the Pashtuns east of the border freely voted to join Pakistan in a referendum. Sponsored by the British, the plebiscite was to ascertain whether the Moslem Pashtuns wished to join Islamic Pakistan or Hindu-dominated India. The Afghans challenged the validity of this referendum, contending that the voters were not given a choice to join Afghanistan or to become independent of both India and Pakistan.

For this reason Afghanistan voted against Pakistan's admission into the United Nations in late 1947, the only nation to oppose. Afghanistan and Pakistan exchanged ambassadors in February 1948. In the following years charges and counter-charges, moves and countermoves succeeded each other. Tensions heightened in 1955-56 after the Pakistan Government's decision to incorporate the traditionally self-governing tribal areas east of the Durand Line into a centrally controlled single province of West Pakistan. Prime Minister Mohammad Daud protested the plan which he called an encroachment on traditional Pashtun self-government and a threat to the Pashtunistan cause.

The problem was complicated by the interjection of other

powers into the dispute. In 1955 the Soviet Union backed the Afghan position against Pakistan, a member of SEATO and later the Baghdad Pact. The issue also increased bitterness between Pakistan and India, which supported Afghanistan.

Tensions were temporarily abated after 1956, and an agreement for transit facilities across each other's territories was signed in May 1958. The Pashtunistan issue, however, smoldered on, culminating in border clashes in the Bajaur area north of the Khyber Pass in September 1960 and again in May 1961 when the large-scale involvement of the armies of the two countries was narrowly averted. In September 1961 Afghanistan severed diplomatic relations with Pakistan and closed the border, in response to Pakistan's closure of Afghan consular posts and trade agencies in western border areas and restrictions on the seasonal movement of Afghan nomads into Pakistan; but these measures brought about an adverse impact on its transit trade and on seasonal migration of some 200,000 Afghan nomads across the border into Pakistan (see ch. 23, Domestic Trade).

Diplomatic and trade relations were fully restored by September 1963 through the good offices of the Shah of Iran. This reconciliation was facilitated in part by the resignation of Prime Minister Daud, the militant exponent of the Pashtunistan movement. Since the resumption of relations there has been little indication of any marked points of differences between the two countries. In March 1965 a 5-year transit trade agreement was concluded, and in mid-1966 talks began between the two nations on measures to establish rail links between them (see ch. 24, Foreign Economic Relations).

Nevertheless, despite the Pakistani assertion that the Afghan claim to Pashtunistan is "a closed question," Afghanistan continued in 1967 to reaffirm its "religious, national and historical duty" to support "the unceasing struggle of our Pashtunistan brethren to insure them the undeniable right to self-determination." Since mid-1963, however, the Afghan Government has emphasized that the Pashtunistan dispute, which it repeatedly asserted was "the only point of difference" with Pakistan, would be settled by peaceful means. It maintained a correct, even sympathetic posture toward Pakistan during its conflict with India in September 1965, despite probable pressures by some to exploit the situation. As a consequence President Ayub Khan visited Kabul in January 1966 before the Tashkent conference and King Zahir Shah visited West Pakistan informally in the spring of 1967 on his return from a state visit to India; but there has been little discernible progress toward resolving formally the remaining "point of difference."

RELATIONS WITH OTHER NEIGHBORS

Iran

Afghanistan has had historical and cultural ties with Iran longer than with any of its other neighbors; Persian culture had had an enduring impact on the country, and many Afghans speak Farsi (Persian) in its Afghan variant, officially called Dari, as either a first or a second language (see ch. 6, Languages and Communication; ch. 11, Artistic and Intellectual Expression).

Relations with Iran in 1967 were generally amicable despite sporadic disputes about the boundary line in the Chakhansur-Sistan frontier region (southwestern corner of Afghanistan) and continued disagreement over the distribution of the Helmand River waters upon which the Iranian-Sistan region depended for its irrigation (see ch. 20, Agriculture).

The water and boundary dispute was settled first in 1872 through a British ruling whereby neither country was to interfere with the water supplies of the other. Continued friction, however, required another settlement in 1905 through the British; this agreement stated that Iran was entitled to one-third of the Helmand waters as they enter the Chakhansur-Sistan area. Nevertheless, disputes continued partly because of the Iranian fear that Afghanistan's increased irrigation efforts upstream could disrupt similar efforts in the Iranian-Sistan region. Bilateral negotiations have been held intermittently but have failed to settle the issue. In 1967 the 1905 settlement continued to govern the water distribution, technically at least since Iran kept insisting on its right to at least one-third of the waters.

At times illegal crossings of the border, smuggling and banditry in the frontier region also disturbed Afghan-Iranian relations. A border control agreement was signed in 1958. Legitimate trade relations improved steadily after early 1962 when a 5-year transit agreement was signed with Iran to insure access to foreign markets for Afghan goods (see ch. 24, Foreign Economic Relations). This agreement gave Afghanistan an alternate route to the sea at a time when its transit trade was disrupted because of strained relations with Pakistan. Shortly after this pact was signed the Shah of Iran played the leading role in the successful mediation of Afghan-Pakistani differences.

India

Friendship with India is important because of a number of common interests, including extensive economic and cultural relations (see ch. 24, Foreign Economic Relations). Both countries support each other's policy of nonalignment with any power bloc.

At the peak of the Pashtunistan crisis in 1955-56 and again in 1960-61, Afghans were backed by India in their dispute with Pakistan. Nevertheless, Afghanistan continued to remain aloof from the Indian-Pakistani dispute over the status of Jammu and Kashmir, in part because of its Islamic ties with Pakistan and in part, paradoxically, because of the Pashtunistan issue. Afghanistan did not side with India on the Kashmir problem since such a position would run counter to the principle of self-determination which Afghanistan wishes to apply in the Pashtunistan dispute. On the other hand, Afghanistan did not openly support Pakistan, apparently for fear of alienating India, whose friendship is highly valued in Kabul.

A visit of Prime Minister Daud to India in February 1959 was the occasion for affirming the two nations' nonalignment policy and other friendly ties. India's President Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan and Vice President Zakir Hussain visited Kabul in May 1963 and July 1966, respectively. King Mohammad Zahir Shah and Queen Homaira reciprocated Indian gestures of friendship by visiting New Delhi in January and February 1967 when the two governments reaffirmed their neutralist foreign policies and pledged expansion of economic and technical cooperation between them.

Turkey

Relations with Turkey have been always cordial. Both countries emphasize their Islamic ties and pride themselves on their virile traditions. An important segment of Afghanistan's population is ethnically related to Turkey's (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups). At first their common antagonism toward Great Britain drew the two states together. Amanullah Khan was inspired in his modernization efforts partly by Turkey's example (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). In addition, after Afghanistan's independence in 1919, it drew heavily on the services of Turkish military missions to help train its armed forces (see ch. 28, The Armed Forces).

The traditionally friendly relations were little affected when Turkey became a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). The visits of Turkish Premier Adnan Menderes in July 1956 and President Celal Bayar in September 1958 were reciprocated by visits of Prime Ministers Daud and Mohammad Hashim Maiwandwal to Ankara in April 1957 and September 1966, respectively.

United Arab Republic

Afghanistan maintains close cultural and educational contacts with the United Arab Republic (see ch. 10, Education; ch. 11, Artistic and Intellectual Expression). A visit of King Zahir Shah

to Cairo in October 1960 was the occasion for endorsing the spirit of mutual cooperation and for affirming a policy of "positive neutrality" pursued by the two nations. In September 1966 Prime Minister Maiwandwal visited the United Arab Republic and signed a cultural exchange agreement for the year 1966-67.

Afghanistan and the United Arab Republic share a common anti-Israeli attitude. Afghanistan frequently had made official statements in support of the United Arab Republic's position vis-a-vis Israel, with which Afghanistan maintains no diplomatic relations. In the Arab-Israeli conflict of June 1967, Afghanistan continued to endorse the United Arab Republic's position, condemning alleged Israeli aggression against the Arab states and calling for unconditional withdrawal of Israeli forces from "occupied Arab territories."

RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES

Since diplomatic relations were established in 1936 between Afghanistan and the United States, the two countries have generally maintained friendly ties. The United States figured prominently in Afghan external relations especially since the end of World War II.

Relations with the United States primarily concern economic and cultural affairs (see ch. 10, Education). United States aid began in 1950 with a modest loan, and a technical assistance program followed in 1952. By mid-1967 United States aid mostly for developmental purposes, totaled some \$340 million—approximately the amount of aid extended by the Soviet Union for similar, nonmilitary purposes (see ch. 24, Foreign Economic Relations).

Afghan-United States ties were further strengthened through direct contacts between the leaders of the two states. In December 1953 Vice President Richard M. Nixon visited Kabul; Prime Minister Daud was in the United States in June and July 1958 and signed a cultural exchange agreement. In December 1959 President Dwight D. Eisenhower, on his 11-nation tour paid a state visit to Afghanistan to assure King Zahir Shah of the United States' determination to assist in the country's developmental efforts. King Zahir Shah's visit to the United States in September 1963 similarly marked a notable step toward more cordial cooperation between the two countries; at that time the Afghan monarch reiterated his nation's nonalignment policy, and President John F. Kennedy reaffirmed United States support of Afghan "national integrity" and his administration's intention to "cooperate with Afghanistan in economic and technical fields."

RELATIONS WITH OTHER WESTERN NATIONS

Relations in 1967 with Great Britain, France, and West Germany were friendly. Until early 1963 memories of three wars with the British during the past century did not endear Great Britain to many Afghans; anti-British feelings persisted even after the British withdrawal from India in 1947 because of Afghan-Pakistani confrontation over Pashtunistan (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). On some occasions former British high officials who had served in India privately expressed opinions generally favoring Pakistan in the Pashtunistan dispute, but the British Government maintained a policy of noninvolvement.

As Afghan-Pakistani relations steadily improved after Prime Minister Daud's resignation in March 1963, however, Afghan-British relations have also shown signs of betterment. In 1964 Great Britain joined other nations in providing developmental loans to Afghanistan.

Since the 1920's France has had an archaeological mission in Afghanistan. In 1967 it also had cultural and educational relations with the country (see ch. 10, Education; ch. 11, Artistic and Intellectual Expression). In June 1965 King Zahir Shah paid a state visit to France and conferred with President Charles de Gaulle; they affirmed their intention to develop closer economic and technical relations in the future.

Afghanistan has had friendly trade relations with Germany since the interwar period. In 1967 Afghanistan maintained diplomatic relations only with West Germany; it had not extended diplomatic recognition to East Germany. King Zahir Shah paid a state visit to West Germany in August 1963 and in March 1967 West German President Heinrich Lübke went to Afghanistan on a state visit, pledging his government's help "within the limits of its financial ability" toward the implementation of the government's Third Five-Year Plan (1967-71). West Germany, the second largest Western donor of aid to the country, invested substantially in Afghanistan and provided specialists in various fields of national economic development (see ch. 10, Education; ch. 24, Foreign Economic Relations).

RELATIONS WITH COMMUNIST NATIONS

The Soviet Union

Afghan-Soviet relations in 1967 were marked by good-neighborliness, a trend that has been evident since 1954 when the Soviet Union embarked on a policy of using Afghanistan as a counterweight to Pakistan, which had aligned itself with the West that year.

Historically, Afghans regarded their northern neighbor with suspicion and fear, and especially during the past century they sought to keep the Russians at a distance (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). Frontier relations were marked by frequent incidents, and proximity was an invitation for the two countries to interfere politically in each other's affairs. In February 1921, therefore, a treaty of friendship was concluded, providing among other things for exchanges of diplomatic and consular representatives, Afghan transit rights through the Soviet Union and a Soviet subsidy of 1 million rubles (see Glossary), arms and ammunition.

By 1922 the northern area of Afghanistan had become the center of anti-Communist propaganda among the discontented Uzbeks and Tajiks of Soviet Turkistan whom the Afghan Government of King Amanullah supported. The 1921 treaty became obsolete and was superseded by the Treaty of Neutrality and Non-Aggression signed in August 1926. After the accession of Mohammad Nadir Shah to the throne, a new Treaty of Neutrality and Mutual Non-Aggression was concluded in June 1931, providing that either state would be neutral in any war involving the other and that neither would allow the existence on its territory of individuals or organizations hostile to the other signatory. This treaty was supplemented by another pact concluded in March 1936, stipulating noninterference of either state in the affairs of the other.

Until the end of World War II Afghanistan's relations with the Soviet Union were uneventful, but as Afghanistan's neighbors became entangled in the East-West cold war in postwar years, a new era of foreign relations opened in 1954—an era of mutual collaboration, a marked departure from that of mutual abstention in earlier decades. Although for different reasons, the two countries were drawn closer as Pakistan aligned itself with the West in May 1954 by signing the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with the United States and by joining SEATO in September of that year.

Against the background of Afghan-Pakistani disputes over Pash-tunistan, Soviet overtures to Afghanistan to offset the United States-Pakistan alliance found Prime Minister Daud willing to use Soviet influence to counter Pakistan which Afghans claimed was using United States weapons against their country. At the time of their visit to the country in December 1955, the Soviet leaders Nikolai Bulganin and Nikita Khrushchev bid for Afghan friendship and favors by supporting the government in its dispute over Pashtunistan; they also granted transit facilities to Afghanistan to offset Pakistan's blockade, extended credits and other forms of aid—including military assistance—and agreed with Afghan leaders to renew for 10 years the 1931 Treaty of Neutrality and Mu-

tual Non-Aggression. This treaty was extended for another 10 years in August 1965 when King Zahir Shah went to the Soviet Union on a state visit.

As a result, the Soviet Union came to play an influential role in the Afghan economy as well as in its national defense. In 1967 it was the major donor of aid; principal trade partner, accounting for about 56 percent of Afghan foreign trade as compared with some 10 percent in 1950; and principal supplier of weapons and other related defense needs (see ch. 24, Foreign Economic Relations; ch. 28, The Armed Forces).

Communist China

Since the establishment in January 1955 of diplomatic ties with Communist China, which Afghanistan had recognized earlier (January 1950), Afghan relations with Communist China have been cordial. In 1967 there was no discernible sign of antagonism between the two countries. The country continued its advocacy of the admission of Communist China to the United Nations.

In August 1960 Afghanistan and Communist China signed a treaty of friendship and nonaggression and also concluded a trade agreement. In November 1963 the two countries signed a border treaty under which they recognized the common frontier of some 40 miles in the inaccessible portion of the Wakhan-Pamir region; boundary markers were erected in the summer of 1964. In March 1965 the two nations also signed an agreement of economic and technical cooperation by which Communist China pledged a long-term, interest-free loan equivalent to \$28 million for development projects to be mutually determined later. In August 1966 the two nations agreed on six projects to be financed under this loan (see ch. 24, Foreign Economic Relations).

For all signs of friendship, however, Afghanistan in the mid-1960's was exercising restraint in dealing with Communist China, probably because it did not wish to irritate two major donors of foreign aid—the Soviet Union and the United States, both of which were on unfriendly terms with Communist China.

Other Communist States

Diplomatic relations exist with all Communist nations except East Germany, North Korea, and North Vietnam, but in 1967 only Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia maintained missions in the country. Hungary carries on its diplomatic relations through its envoy in Iraq; Mongolia and Rumania, through their respective missions in India.

With Czechoslovakia, Afghanistan has carried on active coopera-

tion in trade and in scientific and technical matters; Czechoslovakia has also given some military assistance (see ch. 24, Foreign Economic Relations; ch. 28, The Armed Forces). In April 1964 an air link was established between Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan; this was a weekly flight by way of Sofia, Athens, Damascus, and Tehran.

Relations with Yugoslavia are also friendly; Yugoslavian Foreign Minister Koca Popovic visited Afghanistan in April 1960 and King Zahir Shah visited Yugoslavia in November 1960, when he and President Tito discussed measures to further political, economic, and cultural relations between the two countries. In March 1966 Yugoslavian Prime Minister Petar Stambolic conferred with Afghan leaders in Kabul on economic matters and pledged his country's readiness to help Afghanistan implement its Third Five-Year Plan (see ch. 24, Foreign Economic Relations).

Relations with Poland are largely cultural. In June 1966 Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki paid an official visit to Afghanistan and signed a cultural cooperation agreement. In 1967 a number of Afghan students were studying in Poland.

On the occasion of the Yugoslavian Prime Minister's official visit to Kabul in March 1966, Prime Minister Maiwandwal and the visiting official expressed the hope that the Vietnam problem would be settled on the basis of the 1954 Geneva Agreement on Vietnam and asserted that the self-styled National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam be recognized as "an equal partner" in any peace negotiations concerning the future of the two Vietnams.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Afghanistan has been an active participant in international organizations. It joined the League of Nations in 1934 and became a member of the United Nations in November 1946. In 1958 the General Assembly of the United Nations praised Afghanistan by passing a resolution of appreciation for the banning of opium cultivation in the country. The resolution urged that technical assistance agencies give special aid to the country to prevent the opium ban from having serious economic and social consequences. Afghan Ambassador Abdur Rahman Pazhwak was elected President of the Twenty-First Session of the General Assembly in 1966.

The government has respected the United Nations as the major forum for voicing its support of the principles of self-determination for all peoples, of peaceful coexistence, of general disarmament, and of universal membership, as well as for opposing colonialism, nuclear tests and proliferation of nuclear weapons. The United Nations has been also a major benefactor to Afghanistan,

which since 1949 has been served by some 530 United Nations specialists in agriculture, industries, rural development, and education. By 1965 some \$11 million worth of services and technical equipment were provided by the United Nations. In addition, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) contributed \$3 million.

Afghanistan belongs to many of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations. It is the westernmost Asian member of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE). Some of the organizations to which it belongs include the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; International Development Association (IDA); International Monetary Fund (IMF); International Finance Corporation; World Health Organization (WHO); World Meteorological Organization; Food and Agriculture Organization; International Atomic Energy Agency; International Civil Aviation Organization; United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; Universal Postal Union; International Telecommunications Union and International Labor Organization.

Afghanistan since March 1964 has been a member of the Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia (see Glossary).

MECHANICS OF FOREIGN RELATIONS

Foreign policy is formulated by a few officials in the inner circle of government. Treaties are submitted to both houses of Parliament for ratification.

The conduct of foreign relations is the primary responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Little was known of the degree to which the various ethnic groups differed in their thinking on external affairs. It appeared that the non-Pashtun groups, especially the Hazaras and Turkics, did not share the government's concern for Pashtunistan (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups).

Another agency of government that in a specialized sense enters the field of foreign relations is the independent Department of Tribal Affairs, which in the past served as the principal link between the government's policymakers and the tribes along the Afghan-Pakistani border. This department, which had ministerial status in 1967, played a major role in the Pashtunistan dispute in the mid-1950's and in the early 1960's.

In their dealings with foreign officials in Afghanistan and abroad, Afghans tend to be very formal. Great emphasis is placed on protocol and proper diplomatic manners.

ATTITUDES TOWARD FOREIGN NATIONS

Pakistan

Afghan attitudes toward Pakistanis are varied. Until early 1963 government leaders and some Pashtun tribesmen who identified themselves with the Pashtunistan movement regarded the Pakistan Government as their principal enemy; this attitude changed, however, as Afghan-Pakistani relations improved steadily after mid-1963.

Pashtuns generally have a sympathetic attitude toward their counterparts who live on the Pakistani side of the eastern border and are aware of the strongly Islamic character of the Pakistani people. This awareness has never prevented one Pashtun from fighting another, most recently in the mid-1950's and in the early 1960's, although the antagonism was on a tribal, not a national or ethnic, level (see ch. 13, Social Values).

Iran

Historical ties and religious differences largely condition Afghan attitudes toward the Iranians. For centuries, as late as the mid-nineteenth century, the two peoples fought each other (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). In the mid-1960's some Afghans thought that their annual independence celebration in August was to commemorate their freedom from Iran.

Attitudes between the two peoples are affected because the Shiite branch of Islam which predominates in Iran is the minority sect in Afghanistan, because the Sunnites who are the majority branch in Afghanistan are a minority in Iran and because of Sunnite discrimination against Shiites (that is, Hazaras) in Afghanistan (see ch. 12, Religion).

Turkey

Afghans generally regard Turkey as a fellow nation. Most urban Afghans admire the fortitude and courage of the Turks but many religious conservative Afghans question the secularizing tendency of Turkey.

Among the approximately 1 million Uzbeks and Turkomans living in Afghanistan, Turkey is greatly admired, and the Turks are literally regarded as brothers.

Arab States

Afghans feel an affinity for Moslem Arabs, as they do for all Moslems, though they seldom see an Arab unless they make the

pilgrimage to Mecca. The government supports Arab Moslem causes in Africa and in the Middle East. In Arab political affairs Afghanistan acknowledges the United Arab Republic's leadership, and it sympathizes with the Arabs in the Israeli dispute. In Islamic culture and scholarship, Al-Azhar University in Cairo is considered the zenith of Moslem intellectual leadership (see ch. 10, Education; ch. 12, Religion).

The Western World

Many urban and rural Afghans are prone to regard the British with tolerance, as being fair and just. Americans, except in Kabul and Kandahar where they are present in large numbers, are likely to be mistaken for British because of their common language and physical appearance. Americans are highly regarded for their educational institutions; most Afghans prefer study in the United States to that in any other country. Afghans show mixed feelings of envy and resentment because of the high standard of living of Americans.

In Kabul, before the Pashtunistan dispute erupted into border clashes and especially in mid-1961, the Afghan Government accused Pakistan of having used jet planes supplied by the United States, and many Afghans, including students, viewed with disfavor United States military aid to Pakistan. Conversely, however, as Afghan-Pakistani relations improved after 1963, accompanied by Pakistan's gradual assertion of a neutralist posture in world affairs, Afghans had little cause to be disturbed by the United States.

West Germany is widely known to Afghans and is held in great esteem for its scientific and technological achievements. German technicians, engineers and physicians have been stationed in provincial centers and government ministries and have been in charge of power and industrial installations since before World War II. Many German scientists and scientific expeditions have carried out studies and investigations even in remote areas. Their unostentatious way of life is approved by the conservative and frugal Afghans.

France, through the French archaeological mission, long has supplied intellectual and scholastic leadership to many educated Afghans and the French continue to command respect for their cultural attainments. The archaeological mission, through its long continuity, acquired a vast knowledge of the country's history, and it uncovered in areas near Pul-i-Khumri (about 100 miles north of Kabul) most of the historic remains of the Kushan dynasty (50 B.C.-A.D. 425) (see ch. 3, Historical Setting).

Communist Nations

Most Afghans regard the peoples of Communist nations of whom Soviet citizens are the most well known, primarily as foreigners and only secondarily as Communists. Afghans are accustomed to look upon competition among foreign powers less as ideological confrontation than as sheer rivalry for influence and prestige. Nevertheless, small numbers of Afghans still distrust Soviet citizens because of Soviet persecution of fellow Moslems in Soviet Central Asia after 1917.

In the mid-1960's, however, vestiges of anti-Soviet sentiments on religious grounds appeared to be waning in part because of Soviet conciliation toward the Moslems in regions adjoining Afghanistan and in part because of the Soviet practice of occasionally sending Moslem technicians and engineers to Afghanistan. Attitudes toward Soviet citizens and the Soviet Union have improved steadily since the mid-1950's because of Soviet demonstrations of good will and neighborliness, which included technical and military assistance and low freight charges across the Soviet Union for Afghan imports and exports (see ch. 24, Foreign Economic Relations).

Few Afghans maintain friendly, individual contacts, other than for official purposes, with Soviet citizens, who, on the whole, are aloof. Afghans regard them as frugal and inconspicuous. Attitudes toward them can be differentiated also along ethnic lines. Pashtuns consider them non-Pashtuns (Uzbeks or Turkomans) and regard them as they do all non-Pashtuns. Turki groups are more discriminating; they have friendly feelings toward other Moslem Turki groups in Soviet Central Asia. Turkomans, who did not suffer from Bolshevik colonialism as much as did the Uzbeks, do not necessarily hate the Soviet Union as a Communist state as much as they dislike Soviet citizens as individuals; Turkomans feel above everyone who is not a Turk.

CHAPTER 17

PUBLIC INFORMATION

In 1967 the development and use of formal communications media were still in the formative stage. Many Afghans still depended on word-of-mouth for whatever information they received.

The radio was of the greatest actual and potential importance because of its effectiveness in transmitting information to large numbers of people. Of the approximately 400,000 receiving sets in the country in 1967, many were in public places. Much of the foreign news in the newspapers was a recapitulation of reports gathered by monitoring foreign broadcasts. No television was yet in existence, but negotiations were in progress with French firms regarding the establishment of a television broadcasting station.

Since less than 10 percent of the people are literate, the circulation and distribution of newspapers are limited. In 1967 there were 17 daily newspapers with a total circulation of less than 100,000. In some villages, however, single copies of newspapers are read aloud to illiterates and are then passed around. In the cities, newspapers have considerable political impact on the increasingly literate urban population, especially on students, intellectuals, and government officials.

Film shows are a popular form of recreation. They are well attended in Kabul and in the seven provincial towns which have film theaters. Since 1965 documentary films have been produced by a government-owned film laboratory, but their distribution in 1967 was still limited.

All public information media are under close government control. The radio and the press serve more as instruments for the spread of the government's views than as channels of objective information. In a major policy statement in 1966, Prime Minister Mohammad Hashim Maiwandwal pointed out that:

radio and other mass media . . . should not only serve as a means of conveying to the people useful information about the affairs of the country and the world, but also provide an important means of raising the educational level of the people and promoting national unity and progress.

The government owns and operates Radio Kabul, the only domestic broadcasting service. The new Press Law, promulgated in

August 1965, provides for a free press but authorizes controls which are sufficient to prevent the dissemination of opinions critical of the government and of national traditions. The editorial policies of newspapers show a high degree of uniformity in following the government's views, although minor points of official policy are criticized occasionally.

The Ministry of Information and Culture provides the framework for government supervision of public information sources. Through it the government screens all domestic and imported newspapers, magazines, books, films, and art products. It also selects foreign and domestic news to be released through the official Bakhtar News Agency for use by the press and prepares the programs to be broadcast by Radio Kabul. Furthermore, the Ministry controls the supply of newsprint.

Government information programs disseminated through the formal communications media seek to win support for official policies and to build up the loyalty of the diverse ethnic and tribal groups to the central government. In view of the importance of word-of-mouth communication, the government also dispatches functionaries to the provinces to foster these same objectives as well as to maintain the goodwill of the people and also to instill respect for government authority. The government is concerned, too, with securing the continued support of religious leaders, lower-echelon government officials and businessmen, and particular programs are developed with this in mind.

During the elections of 1965, the government made vigorous use of modern communications media. Political candidates were encouraged to purchase time on Radio Kabul for campaign purposes, and special programs were broadcast to explain the purpose and procedures involved in the election. The major newspapers printed the names and photographs of candidates free of charge, and Provincial Governors spoke in bazaars and mosque compounds in the towns to acquaint the population with the candidates and their platforms (see ch. 15, Political Dynamics).

During the 1960's the government made considerable headway in improving the technical facilities of communications media. Two new, high-powered transmitters were added to Radio Kabul in 1965 and new equipment was purchased for the Government Press, the country's largest printing establishment owned by the government. Substantial aid in the expansion of technical facilities for the press and radio came from West Germany, and the United States lent assistance in the establishment of domestic film production.

Information from the free world reaches the country through newspapers, magazines, pamphlets, and books distributed by the

United States Information Service (USIS) and the British, French, and West German embassies in Kabul. The radio programs of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) have many listeners. USIS film showings are also well received, attracting numerous students, scholars, and government officials.

Material from Communist countries included radio broadcasts originating mainly in the Soviet Union, the free distribution of pamphlets, and children's books published in Communist China. The Soviet themes stressed support for the country's policy of non-alignment in foreign affairs, Soviet solidarity with, and economic assistance to, countries of the Moslem world.

GOVERNMENT AND FREEDOM OF THE PRESS

Since its emergence during the middle of the nineteenth century as a public activity, the press has functioned primarily as an organ of court and government opinion rather than of information. The newspaper, *Kabul*, later known as *Shams-un-Nahar* (Daytime Sun) was published during the reign of Dost Mohammad Khan (1793-1863). It specialized in court news and continued to be published in the capital until 1879.

The Persian-language newspaper *Seraj-al-Akhbar* (Lamp of the News) was one of several newspapers published during the reign of Habibullah Khan (1901-19). Its basic aim was to encourage Afghans to work for independence. During the reign of Amanullah Khan (1919-29) the press became a weapon in the ruler's determined campaign to modernize the country. A total of 15 newspapers were published, many by private persons. Amanullah himself founded a Persian-language newspaper, *Aman-i-Afghan* (Afghan Peace), and made the writer Mahmud Beg Tarzi, an ardent advocate of modernization, its editor. Tarzi's wife founded the first monthly magazine for women in 1921. In 1929 Mohammad Nadir Shah (1929-33) founded the newspaper *Islah* (Reform) which was still one of the major dailies in 1967.

Freedom of the press was provided by the Constitution of 1931. The provision was made more specific in Article 31 of the Constitution of 1964, which stipulated that "every Afghan has the right to express his thoughts in speech, in writing, in pictures, and by other means in accordance with the provisions of the law." The Article also stated that citizens have the right to "print and publish ideas in accordance with the provisions of the law, without submission in advance to the authorities of the State." The right to establish and to operate radio and television stations, however, is limited to the state.

To implement the constitutional provisions for press freedom, a new Press Law was promulgated in August 1965 which specified

the conditions, regulations and limitations governing the publication of newspapers and the establishment of printing facilities under private auspices. The purpose of the law, according to Article 1, is to prepare "a proper ground over which all Afghans may express their thought . . ." and, at the same time, to safeguard "... the interest and dignity of the State and individuals from harms to which they may be subjected by the misuse of the freedom of the press."

Article 29 of the Press Law points out that the fundamental policy of every periodical publication should be to "support the values and aims mentioned in the Constitution. . . ." Articles 31 and 32 forbid publication of "matter implying defamation of the principles of Islam or defamation of the King." Incitement through the press to disobey the country's laws, and to disrupt public security and order is also prohibited.

Political parties and private individuals may publish newspapers, but Members of Parliament and of the armed forces may not be publishers or editors. Prospective publishers must submit a request for registration to the Minister of Information and Culture and must deposit a registration fee of 15,000 afghanis (see Glossary). The law prohibits prior censorship but newspapers and periodicals may be censored after publication. If the Ministry orders them to close down, editors and publishers may appeal the decision through the courts.

A short-lived proliferation of newspapers followed the promulgation of the Press Law. *Afghan Melat* (Afghan Nation), published early in 1966, had a circulation of 1,400. The weekly journal *Khalq* (The Masses), first published in April 1966 by Mohammad Taraqi, criticized the government and advocated public ownership of all property and the abolition of private holdings. After only five issues *Khalq* was closed down by the government on the grounds that it was proposing measures which violated values upheld by the constitution. Other weekly newspapers in 1966 were *Wahdat* (Unity) and the conservative *Mardum* (The People). *Payam-a-Wejdan* (Message of Conscience) was first published in the summer of that year by Abdul Raouf Turkmani; it was nationalistic and slightly critical of the government. By the end of 1966 all newspapers published since the promulgation of the Press Law were forced to close publication because of financial difficulties and because of the lack of qualified editors.

INFORMATION MEDIA

The Ministry of Information and Culture controls and coordinates all information media. Radio Afghanistan and the Bakhtar News Agency are among its major departments. Since 1966 the

Ministry's functions have been broadened to include the administration of museums. Furthermore, the Ministry handles most of the publishing in the country, drafts and implements government information programs for domestic and foreign use, initiates or subsidizes artistic and cultural projects and cultural exchange arrangements. In addition, the Ministry is in charge of plans and programs designed to develop tourism. In 1967 the post of Minister of Information and Culture was held by Mohammad Osman Sidiqi.

The Press

Four of the 17 dailies were published in Kabul (see table 2). The circulation of periodicals and of general interest publications was estimated at 67,000.

Anis (Companion) and *Islah* (Reform) of Kabul are the two most important and oldest newspapers. They are published daily except Friday—*Islah* in the morning and *Anis* in the evening. The articles in *Anis* are predominantly in Dari (Farsi or Persian), but some are in Pashto (see ch. 6 Languages and Communication), but *Islah* publishes mainly in Pashto although some of its columns are in Dari. *Hewad* (Country), also published in the capital, comes next in importance and circulation. Established as a weekly in 1949, it was published daily in 1967, entirely in Pashto. The English-language *Kabul Times*, published since 1962, is written largely for, and read mostly by foreigners residing in the capital.

Provincial dailies include *Tulu Afghan* (Afghan Rise) in Kandahar, *Ittifaq Islam* (Islam Unity) in Herat, *Storia* (Star) in Maimana, *Badakhshan* in Faizabad, *Bedar* (Arise) in Mazar-i-Sharif, *Ittehad* (Unity) in Baghlan, *Nangarhar* in Jalalabad and *Woranga* (Ray) in Gardez. Publication of these and other provincial newspapers is irregular, and they are likely to appear less frequently than scheduled. Most have circulations of between 2,000 and 3,000 and their influence is local.

The outside pages of most newspapers carry progress reports by various Ministries, listings of appointments and resignations in the administration and some national and foreign news. Parliamentary reporting is sparse. The activities of the King and of the royal family are featured prominently. The opening of schools and of new factories receive extensive coverage. Much space is also devoted to visits of government officials to foreign countries and visits of foreign dignitaries to the country. The activities and travels of prominent actors and entertainers are regularly reported.

International news is generally given without comment and in publishing news material from foreign news agencies an attempt is made to use approximately equal amount from non-Communist

Table 2. Representative Newspapers and Periodicals in Afghanistan, 1967

Title	Frequency	Place of Publication	Language	Circulation*	Publisher or Editor
<i>Anis</i> (Companion)	daily	Kabul	Dari/Pashto	30,000	Shafie Rahgozar, editor
<i>Islah</i> (Reform)	do	do	do	15,000	Sayed Faqir Alawi, editor
<i>Hewad</i> (Homeland)	do	do	Pashto	8,000	Mir Said Bariman
<i>Kabul Times</i>	do	do	English	8,000	Bakhtar News Agency (S. Khalil, editor)
<i>Tulu Afghan</i> (Afghan Rise)	do	Kandahar	Pashto	6,000	n.a.
<i>Ittfaq Islam</i> (Islam Unity)	do	Herat	Dari/Pashto	6,000	n.a.
<i>Storai</i> (Star)	do	Maimana	do	3,000	n.a.
<i>Nangarhar</i>	do	Jalalabad	Pashto	2,000	n.a.
<i>Woranga</i> (Ray)	do	Gardez	do	1,000	n.a.

<i>Badakhshan</i>	do	Faizabad	Dari/Pashto	3,000	n.a.
<i>Bedar</i>	do	Mazar-i-Sharif	do	2,000	n.a.
(Arise)					
<i>Ittehad</i>	do	Baghlan	do	2,000	n.a.
(Unity)					
<i>Zhowandoon</i>	weekly	Kabul	Dari/Pashto	5,000	Ministry of Information and Culture.
(Life)					
<i>Bekhan-o-Bedan</i>	do	do	do	30,000	Ministry of Education.
(Read and Know)					
<i>Mairmun</i>	monthly	do	do	3,000	Women's Welfare Society.
(Woman)					
<i>Tibbi Majala</i>	do	do	do	2,000	Ministry of Health.
(Medical Magazine)					
<i>Urdu</i>	do	do	do	10,000	Ministry of National Defense.
(Armed Forces)					

* Circulation figures are approximate.

n.a.—not available.

Source: Adapted from *The Kabul Times Annual*, 1967, p. 57.

and from Communist sources. The space devoted to advertisements is limited, and foreign advertisers are served by a government-affiliated advertising agency founded in 1963. Most advertisements carried in 1967 were placed by foreign cigarette and airline companies and generally appeared in the *Kabul Times*.

Newspapers are similar in size, format and content. Provincial newspapers average four to six pages; the metropolitan, four to sixteen. Since the modernization in 1966 of the Government Press, the Kabul dailies and some of those published in the provinces are printed on modern letterpresses, but rudimentary handpresses are still used in some areas.

Most newspapermen have had little or no formal training. Many are scholars, and all probably have been graduated at least from secondary school. Professional training has been available only since the early 1960's when a school of journalism was opened under the Faculty of Letters at Kabul University. The number of graduates, however, has been small. Some journalists are sent for training to the United States, West Germany, and the Soviet Union.

About 70 periodicals were published in 1967. Many of these were organs of the Ministry of Information and Culture, the Ministry of Education and other government agencies. The Ministry of Information and Culture published *Zhowandoon* (Life), an illustrated weekly magazine which has an approximate circulation of 5,000 and which appeals to a variety of interests. It is the most widely read periodical among the educated urban intelligentsia, *Bekhan-o-Bedan* (Read and Know), with a circulation of about 30,000, is published weekly by the Ministry of Education, and it is intended mainly for persons who wish to improve their reading ability. *Mairmum* (Women) is a women's monthly published in Pashto and Dari by the Women's Welfare Society. The monthlies, *Tibbi Majala* (Medical Magazine) and *Urdu* (Armed Forces), are published by the Ministry of Public Health and by the Ministry of National Defense, respectively.

Some of these periodicals are intended for public consumption; others function as house organs of the respective Ministries and agencies. The publication of many periodicals is intermittent, and different means of reproduction are used to cope with the inadequate supplies of paper and the lack of printing facilities. Much of the literature published in general interest magazines is the work of Western classical authors, translated from Western publications.

News Agencies

The government-owned Bakhtar News Agency is one of the principal aids of the Ministry of Information and Culture for the

control and dissemination of public information. All domestic and foreign news is screened by the agency before distribution to Radio Kabul and to the various newspapers. It is the only direct source of news for all the domestic newspapers and magazines.

The agency furnishes the metropolitan and provincial press with a daily newssheet featuring mostly foreign and some domestic news items. In addition, some items are also transmitted to the newspapers by teletype, from 6 a.m. to midnight daily. In 1966 the agency installed a 20-kilowatt transmitter to facilitate news transmission to the provinces. The transmitter, purchased with a grant from West Germany, relays teletype and telephone messages but is also used for broadcasting. By 1967 teletype receivers had been installed in the provinces of Baghlan, Balkh, Herat, Kandahar, Kunduz and Paktia. Six additional provinces were to be linked to the teletype network by 1970.

In 1966 Bakhtar News Agency had a staff of 30 reporters, 3 of whom were graduates of the school of journalism at Kabul University. Under the sponsorship of the agency, a seminar for news service reporters was taught by a member of the Czechoslovakian School for News Agency Reporters during the same year.

For foreign news coverage the Agency relies on the United Press International (UPI) and the Associated Press (AP) of the United States, Great Britain's Reuter Bureau, and the Deutsche Press Agentur (DPA) of West Germany. The Soviet news agency Telegrafnoe Agentsvo Sovetskovo Soyuz (TASS), Communist China's New China News Agency (NCNA), the East German Amtliche Deutsche Nachrichten (ADN) and the Czechoslovakian news agency Ceskoslovenska Tiskova Kancelar (CTK), furnish news from the Communist bloc. UPI, AP, and Reuters are represented by part-time correspondents; TASS and NCNA are staffed by their own bureau correspondents and furnish news free of charge.

Radio

The government-owned Radio Kabul has been in operation since 1941. In 1966 it had two shortwave transmitters, powered by 50- and 10-kilowatts, respectively, and one 20-kilowatt mediumwave transmitter. Two new 100-kilowatt transmitters, one mediumwave and one shortwave, were installed in August of the same year, with West German assistance.

Radio Kabul is on the air for about 8 hours a day. Most of the programs are locally produced and taped in Dari or Pashto for domestic transmission. In 1964 more than half of the domestic programs consisted of native music. Since that year broadcasts featuring traditional plays and poems have been added, and in 1966 Radio Kabul engaged a number of prominent artists for these

programs. A "Music Around the World" program, broadcast nightly since 1967, features music by Western composers. News and news commentary furnished by the Bakhtar News Agency and educational programs are interspersed throughout the broadcasting day. According to the Minister of Information and Culture, educational programs were to broadcast for at least 4 hours a day by late 1967.

The number of radio receivers in 1967 was estimated at between 300,000 and 400,000, about 95 percent of which were equipped for shortwave reception. In addition, there were about 10,000 community sets in teahouses, bazaars, and clubs. The government has also installed wired speaker systems in about 18 towns, and there are plans to add many more. Although a license is required, supervision of the regulation is difficult, and most of the private sets were unlicensed. The estimated number of listeners per set was 6 for private and 100 for community sets. In the urban areas most listeners tune in on shortwave, those in the rural areas on medium-wave. One of the most popular types of radio set is the Japanese-made transistor which may be bought for the approximate equivalent of \$5.00.

Listening to the radio is a popular pastime. The estimated total radio audience in 1966 was 4 million; since most Afghans have access to public or private radios the number of listeners is growing. Those who have no private sets visit the homes of friends who have receivers, or gather in teahouses, government offices or hotels where the sets are turned up to full volume. Listening to the radio outside the home is common in the rural areas although the accessibility of transistor radios has modified the pattern of rural listening. In 1967 many farmers had their own radios. Herdsmen carry their transistor sets to the pasture and radio aërials are seen on many of the tents of nomads.

Films

In 1967 the country had 21 film theaters with a total seating capacity of 9,000. Seven of the theaters were in Kabul; others were in Mazar-i-Sharif, Kunduz, Maimana, Herat, Girishk, Khost, and Pul-i-Khumri. An estimated 8 million persons attend film performances each year.

In commercial theaters, films are shown three times a day. The audience is mostly male, but since the 1960's an increasing number of women usually accompanied by their husbands, have attended performances. Tea is served throughout the performance, which is punctuated by frequent intermissions, the occasion for sociability.

Many of the provincial theaters are closed for extended periods

of time because of the irregularity in the delivery of films and because of high film-rental fees. When films are shown, however, theaters are usually filled to capacity. Most feature films are imported from India, the United States, the Soviet Union, and Iran. Audiences prefer Iranian movies in Farsi, but such films are not always available. Indian films featuring oriental music and romantic plots are also popular.

Local film production started during the 1960's. The film processing laboratory, Afghan Film, was set up in Kabul, with United States assistance. Film technicians received training in the United States and in other foreign countries. By 1967 however, no feature films were produced domestically. The Ministry of Information and Culture has equipment to produce documentary films and newsreels, which are produced at the rate of about one a month.

Book Publishing and Libraries

Ministries and government offices publish virtually all books. The Ministry of Information and Culture is one of the major publishers and supervises all publishing activity in the country. No more than 100 titles a year are published by the various agencies. They are printed in small editions since a sale of 2,000 copies is regarded as unusual. Only textbooks are printed in larger quantities. In June 1966 a Book Publishing Institute was established within the Ministry. Members of its executive board included the president of the Government Press, the president of the Bakhtar News Agency and the editors of the four major metropolitan dailies. The Institute plans to increase the volume of books published for sale and to publish more translations in Dari and Pashto. In October 1967 the Institute became a part of the Afghan Academy (see ch. 11, Artistic and Intellectual Expression). The Ministry of Education is the second major publisher and has a well-equipped printing plant of its own.

The country's largest printing plant, the Government Press, prints all Kabul newspapers and most magazines and books. It has branches in some of the provincial capitals, and its physical plant and printing facilities were expanded and modernized in 1966.

Most books are sold in bookshops operated by the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Information and Culture. Some may be obtained through the press sections of the various government agencies and Ministries. About two dozen privately owned bookshops and bookstalls in Kabul carry religious books, old editions of classical authors in Pashto and Dari, as well as books and newspapers from Iran. Some Western and Communist-bloc newspapers, magazines, and books are also available in these shops.

The Kabul Public Library administered by the Ministry of Edu-

cation is the country's leading library. It has approximately 70 000 volumes. The Ministry of Information and Culture operates small public libraries in the provincial towns of Gardez, Mazar-i-Sharif, Ghazni, Khulm, Herat, Kandahar, and Faizabad.

Other libraries are the 50,000 volume Kabul University library and the libraries maintained by secondary, vocational, and religious schools. About 16 of these smaller libraries are located in Kabul. The Royal Afghan Army, various commercial firms, and literary clubs operate reading rooms open to the public. Plans were under way in 1966 to provide the provincial libraries with mobile units.

INFORMAL COMMUNICATION CHANNELS

Most Afghans, especially in rural areas depend on the informal word-of-mouth communications. *Mullahs* (Moslem religious leaders), traders, herdsmen, itinerant farm laborers, peddlers, and government agents move around the country carrying rumors and reports. Also, teahouses, which most men visit daily, are traditional centers for the exchange of news and rumors. Exchange of news is an eagerly anticipated occasion both for the bearer, who is socially obligated to relay what he has heard, and for those who await him.

Rumors generally start in bazaars. Many can be traced to merchants, who in speculating about why business is good or bad, spread around truths, half-truths or misinformation of a political or economic nature which appear to apply to the situation. Such rumors reach the ears of villagers and nomads visiting the bazaars who then carry them back to their settlements and camps.

A story which originates in the Kunduz bazaar, for example, is apt to work its way rapidly to Herat, through truckdrivers fanning out to nearby villagers all along the way. From there it may reach Farah and Girishk and eventually be picked up by tribesmen in a bazaar, who carry it back to their desert camps.

News travels quite fast along the main roads but takes time to reach particularly out-of-the-way areas, such as remote Badakhshan and the Hazarajat region. Word-of-mouth news usually gets distorted or embellished in transit.

The Afghan's love of a good story contributes to the eagerness with which rumors and reports are seized upon and repeated in the bazaars and teahouses. Conversation is a recreation, and public gatherings usually involve storytellings, singing, and dancing. Although the voicing of criticism is restricted in the formal communications media, government officials and policies are appraised with considerable vigor by word-of-mouth.

GOVERNMENT INFORMATION PROGRAMS

The government makes extensive use of formal and informal communications media to disseminate information on and to solicit public support for its policies. Much of the broadcasting time of the government-owned radio is devoted to news and commentaries reflecting official government views. Such views are also disseminated by the Bakhtar News Agency which supplies news to the domestic press and to representatives of foreign newspapers.

The principal themes the government sought to develop in 1967 were those of national unity and the praise of the accomplishments of the King and government in the framework of economic and social development programs. Extensive press and radio coverage was also given to themes emphasizing the country's past greatness, cultural contributions and scholastic achievements. Government information material pertaining to external relations emphasized the country's attitude of nonalignment in the conflict of major powers. Statements expressing solidarity with peoples "engaged in the struggle against imperialism and colonialism" was also stressed. On the other hand the once prominent issue of the self-determination of Pashtunistan has been considerably deemphasized since 1963 (see ch. 16, Foreign Relations).

The government also makes use of personal contact to acquaint the population in remote areas with its policies and accomplishments. Officials of local governments and of central government information agencies regularly visit such areas, including those inhabited by nomadic tribes, to familiarize the population with the official view on certain issues. Holidays and national celebrations are used to advance national loyalty, such as the annual Independence Day celebrations in August of each year or the annual International Trade Fair which bring hundreds of persons together in a situation designed to instill patriotic feelings and pride in cultural and economic progress. When the King makes an appearance on these occasions, lively crowds attend him.

For foreign audiences Radio Kabul broadcasts news in English, French, German, Arabic, Urdu (for Pakistan), and Russian. Programs in Pashto and Dari are also beamed to foreign countries. In the summer of 1967 Pashto and Dari programs were broadcast from 3:30 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. local time on the 19- and 25-meter bands, and the English program from 6:30 p.m. to 7:30 p.m. and 10:30 p.m. to 11:00 local time on the 19-, 25- and 60-meter bands. The German service was broadcast from 10:00 p.m. to 10:30 p.m. on the 60-meter band; the Russian from 9:30 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. on the 16- and 25-meter bands. The Urdu broadcast was from 5:30 p.m. to 6:00 p.m.

Illustrated pamphlets intended for prospective visitors and for

readers in foreign countries are published by the Ministry of Information and Culture. The pamphlets deal with industries social and political progress, communications, public works, forests, mineral deposits, cultural monuments, museums, agriculture, archaeology, and the status of women. Some scholarly journals and cultural magazines are also published in foreign languages.

FOREIGN GOVERNMENT INFORMATION PROGRAMS

The Ministry of Information and Culture screens all incoming foreign publications, except those distributed as gifts. Foreign information material utilized by the various communications media is closely checked for controversial comments.

USIS maintains a library in Kabul which is used by students, government workers and journalists. A daily *Wireless File Bulletin* and *Free World*, an illustrated monthly magazine in English, are distributed by USIS regularly to government officials educators, and to special groups. English courses are offered at the English Language Center. USIS also features photograph and art exhibits, and musical programs.

Film showings at the USIS Cultural Center Auditorium are held regularly for secondary school and university students, government officials, and the general public. Films supplied by the USIS are frequently presented at the palace to the King and the royal family. The films are also lent to various groups and to provincial governments. Films supplied by the USIS are shown by officials of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and members of the Peace Corps in various sections of the country. In 1965 approximately 200,000 persons attended the showing of USIS films.

Great Britain, France, and West Germany have active cultural programs. Daily programs in Dari and Pashto are beamed to the Middle East by the BBC. The BBC program in Dari is broadcast from 1615 to 1700 Greenwich Mean Time. Reading material from Great Britain is available through the British Information Services reading room and through the British Council (see Glossary). The Cercle Français offers language classes and has monthly showings of French feature films. West Germany's Goethe Institute sponsors cultural exchange programs and distributes educational materials through the West German Embassy in Kabul.

Information activities from the Arab countries aim at linking Afghanistan more closely with the Moslem-Arab world. Such information reaches the country mainly through broadcasts from Cairo and Baghdad. Arab informational activities were especially vigorous in the summer of 1967 in an attempt to solicit Afghan support for the Arabs in the Arab-Israeli War.

India, too, has been actively engaged in winning Afghan goodwill, notably through the Afghan-Indian Friendships Association founded in 1958. Many Afghans listen to Radio New Delhi and a number of sports and cultural delegations travel back and forth each year between the two countries.

The press and radio are vehicles for the dissemination of Pakistani information. Afghans listen to Radio Karachi and Radio Peshawar which broadcast to Afghans in Pashto, Dari, and English. Pakistani newspapers, including the *Khyber News*, have many readers in the eastern part of the country. The critical tone of Pakistani media in reply to Afghan charges regarding Pakistan's activities pertaining to the Pashtunistan issue have been considerably toned down since the late 1950's.

Communist Countries

The Soviet Union, Communist China, and the Communist countries of Eastern Europe are engaged in various types of information activities. Much information on government programs, economic and living conditions, and on activities in the visual and performing arts in Communist countries reaches the country through the implementation of cultural agreements which the country has signed with the Soviet Union, Communist China, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Albania. The exchange of visitors is frequently used to disseminate information about Communist-bloc countries. Commercial, political, and cultural delegations from these countries regularly visit Afghanistan, and the country's administrators, students, journalists, businessmen, and sport groups are encouraged to return these visits. In 1966 the country was visited by 23 delegations from the Soviet Union, 9 from Communist China and 3 from Eastern Europe.

In 1966 the Soviet Union and Communist China broadcast more than 88 hours per week in Dari, Pashto, Tajiki, and Uzbek. The large majority of the broadcasts originate in the Soviet Union. The Soviet broadcasts are popular with Afghan listeners because the transmission is good and because news and commentaries are interspersed with popular Afghan music.

The Soviet Embassy in Kabul distributes illustrated pamphlets dealing with economic, scientific, and educational progress in the Soviet Union. Some of the titles distributed in 1966 included *The Economics of the Soviet Union*, *Science and Technology in the Soviet Union*, *Education in the Soviet Union*, and *Soviet Sport Today*. Soviet-financed technical aid is shown in another pamphlet entitled *Friendship Construction Projects*. Most of this literature is printed in English although some is available in Dari. Works by classical Russian writers, educational books for children and young adults are mostly in English. Books sold in some Kabul shops or

distributed by the Soviet Embassy included short stories by Chekhov, *Nature's Dairy* by M. Prishvin and *How the Steel was Tempered* by N. Ostrovsky.

Films, exhibits, and art programs also play a part in the dissemination of Soviet information. Soviet films were shown in many commercial theaters and by the Soviet Embassy during the Soviet film festival held in February and June of 1966. In the same year an exhibit was held in Kabul on handicrafts of the Soviet Union, and on five occasions artists and athletes from Moscow displayed their talents in Kabul.

The content of Soviet information programs directed at the country has changed from a highly critical approach to a positive one. Afghan rulers are no longer described as a self-interested elite who keep the majority of the population in a state of poverty and ignorance. Instead, they are catered to, and the theme of Soviet-Afghan friendship is repeatedly emphasized. *The Agitators Notebook*, published for the use of Soviet military and civilian personnel, states, for example, that the friendship between Afghanistan and its neighbor to the north is rooted in the peace-loving foreign policies of the two countries. Other themes are the religious affinity between Afghan Moslems and Moslems in the Soviet republics, the wisdom shown by Afghanistan in following a course of nonalignment in foreign affairs and the help the Soviets have given the country's economy. In general however, the belligerence and intensity of Soviet information activities has decreased considerably since 1960.

Information activities of Communist China closely resemble those of the Soviet Union and other Communist countries. The Chinese Embassy distributes a news bulletin at irregular intervals. The weekly *Peking Review*, *China Reconstructs*, and the illustrated *New China Magazine* all are available, in English, through the embassy and through some bookshops. A large number of children's books are distributed as gifts. Attractively illustrated, printed in English, French, and in a number of Asian languages, these books are much in demand. Communist Chinese participation in the country's cultural, artistic, and sports events is less frequent than that of the Soviet Union although an acrobatic group from Communist China successfully performed in Kabul in August 1966. The Chinese Pavilion with extensive displays of consumer's goods has been among the most popular attractions of the annual Independence Day celebrations.

East European Communist countries are active in the dispatching of delegations, participation in cultural events, and in the showing of exhibits through their respective embassies in Kabul. In 1966 Yugoslavia presented a photographic, and Bulgaria an architectural, exhibition.

CHAPTER 18

POLITICAL VALUES AND ATTITUDES

Attitudes toward nationhood and government in 1967 varied according to urban-rural distinctions, geographical location, level of literacy and degree of exposure to or contact with governmental authorities. On the whole, literate urban residents and the people living in rural areas close to Kabul and other major cities were more aware of their nation-state and government than were those living in the remote communities where governmental activities were not fully known or understood.

Even in remote areas, however, the extent of national consciousness appeared to be gradually broadening, especially in places where the people benefited from developmental projects undertaken by the central government and its provincial counterparts. On the other hand, the traditional attitude of avoiding the tax collectors and the military draft officials continued to persist, although such resistance was diminishing.

The population tends to share a common set of values loosely linking various ethnic or tribal groups, since almost all Afghans profess the Islamic faith. They respect authority and conformity with the tribal customary code of conduct (see ch. 12, Religion; ch. 13, Social Values).

DETERMINANTS OF VALUES AND ATTITUDES

Islam and tribalism, each in its own way but reinforcing each other, prescribe the relationship of man to society in such detail that there is little room for individual variation. For the Moslems, respect for authority is basic to both their political and their social value systems (see ch. 12, Religion; ch. 13, Social Values).

Deference to authority means the duty of absolute submission to God (Allah in Arabic) who alone is considered to be the source of authority and law. Islam makes no clear-cut distinction between religious and political domains. Temporal rulers represent the authority and law of God as protectors of the faith and as executors of God's will. The traditional view of inseparability of religion and state has been moderated somewhat during the past century because of the emergence of the country as a distinct nation-state. Public attitudes toward wide-ranging issues, local or national, were

not determined in the mid-1960's by narrow religious considerations as much as by the growing awareness of the existence of an alternate, secular source of governmental authority. Nevertheless, in areas where government officials had not made their presence known, the villagers continued to seek practical guidance from the *mullahs* (Moslem religious leaders) with whom they had established close, personal relationships from childhood.

Tribal society, nomadic or settled, Pashtun or non-Pashtun, is largely communal and attaches highest priority to loyalty as the essential condition of belonging to a group. Tribesmen are expected to defer to the authority of the group as expressed through their *jirgah* (council of the elders) and to abide by the group's patterns of behavior. For the numerically dominant Pashtuns, family loyalty is an integral part of the customary code of conduct called the Pashtunwali which stresses, among other things, respect for leaders, honor, self-respect, integrity, bravery, and hospitality (see ch. 13, Social Values).

Since the nearly exclusive loyalty which the tribal system demands hinders the development of individual allegiance to the nation, the government has carried out during the past several decades a gradual policy of detribalization (see ch. 15, Political Dynamics).

ATTITUDES TOWARD NATIONHOOD

The concept of an Afghan nation is slowly gaining acceptance among the Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, and the many other ethnic and tribal groups that constitute the population. Nevertheless, the ordinary Afghan's loyalty to his family and his tribe or village is of far greater intensity and immediacy than to any concept of a nation. The valley, mountain, or plain where he lives or camps is his "country," and his immediate neighbors, most of whom are relatives, compose his "nation." A feeling of national identity exists for the most part only in attitudes toward foreigners.

Although members of each ethnic group and of many tribal groups are found in varying numbers outside Afghan borders, those within the country appear to accept their present status with no overt signs of dissatisfaction. Even the Hazaras, long discriminated against partly because they are Shiites and partly because of a series of defeats at the hands of the Pashtuns, regard Afghanistan as their only homeland. The urban Tajik may resent the dominance of Pashtuns in government, but he believes that he is better off in Afghanistan than he would be in another country.

Among the many diverse tribal groups a feeling of common identity and common interest is beginning to emerge, although the

pace of emergence is far slower than that hoped for by the government. The concept of equality before Allah and the absence of social discrimination—even that against the Hazaras is gradually lessening—help to foster a growing feeling of unity. The opening of isolated areas through road building and communication facilities has also done much to promote this trend, although the concept of citizenship and national consciousness has been slow to develop among the villagers. It has, however, taken much firmer root among the educated urban minority whose members are largely detribalized Pashtuns and non-tribal Tajiks.

ATTITUDES TOWARD THE GOVERNMENT

Few Afghans know much about their government. The tribesman's strong sense of independence and long and zealous defense of his freedom of action tend to make him distrustful. Many Afghans know the local policeman or the officials of the sub-districts, but because they are associated normally with conscription and tax collection, they are careful to keep contact with them to a minimum.

The government seeks to integrate all Afghans into the nation, regardless of ethnic group or tribal affiliation, and to develop loyalty to the nation as a whole. The King, popularly regarded as the symbol of national government and as the temporal head of the religious community, plays an important role in implementing this policy of integration. His face appears on the currency, and his name is uttered in mosque prayers. He makes goodwill tours throughout the country, receiving tribal chiefs in audience and accepting their pledges of loyalty. He maintains the martial character of the ideal tribal leader by always appearing in military uniform in public.

The citizenship law provides that all persons born in Afghanistan or of Afghan parents resident abroad, or anyone residing in Afghanistan who does not have unchallengeable documents certifying to foreign citizenship, is an Afghan citizen. By law each citizen must have an identity card giving his name, his father's name, and his place of residence. In the past the card included his ethnic affiliation; this practice was discontinued in the mid-1950's, and each individual has since been officially called Afghan. Persons of foreign birth who have served the Afghan Government for 5 years or who have rendered services to Afghan interests may become Afghan citizens without residence in the country. Difference in religion is no bar to citizenship.

Persons may be deprived of citizenship if they enter the military or civil service of a foreign state, if they publish information or propagandize against the national interests, if they do not fulfill

their public and financial obligations or if, after committing high treason, they flee the country.

NATIONAL SYMBOLS AND HOLIDAYS

The government uses symbols and holidays to build national loyalty and instill patriotic feelings toward the nation. The Afghan coat of arms and flag are designed to appeal to Islam, an important unifying force in the nation (see ch. 12, Religion). The coat of arms consists of a mosque showing a *mihrab* (prayer niche) and a *mimbar* (pulpit) with a banner on each side, and below the mosque is the date 1308 A.H. (A.D. 1929), which is the Afghan solar year in which Nadir Shah (1929-33) was enthroned. The whole is surrounded by a wreath of wheat ears symbolizing the election to the throne of Ahmad Shah Durani, the founder of Afghanistan, who was crowned with ears of wheat at Kandahar in 1747 (see ch. 3, Historical Setting).

The national flag has three vertical stripes of identical width, black at the hoist, red in the center and green at the fly. The coat of arms in white emblazons the center stripe. The black stands for the Pashtun tribes and their lands which Afghanistan lost when the eastern portion of the area was separated by the Durand Line (the present Afghanistan-Pakistan border); the red stands for the blood of patriots shed in the preservation of independence; and the green is symbolic of Paradise and sacred to Islam. The flag is flown on all public buildings. On holidays flags are massed along the line of march if there is a parade, on the front of public buildings, and around the playing field or the stadium when sports events take place.

Two interwoven cycles of holidays, based on the Moslem religious and the national Afghan solar calendar, respectively, are observed in the country. All celebrations are opened by prayers by one or more *mullahs*. The dates of holidays vary from year to year (see ch. 12, Religion).

One of the principal holidays is No Ruz (Persian, new day), the first day of the Afghan solar calendar year (March 21 by the Christian calendar). This is a secular holiday of ancient Iranian origin during which government offices and private firms are closed for one or more days, and sports events, carnivals and other special events are held. There is much visiting, and new clothes are worn.

The most important holiday is Independence Day (Salgre Jeshyn-i-Estiqal), May 28 observed as the anniversary of independence in 1919. The May 27 date commemorates the Afghan siege of the village of Tahl (in the Northwest Frontier Province of British India) in the course of the Third Anglo-Afghan War

(1919). This was the high water mark of the Afghan's campaign during the War and they consider it a victory. As a matter of convenience, however, the real celebration of independence takes place in the latter part of August, when the weather is more favorable. This celebration was highlighted by military parades, sports events, national dancing, and art exhibitions. It was also the occasion for the announcement of personal honors, promotions and amnesties.

Other holidays were the Birthday of the Prophet, June 19; Pashtunistan Day, September 1; Parliament Day, September 10, marking the anniversary of the opening of Parliament in 1930; and King Mohammad Zahir Shah's Birthday, October 14. In addition, October 15 was celebrated as Nejat-i-Vatan (Salvation of the Homeland) commemorating the victory of Nadir Shah over Bacha-i-Saqo in 1929. Friday is the weekly day of rest, marked by prayers and a sermon at the mosque (see ch. 12, Religion). Government offices and most business firms are closed.

SECTION III. ECONOMIC

CHAPTER 19

CHARACTER AND STRUCTURE OF THE ECONOMY

In 1967 the economy was still supported primarily by the traditional occupations of stockraising and farming which engaged between 75 and 85 percent of the estimated population of 16 million persons. Of these some 2 million were nomads whose livestock and their products constituted the largest single source of national income. Settled farmers mainly produced food grains, fruits, and vegetables.

Agriculture, including animal husbandry, furnished more than 75 percent of the country's exports and, besides providing raw materials for a rudimentary industry, supplied most of the basic food needs with the exception of wheat, sugar, and tea. Until 1957 domestic wheat production usually was sufficient to feed the population. Since then, growth of population along with rising incomes resulted in increased wheat shortages and continued demands for greater food imports, principally wheat, which is the main item of the national diet.

Ranking after agriculture and stockraising, trade and services were estimated to contribute the next largest share (8 percent) to national income. In the 1960's construction of new electric power, transportation and communications facilities had greatly expanded government services. Except for a few notable exceptions, mainly exports, trade remained unintegrated and largely local.

Since most internal trade involved exchanges between villagers and nomads, such as wheat for livestock and livestock products, commercial trade consisted largely of exports, imports of manufactured items and those consumer goods which the family could not produce itself. Bazaars served both as wholesale and retail exchange points. The paving of most of the road around the country which connected the major cities facilitated the transport of goods from production to consumption centers.

Handicraft industries continued to be more important than factory industry, employing an estimated 200,000 in comparison with only 30,000 in factory enterprises. In terms of available re-

sources, industrial potential considerably exceeded the ability to mobilize capital for development. Consumer goods industries predominated; modern plants were few, largely producing textiles and cement. Many smaller enterprises produced flour, sugar, vegetable oils, porcelain, footwear, glassware, and leather. Together with numerous handicraft industries, they supplied most of the country's household consumer requirements, handwoven carpets being a major export item. Factory industries have not yet produced for export, but they serve to decrease the country's dependence on certain imports.

The country is heavily dependent on imports of capital goods, on processed industrial raw materials and on most manufactured consumer goods. Such imports have risen sharply since 1956, the beginning of the successive Five-Year Plans. Exports have not kept pace, and Afghanistan, lacking sufficient financial resources, has required foreign aid and assistance in almost all aspects of its development. Manpower is adequate in quantity but lacks technical skills and expertise, forcing continued dependence on foreign administrators and technical assistants with the necessary attendant foreign loans and grants.

With an undiversified economy based on subsistence agriculture and stockraising and with little modern industry and an inefficient distributive system, Afghanistan's production practices and equipment have only slightly altered in centuries. Productivity is low. Although motor power has been introduced, bullocks are generally used to pull loads, but camels, horses, donkeys, and men are used to carry them. The potential for hydroelectric power is far greater than predictable demand and has been exploited sufficiently to supply the needs of Kabul and of the few modern plants already constructed between Kabul and the Hindu Kush.

Water, however, is the great factor limiting expansion of national production. Irrigation and agricultural improvement are among the most important problems of the economy. Mainly desert and mountain, only 3 percent of the total land area is cultivated; most of this is in the major riverine valleys of Kabul, Jalalabad, Herat, Kunduz, and the Helmand. Of the cultivated area about one-fourth is irrigated, but only half of the irrigated area receives water in any given year, primarily because of the unreliable nature of the water supply, largely snowmelt.

The livestock industry is also seriously affected by lack of water in the upland grazing areas which are considered to be one of the country's main natural resources. Constant grazing on the pastures where water is available has reduced their productive capacity. Afghanistan has the potential to bring additional land under irrigation by extending the existing canals, developing res-

ervoirs and building entirely new projects. Canal rehabilitation is underway on a small scale, and several large projects are in various stages of construction.

The country's facilities for marketing are just developing. Volume of credit has been small and sporadic, and the sphere of banking activities is very limited. A major problem that effectively curtails more rapid expansion of banking services is the serious shortage of qualified and experienced personnel. Some progress has been made however, to provide the physical facilities required for a better marketing system. Much has been done to build a primary road network and central grain storage facilities, but not enough for an efficient marketing system.

The progress of the economy is seriously hampered by social factors. Based on a tribal or extended kinship system, the structure of the society does not adapt itself to industrialization. In evaluating men, Afghans generally do not give much importance to occupational roles and, therefore, incentive is lacking for activity outside the old economic traditions. The lack of adequate technological training for staffing modern factories is part of the larger problem of education that affects all social and economic development. Also lacking are workers skilled in modern technology as well as teachers to train even a task force of technicians. The high incidence of illiteracy impedes the communication of new ideas to farmers, craftsmen or other workers. The government recognizes the need for social planning and investment and seeks to extend education to a greater part of the population. It would also like to weaken the traditional emphasis on the kin group as the individual's social and economic horizon. The government has so far approached these problems only in terms of policies and legislation that seek to weaken tribal traditions, but it has been cautious not to undo tradition so rapidly as to lead to an uprooted and disoriented society.

The government encourages private investment, but the amount of private ownership is difficult to assess. Through the Bank of Afghanistan (Da Afghanistan Bank) the government is a partner in all banks with the exception of the privately owned Afghan National Bank (Bank Melli). Through the banks the government has also invested in most joint-stock companies (*shirkats*). Throughout the country, however, there are many small businesses, including the independent artisans and traders in the towns and the bazaars. Since there has been no census of population or of business, their number and the size of their investment are difficult to determine. The government has concentrated its investment under its development plans on providing essential infrastructure, moving into the industrial sector, where necessary, to supplement inadequate local capital. The government com-

pletely controls the import and distribution of sugar, salt, motor vehicles, and petroleum products which it sells at low, fixed prices.

The foreign exchange position of the country was satisfactory until 1950. The modernization program initiated by the government in the 1930's did not involve foreign borrowing. Since World War II, however, capital improvements have been increasingly expensive. Despite foreign aid, principally from the United States and the Soviet Union, the importation of capital goods to serve the needs of economic development and the engagement of foreign technicians required to design and construct modern facilities have made Afghanistan a debtor country. The government is increasingly concerned over the financial position of the country. The cost of servicing foreign loans by Afghanistan during the Third Five-Year Plan (1967-71) is estimated almost three times the cost during the Second Plan (1962-67). To alleviate these pressures on the balance of payments, increases in foreign exchange earnings through exports and tourism are contemplated.

The Soviet Union, the United States, and West Germany are the country's principal sources of aid and loans but smaller contributions come from several other countries plus the United Nations. Soviet aid totals the equivalent of \$600 million, mainly for military assistance, roadbuilding, industrial and mining projects, agriculture, and water resources development. United States aid at the end of 1966 totaled about \$350 million for transportation, Helmand Valley development, education, and miscellaneous projects. The hydroelectric powerplant at the Mahipar Falls on the Kabul River, about 20 miles east of the capital, is the major project in West Germany's aid total amounting to the equivalent of \$64 million. Communist China joined the creditor nations for the first time in 1965 with announcement of a loan equivalent to \$28 million.

A total of 14 billion afghanis (see Glossary) was expended for development in the First Five-Year Social and Economic Development Plan (1956-61), mostly on transportation and communications. The Second Five-Year Plan (1962-67), which cost 25 billion afghanis (see Glossary), put greater emphasis on development of industry and agriculture but retained the major priority for transportation, communications and electric power. The Third Five-Year Plan (1967-71) for which 33 billion afghanis is budgeted envisages greater development in the economic and social spheres. Investment in agriculture, irrigation, and industries constitutes the largest portion of the Third Plan. Projects designed to increase agricultural production are given priority. Goals of the Third Plan combine increased production in agriculture and industry with expansion of education and training to meet the demands for technical, scientific, professional, and administrative personnel.

The shift in emphasis to agriculture in the Third Plan includes expanded research, extension and credit services, as well as continued stress on construction of multipurpose dams, on larger irrigation and network systems, and on similar irrigation projects.

CHAPTER 20

AGRICULTURE

In 1967 the economy, as it had been for centuries, was basically agricultural. Approximately 90 percent of the population of about 16 million were directly engaged in agriculture and from 15 to 20 percent were nomads who migrate seasonally with their livestock. Much of agricultural production directly serves subsistence requirements without being exchanged on the market. The country is not entirely self-sufficient in food; only a third of the sugar consumed is produced domestically, and wheat shortages have been perennial since 1957. On the other hand, Afghanistan has been for years an important supplier of fresh and dried fruit to Pakistan and India. Karakul skins continue to provide a large portion of the foreign exchange needed to finance imports.

Afghanistan needs to increase agricultural production and improve animal husbandry in order to raise the living standards of its people and to provide more exportable surpluses. It has the manpower for this task, but agricultural workers lack the technical knowledge and incentive necessary to increase productivity. The country is mountainous and arid, with only a few small areas of cultivable land, and it needs heavy investment in drainage and irrigation systems. Education of the population, introduction of new techniques and an improved marketing system are also needed for the farmer to receive better prices for his produce.

Hampered by a lack of basic data on the country's resources, a dearth of scientific and technical skills, and only a small stock of foreign exchange to meet the necessary expenditures on capital goods, the government has turned to outside sources for assistance. Techniques and funds have been supplied largely by the United Nations, the United States, the Soviet Union, and the Federal Republic of Germany.

Improvements have occurred in certain sectors of the agricultural economy, mostly north of the Hindu Kush where soils, climate, and crops were more conducive to development, and increased financial returns provided sufficient incentive for more efficient farming. On the whole, however, an illiterate population indifferently cultivating poor soils with poor techniques remains a major problem.

THE PEOPLE ON THE LAND

Most Afghans have a long tradition of nomadism and, even though many are now settled, the ideal way of life for most of them is with their herds and flocks, moving from one grazing ground to another, camping in the open with their tents and animals and carrying out their historic roles of trader and moneylender. Only about 2 million are fully nomadic, and many of these are concerned more with trade than with stockbreeding. Of the remainder, about 65 percent work the land, herd animals or both. Of these only the Tajiks are traditionally sedentary farmers. The Hazara people were presumably once nomadic but have been sedentary farmers for centuries.

Afghans engaged in agriculture usually live in villages that contain 2 to 400 families, who are often related. Usually a village is surrounded by fields and is located on ground that is too rocky or otherwise unfit for cultivation. Most of the villages are connected to one another only by trails, but a few are fortunate enough to lie along a road. Some settlements are known for a particular handicraft or agricultural product.

There are several ways in which the people combine agriculture and animal husbandry. Some nomads in the spring drive their flocks of sheep, goats, and cattle from their winter pasturage near the Pakistan border to higher grazing grounds in the Hazarajat for the summer. As a rule, they do not engage in any agriculture. There are also sedentary village farmers whose sole economic activity is farming and whose few animals are only for farm and family use. Other people both farm the land and engage in animal husbandry. Sometimes the flocks may be driven into the high mountains during the summer months and only return with the advent of the fall. By far the greatest number of families, however, cultivate the valley floors, where irrigation water is available, and send their flocks up into the hills every day driving them home every night.

Sedentary Farmers

Farmers consist of owners or part owners who farm their own or their clan's land, tenant farmers who for their labor receive a share of the produce, and hired laborers. A tenant gets one-fifth of the crop if he provides nothing but labor. If he also supplies implements his share is one-fourth, and if he has draft animals, he gets one-third. Contracts are generally on a yearly basis and either party has the right of cancellation. The decision as to which field the tenant cultivates rests with the landlord or his agent.

The tenant may have to move every year because he may be

switched by the landlord from field to field and from village to village. This may also divide members of the same family who may farm three different fields in three different villages. If the nearest village cannot accommodate the tenant, he may lose hours walking to and from the field. Above all, the system discourages a farmer from taking an interest in the development of any particular plot of land.

The government, through its agents, tried moving farmers as a means of weakening clan solidarity in cases where such solidarity presented political problems. Families were moved from villages where they had kinship ties to villages where they were strangers, and they were replaced by other families who were being similarly moved. This exchange of families was meant to break up the social cohesion of the village and to break down the tribal social systems. The practice failed when families deserted their new lands, and the government abandoned the exchange.

Due to the shortage of skilled labor the good tenant has relative freedom to look for the best landlord and the best land. Landlords compete for the most competent tenants, who in turn look for the landlord with the best land and the most water. Because of family prestige or because of relationship to the landowner, however, some incompetent tenants never lose their tenancy. Even though tenants are not tied to the landlord, their life is made insecure by the meagerness of their financial resources.

The low prices of agricultural produce frequently force the tenant and small farmer to obtain credit at high interest rates from the bazaar moneylenders or from landlords, nomads and merchants. These loans usually are for consumption goods, but rarely for technological improvements which would increase income. The number of hired laborers has greatly increased in the last decade; they are usually paid a share of the crop.

Sedentary Farmers Practicing Transhumance

In many areas, farming is combined with stockraising. Some villagers take the flocks in the spring from the valleys to higher pastures on the mountain plateaus, where the herdsmen live in tents or build temporary shelters of brush and rock. Such a summer encampment is known in Nuristan and the Hazarajat as an *ailoq*. In Nuristan only the men move with the flocks of sheep, goats, and cattle; the women and old men remain in the villages to cultivate the crops. Although they are primarily farmers, the Hazaras also have flocks of sheep, goats, and cattle. They live in a high, cold land which is marginal for agriculture. The growing season is short, and it is impossible for them to pasture their animals during the entire year on the mountains.

As a result of these conditions, there has developed a balance between bottom-land agriculture and stockraising dependent on the surrounding mountains. The herders bring the animals home each night and keep them under their roofs; because of the practice, the flocks can avail themselves of nearby mountain pasture for much of the year. These animals are the responsibility of the boys of the community. There is a division of labor established which enables all healthy members of the community to participate in the production of food.

Among the Durani Pashtun villages of southern Afghanistan, some members of each family leave their villages in the spring for 2½ months and drive their sheep goats, and cattle toward the nearest mountains. They return in June for the grain harvest.

Herdsmen Practicing Some Farming

The Kirghiz people of the Wakhan and the Chahar Aimaks of the western and northern slopes of the Koh-i-Baba Range are primarily nomadic herdsmen, although they live in villages in the winter. The Kirghiz herd flocks of sheep, goats, and yaks and raise horses and camels for transport. The Chahar Aimaks are primarily breeders of sheep and goats. In the spring before they leave for the high pastures, they usually plant a grain crop which they harvest upon their return with the flocks in the fall.

Nomadic Herdsmen

The annual migration of numerous tribal groups, occurring in the spring and fall and always using the same route, is characteristic of rural life both north and south of the Hindu Kush. Every year some 2.5 million people with all their belongings and their livestock move in search of pasture, water, work, or trade.

On the steppeland to the south of the Amu Darya River many families of the Salar, Sarak, Tekke, Goklan, and Yamut tribes of the Turkomans drive their sheep, horses, and camels from winter pasturage near the Amu Darya to summer pastures in the Band-i-Turkistan, the Firoz Koh, and the Paropamisus (see ch. 2, Physical Environment). In summer all of the various tribal groups travel together and keep the stock at the summer pastures until the stock begins to lose weight. The groups then disperse, and in the winter each sets up for itself. Oxen or donkeys hitched to wooden carts pull the yurt dwelling (round, felt tent) and household goods. Horses are used only for riding and packing.

In the east and south of the Hindu Kush numerous Pashtun groups winter their livestock in the lowlands and in the summer drive their animals to the high mountain plateaus in the interior

of Afghanistan. Although some of the Baluchi chiefs and clans of the Chakhansur area own villages, for the most part they accompany their camels, sheep, and goats from pasture to pasture.

Among the nomads in the east are the Zurgbas, who are dependent on goatherding for a livelihood. They live in the valleys of the Alingar and Alishang, east of Kabul, for 4 to 5 months in the winter. In the spring they ascend the valleys eastward to the region which separates the Panjshir River from Nuristan, where they pass the summer grazing their herds near the upper limits of the forest. They have no camels but use cattle and donkeys as beasts of burden. The Zurgbas buy cereals from the sedentary mountain villagers and sell milk products, animals and hair along their route march. Other nomads whose way of life is similar to the Zurgbas are found among the Khostwal and Junibi tribes of the Pashtuns around Gardez.

Taking part in the great spring migration from the east are the reapers, whose flocks usually include camels, cows, and donkeys, which they use for transport, some sheep and goats and—exceptional among nomads—chickens. The reapers leave the region of Jalalabad in May after the winter wheat harvest and along their 2-week march to the Kabul oasis stop and harvest for villages. They camp around the city of Kabul for about a month help harvest the winter crops and then disperse northward toward Charikar and Jabal us Siraj.

Some reapers own land either in the winter or summer villages, but most depend for a livelihood on their animals and their work. For reaping they receive one twentieth of the harvest as payment. Their payment is not fixed for other types of work, and they may receive straw or hay for the animals, stalks left in the fields or the wheat lost on the threshing floor. Families return each year to the same village, but they are free to choose the village where they want to work. Similar migratory reapers are to be found in other valleys of eastern Afghanistan.

The largest group of nomads are the Ghilzai Pashtuns, whose mode of life depends on breeding sheep and goats and who use camels as beasts of burden. They raise donkeys, cows, and chickens. Generally they possess no land, but when they do, it is as a sign of wealth. Cultivation is left to sedentary tenant farmers who receive one-fifth of the harvest. In winter they encamp in the lower part of the Jalalabad region and close to the frontier near Khost. In May they move on to their summer camps. They travel slowly on foot, going not more than 10 miles a day, because of the newborn sheep and goats. The summer camps are in the Panjshir Valley region, the higher regions to the south and south-east of Kabul, the region between Gardez and Ghazni, to the west

and south of Ghazni and finally in the Hazarajat. Summer pastures extend as far west in the Hazarajat as the environs of Daulat Yar in the upper reaches of the Hari Rud which is the limit of Hazara country and borders on the lands of the Chahar Aimaks.

The nomads encamp 2 or 3 months in the Hazarajat, and in the middle of August they begin to descend with their flocks to the Kabul and Logar valleys where they stay for 2 or 3 months. In October, November, and December, depending on the weather, they continue toward the east. Their winter grazing grounds are between 1,000 and 3,000 feet above sea level; in spring and autumn, near 6,500 feet; and in the summer, at more than 10,000 feet. Their economy is based essentially on their animals, which furnish milk, wool, hair, meat and manure. Milk, which is relatively abundant during 3 to 4 months, is chiefly processed as *ghee*, a semifluid butter made by melting, cooling and pouring off the more liquid portion. *Ghee* and dried milk are part of their food supply throughout the year. They either use or sell other products of their animals along their route march. Certain lineages of this group, notably the Ahmadzai, Nasir, and Dharoit, are more merchant than stockbreeder.

Other Ghilzai and Durani clans of the Pashtuns and some Baluchi groups, also herders of sheep, goats, and camels, are found in the winter in the environs of Kandahar and in the interior of the Registan Desert. The greater part of the Ghilzai Pashtuns start in the spring and move northeastwards toward Mukur and Ghazni; others pass into the valleys of the southern Hazarajat, which is also the summer destination of the Durani Pashtuns. The greater part of the Durani, however, travel by the valleys farther west toward the country of the Chahar Aimaks southeast of Herat into the Siah Kuh, Ghor and the neighboring mountains to the north. In the last generation these nomads have acquired some land, usually in the regions of Ghor. Even though they carry merchandise for barter purposes, they have not developed commercial activities as have the Ghilzai. The Baluchi move in areas to the west of the Durani Pashtuns, principally in the Chakhansur area and astride the Iranian frontier as far north as Herat.

There are only occasional conflicts between nomads and settled farmers and between various nomadic groups competing for water and grazing land. The government has claimed that movements of nomadic peoples through cultivated areas brought complaints of damage to crops and grazing lands, but observers who have traveled with the nomads report little friction between nomads and farmers. Each is dependent on the other—the nomads, for grain and the farmers, for supplementary meat and livestock products, for

the additional labor and transport nomads provide at planting and harvest time, and for the readily available cash that the nomads carry.

Most nomadic groups do not move extensively through cultivated areas, and, when they do, they pasture their flocks on lands agreed upon with farmers, usually on the fringes of the cultivated area. Violations undoubtedly occur but are generally settled through payment by the nomad to the offended farmer.

Competition among nomads for grazing land occurs but not on a broad scale. The most recent serious case was in 1956 when some Ghilzai nomads encroached on Hazara pasturage, and the issue came to full-scale tribal warfare, settled only after the government dispatched troops to the scene. Generally, the boundaries of tribal grazing territory have been clearly established after centuries of use, and their ownership is as precisely defined as the arable fields in settled agricultural communities.

FACTORS AFFECTING LAND USE

The way land is used depends on altitude, type of soil, water supply, and landownership patterns. Of a land area estimated at approximately 250,000 square miles, 28 million acres (or 3 percent) are calculated to be arable. The greater part of the land is either arid or semiarid, with extremely rugged terrain, ranging from the glacierecapped peaks of the Hindu Kush in the northeast to the swamp and desert lands of the south. It is estimated that 20 million acres are used for crop cultivation and 8 million acres for pasture. Of the cultivated acreage, about half is equipped with irrigation facilities. Three-fourths of the arable land lies north of the Hindu Kush. Very little of the land surface is covered with forest, which is concentrated on the eastern mountain slopes.

Altitude

The height of land from sea level determines both the crop season and water supply. Elevations over 7,800 feet have a winter of 7 to 9 months' duration. The short growing season permits the planting and harvesting of only one crop of limited variety. The Hazarajat, Wakhan, a considerable part of Badakhshan, and Nuristan are in this category. In the remainder of the country, at lower altitudes, at least two crops a year can be grown on arable soil, if sufficient water is available.

Soil

Soils vary from fertile, rich loams to highly alkaline and saline clays and sands. The heavy loams are characteristic of the river

valleys. The dark-colored loam of the Jalalabad and Kunar areas form a special group. In the foothills and on the mountain plateaus, soil varies from medium-dark to grey and lends itself to intensive cultivation under irrigation. In the northern steppes the soil is poor but cultivable without artificial irrigation where rainfall is sufficient. In the deserts of the south and west much of the soil is clay, sand and rubble and cannot be cultivated without expensive, long-term reclamation.

Water Supply

Rainfall, an estimated annual average of 11 inches, is low. Afghanistan is largely dependent on snowmelt for its water supply. Thus, mountain areas above 4,000 feet which have snow part of the year are cultivable where soil structure permits. Most of the snowmelt is carried to lower altitudes by the rivers which drain north and south from the high watershed of the Hindu Kush, and west and south from the peaks of the Koh-i-Baba in the Hazarajat. At Jalalabad, Kunduz, Balkh, Maimana, Andkhui, Pul-i-Khumri, and Herat and along the Helmand and Arghandab valleys, river-fed canals greatly increase the acreage irrigated with river water. The amount of snow and hence the amount of flow depends on conditions in the high mountains. In a year of little snow the entire country is effected.

Maximum flow from snow extends from February to May. Steep gradients and deforestation cause much of the water to rush down in torrents, instead of being retained and passed on gradually. In order to make use of the water when it is available, various types of irrigation systems have been devised in all the inhabited areas. Some of these are great antiquity.

In the high mountains, especially in Nuristan and the Hazarajat, an intricate system of small, open irrigation channels carries water to every foot of soil in the high terraces. Many stone and brick diversion and storage dams have been constructed to supplement the absence of rainfall in the summer months. At lower altitudes the drainage systems of the Helmand, the Amu Darya, the Kabul, and the Hari Rud supply water to the canals and *juis* (irrigation ditches), carrying water for miles beyond the river stream bed. These channels are usually narrow, winding ditches laboriously built by hand; sometimes three or four are parallel to each other. Dams are built by piling up sacks filled with stone, dirt, and brushwood. Where bypassing the dam site with diversion tunnels is not yet practiced, dams must be rebuilt every year during the low-water season. Although the dams raise the stream level and divert water into lateral canals, water is not stored during the spring floods, except in the mountains where brick

reservoirs have been built. Considerable amounts of water are lost from open, unlined *juis* because of evaporation and seepage.

Major oases under irrigation from *juis* fed by river water are at Jalalabad, Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, on large tracts of land from Balkh to Mazar-i-Sharif, along the Kunduz River, and near Pul-i-Khumri.

In several parts of the country wells are used for irrigation through the employment of Persian wheels. These are precision-carved wooden angle gears which transmit to the bucket-chain of a well the rotating power of an ox or camel constantly moving in a small circle.

In the particularly dry regions south of the Hindu Kush, in broad valleys surrounded by foothills, from Ghazni to Farah and including the Chakhansur, wide use is made of the *karez* (underground tunnel). Miles of these *karez* have been bored through the plains. Walls are dug in a straight line down a gentle slope and then connected by tunnels; this results in a steady stream of water channeled to the fields. Because the *karez* are unlined, much water is lost by seepage. The Andar clan of the Ghilzai Pashtuns is particularly noted for construction and repair of these channels.

Landownership

There is no cadastral survey; information on landownership is based on a few isolated observations and more or less informed guesses. In theory, and from the standpoint of government administration, ownership of land is governed by Islamic *shariat* law, which covers all aspects of human conduct and which is modified locally in some rural areas by *adat* (customary law). Under *shariat*, there are four kinds of landownership: private ownership (*melk*); joint ownership (*khalisah*) by lineage, tribe, or residents of a village by reason of kinship or residence; public lands (*miri khali*); and lands held by a religious trust (*waqf*). *Adat* law may introduce modifications in use, rights, or condition of alienation.

Melk property includes all rights of private landownership, and the owner has full rights of disposal by sale, gift, or inheritance. Equal inheritance among brothers required by Islamic law leads to fragmentation of property into successively smaller plots. Privately owned land in urban centers is *melk* property as are the lands of Tajik villages, the terraced fields of Nuristan and some riverine lands which have been cultivated for many centuries by sedentary farmers. Sections of government-owned land, which have either been sold to private owners or given to retired military or civil servants as pensions, are also *melk* property.

Half the cultivated land is estimated to be privately owned in small holdings of 5 to 50 acres. Large holdings occur in long-cultivated riverine lands, such as those lands in Chakhansur province and in the valleys of the Helmand and the Arghandab rivers. There are some absentee landlords, but most landowning Afghans either cultivate or supervise the cultivation of their lands. The absentee landlords are likely to be government officials or merchants.

Khalisah property may be cultivated fields or grazing grounds acquired through customary use, conquest or treaty. This form of landownership allows the individual family head share rights to use of the land possessed by the clan or tribe; the individual does not have ownership rights to any particular plot of the area but only a right to share in its use. Where *khalisah* ownership pertains, the tribal or clan *jirgah* (council) periodically divides the lands among the members of the group or village residents in accordance with the number of shares owned by each family head. The lands of the Turkomans and of the Uzbek clans north of the Hindu Kush, of the Chahar Aimaks and of the Pashtun tribes of the Safed Koh mountains south of Jalalabad are likely to be *khalisah* property.

Tribal lands which were acquired by conquest or treaty and in which sedentary villagers were already cultivating the fields became "captive" villages and were required either to pay tribute to the conquering tribe or to reserve all produce for its use. Such tribute has become rent paid in kind to either the tribe or the lineage of the khans of the tribe. Such is the background of landholding in the Shamalan strip along the Helmand, 100 miles southwest of Kandahar, and villages owned by the Baluchi in Chakhansur province.

In certain regions tribal lands and flocks have become the property of the tribal chief, and members of the tribe have become tenant farmers on his lands and shepherds of his flocks. Their relationship with their tribal chief has been changed from one of kinship to one of occupation, a change that strikes at the tribal orientation of the society. Although the land continues to be partitioned among the farmers and their respective harvests apportioned on the basis of a share for work animals and a share for labor, the chief has the advantage because he supplies everything but labor.

Under *shariat* law all land which is not used for cultivation or is not usable, such as desert and forest, is *miri khali* land and belongs to the state domain. This includes the Registan and Dasht-i-Margo deserts containing the Helmand Valley, the Lut Desert in the west and some lands north of the Hindu Kush. Although

shariat law also provides for property to be held in the form of a religious trust (*waqf*), as in other Islamic countries, the amount of land so held in Afghanistan is negligible.

Among the eastern Hazaras there are two kinds of landownership. There is private ownership of land by a single individual of either sex or by brothers, which is documented in the provincial or district capital, and there is village ownership of the grazing lands on the immediately adjacent hills. For grazing purposes a village may exploit the grass and any springs that exist in the area, extending from the upper limit of irrigated cultivation to the crest of the mountain and extending along the valley to the limit of village ownership. This area can also be exploited exclusively by the village in terms of whatever useful products grow wild there, such as brush for fires, plants for fodder and edible plants. Hunters, however, many range along the entire mountain area and pay no attention to village land exploitation boundaries.

In an arid country like Afghanistan, water ownership is as important as landownership and follows the same pattern. It is also governed by *shariat* law. A family, a tribe or a group of families who invest in digging a well, ditch, or a *karez*, own the water and have exclusive rights to use or sell it. When water rights are concentrated in the hands of one owner, others in the village are naturally dependent on this owner. When water rights are owned by several families, water must be made available to all of them in common.

Since the work is exacting and dangerous, *karez* are dug by professionals; the most notable are the Andar Kheyl of the Ghilzai confederation. Wells also may be dug by professionals, but irrigation ditches are usually dug by community action. All participating families have rights to the water. In most agricultural areas where the population is numerous, it is usual to have a full-time manager (*mir-ab*). The *mir-ab* allocates the water, chooses the time for the annual repair of ditches and sees to it that all participating families do their proper share of the upkeep. In the Hazarajat, where the population is sparse, the *mir-ab* is not found.

FARMING

Major field crops, cultivated intensively or extensively, depending on the water supply, are wheat, barley, corn, rice, cotton, sugar beet, and sugarcane. Truck gardens, cultivated orchards, and vineyards yield an important harvest of fruit and nuts.

Insects and diseases are estimated to cause 10 to 30 percent of damage to certain crops in some years. Severe damage may be done to susceptible wheats by rust. Smut may occur, but losses seldom exceed 5 percent. Army worms and cutworms sometimes do con-

siderable damage to grass, grain, sugar beets, and other crops. In the wheatgrowing area around Maimana, sen bug infestations have been reported. The bug attacks the green wheat kernel, reducing the quality and the yield of the grain. Locusts (grasshoppers) are sporadic. Birds and rodents cause extensive but generally local loss.

Crops

Of field crops, it is estimated that almost 90 percent of the arable land is planted with cereals. Wheat, barley, rice, and corn are the most important. Wheat is planted to altitudes of 11,000 feet, and barley to 13,000 feet. Although these crops usually are grown under irrigation, they are also dry-farmed. Production per acre varies, from the abundant harvests of Herat to the areas above 8,500 feet, where only one crop of wheat or barley can be grown. In the high mountains barley is used for bread, as well as for animal feed. Total annual production is difficult to estimate since much of the grain is consumed by the producers or in the area where it is grown. Wheat is by far the more important and is generally considered to be in the neighborhood of 2 million metric tons. Barley production is estimated at 378,000 metric tons.

Other cereal crops are highly localized. Corn is grown in the eastern valleys bordering Pakistan. Wheat and barley are also grown in Nuristan, but corn is the staple crop there. Since rice requires abundant water, it is cultivated only where there is plenty. Thus Khanabad on the Kunduz River, Jalalabad on the Kabul, the Laghman Valley north of Jalalabad, the area along the Hari Rud in Herat province, and certain parts of the Helmand Valley are the rice-producing areas.

Cotton, both short and long staple, is produced under irrigation primarily in the well-watered areas north of the Hindu Kush from Kunduz to Herat. The districts of Balkh, Kunduz and Haibak, 25 miles southwest of Kunduz, are the major producing centers. Cotton is also cultivated south of the Hindu Kush in the district of Charikar, Laghman, and in the environs of Kandahar. Raw cotton is one of the major cash crops.

Because of the importance of cotton as an export commodity and as a source of raw materials for industry, the government has tried to get farmers to produce more cotton for relatively low prices through a compulsory acreage allotment program supervised by the field extension staff of the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation. The program, however, has been relatively ineffective. The annual average growth rate of 10.9 percent in cotton production between 1957 and 1967 was the result of improved cultural practices as farmers responded to a 25-percent price increase. In 1963-

64, cotton production reached a peak of 110,000 metric tons (compared to 60,000 in 1955-56), mostly from increased yield. As the price incentive for raising cotton disappeared because of a general price rise of other agricultural products, cotton production fell to about 70,000 metric tons a year in 1967.

Sugar beets, another cash crop are produced largely in Kunduz and Baghlan provinces for sale to the sugar refinery at Baghlan. As in the case of cotton, government policy has been a prime determinant of the level of production. Between 1962 and 1967, production averaged 55,000 metric tons annually. Sugarcane is processed and consumed locally in the form of crude sugar, known as *gur*.

Legumes, such as beans, peas, and lentils and forage crops, such as alfalfa and clover, are important in the crop rotation system and are widely grown in the irrigated areas. A high percentage of acreage in Herat and land under 8,500 feet in the mountain districts of Badakhshan, Nuristan, the Hazarajat, and Ghazni is planted in peas, beans, and lentils as a winter crop. These are the principal foods of the mountain people. The cultivation of alfalfa is restricted to areas where water is plentiful. It lasts 8 to 9 years and yields four to six cuts a year. Since clover does not require as much water, it is grown all over the country.

Truck gardening plays an important role in Afghan agriculture. Melons, watermelons pumpkins, squash, and cucumbers are grown in profusion in all areas of irrigated cultivation under 2,000 feet and are a major item in the diet of both the rural and urban population. Vegetables grown are carrots, turnips, radishes, eggplant, spinach, lettuce, onions, and garlic. The gardens of Kabul, Herat, Kandahar, Jalalabad Mazar-i-Sharif, Tashkurghan, and Haibak are especially noted. Melons, carrots, eggplant, spinach, and lettuce are grown throughout the country and are favorite foods. The carrot is usually raw and grated as an ingredient of pilau. Eggplant is usually cooked with meat, rice, and sour milk. The potato and tomato are grown in Mazar-i-Sharif, Kabul and Herat.

A number of plants are cultivated for oil which is used for lighting, cooking, and for medicinal purposes. These are rape, sesame, hemp, and poppy. Of these, rape is the most widely grown up to altitudes of 10,000 feet. The major areas of cultivation are Nuristan and in the mountains of the eastern provinces where it is used as an illuminating oil rather than as a food. The area of sesame cultivation is at levels not above 7,000 feet. Wild hemp grows in Nuristan, in southeastern Afghanistan and in eastern Afghanistan, especially along the Kunar River. It is widely cultivated, usually for *nasha* (hashish). The chief poppy-growing districts are in northern Afghanistan. Afghan poppies are of both the white and red varieties. The opium content is said to be very high.

Fruit and nuts are Afghanistan's major exports to Pakistan and India. Fruit trees grow throughout Afghanistan at altitudes under 8 000 feet where there is sufficient water. The principal districts are Herat, Kandahar, Mazir-i-Sharif, Kabul, Kalat (east of Herat), Khanabad, Faizabad, Jalalabad, and near Haibak. Fruits and nuts are so plentiful in Nuristan that it is customary for everyone to help himself regardless of ownership of the orchards. As with other crops, there is considerable localization in the kinds of trees grown. The mulberry and walnut are characteristic of the high mountain regions where the mulberry replaces wheat. Especially in Kohistan, south of Pul-i-Khumri, dried and ground mulberries are used for bread. Mulberry leaves are also used as food for silkworms. Sericulture has been long established in northern Afghanistan.

Carefully tended orchards in Haibak, Herat, Mazir-i-Sharif and Faizabad are filled with apricot, peach, pear, almond, walnut, apple, quince, and pomegranate trees. Plums are a major crop in Kabul and Kandahar, and cherries in Kabul and Herat. Kandahar and the adjacent Arghandab Valley constitute a noted center for unusually large and fine quality pomegranates, which are an important export products. In these oases figs are also cultivated in large quantities. Jalalabad, Laghman, and the lower Kunar are sufficiently subtropical for the production of lemons oranges, and date palm. Date palms are also found in the extreme south and dates are a major crop in Chakhansur province.

Major vineyards are near Herat, Maimana, Mazar-i-Sharif, Balkh, Kandahar, and the Koh-i-Daman (north of Kabul). Small vineyards are found throughout Nuristan, near Faizabad, in Farah, and in Shindand, north of Farah. Many types of grapes are grown both for eating fresh and for drying to produce raisins. They vary from black to white and from a small, sweet seedless type to one which is over an inch long. The *abjush*, a dried grape produced in Kandahar, is a special favorite.

Practices

Farming techniques are as old as the country itself. Some are particularly suited to the kind of land under cultivation; on the whole however methods of cultivation are primitive, and the crude implements used are hand tools or are animal drawn. The irrigated plots are generally too small to accommodate mechanized equipment. Farm labor productivity is relatively low because of the small amount of capital input used in the agricultural sector. Use of chemical fertilizers is just beginning.

The low productivity is compounded by the practice of assigning a tenant to a succession of different plots from one year to the

next, plots which may even be located in the fields of different villages.

Intensive farming is characteristic of the terraced fields of Nuristan, Badakhshan, the Hazarajat and the river valley, where the control and use of underground and surface water is an ancient skill. Where there is enough water, except at high altitudes, there are two growing seasons—from late fall to early summer (the winter crops) and from spring to autumn (the summer crops). Winter crops are usually wheat, barley, lentils, beans, peas, and melons; summer crops are rice, cotton, and fruits. In semiarid areas, where irregular water supply is a bar to intensive cultivation, the usual crop is wheat, which is grown only every 2 or 3 years in an effort to maintain the level of fertility. Fertilizers are usually lacking, manure is burned for fuel, and crop rotation is unknown; the only way to replenish the soil is to let it lie fallow.

Because the rainfall is heavily concentrated in a few months, many of the soils have hard surfaces and break into large, hard clods. Most ploughs are of two types: the one-piece nail plough and the slide plough, in which the handle, the implement, and the beam are separate. Slide ploughs are steadier and make ploughing easier. The nail ploughs are used chiefly in heavy soils and in northern Afghanistan, and slide ploughs are used on lighter soils and are generally found in the center and the south of the country. The *mala*, or smoothing board, is used to smooth roughly ploughed fields and as a toothed board for raking. Seeds are usually broadcast on flat ground and not cultivated once the seedlings come through. Weeds are pulled by hand or cut with a sickle. Harvesting is done with hand sickles and cradle scythes. In areas of intensive cultivation many elaborate implements have been developed for the repairing of irrigation ditches and for preparing the fields for irrigation. A number of types of hand shovels were used for cleaning the network of ditches and for the distribution of water. Some types of shovels used in irrigation work are drawn by oxen.

Harvested grain is piled in circular piles and is trodden out by yoked cattle in circular marches around the piles. The cattle may also pull either rollers or drags of faggots. The grain is separated by tossing the tramped mixture and allowing the wind to blow away the chaff. Grain is cleaned in sieves and trays. Wheat and barley are ground in water mills with a horizontal wheel. Rice is hulled in water-crushing mills or by means of a foot pestle.

Cotton yields have been boosted by seed improvement and the successful demonstration of the use of the long-handled hoe. Seeding in ridges or rows rather than broadcasting the seed has added to the increase in yield. The cultivation of sugar beets and the production of sugar started in the Kunduz-Baghlan area in 1940. Al-

though modern methods of cultivation and new seed varieties have been successfully introduced, production has not yet shown the increase demonstrated by the cotton farmers.

STOCKRAISING

Stockraising is a traditional occupation and is carried out in most parts of the country. It is a major source of income to the economy. The livestock population includes both the single-humped dromedary and the two-humped Bactrian camels, horses, mules, donkeys, cattle, goats, fat-tailed and karakul sheep, and yaks. In 1967 numbers were estimated as 14.4 million ordinary sheep, 5.7 million karakul sheep, 3.6 million cattle, 3.1 million goats, 1.2 million donkeys, 300,000 horses, 300,000 camels, and 5.5 million chickens.

Livestock and Livestock Products

Breeding of certain types of animals depends on altitude, availability of water and pasturage, and custom. The yak, the all-purpose animal of the Wakhan, where it is bred by the Kirghiz for meat, hair, milk products, and transport, is not found in other parts of the country. The Bactrian camel is found only north of the Hindu Kush, except among caravans to Kabul during the winter. The dromedary, which is used in summer for heavy and long-haul transport in all parts of the country other than Wakhan and Nuristan, is usually owned and bred by Pashtun nomads who spend the winter south of the Hindu Kush and by the Baluchi tribes. Horses and pack ponies are bred especially north of the Hindu Kush and are used for riding and transport almost everywhere except in Nuristan, where the trails are too narrow and risky for horses or camels. Mules used in the north for cartage, are bred by the Turkomans and the Uzbeks; donkeys are bred and used for light, short-haul transport everywhere.

At least a few cattle are found in almost every village since oxen are the usual plough animals. Most cattle are small and are usually used as work animals or are bred for hides and meat rather than for milk production. Cattle in Jalalabad are usually a humped type. The black cattle of the Hazarajat and the red cattle of Nuristan sometimes exhibit the hump. A particular type called "Kunar," which is especially hardy and a good milk producer, has been developed to the east of Mazar-i-Sharif.

Both ordinary and karakul sheep are primary sources of meat and also supply wool and pelts for domestic processing and export. Goats are important sources of meat and milk. Because of the precarious weather in Afghanistan, both in the wide range of annual

precipitation and in the severity of winters, sheep numbers fluctuate widely from year to year. The sheep are raised primarily on natural public grazing lands located in the lower elevations of the mountains. North of the Hindu Kush, karakul sheep are bred by the Turkomans in the Andkhui and Maimana areas, where the usual fat-tailed breed does not flourish.

Poultry are raised everywhere and geese, ducks, pigeons, quail, partridge, pheasants, and songbirds are bred in the urban oases.

Livestock products are an important source of food and clothing and also provide income through the sale of meat, hides, wool, and pelts. Nearly all the *ghee* sold on the Kabul market comes from the Hazarajat, and that sold in Jalalabad and the Panjshir Valley, northeast of Charikar, comes from Nuristan. Surplus cattle, sheep, and goats driven from the Hazarajat in the autumn are an important source of meat for the Kabul market, which is supplied by a refrigerated abattoir.

Wool is delivered to the local bazaars, to the Kabul and Kandahar mills, and is exported. Since much of the wool crop is used locally for clothing, rugs, coverlets, animal harnesses, and saddlebags, total production is difficult to estimate. Over 1,000 metric tons were exported in 1966, mostly to the Soviet Union. Hides are locally used for clothing, and they are sold in the bazaars of major towns for making shoes and sandals and in Ghazni and Mazar-i-Sharif for leather coats, jackets, and vests. Over a million hides and skins were exported in 1966. Karakul pelts, as a very valuable Afghan export, are especially important livestock products. Annual production between 1955 and 1965 is estimated at 2 million to 2.5 million pelts.

Techniques

The practice of animal husbandry is dependent on water and pasturage. Hand-dug wells, some of great antiquity, are universally used to provide drinking water for animals where streams are absent or the flow inadequate or seasonal. Sometimes, as in the northern provinces these wells are several feet deep. In some places water for herds and flocks is stored in deep brick tanks, built in natural depressions and fed by underground springs. All sources of water are affected by snowmelt conditions so that in periods of drought or harsh winter, flocks and herds suffer heavy losses.

Brick-lined wells and reservoirs are said to have been built many centuries ago by *khans* and *amirs* as "good works." Those in Herat and its outskirts, for instance, were built by Shah Rukh and his queen, Gauhar Shad, and by Sultan Husayn Baikara; one at Kunduz, by an Uzbek *khan*; several in Ghor east of Herat by the Ghorid sultans. An ancient canal and reservoir system around

Andkhui was built by a Turkoman tribe which subsequently emigrated elsewhere. Except for individual household use, wells are now drilled only by the government; this applies to the northern pastures of the Turkomans as well as to municipalities and to villages. Maintenance of wells, reservoirs, ditches, and canals other than those privately owned by individuals or tribal groups, seems to present a grave problem in maintaining government-built irrigation systems. It is probable that, like the roads, such installations traditionally were maintained by the local governor through levies called up by him from the villages or the tribal groups using the water.

Pasture usually consists of natural vegetation, and very little pastureland is irrigated. Grazing grounds are not fenced, and livestock require constant watching. Particularly in the north, shepherds and nomads have huge dogs, similar to the Tibetan mastiff, which guard the flocks as well as yurts and villages. The dogs, greatly prized by their owners, are ferocious and are a constant danger to the casual traveler as well as the brigand. Only where water is plentiful are fodder crops grown. In Nuristan and the Hazarajat animal husbandry is linked with settled agriculture. Most large flocks, however, are owned by nomads. Spot surveys of livestock begun by Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) experts in 1950 have disclosed that most animals suffer from disease, internal and external parasites and lack of winter feed.

With FAO assistance veterinary services have been developed for the production of vaccines, the diagnosis and treatment of animal diseases, and the training of Afghans to carry out field campaigns against major epidemic diseases such as rinderpest, fowl cholera, sheep pox, and blackleg. By the 1960's rinderpest had been eliminated from the country by the use of vaccines produced at the Bini Hisser Laboratory in Kabul and a continuing campaign of vaccination aimed at preventing reintroduction. It was also claimed that animal tuberculosis and parasitic diseases had been eradicated. Dipping centers had been established for the control of external parasites of sheep. In order to improve wool quality, FAO in 1954 supplied a flock of Merino sheep for breeding purposes. Mechanical shearing machines were also imported, and shearing centers were established in various parts of the country.

Particular attention has been paid to karakul sheep. About 88 percent of the skins are marketed as "Persian lamb" and the rest are sold as "broadtail" (prematurely born). No attempt is made to produce artificial abortion by killing the ewe or by inducing miscarriage by salt or exercise. Only when old pregnant ewes are sold as mutton is the ewe killed and the lamb removed prior to the sale of the carcass.

Flocks of 25 sheep are not uncommon, but many flocks exceed 1,000. Lambing occurs on the steppe region at 1,000 to 3,000 feet above sea level. Shepherds usually are experts in fur evaluation. Most lambs are killed for fur before they are 24 hours old, and usually only ram lambs are pelted. Some are allowed to develop for 2 or 3 days. All but very poor quality ewe lambs are kept for breeding. The percentage of lambs killed depends on the relation of pelt prices to meat prices. Lambing percentages range from 50 to 80 percent depending on feed conditions. On an average, 4 out of 5 years are good feed years. Spring and summer range conditions are invariably good. By the end of August flocks are moved out of the higher pastures where heavy snows are common as early as the middle of September. Karakul pelt production is dependent on the survival of the sheep during the winter, disease control and available stock feed.

Overgrazing and the shortage of supplementary feeds, such as wheat, barley, straw, and the waste products of sugar and cotton gins contributed in recent years to a reduction in the size of the flocks and quality of the skins. Herds have had to travel 100 miles a year between the high grasslands and the overgrazed desert ranges receiving only 6 inches of rain a year. Trying to take advantage of the price differential between the meat of the fully grown sheep and the pelt of the young lamb, breeders have overstocked grazing areas whenever the fluctuating pelt price was not attractive enough.

With the help of FAO experts progress has been made in improving quality. Animal pest control has been underway since 1951, and the health of the flocks has been improved. At the same time supplementary feeding in feeding lots and supply of winter feeds helped soften the impact of winter weather. A breeding program for the production of high-quality rams for distribution to flock owners has been initiated. In addition, the government has attempted to set minimum prices for owners who had previously been at the mercy of large trading companies. Range management problems have received increased attention from both government and tribal leaders. A hydrological survey to determine the availability of ground water in the karakul range areas has been completed. Plans are being made to balance dry farming of wheat with sheep rearing.

FORESTRY AND FISHING

Forests are confined to a belt lying between an altitude of 4,000 and 12,000 feet on the eastern slopes of the Hindu Kush and the Safed Koh, in Nuristan and in Paktia province. Other trees are found in locations favorable from the standpoint of water. Wild fruit and nut trees are important in providing not only food but

also income to the inhabitants of the areas where they are found. Nuts from the wild pistachio are an important item of food and trade to the people of Mazar-i-Sharif, Kunduz, Badakhshan and Herat, and pine nuts are important to the people of Nuristan and of Khost southeast of Gardez.

The peoples of Nuristan are particularly noted for household utensils and furniture, which they make of wood and sell to itinerant merchants. They also make torches of pine branches for illumination. Other forest products from Nuristan and the eastern mountains are timber, firewood, resin, asafetida, rhubarb, mushrooms, manna, and medicinal herbs. Ash, mulberry, plane, poplar, and willow trees are cultivated for their wood and shade wherever there is sufficient water. Wherever trees are found, whether wild or cultivated, an important product is charcoal, which is used as a cooking fuel and for heating braziers in winter.

Fish are plentiful in mountain streams, rivers and in those lakes which are not brackish. They are caught and eaten locally along the Amu Darya, in Nuristan, the Hazarajat, and in Chakhansur province. Nets are usually used, although in the high mountains, damming the stream bed in another method. In general, however, Afghans do not appear to be partial to fish, and no commercial fishing has been developed.

RURAL FINANCE AND CREDIT

A large proportion of the farmers cannot manage from one harvest to another without borrowing. Credit is necessary not only for seed, animals, and implements but frequently for subsistence and to meet social and religious expenses. Customarily, credit is obtainable only from moneylenders, landlords, and merchants at exorbitant rates of interest, which run as high as 33 percent. To remedy some of these evils the government in 1954 established the Agricultural and Cottage Industry Bank (Bank Zerati), which charged half of the bazaar rates on its credits to farmers. In 1967 the bank was, and had been for some time, operating on a very low level of effectiveness. Its volume of credit has been small and sporadic, and its loan experience has been less than satisfactory. Plans called for the bank's rehabilitation by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD).

Other loan and credit facilities are available to certain rural producers. The Baghlan Sugar Refinery makes advance payments to sugar beet producers. The Cotton Company also makes advance payments and, in addition, grants loans to cotton farmers.

GOVERNMENT FARM POLICY

Recognizing the preponderant position of agriculture and animal husbandry in the economy, the government has placed special stress

in its development plans on the expansion and modernization of farming and stockbreeding. In an arid zone such as Afghanistan, extension of new land under cultivation and intensification of agriculture through expansion of irrigation are considered by the government to be fundamental to raising the standard of living of the settled farmer and providing an opportunity for nomads to adapt themselves to sedentary farm life.

Since 1939 the government has been engaged in extensive land reclamation and irrigation projects. The earliest, and by far the most successful, were those carried out in the northern provinces between Balkh, Tashkurghan and Haibak and along the Kunduz River near Khanabad. The second most important project and the most ambitious is the development of the Helmand Valley. Since 1946 the government has concentrated a large part of annual expenditure on the valley for purposes of irrigation flood control, hydroelectric power and resettlement of nomads and landless farmers.

The Helmand Valley covers an area of about 1,800 square miles with approximately 880,000 technically irrigable areas. The principal stream through the basin is the Helmand with its tributary, the Arghandab. Although quantitatively the most important river basin in the country, most of the land area consists of rocky desert and shifting sand dunes. Only three areas offer continuous tracts of any size: the Arghandab Valley, the benchland along the Boghra and Marja canals, west of Kandahar, and the Chakhansur area at the end of the river's course. The rest of the irrigable lands lie in narrow strips along the river banks. Except for extensive stretches in the Arghandab Valley and the Shamalan strip, which have long been under cultivation, the quality of the soil is poor. In the Chakhansur area strong winds blow during the 4 summer months, and create wind erosion which reduces crop yields, and clogs irrigation and drainage canals.

An expenditure of \$85 million paid for several projects including a dam on the Arghandab River, 25 miles upstream from Kandahar; the Kajakai Dam on the Helmand 60 miles northeast of Girishk; some 200 miles of the Boghra-Marja-Shamalan canal system; and a road improvement program. The Arghandab Dam supplies perennial irrigation to 130,000 acres of relatively fertile lands in the valley below the dam and intermittent water supply for about 30,000 more acres. At the downstream end of the dam, foundations for a power station have been laid, designed for the installation of two 3,200-kilowatt units, producing 15 million kilowatt-hours per year. The gross capacity of the Kajakai Dam, together with the average annual stream flow of the Helmand, can irrigate 700,000 acres outside the Arghandab Valley. Concrete outlets for the instal-

lation of three hydroelectric units capable of generating 130,000 kilowatts are provided in the foundations. In 1967 power stations had not yet been installed at either dam, but the United States had lent Afghanistan \$12 million to finance the purchase of generators, transmission lines and other equipment for a power plant at the Kajakai site. The Boghra-Marja-Shamalan canal system is designed to serve 150,000 acres.

By 1967 irrigation facilities were available for about 300,000 acres. Canals and main laterals had been constructed, and about 70,000 acres had all irrigation facilities installed, land leveled and drainage provided, thereby greatly increasing crop production. The largest single gain accrued to the farmers in the fertile central section of the Arghandab Valley, where 20,000 additional acres were brought under cultivation. The regular water supply made possible summer cropping where for centuries only winter wheat, barley and some vegetables were grown. Increased farm income was largely realized by the long-established rural population in the Arghandab Valley and the fertile strips along the Helmand. It did not affect the families farming lands in the government's resettlement project of Nad-i-Ali in the Helmand Valley.

For some years the government had proposed permanent settlement within the country of about 2 million nomads of the Pashtun tribes who before 1961 migrated across the Pakistan border. Their economic situation was felt to be deteriorating as their migratory movements became more restricted by national governments, thus reducing the trading seasonal work, and transport services which they had carried on for centuries. Since the Helmand Valley was thought to provide a vast area of reclaimable land, it was selected as the site for settlement of the nomads. The first project was established at Nad-i-Ali, between the Boghra Canal and the Helmand, just south of Girishk.

Between 1951 and 1957 the government settled 1,330 families selected by the Ministry of the Interior in the Nad-i-Ali project. Nine hundred were nomad families selected from 21 tribes, of which the most important were the Sulaiman Kheyl, Daftany, Achakzai, Balock, Kharoti, Nasir, Kaker Toker, Tarak, and Durani Pashtuns. Also included were Uzbek families, refugees from the Soviet Union and a number of Tajik landless farmers who were brought in from different regions of the country in order to gain nationwide support for the development program and to prevent feelings of regionalism or suspicion of ethnic favoritism. Each of the families received 15 acres of land, a house, farm animals, equipment and seed; the total, valued at 26,000 afghanis (see Glossary), was to be repaid with interest within 20 years and included a non-reimbursable cash advance of 1,000 afghanis.

The selection of Nad-i-Ali and the nearby Marja area as pilot projects for complete development and settlement served as a deterrent to the development of other areas. The low fertility of the soil and impervious subsoil at shallow depths rendered successful cultivation of crops almost impossible. By 1967 these waterlogged, saline, and abandoned areas could be used only to develop pasture for livestock.

Some authorities believe that soil surveys of the Helmand were insufficient. The most recent technical data indicate that only a fraction of the territory is arable. A topography which permits normal application of water according to crop needs is rare, except in certain portions of the Arghandab Valley. The physical difficulties of the Chakhansur area present special problems, such as a hot, dry climate, insignificant rainfall, wind erosion, and moving sand dunes and frequent shifts in the river channel, which cause water shortage in some years and oversupplying in others. Surveys by American engineers have concluded that, because of the cost of the extraordinary protective installations required, development priority should be given other areas.

By 1967 several new land reclamation and irrigation projects were in various stages of construction and settlement. Nangarhar commanded 60,000 acres of new land, and the Sardeh Dam near Ghazni is expected to furnish water for 37,000 acres. In the northern provinces along the Kunduz and the Kokcha rivers valuable lands are still awaiting the installation of water control devices and drainage facilities.

In order to expand export markets and to conserve foreign exchange to meet necessary expenditures on equipment for development projects the government has supported or initiated the establishment of joint-stock companies (*shirkats*) designed to facilitate the production, processing and sales of karakul, cotton, sugar, wool and fruit. Through these organizations, or through the relevant ministry, the government has actively engaged in measures conducive to the improvement of agriculture and stockbreeding. A comprehensive countrywide soil survey and a geophysical survey, consisting of locating and appraising underground water resources for irrigation, industrial and drinking purposes, have been completed. A veterinary school, laboratory, and an experimental farm have been established in Kabul with branches at Jalalabad, Kunduz, and Mazar-i-Sharif. The laboratories are for the diagnosis and treatment of animal diseases and for the manufacture of vaccines.

To meet the country's requirements for personnel skilled in agriculture animal husbandry, and engineering, the government established in 1943 a School of Agriculture and Engineering at Kabul

University. In 1953 it signed a contract with the University of Wyoming for the establishment of a vocational agricultural school at Kabul. Another vocational agricultural school, originally established in 1925 under French auspices, has been moved to Darweshan in the Helmand Valley, and one was established in Baghlan in 1960. The Third Five-Year Economic and Social Development Plan (1967-71) proposes construction of five additional schools. It has also been the government's policy since the early 1920's to send promising youths abroad for study. Few Afghans have elected training in agriculture and engineering to meet the country's needs, and most Afghan personnel are trained on the job by foreign technicians. The major handicap to agricultural development is the extreme shortage of trained personnel to transmit the results of research to the farmer. The agricultural extension staff, totaling 206 in 1967, was projected to increase to only 300 by the end of 1971.

CHAPTER 21

INDUSTRY

Emphasis in the first two Five-Year Economic and Social Development Plans, the Second completed early in 1967, was on development of hydroelectric power and natural resources. By mid-1967 expansion of electric power capacity had reached adequate levels for servicing the Kabul, Gulbahar (50 miles north of Kabul), and Jalalabad areas (70 miles east), but was still inadequate in the rest of the country. A notable achievement had been registered in the location and exploitation of natural gas. There were still, however scarcely a dozen and a half factories in the Western sense of the term.

Capacity of current establishments had shown considerable increases even though the enterprises were faced with problems of raw material supply and the marketing of their products. Nonetheless, development of industries, especially by private investors, constitutes a large portion of the Third Five-Year Plan (1967-71).

All mines and all power installations which are not industrial captives (operated by an industrial company exclusively for supplying its needs) are owned by the government. Most large scale industry is owned partly by the government and partly by private persons through joint stock companies called *shirkats*.

Afghanistan's mountains are rich in minerals, and a vast water-power potential exists in its many mountain streams, but modern utilization of these resources and the introduction of industry have barely begun. All modern industry, including mining, construction, and electric power generation, is estimated to contribute only a small percentage to the national product and, of a total labor force of 4 million, employment is limited to about 20,000 persons in industry and 50,000 in construction.

The economic development program conceptualized in the Five-Year Plans is aimed at lessening Afghan dependence upon foreign imports by creating industrial enterprises which would use the abundant hydroelectric power in processing readily available raw materials. Existing industries are almost entirely engaged, therefore, in processing the products of agriculture and animal husbandry and have been carefully selected in order to free the country

from dependence on potentially hostile neighbors for essential consumer goods. Stimulated by the government, investment in industrial expansion has come from karakul, cotton and fruit exporters, and wealthy moneylenders who have invested in joint stock companies. Often a majority stockholder or sole owner, the government has insured the coordination of economic development with the overall, long-range plans.

Industrial development has been hampered by many external and internal factors. External factors included the interruption of supply lines during World War II and recurrent difficulties with neighboring countries, both of which impeded imports of necessary machinery and equipment. Internal factors included the shortage of power, marketing channels, and transport, managerial, and technical skills. The lag in roadbuilding and the inadequate development of transport facilities have been major hindrances to exploitation of natural resources and expansion of industry. The government has turned to the United Nations and to foreign governments for technical assistance, loans, and grants in order to put its development plans into effect.

Before the offer of Soviet aid in 1955, West German firms and engineers played the major role in developing hydroelectric power and establishing industry. Their role in mid-1967 was second only to that of the Soviet technicians. Soviet aid in the industrial sector has centered on the discovery and location of exploitable natural resources in the north with increasing Soviet participation in installation of power stations and industrial projects. United States grants and loans financed the development of the coal mines and the installation of the power station at Girishk (75 miles west of Kandahar) but has focused on vocational education and managerial and technical training. Czechs, Poles, and Japanese have entered into various smaller industrial projects (see ch. 24, Foreign Economic Relations).

MINERAL RESOURCES

The country is known to possess deposits of chrome, copper, lead, zinc, uranium, manganese, asbestos, gold, silver, iron, sulfur, mica, nickle, slate, salt and lapis lazuli. Amethyst, beryl ruby, alabaster, tourmaline, jade, and quartz-bearing rocks also occur. Granite, white and colored marble, porphyry, gypsum, fire clay, limestone, china clay, talc, and soapstone are found in significant quantities. Such pigments as cinnabar, and red and yellow ocher can be easily mined. Outcroppings of coal and seepages of oil and pitch occur both north and south of the Hindu Kush (see ch. 2, Physical Environment).

Promising layers of oil-bearing shales were found in the north during an exploratory survey by the American Inland Exploration Company in 1936, and additional deposits were discovered later in the Arghandab Valley to the west and south of Gardez. In 1954 a Swedish firm began a systematic well-drilling program in the Sar-i-Pul area of Jozjan province, and successful finds were reported during 1958.

Since 1959 in accordance with an agreement signed by King Mohammad Zahir Shah while he was visiting Moscow in 1957, Soviet technicians have been carrying out a comprehensive program of oil exploration over an area of 4,600 square miles along the Soviet border between Mazar-i-Sharif and Andkhui, 110 miles to the west. Prospecting for oil continues, but up to 1967 no reserves which could be tapped commercially had been found. Two oil research laboratories have been set up, one at Keleft on the Amu Darya and one at Shadian near Mazar-i-Sharif. Asphalt is manufactured in the country from imported Soviet crude oil, but as of 1967, all petroleum products had to be imported.

The Soviet technicians, however, discovered natural gas deposits of over 67 billion cubic meters at Khwaja Gogerdak and Yateem Taq in Jozjan province, and production of gas scheduled to start in 1967. Both sources were to begin production with 2 billion cubic meters each and gradually rise to 4.5 billion cubic meters each annually. One pipeline extending to the Amu Darya will export gas to the Soviet Union. A second pipeline will deliver gas to a thermal power station and chemical fertilizer plant at Mazar-i-Sharif at the rate of 350 million cubic meters of gas annually. These projects were being financed under a Soviet aid agreement. The sale of gas to the Soviet Union will provide an important means for servicing the growing debt to that country.

Of Afghanistan's other mineral resources, only coal, salt, and lapis lazuli have been exploited to any extent (see table 3). Usually the distance or accessibility problems between the deposit and a feasible site for a processing plant make commercial development unprofitable.

Coal deposits estimated at 115 million tons have been discovered. In 1966, however only three mines, all north of the Hindu Kush, were in operation: Ishpushta (Baghlan province), 185 miles north of Kabul; Karkar (Baghlan province), 35 miles northeast of Pul-i-Khumri; and Dara-i-Suf (Samangan province), 131 miles south of Mazar-i-Sharif.

Most of the coal produced between 1954 and 1966 has come from the two older mines, Ishpushta, a deposit estimated at 350,000 tons and reaching depletion, and Karkar, a deposit of 4 million tons. Production of these two mines has steadily increased, ris-

Table 3. Afghanistan's Mineral Production, 1954, 1963-66
(in thousands of tons)

Year	Coal	Salt	Lapis lazuli
1954	17.4	22.1	0.3
1963	84.4	31.6	7.5
1964	99.2	31.7	10.8
1965	112.7	29.5	5.0
1966	147.0	41.6	8.5

Source: Adapted from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign Commerce, *Basic Data on the Economy of Afghanistan*, January 1958, p. 4; and Afghanistan, Ministry of Planning Department of Statistics *Survey of Progress 1965-66* Appendix: p. 4.

ing from 17,400 tons in 1954 to 137,000 tons in 1966. Coal from both mines is of poor quality, and transport costs make prices high in Kabul and in the east and south. Of this output two-thirds is used by industry located in the area between Baghlan and Kabul, and the remainder is sold as briquettes to householders.

Dara-i-Suf, a deposit estimated at 60 million tons, was surveyed with United States technical assistance. Exploitation required the construction of an access road as well as the procurement of equipment and the training of personnel. Many problems have been encountered in getting the mine into operation; in 1966 it produced a little over 10,000 tons of coal, of which only 640 tons were sold.

Deposits estimated at 15 to 20 million tons have been located at Masjid-Chabi, 96 miles northeast of Herat. This field appears to be mined sporadically with some 30 workers hired by the day. The field is to be developed to supply fuel to the projected thermal powerplant in Herat.

The country has sufficient salt mines and salt lakes to make imports unnecessary if transport from the sites were available. The Taliqan mine, which produces about 21,000 tons of salt annually, is located between Taliqan and Khanabad, 35 miles and 20 miles east of Kunduz, respectively. It is production from this mine alone which is usually entered in the official statistics. The Kalifgan mine, a thick rock salt deposit, is located 28 miles from the Taliqan mine, but unlike that mine, Kalifgan has storage facilities. However, it is hampered in delivery by being 4 miles from the main road. Mules are used to haul 80-pound blocks of salt to the road.

About 10,000 tons of salt are collected yearly from the salt lake 50 miles southeast of Andkhui; 100,000 tons annually could be produced, but the market in 1967 was confined to Fariab province, except for a small amount sold in Herat and Mazar-i-Sharif. Only a camel trail leads to the lake from the main road. Most of the salt used in Herat province comes from another salt lake lying on the Iranian border about 110 miles southwest of Herat.

Salt output has increased steadily, rising from 22,100 tons in 1954 to nearly 42 000 tons in 1966. Existing distribution sales outlets appear to be adequate. All sources of salt are owned by the state and are operated by the Salt Department of the Ministry of Mines and Industries. Sales are made at the source directly to dealers, traders, and other buyers who furnish their own transportation and use or resell without any restriction. There is no tax on salt; government revenue derives solely from sales.

Most lapis lazuli is obtained from government-owned mines in the Kokcha river valley in Badakhshan and is cut and finished at the lapidarium in Kabul. Production has risen from 300 tons in 1954 to 8,500 tons in 1966.

Iron ore is mined in very small quantities, but exploitation of the 2-billion-ton reserves of 62 to 63 percent grade ore at Hajigak, some 60 miles northwest of Kabul, has not yet begun. Lead and zinc outcroppings near Tulak in Ghor province, 90 miles southeast of Herat, have been worked for centuries. Chemical analysis indicates that one of the veins known as Siah Sang is most promising.

POWER

Many mountain streams and waterfalls provide a great hydroelectric power potential, but the flow is torrential in the spring and dribbles to nothing in the summer, so that a considerable investment in dams and reservoirs is needed to maintain sufficient regularity for power generation. Although hydroelectric power generation has been greatly expanded, it has not yet caught up with demand. Total electric power capacity at the end of 1956 was estimated at 18,534 kilowatts, with an annual production between 38 million and 45 million kilowatt-hours.

By the end of 1966, kilowatt capacity of both public utilities and industrial captive installations (operated by an industrial company solely for its own needs), was 59,234 kilowatts, generating 238.7 million kilowatt-hours. Public utilities alone had a capacity of 35,887 kilowatts and generated 173.9 million kilowatt-hours. Of total capacity about 80 percent was hydroelectric and diesel and thermal stations provided the balance.

Most of the installed capacity is located in the Kabul area and serves the city and the Gulbahar textile mill to the north. This capacity is based on the Sarobi (capacity 22,000 kilowatts) and Nagalu (capacity 90,000 kilowatts when finished) hydroelectric plants. The Jabal us Siraj hydroelectric powerplant (2,840 kilowatts), 45 miles north of Kabul, provides electricity to the town and the nearby textile mill and also to the town of Charikar. The 4,800-kilowatt hydroelectric installation at Pul-i-Khumri serves

both the textile plant and town and also the Kharkar mine, northeast of the town. Girishk, on the Helmand River 70 miles west of Kandahar, has a hydroelectric power generator with a 3,000-kilowatt capacity which also serves Bost, 25 miles southwest of Girishk, and the headquarters of the Helmand Valley Authority.

Diesel-driven generators of small capacity serve Ghazni, Herat, Mazar-i-Sharif, Maimana, Andkhui and Kandahar. The installed capacity at Kandahar is inadequate to meet the needs of shops and factories, but expansion depends on completion of the Kajahai hydroelectric plant in the Helmand Valley northwest of Kandahar, for which the United States has lent the Afghan Government \$12 million.

Many individual concerns in the bazaars and towns use small diesel motors or scrapped automobile and tractor motors for power. Hundreds of windmills, constructed of timber and with woven reeds as vane matting are located in the windy areas to the west and south of Herat. They grind flour and also draw water. Thousands of water mills for flour grinding are located along the streams throughout the country.

MANUFACTURING

In terms of available resources, industrial potential considerably exceeds the country's present ability to mobilize capital for development. Except for a few cement plants, most manufacturing processes agricultural and livestock products (see table 4). Factory installations are located largely around Kabul or north of the Hindu Kush in the Pul-i-Khumri—Baghlan—Kunduz area. The number of plants is expected to increase under the Third Five-Year Plan; the plants will produce a wide range of new items and expand the capacity of already established industries (see table 5).

Cotton Gins and Edible Oil Mills

The Spinzar Company, Afghan financed with headquarters in Kunduz, operates more cotton gins than any other single company and is the largest producer of edible oil. It owns and operates most of the industrial ginning installations in the northeast. These consist of 8 gins at the factory in Kunduz and 29 gins installed in 12 smaller factories established in northeastern towns located in the cotton-producing centers. The company buys, gins, and bales cotton; manufactures cottonseed oil, oil cake, and soap; manufactures ceramics; and also bales wool on a commercial basis.

Representatives of the company to whom the farmers deliver the cotton are located throughout the cotton-producing areas of

the northeast. Prices paid for raw cotton are in accordance with a grading system. This aspect of cotton production is stressed to farmers, and courses in grading are held at the plant in Kunduz. From the collection points the company, which operates its own trucks, hauls the cotton to the gins. Most of the cotton used by the three modern spinning and weaving mills comes from the Spinzar Company. In 1966 it ginned 36,000 tons of raw cotton and produced 600 tons of liquid cottonseed oil and 1 800 tons of hardened fat.

There are many small, independent operators of gins scattered over the northern provinces from Herat in the west to Taliqan, 35 miles east of Kunduz, and in the Helmand Valley, so that in 1966 actual production of ginned cotton and edible oil considerably exceeded the official estimates of 27,500 tons of cotton and 3,400 tons of oil. Among the largest of these firms are the Bakhtar Industrial Company, the Shirkat Sannaty Mezar, the Sakhi Mashin-karam Limited, and Amin Limited—all of Mazar-i-Sharif—plus the Herat Cotton Company and the Bost Oil Company.

Textiles

Cotton textiles, the largest industry, in 1966 had an estimated annual production of 55.2 million meters (1 meter equals 39.37 inches) of cloth and 2.5 million pounds of yarn, up from 36.8 million meters of cloth and 1.6 million pounds of yarn in 1963. The bulk of cotton cloth used in the country is produced in the home or the bazaar workshops. There are however, three cotton spinning and weaving mills, at Jabal us Siraj, at Pul-i-Khumri and at Gulbahar, all owned and operated by the Afghan Textile Company (Shirkat-i-Nasaji). The Jabal us Siraj mill—with 1,800 spindles, 80 hand looms and 56 power looms—has a capacity of a million meters of plain white cloth or cotton textiles for military use from its power looms and 350,000 meters of specially woven textile from its hand looms. Since the opening of Gulbahar the Jabal us Siraj mill has been operated at a branch of the bigger mill; its spinning section has been shut down. It utilizes yarns from Gulbahar, and cloth is sent to Gulbahar to be dyed and finished.

The Pul-i-Khumri plant, opened in 1943 with the help of West German specialists, is entirely mechanized with 30,000 spindles, 550 nonautomatic looms, and approximately 300 automatic looms. On withdrawal of West German technicians in 1960 annual production fell to 15 million meters but rose again to 25 million meters in 1966.

Construction of a textile plant with a planned capacity of 55 million meters a year was begun at Gulbahar in 1954. It was designed, built, and equipped by West German firms. Transit

Table 4. *Production of Selected Industrial Commodities in Afghanistan, 1963-66*

Commodity	Unit	1963	1964	1965	1966
Cotton textiles	thousands of meters*	36,800	36,000	53,500	55,200.0
Cotton yarn	thousands of tons	800	1,050	850	1,250.0
Woolen textiles	thousands of meters*	191.0	189.5	190.0	170.0
Rayon textiles	do	237.6	338.0	651.0	1,000.0
Ginned cotton	thousands of tons	21.1	23.6	31.3	27.5
Cement	do	59.1	103.0	141.2	158.0
Vegetable oil	do	2.4	2.4	2.5	3.4
Soap	millions of cakes	2.0	1.9	1.7	2.2
Shoes	thousands of pairs	25.2	57.5	52.9	74.8
Sugar	thousands of tons	8.0	7.0	4.0	7.4

* meter equals 39.37 inches.

Source: Adapted from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of International Commerce, *Basic Data on the Economy of Afghanistan*, June 1966, p. 4; and Afghanistan, Ministry of Planning, Department of Statistics, *Survey of Progress, 1965-66*, Appendix: pp. 1-3.

Table 5.—Industrial Establishments in Afghanistan, 1966

Industry	Number of establish- ments*	Number of employees
Food	7	1,935
Textiles	16	12,182
Furniture manufacturing	3	572
Press and publications	17	958
Coal briquette production	1	108
Nonmetallic industry	6	2,043
Repair of equipment	7	1,399
Other	2	271
Total	59	19,468

* Employing 20 persons or more.

Source: Adapted from Afghanistan, Ministry of Planning, Department of Statistics, *Survey of Progress, 1965-66*, p. 88.

difficulties with Pakistan delayed delivery of machinery, and the plant did not open until 1960. Equipped with 45,000 spindles and 1,300 automatic looms, it is estimated that the daily capacity of the weaving department is 120,000 meters and that of the dyeing and finishing department 220,000 meters. The factory has faced a number of unforeseen problems, chiefly marketing. Wholesale outlets, however, have been established around the country, and attempts have been made to adapt production to consumer tastes.

The annual consumption of cotton textiles is estimated at between 120 and 140 million meters. Since the Afghan Textile Company's production will fill only about two-thirds of this demand, three or four additional factories are projected in the Third Five-Year Plan. These are to be 10 to 15 million-meter facilities to be located in Mazar-i-Sharif, Herat, Kandahar, and Kabul.

One rayon factory is in operation, the Omid Textile Factory in Kabul. It is privately owned and was established about 1955 with second-hand Japanese equipment and Japanese technical assistance. It has 108 power looms and 80 foot-powered looms and in 1966 produced over 1 million meters of cloth.

For over 40 years there has been wool weaving factories in Kabul, Herat, and Kandahar. Establishments have been beset by numerous difficulties, and the Kabul and Herat factories have been closed since the machinery was transferred to the Kandahar factory. This factory operates only part time, using its original 20 looms, and is mainly engaged in wool washing.

In 1965 a modern woolen factory, Afghanische Wolle Industrie (AWI), constructed, owned, and managed by West German in-

terests, opened in Kabul. Equipment ranges from 15 to 40 years of age although some is new. A wide variety of camel hair and woolen goods is produced, including blankets, suit material, uniform material, and carpeting. The two factories produced 170,000 meters in 1966, a decrease of 20,000 meters compared with 1965, as a result of a cut in personnel at AWI and the partial shutdown of the Kandahar mill.

Tanning and Leather

A number of tanneries for fleshing, drying and baling of karakul skins are scattered across the northern provinces from Herat to Mazar-i-Sharif. The 10 largest are owned and operated by the Karakul Company. The two most important of these installations are the Mazar-i-Sharif plant, which handles about 400,000 skins, and the Andkhui plant, which handles about 150,000 skins during the season from mid-March to mid-June. The government has induced the independent operators to form a cooperative which now competes with the privately owned Karakul Company.

In 1962 the Afghan-Swiss Trading Company (ASTCO) formed the Ahu Shoe Company in partnership with a group of Afghan businessmen who owned a defunct shoe factory and a partially operating tannery. Some of the machinery and the buildings belonging to the Afghan partners date back to the 1930's when the operation was started by the government. After a few years the factory closed down. Subsequently it was sold to several businessmen who operated it for a few years before again closing it down. The factory in 1967 was operated by the Swiss and could produce 400 pairs of shoes and 1,000 half-processed hides daily. Almost 75,000 shoes were produced in 1966. Most of the hides are exported.

Food Processing and Preserving

The most important of the food processing plants is the Baghlan Sugar Refinery. It has a maximum capacity of 60,000 tons of sugar beets with a production estimate of 7,500 metric tons of sugar. All sugar is sold to the Sugar Monopoly which is operated by the government. Since the refinery's completion in 1940, it has operated below capacity because of an inadequate supply of sugar beets. Production has varied widely but shows no upward trend. In 1966, 23,000 acres were under production. Farmers within an arbitrarily determined district must plant one-fifth of their irrigated land in beets, and forced collections are made. Per acre production of beets is very low.

One raisin cleaning factory, the Samoun Rasin Company of Kabul, is capable of producing a product up to international stand-

ards. The factory was completed in 1963 and has a capacity of 50 tons per 8 hours. In both 1965 and 1966 about 6,000 tons of raisins were processed.

The only mechanical fruit processing and canning plant is located at Kandahar. It is owned by the Pashtun Company which has a fruit juice press, a pasteurizing and bottling machine, and a candy making unit. The company, when in operation, cans fruits and jams, using imported glass containers, and packages dried fruits in cardboard containers. It can produce about 20,000 to 30,000 pounds of canned and packed fruit annually. The bottling works can produce more than 50,000 to 60,000 bottles of soft drink syrups and cordials annually. The plant has been closed since 1964 but was expected to open in the fall of 1967.

At Kabul there is a modern abattoir and refrigeration plant; and a 50-ton-per-day flour mill and bakery have been built with Soviet aid.

Cement Industry

Cement production which began in 1958 with the completion of the Afghan Cement Company's 100-ton-per-day mill at Jabal us Siraj and which was followed in 1962 by the government-owned 400-ton-per-day Ghorī mill near Pul-i-Khumri has steadily increased, reaching a level of 158,000 tons in 1966. Both plants were planned, equipped, and constructed by the Czechs.

Miscellaneous Industries

The Nadjai Company, leased for 10 years by Hochtief of West Germany, in Kabul operates a marble cutting and polishing works, a furniture factory, and a foundry and machine shop. The marble works uses marble from Kabul and Kandahar; lack of transport precludes hauling from other areas. It can produce 8,000 square meters of cut and polished marble yearly. It also cuts and polishes lapis lazuli. The furniture factory which is located in Jangalak is equipped to make furniture, toys, and truck bodies. The foundry and machine shop (also located at Jangalak) was equipped by the Soviets. It produces hardware, steel doors and windows, cast iron stoves, filing cabinets, truck bodies, and iron beds. The Afghan Metal Company also makes metal doors and window frames, chairs and tables, closets and cabinets, armchairs and beds, safes, and gates. At Kabul there is a stocking and sock knitting factory, an arsenal, an asphalt plant built by Soviet technicians, and an airdrome for aviation maintenance.

HANDICRAFTS

Handicrafts, an important branch of the economy, provide a livelihood for hundreds of thousands of persons and produce a wide variety of essential articles and luxury goods. Some of the latter are exported and provide a valuable source of foreign exchange (see ch. 24, Foreign Economic Relations). It is in the field of handicrafts and small cottage industry that the country can develop industrially without heavy dependence upon great capital outlays.

The most important handicrafts are felt-making and the weaving of carpets and cotton, woolen, and silk cloth. There are looms outside many homes in the countryside. Leather goods (saddles, bridles, boots, and shoes) and pottery are produced almost universally. Istalif, about 15 miles north of Kabul, is particularly noted for its glazed blue pottery.

Mazar-i-Sharif, in the north, and Ghazni (80 miles southwest of Kabul) are famous fur centers, selling sheepskins or skins of locally trapped wild animals. Mazar-i-Sharif produces fur-lined overcoats (*khalats*); Ghazni, the embroidered sheepskin coats (*pushtins*). Nuristan is especially noted for the production of carved furniture and cooking utensils, dishes, and milk pails made of wood. Most metalworking is carried on in urban bazaars; Charikar, however, is particularly known for decorated silver and cutlery. All other handicrafts have developed as a result of locally available raw materials such as hides, wool, silk, cotton, dyes, and clay.

The organization of production in the homes is on a family basis and in the bazaars is on a guild basis. In the homes various members of the family perform specific operations; men, for instance, are responsible for shearing sheep and camels, and women wash and spin the wool. Men tan skins and hides, the women embroider them for coats or the uppers for shoes. The products made by the women are delivered by the men to the bazaars where the furrier tailors the coat or the cobbler adds the sole and completes the shoe. Usually the bazaar workshops also are family enterprises; the personnel are either members of the same family or member of families which have served apprenticeships with this family of craftsmen for generations.

Handweaving both in homes and in the bazaars is carried on throughout the country, but is especially notable in the area north of the Hindu Kush from Faizabad to Herat. The usual loom is a simple, steeply inclined frame, manually operated and practical for a confined space. Raw materials used are cotton, silk and wool. Cotton and silk cloth are made into clothing; silk is usually woven into turban lengths. In nearly every town and village where cot-

ton is grown, it is hand-ginned, spun, and woven. Many small workshops consisting of hand-operated gins and spinning wheels supply local weavers. Total handicraft production of cotton cloth is unknown but provides a major part of domestic requirements.

Silk worms are also cultivated throughout the northern provinces and silk is handspun from cocoons. In handspinning two men can handle 15 pounds of cocoons per day. Weaving is done at the rate of four or five meters per day. The traditional silk weaving center is Herat, followed by Andkhui and Maimana. In addition to these centers, there are many individual silk weavers in Kabul, Baghlan-Kunduz area, Mazar-i-Sharif, Kandahar, and Ghazni. Government estimates of 66,160 meters of silk cloth produced annually are probably well below actual production. With the assistance of the United Nations, silk spinning and weaving centers have been established at Kunduz and Baghlan.

Wool is used for the manufacture of textiles carpets, and felt. There are plants for washing and carding wool in virtually every town of any size, and woollen textiles for clothing are woven throughout the country. Fine woolens, from the best raw wool, come from Mazar-i-Sharif. Turkoman women weave camel hair for making coats. Hazara women make a special cloth called *barak* which is woven on looms out in the open. The men soften it by placing it on a flat stone over the fire and stamping on it for a whole day while keeping it continuously damp. This cloth is used by the Hazaras for blankets as well as for men's clothing.

For clothing, the women of Nuristan weave a thick, heavy cloth usually of a dark color. Among the Turkomans, the women use the coarser wool to make felt for the walls of the tent, for shepherds' cloaks, floor and bed coverings, saddle pads, boots, felt caps, and robes. The Hazaras also make felt floor coverings on which to sit and sleep.

Of the handicrafts only carpets—which are known throughout the world for their quality and brilliant colors—are exported to any extent. The art of carpet-weaving is highly traditional, and the majority of patterns are jealously guarded family secrets handed down over the centuries. Other than among the Turkomans, where men and boys also weave, craftsmen are almost exclusively women and girls; their work provides an important supplement to the family income. Carpet-weaving is found everywhere in the country, but carpets woven for export come from an area that describes an arc across the north from Herat to Faizabad. The finest are those woven in Maimana province from the wool of karakul sheep. This wool is carefully washed, carded, and spun by hand and dyed locally. The carpets may have as many as 55 knots to the square centimeter, while the coarsest have only 20 to 30. The

finest work requires four weavers working 3 months to finish a rug of six square meters. The rugs are sold in the local bazaars or taken to Kabul by truck to be sold for export. Recently the government has encouraged improved standards of workmanship and higher output.

Pushtins are embroidered lambskin waistcoats and overcoats with the fleece turned inward. Blue and black and orange and yellow are favorite color combinations. Making and embroidering these coats provides a livelihood for much of the population of Ghazni. Embroidery work on the caps which most men wear under their turbans, on vests, and on the outer robe worn by women (*burqa*) and numerous other articles is a typical craft widely practiced by women living in urban centers and in villages near bazaar towns. Color combinations and designs vary in different parts of the country. Sewing the garments together is generally done in the bazaars by tailors.

Hides and skins are crudely tanned almost everywhere, and boots, shoes, and saddlery are produced in all bazaars. Saddlery and the uppers of shoes may be decorated in the villages, but final assembly is done in the bazaars.

Potters are found in almost every bazaar; they produce a pottery of rather poor quality which breaks easily. The only artistic pottery is produced at Istalif; shaped like Persian pottery and glazed in blue and green, it has a sizable local market.

Metalworking, which is usually found only in bazaars, produces hand tools, agricultural implements, copper pots, and household utensils. Some Pashtun tribes make rifles and bone-handled knives.

CONSTRUCTION

Important activity in construction has taken place since 1957 and is still taking place throughout the country, expansion of the socio-economic infrastructure being an integral part of the two Five-Year Plans. Highway construction, in particular, has had a high priority and thousands of Afghans have gained experience building some 1,800 miles of asphalted concrete roads under the supervision of Soviet Union and United States engineers. This experience included the Salang Tunnel (north of Charikar) through the Hindu Kush which was constructed under difficult climatic conditions.

In addition to the Kandahar International Airport, numerous small airports have been built throughout the country. Dams, power plants and industrial installations have also been constructed and in 1967 some were still under construction. Local development projects have included apartment houses, urban and

rural housing, public buildings such as schools, hospitals, and clinics, as well as secondary and access roads; local construction firms have been formed to carry out these projects.

STRUCTURE AND OWNERSHIP OF INDUSTRY

Until the mid-1960's the *shirkats* (joint stock companies) possessed many monopolistic features which after that period were gradually being withdrawn. The first *shirkat* was the Shirkat-i-Ashami established by the government in 1932 (see ch. 26, Banking and Currency). It promoted the National Bank (Bank Melli), a trading and industrial bank which was authorized to create and finance those businesses deemed most necessary to the economic development of the country. With funds from the export of karakul, cotton, and fruit and from wealthy moneylenders the bank financed the beginning of Afghan industry. After assessing domestic requirements, the bank established in 1939 the General Electric Company (Shirkat-Ummi Barq) which was nationalized in 1966 the Textile Company (Shirkat-i-Nasji), the Pushtun Company at Kandahar (Pushtun-i-Kandahar), and the Karakul Export Company (Shirkat-i-Umumi Sadirat-i-Karakul). By 1940 there were 25 *shirkats* and 125 by 1960. Shares in all the *shirkats* are available for private investment.

The government has turned over to private enterprise the marble works in Kabul, the woolen mill at Kandahar, the soap factory at Kunduz, and the sugar factory at Baghlan, all of which were originally operated by government agencies. As an example, 20 percent of the shares in the woolen mill at Kandahar, capitalized at 5 million afghanis, is owned by the National Bank, the remainder by Kandahar landowners and moneylenders.

THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT

In addition to investing in industrial enterprise the government has in many other ways encouraged the growth of industry. New industry is exempt from taxes for the first 3 years and in succeeding years is taxed at reduced rates (see ch. 25, Public Finance). Machinery and trucks may be imported duty free. Foreign exchange is freely allocated by the government at reduced rates for government-approved projects. The government keeps a watchful eye on the operation of the *shirkats* and sets rates charged for electric power and prices paid to the producers for karakul skins. It owns and operates the coal mines, the salt mines, and the lapis lazuli mines.

Hampered in its plans for industrial expansion by lack of foreign exchange, the government has sought and received loans

from a number of foreign nations, including the United States, the Soviet Union, West Germany, and Czechoslovakia (see ch. 24, Foreign Economic Relations). These countries together with the United Nations have also supplied technical assistance to support the government's industrial development plans. The government welcomes foreign private investment in the industrial sector and is attempting to provide a favorable environment for foreign capital.

CHAPTER 22

LABOR

In 1967 about half the population of some 16 million was between 15 and 60 years of age and capable of work, but the availability of such persons for hire or for occupations other than their traditional pursuits was limited. Approximately 90 percent were farmers and herdsmen, most of whom were fully employed a good part of the year, if they wished to be. They accepted the kind of work they did and were reluctant to change it, particularly when the change was to urban factory work.

The laborer generally is not an isolated wage earner; he works as a member of a family or a tribal group. Each family member, male or female, young or old, has various duties assigned to him in accordance with his capabilities, and the material welfare of the family depends on fulfilling these duties. In effect, the worker is a member of a collective working unit, and only rarely can he be separated from it. His place in society is determined by his family or tribal connections or his ethnic affiliation, rather than by his occupation.

Economic and social changes, requiring new types of labor, are taking place. The government has made determined efforts to industrialize, especially in the field of consumer goods. It has encouraged industrial development and has become an owner of, or investor in, many industrial enterprises.

The government's objectives are seriously impeded, however, by the lack of adequate manpower trained in essential skills. The number of industrial workers increased 100 percent between 1956 and 1964, but in 1966 it remained only about 1 percent of the total labor force. Skilled labor is extremely scarce, and the need for persons trained in technical skills or qualified for teaching, medicine and administrative and managerial tasks is great. In some areas even the recruitment of unskilled labor for permanent jobs presents problems.

The government has tried consistently to create conditions and opportunities encouraging workers to orient themselves toward occupations instead of family and tribal groups. In 1946 it promulgated a Labor Code which set standards for favorable working

conditions and established principles governing the relations between workers and employers. Expanding industrial employment stimulated the drafting of a new Labor Code, designed to cover a larger segment of the labor force and to help implement official manpower policies. The drafting was in progress in 1967. A national wage policy has been formulated whereby fringe benefits represent a significant portion of workers' compensation.

The rise of wages and salaries between 1962 and 1967 was not significant but workers and employees in government-owned and private industries and enterprises were given free housing, meals, medical coverage, transportation and bonuses. Cooperatives, available to all production and administrative workers employed by the government and to many workers in private industries and offices, helped offset price increases of such essential commodities as flour and vegetable oil. Vocational training institutions have been expanded, but the size of enrollment and the number of graduates are insufficient in relation to actual manpower needs. During the 1960's a growing number of industrial enterprises have offered on-the-job training, often with good results, to workers who have shown an interest in permanent employment (see ch. 10, Education).

Efforts to create a versatile labor force are impeded by the underutilization of existing training facilities and by the attitudes of workers toward industrial employment. Afghans are strongly attached to outdoor occupations and to traditional forms of craft and commerce. Discounting the few who aspire to religious scholarship, most Afghans generally prefer to be traders. Trade has long been the historic role of the nomad, and it produces profit with relatively little effort. A second choice for most rural Afghans is stockbreeding. Except among such long-settled groups as the Tajiks, farming is less desirable than either trading or herding, but most villagers prefer cultivating to employment in modern industry. Only among the urban Parsiwans (see Glossary) and a few other small urbanized minorities, such as the Hazaras, is there a desire for urban pursuits, but even these people prefer trade and business to industrial work.

Employer-employee relations in 1967 still were governed by traditional values, basically paternalistic. Generally, the employer comes from a family with recognized high status, and the employee, from a family or lineage of lower status. The employer assumes the obligation to advise and assist in the personal affairs of the employee, who, in turn, expects him to do so. Family connections, social status and personal loyalties transcend considerations of work efficiency and competence. The non-Afghan supervisor who

tries to impose a more impersonal policy is confronted by misunderstandings and difficulty.

Traditionally, agricultural landowners, master craftsmen, and commercial traders have been the principal employers. Since the late 1950's industrial enterprises and the government have taken an important place in this sphere. This development has increased the demand for labor and introduced the need for a whole new range of supervisory skills.

Despite the beginnings of industrialization, most of the economy is still based on subsistence agriculture and animal husbandry, which produce few conflicting occupational interests. Therefore, labor unions have not developed. Furthermore, the concept of the solidarity of workers is foreign to Afghans, whose basic loyalties are to their families and tribes. Another factor is the negative attitude of the government to the formation of any organization which might take on political significance. Guilds, however, have been in existence for many centuries. In 1967 the great majority of the country's artisans and shopkeepers were still guild members (see ch. 23, Domestic Trade).

GENERAL CHARACTER OF THE LABOR FORCE

Approximately 7.6 million persons were of working age; some 6.2 million people were sedentary; and the rest were nomadic. The actual figure of the working population may be higher because at 8 years of age in the rural areas, every able-bodied person, except those in school, participates in some or all of the various activities from which the family derives its support. Some 44 percent of the sedentary population between 15 and 60 years of age live in the southeastern part of the country, in the region south of the Hindu Kush, from Kabul south-westward to Kandahar, and in the Northern Plains west of the Kunduz River.

The number of persons of working age in the cities totaled about 715,000 in 1966. The law permits boys under 15 years of age to work as unpaid apprentices; since many children do not go to school, they are generally available for employment. Approximately 49 percent of the urban labor force consists of women, most of them working in their homes. Of the women employed outside the home, the majority are in Kabul and in the larger towns. A survey in 1965 of the employment market in Kabul indicated that 2,560 workers of a total labor force of 54,810 were women employed mostly as government typists or teachers.

Employment Patterns

The employers are landlords, master craftsmen, factory managers, tribal groups operating as collective units, and clan chiefs,

who by virtue of their office hold rights to the lands of their lineages. A substantial amount of land is tribally owned and allotted to individual families to work, but in more instances it is held by small farmers who work the fields themselves or hire a tenant or sharecropper. Large estates are rare, and absentee landlords are few. Only a small number of factories are in the hands of private individuals; most industrial enterprises are joint stock companies, called *shirkats* (see ch. 20, Agriculture; ch. 21, Industry).

A self-employed group includes farmers and herdsmen who own their own lands or flocks, artisans, male and female craft workers, and traders who are also employers.

The bulk of employees are wage and salary earners in government, business, industry and construction; others are hired field hands, shepherds, domestics, and bearers. They may also be male or female craft workers, such as women who embroider slippers in their homes under direct commission from bazaar merchants. Professional people are mainly wage and salary earners in government rather than self-employed persons because they are generally expected to put in many years of public service in return for the free education which the government has provided them (see ch. 10, Education).

Age and Sex Distinctions

Generally, age does not determine any occupational role, provided that the worker is physically capable of performing the required work. The very young and the very old are expected to carry out less arduous tasks, which are determined by maturity and capability. Young boys and old men are frequently shepherds or tenders of livestock in the villages; young girls and old women perform household tasks as assistants to the more able-bodied, middle-aged women.

The most significant exception to the lack of age differentiation is in the additional supervisory role of old men. Old age can give a man status in his family unit because he probably is the head of the household and because he is believed to have acquired wisdom with his advancing years. He therefore performs directive functions not only within the family but also in the larger community, whether a tribal unit or village (see ch. 8 Family).

Women rarely work for hire outside the home, but this custom is changing in some areas, especially in the towns. Rural women may help in the harvesting of the fields but usually play only a limited role out of doors. Nomad women, however, have done the weeding in the wheat and cotton fields for many centuries.

Women rarely work in industry; when they do, they are assign-

ed jobs which require little physical or mental effort. In 1967, for example, the country's three major textile factories employed women to pick defects and pieces of refuse out of the woven fabric and to place thread into spindles. In general, however, industrial employers hesitate to employ women on the grounds that their employment would break up the traditional family structure and would result in the neglect of small landholdings. Furthermore, many employers feel that factory jobs should go to men as a matter of justice and equity, and women should be hired only when male workers are not available.

Among the educated groups traditional attitudes regarding female labor outside the home are changing more rapidly. The number of women among the teachers, midwives, and nurses has risen significantly during the 1960's. There are also some women doctors and lawyers in Kabul. Many educated women in the cities have found it necessary to work in order to supplement the family income. According to official predictions the number of women in the nonagricultural labor force will double between 1967 and 1971.

Mobility

A large part of the labor force is on the move much of the time. About 2.6 million of the country's 10.5 million rural inhabitants are fully or semi-nomadic. Settled farmers generally live in small villages, but at least some members of the family practice herding part of the year in high pastures with their flock. This includes the bulk of sheep and goat herders in the mountain regions. Durani Pashtuns and the Ghilzai Pashtuns, Baluchis and the Turkomans are among the groups frequently on the move; some of their yearly migrations cover great distances (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups).

Unemployment

Generally, there is little unemployment. Some seasonal unemployment is found among agricultural workers because of the fluctuating demands which farming and stockbreeding make on their time and energy. During the summer months when agricultural work is in full swing, many industrial employers have difficulty finding even temporary unskilled workers. In the mountain regions many people pursue a craft or engage in trading during the winter. Some factory workers are affected by intermittent layoffs since some of the country's important industries, notably sugar refining and fur processing, are seasonal.

Some urban unemployment exists in Kabul and other towns

because many people who migrate there to find jobs in government and industry lack the necessary skills. In 1965 an employment survey in Kabul showed that more than 150 jobs in government and 140 jobs in private industry could not be filled because of the lack of qualified applicants. Furthermore, many persons who look for work in the cities desire only temporary employment. The Hazara tribesmen, for example, who come to Kabul after the harvest in search of jobs are not interested in remaining in the city permanently.

Aptitudes and Skills

Afghans generally work hard when the situation demands it. Working for themselves, they put in long hours without protest or complaint; as employees working for someone else, they tend to take a more easy-going attitude. To some workers the change from outdoor occupations and tribal life, where courage and endurance are the most distinguishing traits, to the routine of daily factory work has proved stressful. In many instances the difficulty in adjustment has manifested itself in absenteeism, which presents a problem in many industries.

Each ethnic group tends to have special aptitudes for a particular kind of work. Pashtun men have demonstrated an aptitude for mechanical work, and the Hazaras, who are noted for acquiring new skills quickly, make good factory workers. The city-dwelling Parsiwans generally have been successful in the professions (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups).

Turkomans are particularly noted for their skill at horsebreeding and sheep raising. The special skills of the Turkomans and the Uzbeks in producing, spinning and weaving fine textiles and carpets and their experience in setting up and operating well-integrated handicraft producing units of varying sizes and complexity may be important factors in the successful industrial development of the area north of the Hindu Kush. An additional factor may be the relative lack of sex differentiation in occupational groups within the particular ethnic group. Both men and women work in the fields and operate cotton gins; men and boys, as well as women and girls, are expert weavers.

The cultivator in general is fairly skilled in farming methods familiar to him and in using simple tools. If the advantages of new methods are demonstrated to him, however, he proves to be capable and willing to adopt them. During the late 1950's, for example, United States agricultural experts, in order to demonstrate the use of the long-handled scythe, traveled with the nomadic reapers of the Kabul River Valley on their annual march up the river valley toward Charikhar and Jabal us Siraj. Convinced

that its use would greatly increase their productivity, the reapers were soon demanding the scythes faster than they could be supplied.

Craftsmen are generally skilled and take much pride in their work, provided that there is an element of personal contact between themselves and their buyers. If the articles which they are making are to be sold directly on the market rather than to a specific customer, however, they are not likely to apply their skill with much care.

The lack of skilled industrial workers, intermediate and high-level technical and administrative personnel, and high-level professional personnel presents a serious problem to economic planners. In 1967 industry needed 9 100 skilled workers, and 1,400 skilled workers were needed in construction.

The government has made vigorous efforts to enlarge the pool of trained manpower by increasing the number of vocational schools and by adding vocational subjects to the curricula of primary and secondary schools. These efforts have been substantially supported by the United States and West Germany.

Frequently, skilled workers are trained on the job. According to reports by West German economic experts in 1966, many industrial employers prefer to fill skilled positions with workers trained on the job rather than with graduates of vocational schools, who have shown a lack of interest as well as aptitude for the work required. Government officials reported in 1967 that the majority of the 9,100 workers needed in industry will be trained on the job. Many qualified craftsmen are reluctant to give up their independence for factory routine.

Skills on the intermediate and high supervisory level are particularly scarce. The government estimated in 1967 that only half of the 2,500 vacancies on these levels would be filled by domestic applicants; the rest would be filled by foreigners. The lack of qualified supervisory and administrative personnel is conspicuous in commercial enterprises although many persons working in such establishments have adequate mercantile talents.

The area for recruitment of managerial personnel is severely limited. In order to have their authority recognized, such personnel must come from families or lineages with status. Managerial positions in industry, however, are not considered desirable by the children of socially prominent families. The government has appointed young Afghans who had received their education at official expense to managerial positions, regardless of their personal inclinations. Many factories owned by the government or by the Afghan National Bank (Bank Melli) are under competent man-

agement, but many privately owned factories need qualified personnel.

OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS

The workers are relatively undiversified, with only a few significant occupational groups. Because of the predominantly rural character of the society there are few labor specializations. Generally, workers in all parts of the country and in most ethnic groups do much the same kind of work.

A good deal of overlapping occurs in the occupational structure because of the extent of part-time specialization. In many villages shopkeepers are farmers who tend their shops when there is no field work required. In some parts of the country village men are artisans who are able to take up their trade in wintertime. Particularly in northeastern Badakhshan the men of entire villages often make a specialty of a particular trade, so that one village in the area may become known for its pottery, another, for horsetrap-pings, a third for ironwork, and so on.

Farmers and Herdsmen

Farmers and herdsmen can be divided occupationally four ways: settled farmer, farmers practicing some herding, herdsmen practicing some agriculture, and nomadic herdsmen (see ch. 20, Agriculture).

Among settled farmers in most parts of the country, with the exception of the Nuristanis, the men do the heavy part of the outdoor work, including sowing, reaping, and storage. but, except in Tajik villages, women also have a role in these activities. The women's primary responsibility, however, centers around the home. In addition to the cooking, sewing, child rearing, gathering fodder for the domestic animals, and making dung patties they also do craftwork. Children learn responsibility early by helping with jobs which they are capable of doing, indoors and out. Older men who no longer can do physical work are sought out for advice on farming problems.

The people of the Hazarajat are chiefly farmers who practice some herding. Primary cultivators, who farm intensively, may also have a few cattle and large flocks of sheep and goats. Hazara villagers on the norther slopes must take their flocks to higher altitudes for water and pasture part of the year. Normally, the men and boys go with the flocks, perhaps taking one or two of the younger women along but leaving most of the women to work the fields while they are gone. Any older boys who can be spared from field work in autumn are sent to collect bundles of hog-

weed, which they carry on their backs to the farmhouses for use as fuel during the coming winter.

The manufacture of *barak*, a rough woollen cloth for which the area is famous, is a local activity in which both men and women take part. Women weave it on outdoor looms; men soften it by laying it on a smooth warm stone and stamping on it for many hours. *Barak* must be kept damp during the softening process. Men do not help in making *ghee* (clarified butter), which is an exported product of the region.

Afghans who are mainly herdsmen are usually Chahar Aimak tribesmen and Pashtuns. Near their wintertime quarters they plant one grain crop, which they reap in the late fall upon their return to the villages. The division of labor among these groups is roughly comparable to that of the purely nomadic groups.

Nomadic herdsmen migrate in search of work, pastureland, or markets or a combination of all three. Traveling through the mountainous regions, they often split into groups. Grown men and older boys herd the sheep and goats along the high trails. The rest of the entourage, including older men, women, children, donkeys, and camels, take a lower trail. Women make the meals, tend the domestic animals, and set up camp at night.

Many nomadic herdsmen, such as the migratory reapers in the Kabul Valley, provide surplus farm labor. The reaper caravans move each spring through the valley from east to west, stopping at villages along the way to help harvest the spring crop. Men, women, and children all help to harvest the grain. Oxen tread on it; the men toss it in the air to remove the chaff; the women and children sieve it. Some of the Ghilzai Pashtuns and the Durani Pashtuns also provide surplus labor, but their main function is transport.

The nomadic Turkoman families of the north never act as supplementary farm labor, for they can support themselves comfortably on the products of their flocks. Each spring, these families travel together from winter pastures in the region of the Amu Darya River in a south-westerly direction toward the Paropamisus mountain range. The entire entourage, consisting of men, women, children, household goods, and tents mounted on wagons and herds of sheep, horses, and camels, moves back and forth twice each year.

Women prepare the meals, take care of the children, and milk the sheep. They render the fat from the carcasses and make soap, dry the meat, and wash the sheep's wool, spin it and make it into cloth and rugs. To a greater extent than in other ethnic groups, they participate in all the economic activities of the group.

Traders and Merchants

Trade and moneylending are old pursuits. Throughout the centuries nomadic caravans—"the carriers of Central Asia"—have moved in yearly migrations along fixed routes that take them from place to place within the country and back and forth accross the country's borders. They exchange milk and animal products for wheat and other necessary supplies. Some, notably the Ahmadzais, are closer to being merchants than stockbreeders, since they carry merchandise in their caravans to exchange by barter along the route. Often they provide villagers with cash loans (see ch. 20, Agriculture; ch. 23, Domestic Trade).

In addition to the nomads and itinerant peddlers of cloth, yarn, and small merchandise, there are settled merchants of various sorts in every town and major village. In fact, most townsmen who are not artisans are engaged in trade.

Factory and Construction Workers

There are relatively few industrial and construction workers; in 1967 industry employed 30,100, and construction 84,300. The government hopes to increase these numbers, particularly in industry, but, because of the lack of skills and the difficulty in finding permanent workers, recruitment is difficult. Textile factories and food-processing plants are the most important employers of industrial workers. According to the latest figures available, textiles and food processing accounted for two-thirds of industrial employment in 1965.

In 1966 the three largest factories in the textile industry—the Gulbahar Textile Company, the Pul-i-Khumri Textile Company, and the Nesadji Factory in Jabal us Siraj—employed 5,000, 1,300, and 600 workers, respectively. Most plants in other branches of industry employed between 100 and 500 people but there are many where the workers number less than 100. Those employing between 100 and 500 persons include: wool-processing plants and silos; food-processing, tanning and cement factories and vehicle repair plants in Kabul, Jabal us Siraj and Kandahar; and karakul-processing plants in Mazar-i-Sharif. Small plants for combing and washing wool provide employment for a handful of people, and are found in nearly every town of any size. Factories engaged in cotton processing, cement mixing, and textile manufacturing operate in the area between Kunduz and Pul-i-Khumri and employ a total of some 5,000 persons.

The Pul-i-Khumri Textile Company supplies meals, housing, hospitalization, and raw cleaned cotton free of charge for its workers. Production and maintenace workers receive rent-free

housing, except for a few who pay approximately 8 afghanis (see Glossary) per month for electricity. The company cafeteria provides two meals a day; a suit of clothing is distributed each year to every man and boy employed. Two hospitals are maintained; one is a 7-bed facility for men; and the other is a 25-bed hospital for women. Both are supervised by a German physician. At a cooperative, workers may purchase flour and cloth at reduced prices.

The Gulbahar Textile Company operates the country's largest and most modern plant. It provides free housing in new air-conditioned buildings, free medical coverage, a pension and death benefit plan, profit-sharing for technical, administrative and professional employees, cloth at half price, and cooperative privileges.

Construction workers are engaged in building roads and bridges and repairing damages caused by snow, floods, and earthquakes. Most of this labor is under the supervision of the Ministry of Public Works. The Ministry also is in charge of agricultural work projects, which in 1967 employed some 20,000 workers. To alleviate the chronic shortage of personnel in public works, the Ministry is responsible for 21 conscripted labor corps which supply much of the manpower for construction and maintenance projects in various areas. The corps consists mainly of young men who have been called up for their military service, but instead, have been assigned to this type of duty. Many construction workers receive on-the-job training while working on projects supervised and financed by the United States, West Germany and the Soviet Union.

The exploitation of natural resources provides employment for only a few thousand persons. In 1964, for example, not more than 1,067 workers were engaged in coal mining. In 1965 the number of coal miners was just over 1,600. Salt harvesting, centered mainly in the area just east of Kunduz between Taliqan and Khanabad, usually employs more workers than coal mining, but the number of these workers is not known.

Craft Workers

Traditional crafts and industrial home work provide much employment. The number of workers involved in the production of cloth, rugs and various craft articles, at home or in the bazaars, makes the modern industrial labor force look minute in comparison. Much the smallest element are the bazaar artisans; added to this group, home craftsmen bring the total up into the millions, many of whom are also farmers and herdsman. Pottery, wood-working, jewelry making, tanning, cobbling, and harness making

are men's crafts. These activities are carried on in bazaars and in homes on a part-time basis.

Women's crafts include carpetmaking, feltmaking, and embroidery. Cotton cloth is woven throughout the country, but the northern provinces are the country's greatest cotton-producing areas; in this region, between Andkhui and Maimana, virtually no home is without a loom. Families can raise their own cotton, gin it, card it, spin it into thread, and weave their own fabrics. More and more people, however, are buying industrially made yarn.

Women in all parts of the country spin and weave wool as well as cotton. In the northern provinces they make fine carpets. Turkoman women make felt, with which to line their tents, and camel's hair cloth. Uzbek women make a coarse pile carpet. Women of the Hazarajat are noted for producing high quality woolen products, notably *barak* (see ch. 21, Industry).

White Collar and Professional Workers

Occupations requiring education and special training are increasing. The most important are teaching, medicine, administration and management in government service and in private industry.

There were roughly 6,600 teachers, including about 400 university professors, in 1966. The members of university faculties have high status, and virtually all are employed by Kabul University or the Nangarhar University Faculty of Medicine. Until the 1960's teachers of other school levels were not highly respected, and their salary schedules were among the lowest in the labor force. Since then both the social status and the remuneration of teachers have risen, but the profession fails to attract candidates in sufficient numbers to meet the country's urgent needs (see ch. 10, Education). Most teachers are men, but since 1960 an increasing number of women have entered the profession.

Medicine is one of the most seriously understaffed professions. In 1966 the country had only some 405 physicians and 84 medical assistants. About 948 persons worked in paramedical fields, such as nursing and midwifery. Physicians have high social status and earn relatively more money than other professional groups; most of them work for the government (see ch. 9, Living Conditions).

The insistence of doctors, teachers, engineers, and other professional personnel to work in Kabul or one of the larger provincial towns creates serious problems in government and in industrial employment. A few enterprises add a compensatory sum to the salary of professional employees to entice them to accept positions outside of Kabul.

The number of civil servants has increased rapidly as the government has expanded its activities during the last two decades. In urban areas, government service is becoming an increasingly respectable occupation, offering security and status.

WORKING CONDITIONS

Working conditions are regulated by the Labor Code enacted in January 1946. The Code, administered by the Ministry of Mines and Industries, was still in force in 1967 although a new one was in preparation.

The Labor Code of 1946 applies specifically to "persons in industrial establishments." If the term "industrial" is interpreted in the narrow sense, the Code apparently covers only workers and apprentices in modern factories or crafts shops and not store clerks, commercial office help, waiters, barbers, domestics, and other service workers. By implication it applies only to full-time workers, for it never refers to part-time workers. Conceivably, part-time workers could also come under its jurisdiction, but probably they do not. The group to which the Code refers as employers includes every man who contracts for another man to work for him in any capacity. The persons put under contract are employees.

Verbal employment agreements are prohibited; there must always be a written contract specifying the terms of employment. Either party may cancel the contract on 1 month's notice. To protect employers who face a chronic labor shortage, the regulations specify that should an employee leave without giving sufficient notice and then take a new job his new employer is liable to the previous employer for compensation if it appears that he has lured the worker away from the old job, if he knew that the worker had not given proper notice, or if he continues to employ him after discovering this.

An employer has rights and obligations in respect to his employees. He must provide the work contract and post a notice of conditions of employment in a conspicuous place in his shop or mill. He must pay wages, which are determined by agreement between himself and his laborers, monthly and in currency; if the worker is indebted to him, he may deduct a portion of the amount each day. Special regulations apply to apprentices, who must be at least 15 years of age. No person under that age may be employed for pay. If he employs apprentices, the employer must see to it that they learn a trade; he is also responsible for their morals and personal conduct. Employers are required to see that their workers are healthy and to bank funds to be available for medical care for

any who become ill. In some industries, exclusive of cotton and textiles, an employer must pay compensation if a worker is injured or dies as a result of injuries incurred on the job.

Similarly, an employee has certain rights and obligations to his employer. He must do his job well; if he fails to do so, his employer can make up for this by docking the worker's wages. This money is supposed to go into the worker's welfare fund. The worker must keep the trade secrets of the man or company employing him. He is expected to appear for work on schedule. An employer who has used every means at his disposal to get an absent worker back on the job may call in "competent authorities" presumably government representatives, to help him.

In the modern enterprises built since the late 1950's, wages, benefits, and the physical facilities of the plant far exceed the standards prescribed by the Labor Code. Smaller enterprises, many of which are family-owned and-operated, have long working hours, unhealthy working conditions, and minimal wages. Such shops usually operate on a narrow profit margin. Since the enforcement of absolute compliance with the Code's provisions would probably have the effect of putting a great number of them out of business, the government administers the Code with flexibility. In effect the standards of the Labor Code represent an ideal toward which labor can aspire rather than a representation of prevailing conditions.

Wages and Benefits

Only in urban areas, where money is in broad circulation, are most wages paid in money. Most of the labor force is compensated in kind. Agricultural workers are usually reimbursed for their services with a share of the crop, rather than in cash. In the Kabul Valley, for example, one-twentieth of the harvest is divided among the migratory workers for helping to reap the grain, and more, if they glean it.

The generally accepted technique for determining payments to tenant farmers is that a contribution of labor, seed, water, or equipment is worth one-fourth of the harvest. The tribal chief who holds rights to the land stands to get three-fourths of the crop without doing any of the work. A competent tenant farmer might get a contract whereby he agrees to pay a certain rent and supply his own labor, seed, and equipment, in which cases the entire crop belongs to him. A poor farmer, however, must usually be satisfied with one-fourth of the crop. The system leads to argument between landlord and tenant as to how large the crop actually was, and a good deal of effort goes into trying to cheat the landlord.

The compensation of workers in government offices, government-owned industries, and in private industries and enterprises consists of a basic wage or salary and various kinds of benefits. In some industries, workers may also increase their pay by piece-rate earnings above quota. Benefits may include cooperative privileges, free meals, free housing, medical coverage, transportation, and annual bonuses in cash or kind. Ranging from 4 to 47 percent of the average annual compensation, benefits represent an important component of total earnings. In general, white-collar employees receive more extensive and more generous benefits than production workers.

The government uses a 13-grade scale for administrative and clerical workers, from beginning-level clerk to deputy minister. In 1967 the annual salaries of government clerks ranged between 10,800 and 14,000 afghanis per year. For the same period, minor officials received between 16,200 and 18,000 afghanis; officials of intermediate ranks received 25,200 afghanis; departmental directors, 32,400 afghanis; general directors, 46,800 afghanis; and presidents, 57,600 afghanis.

Government workers have a cooperative where they may purchase flour and vegetable oil at reduced prices. The amount of flour which white-collar government employees may purchase is 8 seers (see Glossary) per month if they are married, 4 seers, if they are unmarried, at a fixed price of 30 afghanis per seer. In 1967 this price was about half of the free market price of flour. The monthly allowance for vegetable oil purchasable at reduced price is 8 kilograms a month for married persons and 4 kilograms for unmarried persons. A lunch allowance of 4 afghanis per day and free medical treatment are additional benefits extended to white-collar employees of the government.

Blue-collar government workers are generally hired on 1- to 2-year contracts and are paid according to a 17- grade scale. Foremen are at the top of the scale with a monthly wage of 4,050 afghanis in 1967 for grade 1 positions and 2,850 afghanis for grade 3 positions. Electricians, carpenters, drivers, and typists in grade 6 earned 1,650 afghanis a month. Metal lathe operators, drivers and typists in grade 9 received 870 afghanis monthly. The monthly wages of laborers, janitors, and cleaners varied between 600 and 510 afghanis. Flour and vegetable oil were sold in co-operatives to these workers for the same price as for white-collar employees, but the amount allowed to be purchased varied. Four seers of flour and 4 kilograms of vegetable oil were allotted to all bluecollar workers, regardless of marital status.

The salaries wages, and benefits extended to administrative and clerical workers in the government and to production and

maintenance workers in government-owned industries often serve as samples for compensation granted to persons working in private enterprise. A limited survey of wages and salaries in 1967 indicated that the compensation of many blue-collar workers and of the majority of clerical workers in private industry is based on government wage and salary scales, although differentials and bonuses are often added by private employers.

In 1967 the basic salary of clerical workers and administrative staff in private industry was about 10,800 afghanis per year though differentials added by private employers ranged between 15 and 35 percent of the basic wage. During the same year the median annual compensation, including side benefits, for mechanics in private industry was 23,100 afghanis, of which the basic wage was 21,600. Electricians and carpenters received a median compensation of about 24,000 afghanis per year, with a basic wage of 18,000 afghanis. The median annual wage for weavers was 18,300 afghanis, of which the basic wage was 16,800. Clerks received a starting median rate of about 23,000, with a basic salary of 10,800 afghanis. Unskilled common laborers earned about 9,000 afghanis per year, of which 8,400 afghanis represented the basic wage.

The significant differential between wages paid to skilled and unskilled workers are apparent from the daily rates. For example, masons at the Herat Cotton Company received 65 to 100 afghanis per day depending on the degree of their skill, as compared to daily rates of 25 to 30 afghanis for unskilled labor. Experienced weavers and spinners at the Pul-i-Khumri Textile Company earned 250 percent more than the common laborers.

The availability of farmers for temporary work when agricultural activities slacken off during the winter significantly affects the rates for unskilled labor. At Baghlan, for example, the daily wage rate of 30 afghanis in the summer fell to 20 in the winter. In Mazar-i-Sharif the rate decreased to 25 to 30 afghanis during the winter, compared to 50 afghanis paid during summer. The daily rate of 18 afghanis at the construction site of Bost (about 100 miles west of Kandahar) rose to 25 in the summer. Seasonal help and day laborers, however, receive cash wages only with occasional benefits in the form of free meals and medical treatment for injuries contracted on the job.

Location has a marked effect upon the amount of compensation, especially for clerical and administrative employees. Educated workers prefer working in the cities, and most employers offset the disadvantages of working in rural locations by granting higher salaries. In the major towns, notably in Kabul, Kandahar, and Mazar-i-Sharif, the starting clerical salaries in 1967 were be-

tween 13,000 and 16,000 afghanis per year. At the same time the average annual earning of similar employees in provincial towns, such as Pul-i-Khumri, were 23,000 to 27,000 afghanis.

The Gulbahar Textile Company, located off the main road north from Kabul, had difficulty filling vacancies for white-collar staff, although it paid in excess of 31,000 afghanis per year to such workers. A similar pattern of higher wage rates in smaller towns may be noted for carpenters and electricians. Wage differentials related to location also affect common unskilled labor. This category of workers in Kabul and in the provincial towns of Baghlan, Kunduz and Herat earns about 8,000 to 9,000 afghanis per year, while those at Pul-i-Khumri and Jabal us Siraj earn 10,000 afghanis.

According to the Labor Code, employers are liable for on-the-job injuries. Free medical coverage is provided for nearly all clerical and administrative employees and for production workers in most of the modern industrial enterprises. Medical policies for clerical and administrative employees usually cover the family, but those for production workers rarely do. Some enterprises provide medical coverage in return for a salary deduction of 2 percent, but others make this deduction only if the workers wish to extend the coverage to his family.

Few formal schemes exist for retirement and death benefits. The most prevalent custom is to provide a lump sum upon retirement or death. Only the Gulbahar Textile Company has a formalized plan; upon retirement or death production and maintenance workers or their families receive an amount of money which is equal to 15 days' terminal pay for each year worked. More generous provisions apply to professional personnel, notably to engineers, technicians, and administrators. These workers have 4 percent deducted from their monthly pay, to which the company adds 6 percent. Therefore, a sum equal to 10 percent of lifetime earnings is paid at retirement or death. To this sum is added 1 month's salary at the terminal rate for each year worked.

Hours and Holidays

Most adults work 6 days a week and 8 hours a day. Variations exist, however, in the number of daily working hours in some enterprises. At the Spinzar Company, a cotton ginning factory in Kunduz, the shift is 9 hours in the summer and 8 hours in the winter. The Herat Cotton Company has 8½-hour working days all year long. At the West German-owned Afghanische Wolle Industrie (AWI) near Kabul workers have a 5-day week, but they work 9½-hour shifts. Temporary workers and contract laborers

often work 12 hours a day in order to increase their earnings. Some food processing factories have a 12-hour working day during the height of the season. During the feast of Ramadan, when all Moslems observe a rigorous fast, virtually all factories and offices have a 5-hour working day (see ch. 12, Religion).

Considerable flexibility governs the granting of holidays, vacations, and sick leave. There are 16 national and religious holidays with pay. According to the Labor Code, each fully qualified worker is allowed 20 days of annual leave and 1 month's sick leave; an apprentice is entitled to the same amount of sick leave but only 15 days of annual leave. Contract laborers have no formal leave privileges. Many employers grant 30 days for vacation and 30 days for sick leave. Others allow a total of 50 days leave per year, to be used for sick leave or vacation, at the workers' discretion. It is general practice among employers to grant additional leave if the worker needs it for emergencies, such as weddings or funerals.

LABOR RELATIONS

Agricultural workers are hired for particular jobs, such as shepherding or reaping, in many parts of the country, although as a group they are not believed to be significantly large. Tajik villagers frequently hire independent shepherds to take their community flocks to high pastures in the summer; these shepherds are skilled in the many aspects of animal husbandry.

There are various nomadic groups which travel from harvest to harvest helping cultivators reap their grain or pick their fruit. They work for wages in cash but more often in kind—receiving grain household utensils, clothing, or other “manufactured” commodities that they can not produce themselves. The terms of their contracts are bargained for at the beginning of each harvest or job and usually follow precedents set centuries ago. If individuals or families are hired for long periods of time, indicating usually that they are relatively competent, employers bestow bonuses from time to time, especially during religious holidays. Once a contract is drawn up between an employer and a “hired hand,” both sides generally try to live up to the agreement. Accusations of default are often brought before the local *mullah* (Moslem religious leader), who decides guilt or innocence.

Although most craft work is a home industry in which family members participate without any employer-employee relationship beyond that of father and son, commercial craft industries exist in the major cities, with a master craftsman as owner of the enterprise and journeymen and apprentices as his employees (see ch. 20, Industry).

The relations between a master craftsman and his employers are governed chiefly by custom, but they are limited by the government's Labor Code and the craftsmen's guilds. When a master craftsman hires an apprentice, the apprentice is usually related to him in some way, or else is a member of a family that traditionally sends one of its sons into the craft through the same master craftsman. Working arrangements are set forth in a written contract, which is signed in the presence of the local *mullah*. The contract obligates the apprentice to work a set number of hours for a set period of time and obligates the master craftsman to pay a specified amount and provide food, clothing, and housing.

The contract must conform to guild regulations. Representing all the members of the trade, the guild determines the number of apprentices a craftsman may hire and approves promotions from apprentice to journeyman and from journeyman to master craftsman. Once the contract is signed the employee is under the paternal guidance of the master craftsman until the learner becomes his own boss in his own shop. He has little recourse from the master craftsman's decisions unless he feels the employer has broken his contract, in which case he takes his complaint to the guild. By the same token the employer can appeal to the guild in case his apprentice does not work hard enough. The Labor Code generally governs wages, hours, and holidays. Its regulations are the same for craft industries as for modern factories.

The paternalism of the master craftsman toward his employees carries over into modern industries, but it is influenced more in favor of the employee because of the acute skilled-labor shortage. In order to recruit and to keep factory workers the employer must concern himself with his workers' welfare, even more so than the craft shopowner.

The factory employer behaves in an authoritarian manner toward his workers, but he is also expected to respond to their needs and to be ready to help in their problems. Similar to the model of the chief-tribesman relationship, the senior figure is both directive and protective.

Generally, intimacy between employer and employee during working hours is not considered proper, and the employer who fails to maintain a suitable degree of reserve on the job would probably lose the respect of his workers. On the other hand, the employee, especially on religious holidays, is expected to visit his employer in his home to pay his respects. The employer, however, visits a worker's home only under very special circumstances, such as the illness of the worker or the marriage of his children. Where there are several job levels within an establish-

ment, the men in the higher grades may join the relatively permanent coterie of the owner or manager. In such cases all the persons involved would usually have about the same family status and educational background.

Supervisors are reluctant to delegate authority. This pattern creates no particular problem in the small shop or office, and it is consistent with the tendency to personalize all relationships. It creates serious problems, however, in any large-scale enterprise. Suggestions for improvement in operations must come from the top; however meritorious, they cannot be accepted from men lower in rank.

Agricultural labor and craft workers have their custom and contract, and industrial workers have the protection of the Labor Code. Many domestic servants, porters, and other unskilled laborers, however, have little protection. Their relationships with their employers are governed generally by the magnanimity of the employer and modified by the competence of the worker and the pressures of supply and demand. In some cities such as Kabul and Herat, unskilled manual laborers are available in times of hardship in the countryside, particularly when the Hazaras leave their mountain homes to seek temporary employment in the cities. They inevitably have low status and are vulnerable to all the adversities that low status can bring in a city.

White-collar workers outside the government are clerks in commercial enterprises, and, like menials, they have no protection from the whims of their employers, except as the forces of supply and demand apply. Frequently working conditions for clerical workers are poor, and they have little recourse except to leave their jobs. To them government service has great appeal, although most of them lack the educational and family background which would help them to qualify for governmental service.

For civil servants the pay scales, working hours, holidays, sick leave, and promotion schedules are all set by government regulations. Yet, like other working groups, civil servants have a relationship with their superiors that is strongly influenced by Afghan values and customs. Family status frequently determines the treatment of a worker by his superior, and the authoritarianism of the shop or factory exists in the government office.

Strikes are almost unheard of because there are no strong labor groups to organize or finance them. Individual workers normally settle differences with employers either on their own or simply by leaving the job. A limited amount of informal bargaining between workers and employer exists, however, in the hiring of groups of contract laborers. Invariably, a leader emerges

from such a group and bargains with the potential employer regarding wages, bonuses, and working hours. Such groups also resort to work stoppages or slowdowns if they find the working conditions unsatisfactory.

The Labor Code provides for official boards to arbitrate cases of violation of contract. These boards, appointed by the government, may impose fines on either party found guilty of failure to meet the terms of an agreed contract. Five types of offenses are considered serious enough for arbitration: larceny, hindrance of production, carelessness in handling equipment or produce, the employee's failure to show up regularly for work, and the employer's failure to pay wages regularly. Other than these arbitration boards, no machinery for the settlement of disputes is known to exist.

CHAPTER 23

DOMESTIC TRADE

By 1967 the opening of new roads, especially the road from Sher Khan (Qizil Qala) on the Amu Darya via Kunduz and Pul-i-Khumri through the Salang Tunnel in the Hindu Kush to Kabul, had increased internal trade with major consuming areas throughout the country. Internal trade was, however, still largely limited by the subsistence nature of the economy to a few manufactured items and consumer goods. The increased volume of trade continued to involve the exchange of local products, particularly milk, meat, hair, and wool, for grain, fruit, and handicrafts. In this exchange the nomads still played their traditional important role.

The unintegrated economy, in which the country's various producing areas are relatively self-sufficient, has discouraged the development of extensive internal trading patterns. With significant exceptions domestic trade is primarily localized and consists largely of the exchange of agricultural and livestock products for a few essential consumer goods, such as pots and pans and items of clothing, not produced by the family. Most exchange takes place between villagers and nomads and itinerant merchants; the rest is between villagers or nomads and townsmen. Towns serve as the major marketing centers for the region in which they are located, and there is little trade between them.

There is freedom of trade except for a few government monopolies and for occasional government-imposed price controls. Although localized, trading occupies some part of the life of all Afghans, and for some, particularly nomads, it is their major occupation corresponding to their historic role of merchants traveling with their caravans between the great commercial centers of Central Asia and India.

The number of persons who earn a livelihood from trade cannot be estimated since there has been no census of occupations and because so much trade is carried on outside fixed shops. Yet the government has estimated, probably conservatively, that trade contributes 8 percent of the national income, ranking after agriculture and stockbreeding. Certain tribal groups, such as the Atrenjis of the Turkomans and the Ahmadzais of the Ghilzai

Pashtuns, are made up almost entirely of traders who also raise animals for their own use as caravan transport. No ethnic group monopolizes trade or trading in any particular commodity. In nearly all cases trading businesses are small, run by the owner himself or by the family or by the specialized clan of a tribal group.

Development of broader domestic trade patterns is hampered not only by the absence of an integrated economy but also by inadequate transport facilities. The camel is the primary carrier of goods, but profits from smuggling make it difficult to divert caravans to domestic transport. Trucks have only been utilized and exploited since the 1950's. They primarily handle exports, imports and shipments to and from the few modern factories. Lack of roads, trucks, spare parts and workshops limits the amount of domestic trade that can be diverted from the traditional system. Trade development is also hampered by various trade practices, particularly the predominance of barter. Government policy is aimed at improving transportation facilities so as to develop the domestic trade system.

TRADE PATTERNS

The traditional pattern of domestic trade, which still predominates in most of the country, is based on the barter relationship between the nomadic or seminomadic stockbreeders and the settled village farmers and, in turn, upon the dealings of these groups with artisans and merchants. Farmers produce a surplus of grain and sometimes textiles for which the nomads trade their livestock or animal products; the few necessities not derived from animals or the fields are supplied to the nomads and farmers by artisans and merchants in exchange for food and raw materials. In accessible parts of the country, goods are increasingly transported by truck; although in the less accessible areas, nomadic and itinerant merchants still provide transportation of goods from the towns to the villages.

The four major urban concentrations of population are the principal distributing centers: Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, and Mazar-i-Sharif. Located for some 3,000 years on important caravan routes crossing the Hindu Kush, they deal in almost all types of goods; Kabul and Kandahar are the principal centers for imports from or via Pakistan; Herat and Mazar-i-Sharif are primary receivers of goods from Iran and the Soviet Union. These cities have large wholesale and retail trading communities, and the largest and most important concentration of firms is in Kabul.

Other towns, usually those with more than 10,000 population, are also distribution and collection centers for surrounding villages; except for commodities they produce themselves, they rely on trade with one or more of the four major centers for supplies. The most notable exception is the Hazarajat, the mountainous area in the center of the country, which has no major trading towns and is dependent on nomad merchants for products not locally available.

The Role of the Nomad

There are two types of trading nomads: those primarily engaged in transport and those who combine stockraising and trade. The former are remnants of merchant clans whose caravans traveled as far east as China, as far west as Baghdad. It was with them that Marco Polo took passage on his way to China, and it was through them that the products of Asia reached Europe before the days of ocean shipping. Pastoral nomads have an equally long history, and for centuries, until Abdur Rahman Shah (1880-1901) established some degree of control over them, they lived by raiding villages and caravans (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). Raids provided them with grain, and intertribal warfare provided them with animals. When raiding was suppressed, the nomads were obliged to pay for the grain with the products of their stockraising. They bartered or sold their livestock, hides, wool, *ghee* (clarified butter), and rugs to villagers or traders to obtain those commodities they could not produce—hardware, grain, tea, cotton cloth, and tobacco.

Caravan nomads range through nearly all areas (except Nuristan where trails are too precipitous) following routes estimated to be about 18,000 miles. Their activities have expanded in the last generation because increasingly strict border control has led them to concentrate on commerce within the country. Their trading fairs that take place in the Hazarajat each summer appear to have originated only 40 to 50 years ago.

Caravan transport is largely engaged in profitable exchange of consumer goods with the nomadic and sedentary population located outside the urban centers, and in smuggling across the borders. In the northwest transport nomads are Turkomans, who, with camels, ponies, or horses, carry karakul skins, hides and other products from villages to the central markets at Mazar-i-Sharif, Andkhui and Maimana. They are hired on contract much as truckers are and utilize bills of lading. Other trading nomads move through the center of the country, coming south from Mazar-i-Sharif, east from Herat, west and north from Pakistan, and

bringing to the villages and towns along their route the grain, animal products, handicrafts, and manufactured goods they have picked up on their way.

The most famous of Afghanistan's caravan traders are the Powindahs, most of whom are from the Ahmadzai, Nasir, and Kharoti clans of the Sulaiman Kheyl tribe of the Ghilzai confederation. They play their greatest economic role in central Afghanistan where they supply manufactured items (especially second-hand American clothing, shoes, and hardware) brought from Kabul and Ghazni to the Hazaras and Chahar Aimaks. They also act as moneylenders and commission merchants. In return they receive wheat, *ghee*, leather, and new supplies of animals.

Village-Urban Trade

The larger towns are the economic and commercial centers for the nomads and villagers of their respective hinterlands. The settled farmers get from the towns the few necessities that cannot be derived from animals or the fields; the townsmen in turn depend on the animal and farm products of the countryside and on imported goods. There is little direct trade between contiguous villages because most produce consists of the same commodities at the same season of the year.

Interregional Trade

Most of the economic regions are equally self-sufficient. With their village-urban and nomad traders they are able to subsist without imports except for particular items which are generally the same throughout the country: manufactured goods, petroleum products, sugar, tea, salt (except in the north where salt is produced), and cloth. There is, therefore, little interregional trade in domestic products. Exceptions are Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, and Pul-i-Khumri, which must import grain; Kabul obtains textiles from Pul-i-Khumri and Gulbahar as well as abroad, carpets from Herat or Mazar-i-Sharif, hides and skins and coal from the north and cattle from the Hazarajat.

THE DISTRIBUTIVE SYSTEM

Trading has long been on a person-to-person bargaining basis with many traders combining the roles of producer, middleman and retailer. Only in Kabul and Kandahar are wholesale and retail functions organized along significantly sizable lines, although the Textile Company at Gulbahar and the Karakul Company in Mazar-i-Sharif wholesale their own products.

The government is one of the biggest wholesalers in the country through its monopoly control over petroleum products, grain storage, vehicles, and sugar. It also sells to retailers through outlets in the major cities and directly to consumers. Trade in the major cash crops is in the hands of *shirkats* (joint stock companies), and most have access to the credit facilities of the Afghan National Bank and the Afghan Commercial Bank. The *shirkats* also have extensive storage facilities.

Next in importance are large proprietary traders with funds of their own or easy access to credit facilities. They are more numerous than the *shirkats* and form the backbone of the mercantile class. Most of them operate in cities and large towns, never in villages and rarely in small towns. These proprietary traders also have warehouses at their disposal and do trading as well.

A large number of the retail shops in bazaars of the small towns are run by wholesalers who are also retailers. Their scale of operations is smaller than that of the proprietary houses in the cities, but they hold enough inventory to last a season. The smallest operator is the trader who opens a shop for a few days a week—with scanty funds, a small inventory, and probably with money borrowed at inflated bazaar rates.

Trade is a family affair, and generally at least one son is in business with his father. Beginning with the 1950's, when motor transportation became available, the son's first independent venture—financed with family capital—probably consisted of going to Kabul to buy merchandise, renting a truck for the return trip, and then taking a local profit. Small-scale merchants may prefer to sell inexpensive articles and make sales at a small profit rather than sell only a few expensive items. The reputation for selling cheaply is sought after, and a shopkeeper may at intervals sell below cost in order to establish and maintain such a reputation.

Fledgling merchants go into the transport business by buying a truck, hiring a driver, and setting out in search of a cargo in much the same way that camel caravans travel from town to town. The truck driver himself may buy or rent a truck with capital derived from private deals and from fares received for carrying passengers on top of the loads of cargo.

Financing Domestic Trade

The average trader who operates with a meager volume on small capital can ill afford to tie up funds in purchases of futures or of future deliveries, even though the farmer or herd owner is willing to pay high interest on advances. Since the establishment of the *shirkats* in the early 1930's, however, followed by a

widening in the scope of the market economy, the financial resources of a substantial number of traders have increased (see ch. 21, Industry). At present a considerable volume of trade is carried out on a credit basis. The proprietary trader in the bazaar frequently doubles as moneylender, especially in small towns.

The traditional arrangements between the wholesale buyer of farm products for resale and the farmer serve to illustrate the use of credit. Arrangements are of two types. First, in periods of generally abundant supply of products, a trader, against a partial advance of the purchase value in kind or in cash, buys wheat or the fruit of an orchard for future delivery 10 months prior to the harvest. The quantity and price are fixed at the time of purchase at such levels that the expected resale value at the time of delivery yields the trader the purchase cost and the going interest rate on the amount advanced. The advance generally amounts to from 20 to 30 percent of the full purchase cost. The resale value of the quantity on delivery, however, may be higher or lower than the purchase cost plus interest because of the fluctuations in market price. This uncertainty about the margin over cost is reflected in the low price the trade may offer at the time the purchase contract is made. Thus the interest rate demanded by the trader is high under such circumstances because he takes a heavy risk. Since there is a Moslem religious prohibition against charging interest, the amount of interest is not explicitly stated but rather is implied between purchase price and expected resale price.

Second, in times of general scarcity of farm products and an expected upward movement of prices, the trader makes an advance without agreement as to price. Instead the purchase price is settled at the time of delivery in accordance with the market price prevailing at that time. The local price will reflect the typical charges the trader has to expect for transportation, markups at the next distribution level, transaction taxes, and in the case of exports, customs, insurance, freight, and a foreign exchange rate which may differ substantially from the purchasing power parity of the two currencies involved. Clearly, in such an arrangement the trader takes considerably more risk, and the farmer or stockraiser is in a far better position than under the first type of arrangement. He shares in the price rise occurring between the time the advance was made and the time of delivery, but he is not protected as in the first case, against a drop after the time of purchase.

In both cases however, the trader, being better informed about the markets in which final resale takes place, is in a better bargaining position, and farmers find themselves frequently taking the losses and foregoing the gains inherent in a rising market.

Both arrangements burden the farmer with a high interest rate on the amount advanced, ranging from 18 to 30 percent a year. Two factors account for the high rates: the prevailing markup over cost and the rate of turnover of stock. The profit on loans must equal that on a trade against cash which the trader could make with the amount loaned. If the markup on wool purchased and sold against cash is 25 percent, and, further, if the turnover of stock purchasable with the money advanced is three times a year, a merchant making an advance of 1,000 afghanis (see Glossary) to a farmer stands to forego 750 afghanis gross profit during the year, or 75 percent on 1,000 afghanis. Thus, under ordinary circumstances trading against cash may yield 75 percent interest and is more profitable than making loans.

Storage Facilities

One of the greatest impediments to developing wider marketing channels is the lack of adequate storage facilities, including warehouses and silos. Those that do exist are located only in the major cities. The government has built identical wheat silos in several towns, each of 1,280 tons capacity. The bagged grain is carried to the top of the silo and dumped loose into chutes; later, at the bottom it is bagged again for distribution. The Soviet Union has built grain silos in Kabul, Pul-i-Khumri, and Mazar-i-Sharif. It has also built petroleum storage tanks at Kabul, Mazar-i-Sharif, and Sher Khan. There is a refrigerated and dry storage warehouse in Kabul, but other warehousing facilities are limited to storage rooms attached to shops in the bazaars.

The Town Bazaar

Retail trade takes place in the bazaars of the towns, between individuals, between villages, and in nomad fairs. Bazaars, like others throughout Soviet Central Asia and the Middle East, consist of narrow winding streets and alleys lined on both sides with small stalls which serve both as workshops and salesrooms. In Herat and Kandahar parts of the bazaars are covered with arched roofs; those in Herat are of great antiquity. The Herat bazaar is located under the mighty walls and bulwarks of the citadel and behind the Masjid-i-Jami, or Friday Mosque, for which Herat is famous. The bazaars of Kabul are relatively new. The only one of Kabul's five bazaars to survive the bombing of the city by the British during the Third Anglo-Afghan War (1919) was made into a park in the early 1960's and shops on the street floor of new apartment and office buildings have replaced the bazaar stalls.

The bazaar is in reality a number of markets. Artisans and shop-

keepers are formed into guilds, and for certain guilds, including the coppersmiths, jewelers, and cloth sellers, each occupies its own section of the bazaar. Those who cannot afford to buy or rent a stall wander through the crowds or sit on alley corners selling their goods, such as matches, bread, small cakes, candy, and fruit.

Each guild has a *vakil-i-senfi*, a man whose primary function is to represent the members of the guild in their relationships with the government, serving as the government's contact man with members of that particular craft. Anyone who joins the craft must notify the *vakil-i-senfi*, or if an individual changes crafts or type of shop, the respective *vakil-i-senfi* must be informed. The *vakil-senfi's* duties revolve around the mayor's office. If the government want to see a particular craftsman, the *vakil-i-senfi* is expected to present the craftsman or shopkeeper at the proper government office. He also conveys complaints of guild members to the government. Other than as government contact man, price, wages, or quality of product do not lie within his province. His sole leverage with craft members lies in the fact that government work is meted out through him.

The city bazaar is the principal point of trading, storage, assembly into larger lots, or dispersion into smaller lots. On the whole, turnover is low so that the profit per individual transaction is high. Half of the loanable funds for the bazaar traders emanates from the bazaar moneylenders. Bazaar prices fluctuate widely, as does the spread between wholesale and retail quotations. Wide fluctuations occur only because inventories are either too low or because traders hold onto inventories sitting out a price fall. When supplies available to the market are low, a slight change in market conditions, a rumor about a wheat shipment from the United States for example, produces a violent reaction in prices. One observer has indicated that there are too many speculators in the trade business and too few intermediaries who might perform the normal wholesale function of smoothing out market fluctuations. Monthly price quotations issued by the Kabul Chamber of Commerce show that even the prices for such a nonperishable as wheat may vary 60 percent or more during one season, and for vegetables and fresh fruit even more than this.

The Nomad Fairs

Each summer the Ghilzai and Durani nomads hold four fairs in the Chahar Aimak and Hazara area. The greatest, the Bazaar-i-Abul, which thousands of villagers and nomads attend, is located southwest of Daulat Yar in the upper valley of the Hari Rud

where a number of caravan routes intersect. The fairs last from a month to 6 weeks.

Almost all the nomad groups meet to the trade and barter at these fairs. The Pashtun tribes of Khwazak, Niazi, Julabi, Taghar, Sulaiman Kheyl, Omerizai, and Ahmadzai come from Nangarhar Province, and from the country of the Mangals and Jadranas in the Khost region around Matun, some 50 miles southeast of Gardez; the Badris come from Herat in the northwest; the Mirazai, Achakzai Ashaab and Froat tribal groups come from Maimana, Qala Nau (northeast of Herat), and Farah (south of Herat). The Baluchis of the south and southeast bring merchandise and trade goods; the Turkic and Pashtun nomads of the west and northwest bring their flocks and their handicrafts. Usually from 25,000 to 30,000 people attend the fairs.

The fair is a scene of great confusion of bales, fodder, camels, and horses, arms, saddles and kitchen utensils, bags of rice, sugar, tea, and grain. People move through the melee dodging kicking horses, slobbering and hissing camels, and aggressive, snarling, barking mastiffs. Trading often takes place in crowded tents where Pashtuns, Hazaras, Chahar Aimaks, and other tribesmen bargain in Dari and Pashto.

On the first day of the fair a president is elected from among the nomad chiefs to govern the market. He appoints two representatives, called *dalal*, to supervise the proceedings and see that all transactions are just and fair. On the opening day, dancing, shooting contests, a cavalry show, and other entertainments are punctuated by volleys of ceremonial firing. The young men dance the *attan*, the national dance, which is said to have been brought to the Pashtuns by the Macedonian Greeks. The cavalry show consists of parades, counterparades, mock attacks of one tribe against another, trick riding exhibitions, and displays of the best horses. The next day the market begins with the sale and barter of goods and animals.

TRADE PRACTICES

Hours of business are not fixed; they vary from north to south, east to west, depending on the season. The bazaar merchant opens his small shop early in the morning and usually eats there lunch being brought from his home or from the *chai-khana* (tea houses). *Chai-khana* open earliest and close latest and are ready to open up to serve a customer even in the middle of the night. Moslem firms usually do not do business on Friday, Jewish firms not on Saturday. Sikh and Hindu firms seem to follow the Moslem majority.

Setting the Price

All Afghans—sellers, buyers, shopkeepers, artisans, consumers, drivers of *gaadi* (two-wheeled horsedrawn carriages) and taxis—expect to bargain. The buyer generally opens the transaction by bidding a third of the sum asked by the dealer. The latter shakes his head and puts away the article. The buyer then starts to walk away, only to be recalled after going a few paces, to begin bargaining again. The dealer offers two-thirds of the original bid. The process continues until agreement is reached or until one or the other loses interest. Sometimes the trader asks the customer to take tea in his stall and both squat, chatting and paying compliments. Prices not bargained for are more often than not set by the government. In Kabul a number of modern shops sell at fixed prices.

The government began price fixing at retail before World War II through its monopolies of sugar, petroleum products, tobacco and automobiles. During World War II it began extending the concept of price fixing to commodities other than those sold by the monopolies; among them were cloth and grain. In addition, the government at various times has set retail price ceilings on flour, meat, and bread. Postage, telephone, telegraph, and electricity rates are set by the government, as are bus fares and freight rates charged by the Afghan Royal Mail. Bus fares and taxi rates in urban centers are set by the municipalities.

Barter

Although the economy is becoming increasingly monetized, barter is still the prevailing method of exchange for goods and services. Most villagers are farmers whose income is in produce. Money may be received for the sale of farm produce, particularly cotton sold to the Cotton Company or sugar beets to the Baghlan Sugar Refinery, but is more likely to be obtained from textiles or carpets made by the family and sold to an itinerant merchant or to a merchant in the nearest bazaar town. The villager uses money only to pay taxes and for purchases he cannot make in any other way, perhaps for medicines. He is likely to convert money into specie or into gold and silver jewelry for the women in the family.

If the villager's own livestock are insufficient in number to provide the needs of his family for wool and hair for textiles and clothing, or for meat, butter, and fat, he may buy these livestock products with a portion of his crop from the nomadic stockbreeders who pass his village on their migration route. Other family requirements, such as lengths of cloth, needles and pins, buttons, and thread, his wife may purchase from itinerant merchants; or the vil-

lager may exchange his produce or the handicrafts produced by his family for these articles and small items of hardware, pots and pans, water jars, teapots, cups and saucers, and shoes in the nearest bazaar.

Nomadic stockbreeders, Turkomans or Pashtuns, also practice barter exchange even though they frequently sell for money and have become the major distributors of cash about the country. Turkoman stockbreeders barter with felts, woolen cloth, carpets, and other handicrafts for hardware. Pashtun stockbreeders exchange animal products and some live animals with the village farmers for cereals or with itinerant merchants for cloth and other consumer goods. The nomad depends on specialized artisans who furnish tent cloth; trappings for donkeys, camels, horses and ponies; bedrolls; and all cooking utensils. The nomad families themselves appear to make only carpets and felt cloaks, leather objects such as sacks for water, for churning, and for packing butter and curds, and threads and twine of wool and hair—all produced mostly by women.

Standardization of Measurements

Domestic trade has been hampered by the lack of uniformity in measurements of length, area, and weight since units are in use which have different values in different parts of the country or when applied to different commodities. Officially the country has adopted the metric system, but in practice other types of measurements are usually used.

A further problem affecting domestic trade is the absence of proper standardization and grading of local manufacturers and of agricultural and livestock products. All qualities of local produce are mixed, and little attempt is made to classify products according to varieties and sizes. Under such circumstances ordering merchandise sight unseen tends to depress prices to the lowest level and to undercut Afghan products in competition with comparable merchandise which is graded and standardized. The government, in order to improve quality and expand production of export commodities, has set price floors on karakul skins, wool, and cotton according to standards and grades, thereby forcing buyers to pay producers higher prices for quality.

TRANSPORTATION

The country has no railroad system or significant navigable rivers. Highways and trails form the transportation network for both domestic and export traffic. This system is supplemented by seven principal airports, two of which, Kabul and Kandahar, are

international airports built by the Soviet Union and the United States, respectively. A large amount of traffic is still carried by camels, donkeys, and horses.

A circumferential route connects the major urban centers, and from it a few access roads lead to the borders. The main road runs from Kabul via Ghazni to Kandahar, then to Girishk and Herat. From Herat it continues northeast to Maimana, Andkhui, Shibarghan, Balkh, Mazar-i-Sharif, and Tashkurghan, and from there a branch goes east to Kunduz, Khanabad, and Faizabad. The main road leads southeast from Tashkurghan to Pul-i-Khumri, then through the Salang Tunnel to Charikar and thence south to Kabul.

From Herat, in the northwest, motorable roads go to Islam Qala and Zulfikar on the Iran border and north through Khushk to the Soviet border. From Mazar-i-Sharif a road leads north to the river crossing at Termez on the Soviet border. There is also a 180-mile road from Kabul to Peshawar in Pakistan and in the south a road runs from Kandahar south to Chaman on the Pakistan border.

The highway and trail system is estimated to be about 8,500 miles. Approximately 1,250 miles are paved primary highways which will eventually be extended to ring the country. This ring, in 1967, was incomplete from Kunduz west to Herat. Roads leading to the borders of Iran, Pakistan, and the Soviet Union have also been paved. Road construction has received top priority as a basic essential for economic development, and with aid from the United States and the Soviet Union, internal communications have been substantially improved. The paved highways are supplemented by over 3,000 miles of secondary dirt roads and by about 4,000 miles of trails that are not always passable.

Camels and pack ponies utilizing thousands of miles of caravan routes provide the usual means of distributing goods throughout most of the country. Camels are generally used in the desert areas or where climbing is not involved; pack ponies are used in the mountains where trails are narrow and precipitous. Caravansaries (mud-walled fortress-like inns), located 20 miles apart, provide shelter and provisions for both man and beast along most of the caravan tracks. Some caravansaries along the motorable road which circles the country contain motor repair workshops. In and near the cities and towns much freight is hauled by men, either on their backs or on flat-bottomed carts.

At the end of 1966 the total number of registered vehicles was about 16,500, of which 8,100 were automobiles, 7,150 were trucks, and 1,250 were buses. Truck capacity ranged from 4 to 12 tons and averaged 6 tons.

Ariana Afghan Airlines Company, Ltd. (49 percent owned by

Pan American Airways) serves the major cities in Afghanistan and several foreign points with a fleet of two DC-3's, two DC-6's and one Convair 440. In 1966 Ariana flew over 48,000 passengers and more than 5.6 million ton-miles of freight, a considerable increase of traffic over previous years. The international airports at Kabul and Kandahar are served by several foreign airlines.

COMMUNICATIONS

All principal cities and many smaller towns and villages are served by the postal, telegraph and telephone systems. In 1966, 221 post offices handled almost 5 million letters and over a million issues of newspapers as well as post cards and parcels. Automatic telephone exchanges were operative in Kabul (5,000 lines) and Kandahar (1,500 lines), and 1,500-line automatic exchanges had been installed at Herat and Mazar-i-Sharif. The system was being improved by the installation of carrier-frequency systems throughout the country, additional automatic exchanges, and modern trunk exchanges. Twenty-nine telegraph stations and over 9,000 telephones were in operation in March 1966. Telegraph land lines connect with those in the Soviet Union, India, Iran, and Pakistan, and direct international service is available by radiotelegraph and/or radio telephone to the United States, Canada, the Soviet Union, Europe, Iran, India and Pakistan. Telephone, telegraph, and radio are government monopolies. In 1966 radios in the country were estimated to number between 300,000 and 400,000; there was no television.

THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT

The government has encouraged certain improvements in domestic trade practices and the expansion and modernization of storage and transportation facilities. It has advocated the use of the metric systems of weights and measures and has promoted standardization and grading of export products. It has also introduced commercial law and law courts and has applied partial price control.

Under *shariat* law relations between contracting parties have no clear and enforceable basis. Arbitrary decisions by judges differently interpreting the laws led to considerable uncertainty in the conduct of business. Since trade suffers from an unfavorable institutional framework, the government in 1954 promulgated a Commercial Code, patterned on Turkish, Swiss, and German commercial law. In 1967 the Commercial Code was being reviewed.

To make up for the lack of transport facilities and an inadequate road network, which are major deficiencies in the economy, the

government has directed a major share of development funds to speed road construction and maintenance and to induce the formation of transportation companies which will import trucks and set up truck repair stations.

Through its regulation of foreign exchange rates the government is able to affect traders in several ways. Traders selling to export markets are faced with different exchange rates applicable to different products in different countries. The applicable exchange rate determines the margin over purchase cost the trader can expect. If the product is sold on the domestic market as well, an exchange rate set too low may divert trade from export markets to domestic channels. A rate set too high may have the opposite effect. For traders buying imported articles the exchange rate set by the government directly determines his cost and, in an elastic market, indirectly determines the volume of sales. In this way the government can control the amount of trade business in various commodity categories. More, rather than less, government intervention in domestic trade appears to be the trend. The inflation that may occur as a result of the government's heavy foreign borrowing may force new price controls and other restrictive legislation.

CHAPTER 24

FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS

In 1967 the pattern of trade remained unchanged. Afghanistan was still importing products, such as sugar, fuels and lubricants, cement, iron, and steel in bulk, plus basic consumer goods from the Soviet Union and the other Eastern European Communist countries. Western countries and Japan supplied readymade goods, such as clothing, cooking utensils, radios, and automobile tires. General government policy was to provide for the continued development of trade. Steps were to be taken to improve exports in order to increase foreign currency earnings. This aim was to be achieved through expansion in the amount and improvement in the quality of export items together with special incentives to exporters.

An agricultural country with few developed resources and little industry, Afghanistan is primarily an exporter of agricultural products and an importer of industrial goods, although several items of farm origin are of significance in imports. As a landlocked country, the mix and direction of foreign trade is seriously affected by the country's relations with neighboring nations. Committed to a program of economic development for which it does not have the necessary financial and technical resources, it must also obtain extensive economic aid.

The problem of international indebtedness has added to the country's foreign economic difficulties. Since World War II the export-import equilibrium which formerly characterized the economy has been deeply disturbed. After the war and particularly since 1954, the government's determination to carry out an ambitious economic and military development program increased its import demand far beyond its export earning capacity. The export-import imbalance combined with the country's ambitious development plans was seized upon by the Soviet Union as a means of penetrating the Afghan economy as well as the political life. The Soviet Union, by offering long-term loans, grants, and barter agreements, has become a major supplier of machinery, petroleum products and technical assistance in roadbuilding and in surveying and exploiting the country's natural resources. Afghanistan has also received loans and grants from the United States.

The government's long-range goal is to decrease its dependence on the import of certain basic commodities and to improve its export position. In contrast with many countries in Asia and Latin America, which seek to reduce their dependence on foreign exchange from agricultural products, Afghanistan has not hesitated to continue investment in the improvement of its traditional agricultural export items. Not only has the government encouraged improvements and expanded production in agriculture, stockbreeding, and handicrafts, but it has also established firms to expand markets for karakul, wool, cotton, carpets, and fresh and processed fruits. This policy reflects the government's belief that sales of these products will produce the maximum foreign exchange revenue in the foreseeable future. It appears to assume that, despite evidence that the demand for such items is subject to sharp fluctuations, there will be a continuing sizable market for these products.

The government also seeks to lessen the country's dependence on those imported basic consumer commodities which could be as cheaply produced domestically from local raw materials especially if transit costs are taken into account; examples are sugar, cotton textiles, and processed foods. By cutting down such imports, more foreign exchange will be available for the import of capital goods. No official plans have been made to establish heavy industries which would require such extensive investment that domestically produced items would be more expensive than imported ones.

THE PATTERN OF FOREIGN TRADE

Until 1955 India, Pakistan, Germany, Great Britain, the United States, and Japan were Afghanistan's most important trading partners. Since then the Soviet Union and other Communist countries have assumed an increasingly prominent position in total trade. In 1966 they accounted for 66 percent of Afghanistan's exports and 42 percent of its imports.

Trade flows into and out of Afghanistan by land and by air. Along the Amu Darya trade goods destined for and from the Soviet Union arrive and depart by ferry and river barge, utilizing the Soviet railhead ports of Kelif, Termez, and Nizhnir Pyandzh and the Afghan ports of Dagla Arasa Pata Kesar, and Sher Khan (Qizil Qala)—the last being the major port for petroleum. From the Afghan ports goods are shipped to the interior by truck.

Heavy vehicular traffic between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan generally crosses the border on the road between Chehil Dukhtaran in Afghanistan and Kushka in the Soviet Union and

travels to the interior via Herat. The little trade that Afghanistan has with Iran flows between Herat and Meshed by truck, camel, or horse caravan as does trade across the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Produce from Afghanistan is trucked or flown to New Delhi, Karachi, or way points; some shipped to or across Pakistan is delivered at the railheads located in Peshawar and Chaman for transshipment into India or to Karachi for overseas delivery.

Exports

Exports consist, as they have for more than 40 years, almost entirely of the products of agriculture and animal husbandry and are concentrated on a few items. Exports have increased substantially both in volume and in value since 1951 because of the overall expansion in sales of karakul and of exportable surpluses resulting from improvement in agricultural production. In 1966, as in the 1950's, slightly more than one-third of the total value of exports consisted of fresh and dried fruits and nuts (see table 6). Karakul skins which are the major earners of hard currency accounted for 23 percent of the total value in 1966, a decrease from 27.5 percent of the total value in 1957; wool, cotton, carpets, and sheepskins supplied the remainder.

Markets for these products are unstable, and prices fluctuate widely. Fresh and dried fruits are perishable and liable to spoilage by insects, dirt, and heat or by delays in transit. Karakul is both an expensive luxury and subject to the whims of fashion. For instance, the United States' market for karakul has shrunk because the American consumer since World War II has preferred mink or artificial furs. The quality of cotton, wool, and hides is uneven, and Afghan shipments do not command the best prices. Even carpets and rugs, once regarded as the best in the world, despite price increases are losing their marketability, allegedly as a result of deteriorating quality.

Leading customers in 1966 were the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom the United States, Pakistan, and West Germany (see table 7). Shipments to India, usually Afghanistan's second best customer, had declined as a result of the India-Pakistan border dispute. The Soviet Union retains its position as Afghanistan's principal customer by large purchases of fruit and nuts, raw cotton, and wool. The largest purchaser of fruit and nuts in 1966 was Pakistan, replacing India. The United Kingdom is the foremost market for karakul skins, followed by the United States which also buys almost as much fruit and nuts as the Soviet Union. West Germany is the principal purchaser of carpets; the United Kingdom, the second best customer.

Table 6. Value of Afghan Exports, 1957, 1960 and 1964-66
(in millions of U.S. dollars)

Commodity #	1957	1960	1964	1965	1966
Fresh and dried fruit and nuts...	13.3	15.7	14.4	19.2	24.0
Karakul skins	14.1	17.4	16.8	12.5	16.1
Raw wool	7.4	9.7	7.4	6.2	2.0
Raw cotton	8.8	7.7	12.6	14.9	11.1
Carpets and rugs	3.3	5.5	6.4	8.7	8.9
Other exports	4.4	4.4	11.4	9.2	7.9
Total	51.3	60.4	69.0	70.7	70.0

Source: Adapted from Afghanistan, Ministry of Commerce, *Afghanistan's Foreign Trade, 1335 through 1342* (March 21, 1956, through March 20, 1964), p. 2; *ibid.*, *A Summary of Afghanistan's Foreign Trade in 1343* (March 22, 1964, through March 20, 1965), p. 2; and *ibid.*, *A Summary of Afghanistan's Foreign Trade in 1344* (March 21, 1965, through March 20, 1966), p. 2.

Imports

Afghanistan was self-sufficient in the production of foodstuffs, except sugar and tea, until 1957 when 40,000 metric tons of wheat were imported because of drought. Wheat shipments which are imported under Public Law 480 from the United States and which are a gift are not included in imports. Between 1958 and 1962 annual imports of wheat averaged 50,000 tons and between 1963 and 1967, 97,000 tons. Imports rose steadily from 732 million afghanis (see Glossary) in 1952 to 4.1 billion afghanis in 1966, reflecting the increased investment in development projects. Leading imports are textiles (largely cotton cloth), petroleum products, motor vehicles, and miscellaneous manufactured products (see table 8). In the 1950's and 1960's, imports of building materials, machinery, and petroleum products have assumed a greater proportion of the total.

The leading suppliers in 1966, as in 1956, were the Soviet Union, Japan, India Pakistan, West Germany, and the United States (see table 9). Purchases from the Soviet Union were largely petroleum products, sugar, motor vehicles, and cotton fabrics. Japan, the second major supplier, shipped rayon and cotton textiles, rubber tires and tubes, and other manufactured articles. Indian shipments included tea, cotton, and textiles; Pakistani shipments were cotton fabrics and chemical products. Purchases from West Germany consisted of medicinal and pharmaceutical products, plumbing, heating, and lighting equipment. and miscellaneous manufactures. The United States supplied used clothing, motor vehicles, and petroleum products.

The position of the Soviet Union has improved greatly since

Table 7. Direction of Afghan Exports, by Commodity, in 1966
(in millions of U.S. dollars)

Commodity	Soviet Union	United States	India	United Kingdom	West Germany	Pakistan	Other Barter Countries	Other Countries	Total
Fresh and dried fruit and nuts	4.5	4.3	4.64	0.04	0.02	7.3	0.8	2.4	24.0
Karakul skins	...	6.0	...	10.0		...	...	0.1	16.1
Raw wool	1.2	0.6	...	...	0.2	...	...	...	2.0
Raw cotton	8.7	...	...	0.3	1.0	...	0.6	0.5	11.1
Carpets and rugs	...	...	...	1.9	4.3	...	...	2.7	8.9
Other exports	3.1	...	0.3	0.1		2.3	0.3	1.8	7.9
Total	17.5	10.9	4.94	12.34	5.52	9.6	1.7	7.5	70.0

Source: Adapted from Afghanistan, Ministry of Commerce, *Afghanistan's Foreign Trade in 1344 March 21, 1965, through March 20, 1966*, p. 1.

Table 8. Major Afghan Imports, 1957, 1960 and 1964-66
(in millions of U.S. dollars)

Commodity	1957	1960	1964	1965	1966
Sugar	3.1	3.2	1.2	5.7	3.0
Tea	2.8	3.2	3.7	4.2	2.9
Petroleum products	1.2	4.8	6.5	7.5	4.3
Medicinal and pharmaceutical products	0.4	0.8	2.1	2.6	1.5
Other chemicals	0.1	0.6	2.8	1.3	1.6
Rubber tires and tubes	n.a.	1.2	2.9	1.1	2.1
Cotton fabrics	7.1	5.3	2.7	3.9	4.0
Other fabrics	7.2	7.1	5.6	5.8	4.3
Nonmetallic manufactures	1.6	2.8	5.2	4.4	3.5
Metallic manufactures	0.9	1.3	2.2	2.2	1.9
Electric machinery	1.0	0.7	1.4	2.0	1.9
Other machinery	5.5	0.9	0.7	1.3	0.8
Motor vehicles	3.8	3.8	4.0	1.5	3.9
Other transport equipment	0.8	0.8	1.2	1.0	1.0
Used clothing	n.a.	0.7	1.5	2.1	1.4
Footwear	n.a.	1.2	1.5	1.8	1.6
Miscellaneous manufactured articles	n.a.	2.1	3.7	4.1	3.9
Other and unknown	9.0	4.6	13.0	14.4	12.9
Total	44.5	45.1	61.9	66.9	56.5

n.a.—not available.

Source: Adapted from: Afghanistan, Ministry of Commerce, *Afghanistan's Foreign Trade 1335 through 1342* (March 21, 1956, through March 20, 1964), p. 33; *ibid.*, *A Summary of Afghanistan's Foreign Trade in 1343* (March 22, 1964, through March 20, 1965), p. 6; and *ibid.*, *A Summary of Afghanistan's Foreign Trade in 1344* (March 21, 1965, through March 20, 1966), p. 6.

1957, particularly as a result of increased delivery of petroleum products. Bulk supplies are imported through the 350,000 gallon storage installation at Kabul and the 120,000 gallon installations at Mazar-i-Sharif at Herat. The only storage facilities available to United States petroleum imports, all of which come through Pakistan, are small. American petroleum products are sold in cans and drums and are more expensive than the Soviet bulk product.

Smuggling

A large but unknown number of smugglers cross Afghan frontiers, taking advantage of the mountain and desert terrain, with the object of evading payment of customs duties. Some smuggling is carried out by truckers, some by the nomads who cross the borders on their seasonal trek, and some by caravaneers who operate over routes they have used for centuries.

Table 9. Countries Supplying Afghan Imports, 1957, 1960 and 1964-66
(in millions of U.S. dollars)

Country	1957	1960	1964	1965	1966
Soviet Union	15.3	13.3	16.0	19.0	18.2
United States	7.3	1.8	6.4	4.5	3.7
India	11.4	8.0	10.5	8.0	5.0
Pakistan	4.3	2.4	1.9	4.9	4.0
Germany	1.2	2.3	3.9	6.7	3.7
Japan	2.3	7.4	8.6	9.2	8.0
United Kingdom	0.6	1.4	2.0	2.2	2.9
Other barter countries	1.0	3.8	5.8	4.5	5.6
Other countries	1.1	4.7	6.8	7.9	5.4
Total	44.5	45.1	61.9	66.9	56.5

Source: Adapted from Afghanistan Ministry of Commerce, *Afghanistan's Foreign Trade, 1335 through 1342* (March 21, 1956, through March 20, 1964), p. 34, 37; *ibid.*, *A Summary of Afghanistan's Foreign Trade in 1343* (March 22, 1964, through March 20, 1965), p. 6; and *ibid.*, *A Summary of Afghanistan's Foreign Trade in 1344* (March 21, 1965, through March 20, 1966), p. 6.

Most smuggling by truck occurs across the southern and western borders where the truck can be driven across the desert during the night and thus evade the customs post on the road. Another method is for the truck not to leave Afghanistan but to park in the desert off the road and rendezvous with a caravan which has crossed the border at some unpatrolled point.

Items smuggled in are usually consumer goods and run the gamut of articles to be found in the bazaars of neighboring countries. Tea, sugar, haberdashery, and other clothing are perennial favorites. Opium, hashish, and karakul skins are usual items which are smuggled out.

With the exception of the Soviet border which has been carefully patrolled since the 1920's, most borders can be crossed relatively freely by certain tribal groups in their seasonal treks with their flocks. The Baluchis cross between Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan; the Chahar Aimaks and the Turkomans between Iran and Afghanistan. All carry some trade goods for barter purposes. The Ghilzai and Durani Pashtuns, who for centuries crossed between Afghanistan and Pakistan with their flocks, since the closure of the Pakistan border from 1961-63 leave their animals in Afghanistan but continue their transborder trading activities.

Certain clans among the Ghilzai Pashtuns, the Baluchis, and the Turkomans operate smuggling caravans. The Ghilzais have been known to participate in the opium traffic from the Persian Gulf across Afghanistan to the Indus basin; southern Iran and the western part of the Baluchistan desert in Pakistan and Af-

ghanistan are usual Baluchi areas of operation. Baluchi caravans are in the carrying trade from the Persian Gulf as far north as Herat and Meshed. Across the north from Meshed to Wakhan, Turkoman caravans take over. The Atrenji clan of the Turkomans for many centuries operated the semiannual opium caravans from Faizabad to Yarkand in Sinkiang. These caravans ceased operation within the last 10 years. The border with Communist China is said to be closed, but the Atrenjis may have found new markets in Chitral or Kashmir.

THE TRANSIT PROBLEM

Since Afghanistan has no seaport, all exports and imports to and from other countries must cross the Soviet Union, Iran, or Pakistan (see ch. 2, Physical Environment).

Before 1955, 80 percent of Afghan exports and 79 percent of imports crossed Pakistan. The use of this route was a natural extension of the direction of Afghan trade and of the privileges of duty-free transit granted to Afghan traffic by British India. The discontinuance of these privileges by Pakistan in 1947, after the partition of India and the virtual halting of Afghan shipments through Pakistan, not only jeopardize Afghan trade in general, but also deprived Afghan merchants of the valuable Indian fruit market.

As ill feeling between Afghanistan and Pakistan deepened over the Pashtunistan issue, the Pakistan Government increased economic pressures (see ch. 16, Foreign Relations). Afghan merchants experienced delayed shipments, the levy of penalties in the form of forced demurrage charges, refusal of railroad wagons, difficulties in customs prevention of reexport of goods, repeated inspection of transit goods at every road or rail junction and custom-house, carelessness in loading and unloading of Afghan transit goods, and refusal of storage.

In December 1950 Pakistan stopped all shipments of gasoline to Afghanistan on the grounds that Afghan trucks did not conform to Pakistan safety regulations. Immediately, the Afghans contracted to buy oil and petroleum products from the Soviet Union. After United States and British representations were made to Pakistan the border was reopened, only to be closed again in 1955, after Kabul's intensification of the Pashtunistan demands. This time the Soviet Union proposed a transit agreement as well as massive economic aid. The transit agreement, signed in Moscow in late 1955, entitled both countries to duty-free transit facilities for the ensuing 5 years. Although the border was reopened after a 5-month blockade, a large portion of Afghan trade had been diverted to and through the Soviet Union.

To counter Soviet economic policies and to maintain its major role in the economic development of Afghanistan and Pakistan, the United States attempted to help resolve Afghanistan's transit difficulties with Pakistan. Partly through United States efforts, a transport and trade agreement was signed by Afghanistan and Pakistan on May 30, 1958.

Shortly afterward, the Pakistan Minister of Commerce and Industries issued new regulations to improve the movement of freight in transit to and from Afghanistan. A month after the transit and trade agreement was signed, Pakistan and the United States International Cooperation Administration, the predecessor to the Agency for International Development (AID), signed an agreement for the improvement of the Pakistan North Western Railway to Afghanistan, followed by a similar agreement with Afghanistan. The United States planned to make available to Pakistan a grant of over \$7 million in addition to 83 million rupees (see Glossary) in counterpart funds for this project.

These plans for the development of the Afghan transit trade across Pakistan were, however, disrupted by the closure of the border (this time by Afghanistan) again in September 1961. As the border remained closed during 1962, the United States aid shipments for Afghanistan continued to pile up on the Karachi docks, and the Shah of Iran offered to mediate the dispute. As a result of his efforts and his visits to Kabul and Rawalpindi, the dispute between the two countries was finally negotiated in July 1963 although the border was not opened until August 12.

In the meantime a supplementary transit agreement had been signed with the Soviet Union providing for an expansion of transit facilities. In addition, on January 9, 1962, a transit agreement was signed with Iran which provided for a discount in railroad freight rates for Afghan goods crossing Iran. A preferential tariff was also granted on Afghan goods shipped from the Iranian port of Khorramshar on the Persian Gulf to the terminus of the Iranian State Railway at Meshed. United States diplomacy reportedly placed an active role in leading the two countries to find common ground for the agreement. By 1967 Afghan trade through Iran was still negligible but was expected to increase when road improvement projects were completed.

FOREIGN AID AND LOANS

Since 1949 Afghanistan has received almost \$1 billion in technical assistance, grants-in-aid and loans from the United States West Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Japan, India, the United Arab Republic, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Bulgaria,

Communist China, and international organizations. The United States the Soviet Union, and international organizations have been the main sources of nonreimbursable technical assistance, grants-in-aid, technical services and equipment for which no repayment is required of the Afghan Government. The Soviet Union, the United States, and West Germany have been the major suppliers of loan funds. The Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Poland, West Germany, and Japan have also assisted Afghanistan by granting short-term credits.

United States

Afghanistan has received nearly \$350 million in aid and loans from the United States since 1949. About \$166 million has been in direct grants, most from AID and its predecessor agencies. Some \$111 million was in the form of wheat shipments, the proceeds from the sale of which remained in Afghanistan as counterpart funds to be invested in development projects under agreement. About \$72 million is in the form of loans. Two loans totaling \$30 million were granted by the United States Export-Import Bank for the development of the Helmand Valley project, and the remainder were loans from AID and its predecessor agencies for a number of purposes. The only direct private investment is Pan-American Airways' investment of \$400,000 in Ariana Afghan Airlines Company, Ltd.

By far the most substantial amount of aid from the United States has been the nearly \$100 million spent on the Helmand Valley project to improve irrigation and flood control, to increase hydroelectric power, and to resettle nomads. The project was initiated independently by the Afghan Government before World War II. In 1946 the government let a contract to the United States engineering firm, Morrison-Knudsen, to complete the work. The cost of the project and depression of the karakul market by 1948 had seriously depleted foreign exchange reserves, and the government requested financial assistance from the Export-Import Bank.

In 1950 the Export-Import Bank granted a loan of \$21 million, repayable in 9 years, beginning in 1956. In 1953 it gave another \$18.5 million which was reduced to \$9 million at the Afghan Government's request. At the same time the Bank revised the payment terms of the 1950 loan by granting the Afghans 18 years to repay both loans, payments running concurrently from October 1958 to April 1976.

Interruptions of transit trade through Pakistan hampered work on the project. By 1955 the government had spent \$70 million of its own reserves on improvements in the Helmand Valley, and

very little progress had been registered. The United States has financed completion of major construction works and assisted in the organization and training of the staff of the Helmand Valley Authority. United States personnel still serve in an advisory capacity.

By the end of 1966 AID and its predecessor agencies had spent some \$66 million in grants for development in the fields of agriculture, education, industry, mining and transportation (including \$24 million for air transport). It also included a grant of \$19 million for construction of the road from Kabul to the Afghanistan-Pakistan border at Spin Baldak, southeast of Kandahar. The same series of agencies also lent Afghanistan \$26.4 million to finance the development of a road maintenance unit to train Afghans for the construction of a section of the Kabul-Tor Kham highway (at the Khyber Pass), for the purchase of aircraft by Ariana Afghan Airlines and of special heavy duty trucks, tires, spare parts, and lubricants, for the construction of a road from Herat to Islam Qala on the Iranian border and for the encouragement of private enterprise in industry and agriculture.

In August 1967 the United States Government announced that AID was lending Afghanistan \$12 million to finance the purchase of United States hydroelectric generators, transmission, and other equipment for the 33,000 kilowatt powerplant to be constructed at the Kajakai Dam, northwest of Kandahar, and \$4.6 million for plans, equipment, and training required for a program to improve some 5,000 acres a year through irrigation and other works in the Helmand Valley.

West Germany

The establishment of Afghan industry and the construction of power installations were accomplished largely with the help of German firms, especially Siemens-Schukert, and were backed by German government credits. Before World War II German engineers and technicians were introduced into the industrialization program because of the policies of Mohammad Nadir Shah, from 1929 to 1933, and of Nazi Germany. Determined to develop Afghan industry, and realizing that European assistance was indispensable, Nadir Shah was driven by his suspicions of British and French intentions to conclude that Germany was the least dangerous of the technically advanced nations. At the same time Germany, eager to supplant traditional British influence and to infiltrate an area on the flank of British India, offered generous terms. The textile company and model town of Pul-i-Khumri, the Kunduz industrial enclave, the woolen mills at Kabul and Kandahar, and most of the pre-World War II power installations were the result.

Since 1950 German credits made possible considerable expansion in both industry and power capacity. The Pul-i-Khumri cotton textile plant was retooled and doubled its yarn-spinning capacity. The Gulbahar cotton textile plant north of Kabul, which can supply nearly half Afghanistan's domestic requirements for cotton cloth, and the Sarobi and Mahipar power projects on the Kabul River, which have more than doubled Afghanistan's power capacity, were completed. An agricultural development project was begun at Khost.

By the end of 1966 West Germany had lent Afghanistan the equivalent of \$54.4 million and in addition had given over \$3 million in grants. German technical assistance includes an 85-man volunteer German Development Service (Peace Corps), an economic advisory group in the Ministry of Planning, Khost regional development, including advisory services in forestry and agriculture, a geological survey of southwest Afghanistan, advisory services to the Afghan Electric Institute, the National Energy Board, Radio Afghanistan, and the Institute of Public Health.

Japan

In 1956 the Prime Minister, renewing pre-World War II economic ties, visited Japan and arranged for a long-term credit. Subsequently, the Marubini Company of Japan joined with the Cotton Company to establish the 1.4 million afghani ceramics factory at Kunduz. Other Afghan-Japanese corporations have developed enterprises for the manufacture of glass and glassware, knitwear, socks and stockings, and the assembly of bicycles. Japanese technical assistance includes the building of laboratories, workshops, small electric power stations, and several municipal water systems.

Other Non-Communist Nations

British aid consists largely of industrial credits on concessionary terms. Credits have included £225,000 (£1 equals US\$2.40) for extension of the Baghlan Sugar Refinery and £650,000 for the Bost Cotton Oil Seed Plant. In 1965 Great Britain made an interest free loan of £200,000 for the purchase of 135 Bedford trucks and buses and for the construction of a 200-bed hotel in Kabul. French aid is mainly in the form of technical assistance: professors in law and medicine for Kabul University; the establishment of and teachers for a French-language center at Kabul University; and a woodworking center and furniture factory in Kunar province.

India has given Afghanistan a 100-bed children's hospital and provided several teachers for secondary schools, and an adviser to the *Kabul Times*. The United Arab Republic (Egypt) supplies

the Ministry of Justice with an adviser on the criminal code and teachers of Arabic to Kabul University.

Soviet Union

By the end of 1966 Afghanistan had received the equivalent of about \$600 million in loans, credits, grants, and technical assistance from the Soviet Union. The original loans were allocated in six different categories of development: silo construction, municipal and public works, petroleum survey, industrial construction, national defense, and general purpose development.

Although the Bolshevik government in 1921 recognized the independence of Afghanistan, Afghan suspicions of Russian designs kept their relations to a correct business basis until the initiation early in the 1950's of the Soviet economic offensive in underdeveloped nations.

In 1950 when Pakistan cut off Afghanistan's supply of petroleum products, the Soviet Union offered Afghanistan a 4-year trade agreement. Signed in July 1950, the Soviet Union undertook to export petroleum products, cotton, cloth, sugar, and other commodities at lower prices than other suppliers in exchange for Afghan wool and cotton, for which the Soviet Union was willing to pay higher prices than other customers. The Soviet Union also offered to carry out oil exploration in northern Afghanistan. To facilitate delivery of gasoline and kerosene, large storage tanks were to be built on the Amu Darya by the Soviet Union. To ease Afghanistan's transit difficulties, the Soviet Union offered favorable transit terms for Afghan goods to cross its territories. In 1954 Moscow granted a credit, the equivalent of \$8 million, for the construction of eight gasoline storage tanks and a 60-mile pipeline across the Amu Darya. The credit was to be paid in cotton and other Afghan commodities.

Direct loans became a part of the Soviet Union's arsenal for economic penetration in 1954 when the \$8 million credit was followed by a loan equivalent to \$3.5 million, at 3 percent interest for the construction of a wheat silo in Pul-i-Khumri and a wheat silo, flour mill, and bakery in Kabul. This loan, to be spent on Soviet equipment and technical services, was repayable in United States dollars or in karakul, cotton, and other commodities at the rate of \$1 million a year, beginning in 1957. Another loan granted in 1954 was for \$2.1 million to finance the construction of an asphalt factory and the paving of Kabul's streets.

The high point in loans was reached in December 1955, when, at the end of their 3-day visit to Kabul, Premier Nikolai Bulganin and Nikita Khrushchev offered Afghanistan a long-term loan equiva-

lent to \$100 million. A gift to the city of Kabul of a 100-bed hospital and 15 buses accompanied the loan offer. The loan agreement, signed on January 28, 1956, committed the Soviet Union to export equipment and materials for cooperative ventures in the development of agriculture and the construction of irrigation projects. Repayment was to be made in export goods within 30 years at 2 percent interest in 22 equal annual installments. Repayments were not to begin until 8 years after delivery of the equipment.

Under this loan a further agreement was signed on March 1, 1956, providing for the Soviet Union to supply materials, equipment, and technical assistance for the construction of two hydroelectric stations, three vehicle repair workshops, an irrigation project, a physics and chemistry laboratory, reconstruction of the airport at Kabul, construction of a new airport at Bagram, and a highway across the Hindu Kush. Soviet specialists and technicians were to supervise these projects and train Afghan labor.

In August 1956 the Afghan Prime Minister announced that the Soviet Union had agreed to give military aid to Afghanistan. Under this agreement signed between Afghanistan, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and East Germany, a \$25 million credit was granted Afghanistan for arms purchases to be repaid in Afghan goods over an 8-year period in easy installments. Additional credits for this purpose have been granted subsequently, and in 1967 the Afghan armed services and police had been armed and equipped by the Soviet Union which had also delivered tanks, jet aircraft, and helicopters.

During the visit of King Mohammad Zahir Shah to Moscow in 1957, the Soviet Union made a further offer of \$15 million for oil prospecting in northern Afghanistan. A protocol of June 26, 1958, outlined the surveys to be carried out by Soviet technicians which would lead to possible irrigation and hydroelectric projects by both nations utilizing the waters of the Amu Darya.

Beginning in 1958, \$16 million of the loan funds were used to pay for the shipment to Afghanistan of Soviet oil, sugar, and margarine, and the proceeds from their sale in Afghan currency were used to finance Afghanistan's share of the construction costs on the Jangalak auto repair shop near Kabul. The Soviet Union also made gifts of grain: 10,000 tons in 1959 and 30,000 in 1960. As the Russians began to suffer from their own crop failures, they substituted sugar and oil for wheat. This policy continued into 1967. On May 28, 1959, the Soviets announced another gift, the building of a 425-mile highway from Kushka to Herat to Kandahar, estimated to cost \$140 million, which could be used by the Soviets in case of conflict.

Two new loans, one for \$81 million and the second for \$116

million, were signed in late 1961 and another for \$20 million in 1962. Funds were to be used to finance the construction at Mazar-i-Sharif of a nitrate fertilizer plant and a thermal powerplant to be fueled by natural gas, a film studio and home-construction factory in Kabul, a Technical Institute, four state farms at Jalalabad, an oil refinery, and an electric grid from Nagalu to Kabul. On June 25, 1964, a \$39 million loan was ratified for the exploitation of natural gas deposits and a small sum of about \$170,000 for the construction of an atomic reactor. A feature of the loan for the development of natural gas resources is that the principal and 2.5 percent interest on the loan are to be repaid in gas from the deposits.

Other Communist Nations

Other assistance has come from Czechoslovakia. In 1956 the country signed an agreement with Czechoslovakia for the exchange of Afghan cotton for Czech machinery. This was extended in 1957 to include motor vehicles and telecommunications equipment and again in 1958 to include building materials, glassware, and ceramics. Also in 1958 a Czech organization contracted to establish a new telephone exchange in Kandahar. Under a \$5 million loan cement plants were built at Jabal us Siraj and Pul-i-Khumri. The Czechs also undertook the construction of a fruit-preserving plant at Kandahar. They provided technical assistance to the Karkar coal mine, near Baghlan, and medical personnel at the 100-bed Wazir Akhbar Khan hospital in Kabul.

Although they trade with Afghanistan, most of the other Communist countries have extended little economic aid. In 1956 Afghanistan signed a trade agreement with Poland which provided for the exchange of Afghan agricultural produce for Polish machinery, tractors, cement and consumer goods. A similar agreement signed in September 1960 also provided for technical assistance. In June 1961 a trade agreement was signed with Bulgaria, and the Bulgarians are rendering technical assistance on inland fisheries and various activities in the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation.

Economic activities of the Communist-bloc nations have also included those of Communist China. In January 1957 Premier Chou En Lai arrived at Kabul, and the following July the first trade agreement between Afghanistan and Communist China was signed. China agreed to exchange tea, textiles, paper, machinery, and building materials for Afghan agricultural produce. In 1965 as part of the bargaining which preceded the expected opening of the Algerian conference, the Chinese announced a loan equivalent to \$28 million, but by the end of 1967 no agreement had been reached on use of the funds.

International Organizations

Afghanistan was one of the first countries to request technical assistance from the United Nations. Since 1949 the United Nations and its Specialized Agencies—the International Labor Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, the World Health Organization, the International Civil Aviation Organization, the International Telecommunications Union, the World Meteorological Organization—have supplied the services of experts and equipment valued at more than \$9 million in the fields of education, health, agriculture, industry, engineering, communications, and civil aviation. The direct results of this program include the eradication of some epidemic diseases among livestock; important increases in production of wheat, cotton, and sugar beets; and a marked improvement in the quality and value of karakul skins.

In addition, in June 1964 the United Nations Special Fund announced two loans to Afghanistan. The first, a 4-year loan of \$811,000 was to be used for the survey of the direct road from Kabul to Herat across the Hazarajat; the second, a 4-year loan of \$1.6 million to carry out additional studies in the Hari Rud and upper Kabul river basins for the development of new irrigation projects and to set up two pilot irrigation stations in the basins. Also in 1964 the International Development Association (IDA) announced a credit equivalent to \$3.5 million repayable in 50 years to help finance the construction and equipment of seven vocational secondary schools. In 1965 the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development agreed to finance a survey of the irrigation and agricultural project in the Kunduz Valley.

Afghanistan is a member of the Colombo Plan (see Glossary) which has granted scholarships to more than a hundred Afghan technicians and students.

Private Foundations

Assistance is also received from private foundations. Cooperative for American Remittances to Everywhere, Inc.—Medical International Cooperation Organization (CARE—MEDICO) supplies medical specialists of various types, and the Asia Foundation provides advisers in various government agencies or technical experts requested by the government.

Balance of Payments

No reliable statistics on balance of payments are available on a consistent basis over a period of several years. Those that are given

cover only certain major transactions, and import figures exclude loan and grant imports which are about as large as commercial imports but are entirely financed from abroad, mainly the Soviet Union and the United States.

Afghanistan's balance of payments appears to have been favorable until after World War II, when the country entered into a large-scale development program. Shipments of karakul skins to the United States, Great Britain, and Germany and of fruit to India were more than sufficient to pay for the few consumer goods which Afghanistan imported and for the German equipment and technical assistance which established its few prewar industrial and power installations. Since the end of World War II, however, both imports and exports have greatly increased, imports at a faster rate than exports. The deficit has been met by foreign grants and loans.

THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT

Government departments and government-controlled or-sanctioned monopolies account for a large part of Afghanistan's imports. Exports, however, are generally handled by the private sector. Imports of a few items are prohibited on religious or security grounds, and a number of products considered nonessential or domestically available are also prohibited. Otherwise, government control over imports is exercised through the sale of foreign exchange by the Bank of Afghanistan.

Export controls generally are limited to exports to bilateral agreement countries, although the government may occasionally impose administrative restrictions to influence the direction of trade. From time to time the government may also require surrender to the Bank of Afghanistan of part of the proceeds of exports to its bilateral trading partners in order to correct adverse balances. Otherwise, it exercises no controls over exports.

Expansion and improvement of the export trade have been, since the reign of Nadir Shah, a first principle of the Afghan Government. It was to expand foreign trade and to market Afghan products abroad through Afghan firms that the government established the first bank, the Afghan National Bank for the first *shirkats* (joint companies). The government recognized that the country is dependent on further expansion of foreign trade to finance the development program. To this end, in addition to signing many barter and trade agreements with other nations, the government has encouraged numerous improvements in the production of exportable commodities and in the marketing of those products which are the mainstay of the export trade.

CHAPTER 25

PUBLIC FINANCE

By 1967 public finance had evolved from a heterogeneous mass of inherited practices to a relatively modern system of revenue collection and government expenditure. The government, under the Constitution of 1964, was required to present an annual budget to the Houses of Parliament where its provisions were open to inspection and debate. Improvement in the form and presentation of the budget indicated that the government desired to conform to accepted modern methods; defense spending, however, still remained secret. Expenditures had steadily increased over the decade as both government services and government investment in development expanded. Although reforms were contemplated which would greatly enhance the government's ability to raise revenues, only minor changes had been made in the tax structure.

The tax system reflects Islamic principles, a degree of local and tribal autonomy, and the practical effects of the country's traditional role as a caravan crossroads in the Central Asian transit trade. Based largely on customs duties collected in the towns and on taxes on income from trade, the system bears lightly on land-ownership, agriculture and stockraising.

Reforms which would increase government revenue, correct imbalances, and develop the economy have been discussed since 1955. Some reforms have been adopted and in mid-1967 other new measures were expected. The stated aim of the government's policy is to prevent the concentration of wealth in the hands of a few, to induce a more equitable distribution of purchasing power among consumers and to create a favorable climate for investment likely to increase the country's productive capacity.

The basic concept of taxation is the Islamic *zakat*, a tax levied by the state which uses the surplus of the well-to-do for the benefit of the poor. The principle of its application is the more capital and labor involved in the accumulation of income, the less the income should be taxed. Articles should be taxed in inverse proportion to their perishability and in direct proportion to their capacity for production, growth and reproduction. In practice, however, the government has invested funds in the development of agricul-

ture, and gets disproportionately little tax revenue from the expanding agricultural income it has created. Government investment has also raised urban land values without any proportionate return in taxes from large increases in income resulting from speculation in land.

Collection of taxes is the responsibility of the provincial governors. An administrator of tax collections representing the Ministry of Finance is on each Governor's staff. Each provincial district (*woleswali*) is administered by a *woleswal*; in the larger provinces, districts are subdivided into subdistricts administered by an *alakadar*. Each tribal *jirgah*, a council made up of the lineage leaders and the heads of families, elects a *wakil* who represents them in local government fiscal affairs. The district and subdistrict officers meet with the *wakil* of each tribal group and direct the collection of taxes (see ch. 14, The Governmental System).

Taxes are paid in cash or kind. Collection in rural areas is hampered by the government's lack of information about ownership of land, water and animals. Another complicating factor is the very large nomadic population which may move across provincial boundaries and objects to paying taxes more than once. The easiest taxes to collect are on goods brought into trading centers and on incomes derived from buying and selling in the towns.

Afghans have had long experience both in paying and evading such taxes. Herat in the northwest, Mazar-i-Sharif, in the north, Kabul in the east, Kandahar in the south and Farah in the southwest are all entrepôts on routes of great antiquity where caravans assembled or were provisioned. From the earliest historical records, under all types of governments, such commercial centers have charged customs duties and have taxed resident and transient traders. The practice continues and in some towns ancient caravansaries are still used as customs houses. Collection is under the jurisdiction of the provincial governor who is held accountable by the Ministry of Finance for the administration of customs regulations and for all funds collected. Although customs duty is the best revenue producer, it is estimated that 50 percent of the goods entering and leaving the country are smuggled.

In the 1960's as in the 1950's, indirect taxes accounted for half of the total government revenue (see table 10). Profits from government enterprises contributed about 15 percent and the individual income tax about 12 percent as compared to 10 percent from each source in the 1950's. Taxes on land remained constant over the decade accounting proportionately for less and less of the annual total. Even when doubled in 1966 the land tax provided less than 2 percent of government revenues. While government expenditures registered a 63 percent rise between 1963 and 1966,

Table 10. Afghan Government Revenues, 1963-66
(in millions of afghanis*)

Sources of revenue	1963	1964	1965	1966
Direct taxes				
Individual income	113.6	157.2	238.4	324.3
Company income	77.1	78.8	80.6	81.1
Land	46.4	49.8	44.3	81.9
Livestock	82.9	89.7	84.5	87.6
Total	320.0	375.5	447.8	574.9
Indirect taxes				
Import duties	883.6	944.4	1,095.1	1,129.2
Export duties	74.7	76.7	80.1	139.3
Tax on sale of consumer goods	71.6	90.3	197.6	92.3
Tax on commercial transactions	89.0	592.5	529.5	804.3
Monopoly duties	8.2	8.4	15.2	10.4
Total	1,127.1	1,712.3	1,917.5	2,175.5
Income from sale of property and services ..	115.4	150.9	197.5	244.6
License fees and fines	76.7	89.9	110.8	114.1
Rents and interest	29.7	79.3	86.1	50.1
Income from government enterprises	388.8	570.0	347.1	767.6
Other income	93.2	75.2	64.6	67.7
Nonrevenue income	29.9	56.3	58.3	151.0
Commodity assistance and special proceeds	51.4	182.9	241.8	564.0
Total revenue	2,232.2	3,292.3	3,471.5	4,709.5

* For value of the afghani, see Glossary.

Source: Adapted from Afghanistan, Ministry of Planning, Department of Statistics, *Survey of Progress, 1965-66*, Appendix: Public Finance 1.

revenues increased only by 47 percent. Annual deficits have been covered by borrowing from the central bank and by foreign grants and loans (see ch. 24, Foreign Economic Relations).

THE BUDGETARY PROCESS

Article 70 of the Constitution states that bills relating to budgetary and financial legislation may only originate from the government. The government agencies directly responsible for preparing the budget, which includes both the ordinary and development budgets for the next fiscal year, are the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Planning. Before the end of the 1967 fiscal year (about December), the Ministry of Finance, in consultation with the Ministry of Planning, prepares a statement for submission to the Cabinet of sources of government finance for the next fiscal year. This report takes into consideration the current year's revenues

and the revenue prospects for the coming year and prepares a statement of sources of government finance for the next fiscal year.

Based on questionnaires concerning the next year's expenditures returned by the various ministries and government agencies, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Planning also prepare expenditure projections—the former, the ordinary budget; the latter, the development budget. After thorough study, which includes the feasibility, priority and the foreign currency component of each request, a report making recommendations concerning prospective expenditures is submitted to the Cabinet along with the report on prospective revenues. The report on expenditures includes a recommended ceiling for the total expenditure and a recommended ceiling on borrowing to cover any deficit.

It is the Cabinet, however, which decides the ceiling for the next year's budget. It may order that revenue be increased, or it may cut expenditures in the ordinary or development budget. After the Cabinet has set the ceiling, a joint committee of the Ministries of Finance and Planning estimates the items of expenditure in both the ordinary and development budgets, based on all the information obtainable concerning the previous year's expenditures and the reasons for increases.

This estimated budget is sent by the Ministry of Finance to the Meshrano Jirgah (House of the Elders) which is required by Article 75 of the Constitution to present it to the Wolesi Jirgah (House of the People) along with advisory comments. When a bill is placed on the agenda of either of these two Houses, it is first referred to the committee concerned, in this case the Budget and Financial Affairs Committee. After the bill has been commented upon by the Committee, it is read in the House along with the comment of the Committee, and debated upon, followed by voting on each article. After this, the draft is read for the second time and put before the House for rejection or approval as a whole. The Meshrano Jirgah can recommend changes in the budget to the Wolesi Jirgah, but only the Wolesi Jirgah can make changes in the budget.

On receiving the budget bill the President of the Wolesi Jirgah sends it to the Budget and Financial Affairs Committee for study. After hearings and inquiries the Committee submits the bill to the House with recommendations for changes. These are accepted, rejected or modified by the Wolesi Jirgah. After passage of the budget bill it is submitted to the King and becomes law when he signs it. If the King makes changes or adjustments in the items, the budget does not thereafter need to be resubmitted to the Wolesi Jirgah; the King's decision is final.

The Constitution stipulates that when an enactment of one

House is rejected by the other, a joint committee consisting of an equal number of members from both Houses is set up in accordance with the provisions of the law to settle the differences. When the differences between the two Houses relate to financial bills and are not resolved by the joint committee, the Wolesi Jirgah may present the bill again in the following session and approve it by a majority vote. This enactment, without reference to the Meshrano Jirgah, becomes law after it is signed by the King.

Article 75 of the Constitution also stipulates that if the budget is not passed before the beginning of the new fiscal year, the budget of the previous year is applicable until the new budget is adopted. Under this same article, the government is bound to submit to the Wolesi Jirgah final accounts of the budget of the previous year at least 1 month before the submission of the new budget.

GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES

The ordinary operations expenditures of government Ministries and institutions have risen as they have expanded their services and absorbed the maintenance charges of completed development projects (see table 11). Over the period 1963 through 1966, the largest single item of the ordinary budget, accounting for 30 percent of the total, was "Other," which includes defense expenditures.

Expenditures on administration and police averaged 15 percent of the total budget; social and cultural expenditures, including education and health, about 20 percent; and communications and other expenditures in support of the economy, about 12 percent. The remainder is allocated to the Ministry of Finance. The amount allotted to debt service and other financial transactions decreased substantially in 1965 and 1966 as a result of the 30-year moratorium on debt repayment granted by the Soviet Union. The development budget reflects increased government financing of development projects, including educational and medical facilities, public works, irrigation and rural development (see table 12). The category of government expenditure rose from 23 percent of the total in 1948-49 to 47 percent in 1955-56.

In 1963 and 1964 development expenditures were 43 percent of total budgeted expenditures, the percentage sinking to 38 percent in 1965 but showing a slight rise to 39 percent in 1966. The decrease resulted from the limitation imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on government borrowing from the central bank. The larger part of development expenditures over the 10-year period 1956-66 was devoted to expansion of electric power capacity, road construction and the location and exploitation of natural resources (see ch. 26, Banking and Currency; ch. 19, Character and Structure of the Economy).

Table 11. Afghan Government Expenditures—Ordinary Budget, 1963-66
(in millions of afghanis*)

Item	1963	1964	1965	1966
Ministry of Court	20.9	24.0	27.0	31.6
National Assembly	14.0	14.4	8.8	17.9
Senate	0.6	0.5	1.2	4.2
Prime Ministry	19.5	23.4	24.0	26.3
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	84.6	66.0	70.2	82.1
Ministry of the Interior (civil)	31.0	37.0	50.6	54.8
Ministry of the Interior (police)	99.5	112.8	146.5	149.8
Ministry of Justice	13.1	20.0	37.8	62.5
Ministry of Finance (debt service)	257.6	543.4	378.7	286.4
Ministry of Finance (other)	126.8	155.6	151.2	260.0
Ministry of Education	167.1	232.9	300.5	375.9
Ministry of Public Health	47.7	62.2	75.7	80.4
Ministry of Communications	33.1	41.6	47.7	48.1
Ministry of Public Works	53.1	58.0	75.6	123.3
Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation	44.6	50.2	48.9	53.6
Ministry of Mines and Industries	41.5	50.1	45.1	56.1
Ministry of Planning	10.0	20.2	22.0	22.5
Ministry of Press and Information	23.7	39.7	33.4	30.6
Ministry of Commerce	8.1	14.4	11.8	15.0
Department of Tribal Affairs	20.8	24.8	26.3	26.7
Kabul University	39.1	59.0	67.0	72.0
Health Institute	24.8	27.7	30.9	32.1
Faculty of Medicine	9.3	10.6	11.7	11.6
Olympic Department	2.1	2.7	2.9	1.8
Civil Aviation Directorate	16.0	24.1	33.2	35.5
General Transport Department	3.7	13.7	6.6	9.0
Helmand Valley Authority	37.3	34.1	35.1	29.9
Cartographic Survey	6.3	5.9	6.7	6.1
Water and Soil Surveys Authority		0.5	3.7	2.1
Other	593.6	646.0	778.0	900.9
Total	1,849.5	2,415.5	2,558.8	2,908.8

* For value of the afghani, see Glossary.

Source: Adapted from Afghanistan, Ministry of Planning, Department of Statistics, *Survey of Progress, 1965-66*, Appendix: Public Finance, 3.

SOURCES OF GOVERNMENT REVENUE

The government levies both direct and indirect taxes and also derives income from government monopolies and from government investment in various enterprises. To insure the revenues needed for the regular and development budgets, the Ministry of Finance in 1967 was implementing a new income tax law, carrying out a cadastral survey and instituting administrative reforms in account-

Table 12. Afghan Government Expenditures—Development Budget, 1963-66
(in millions of afghanis*)

Item	1963	1964	1965	1966
Prime Ministry	0.5			
Ministry of the Interior (civil)				1.5
Ministry of Finance (other)	5.2	50.8	44.6	65.8
Ministry of Education	37.3	80.9	39.1	81.1
Ministry of Public Health	17.5	12.9	13.3	14.4
Ministry of Communications	8.9	7.9	19.5	23.1
Ministry of Public Works	791.1	923.7	850.2	480.1
Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation....	32.4	56.0	51.1	98.7
Ministry of Mines and Industries	367.3	442.0	445.2	641.6
Ministry of Press and Information	10.2	84.6	36.1	22.8
Ministry of Commerce		0.2	0.3	
Kabul University	42.0	34.4	9.6	7.3
Health Institute	0.8	7.8	0.6	2.4
Faculty of Mines	1.3	2.0	2.2	1.2
Civil Aviation Directorate	44.1	6.7	7.8	10.1
Helmand Valley Authority	70.0	90.3	54.6	35.2
Rural Development Department	14.3	20.0	19.0	21.2
Cartographic Survey	3.5	3.0	0.9	0.7
Water and Soil Surveys Authority		6.6	11.5	41.3
Paktia Development Authority				3.3
Polytechnic Institute			16.6	40.7
Nangarhar Valley Authority				262.3
Total	1,446.4	1,829.8	1,622.2	1,854.8

* For value of the afghani, see Glossary.

Source: Adapted from Afghanistan, Ministry of Planning, Department of Statistics, *Survey of Progress, 1965-66*, Appendix: Public Finance, 3.

Direct Taxes

Direct taxes include taxes on individual income, on company income, on land, and on livestock. The individual income tax is assessed against income derived from all sources, except agriculture which is exempt. A taxpayer is permitted a deduction of 15,000 afghanis (see Glossary) for himself, 10,000 afghanis for one wife, and 2,000 for each child up to five children; the top limit on deductions is 35,000 afghanis. The tax is progressive; the first 10,000 afghanis of taxable income is assessed at 4 percent, rising to 40 percent on taxable income over 2.5 million afghanis. Beginning in 1965 taxes on salaries and wages of employees in all government agencies, departments, and enterprises, of municipalities and of all corporations and companies employing 10 or more persons have been withheld from salary and wage payments, thereby considerably increasing the size of income tax revenues. The tax on corporation and company income is 20 percent of the new earnings.

The land tax is assessed by *jirib* (roughly half an acre, although size of a *jirib* varies throughout the country) depending on whether the land is classed as "excellent," "medium" or "poor." In general, classification and assessments were made locally in the 1920's. The highest assessment is payable on "excellent" land and the lowest on "poor" land. The tax ranges from 0.1 afghani to 30 afghanis per *jirib*, and rates vary throughout the country for roughly the same quality land. In 1966, when the land tax was doubled, no changes were made in assessment; the landowner was simply required to pay twice as much. In the absence of scientific classification of land and land registration, many landowners pay low taxes on highly productive land, and others pay no tax at all. To improve the system of land taxation requires both a cadastral survey and scientific land classification, both of which are expected to begin during the Third Five-Year Plan (1967-71).

The livestock tax varied with the kind of animal. It was assessed per head: 2 afghanis for karakul sheep; 2.25 afghanis for other sheep and goats; 5 afghanis for cows and buffalo; 10 afghanis for horses and mules; and 15 afghanis for camels. Payment of this tax was suspended in fiscal year 1967.

Indirect Taxes

Indirect taxes, consisting of customs duties on both imports and exports, taxes on sale of consumer goods and on commercial transactions and monopoly duties, provide the largest portion of government revenues. In 1954-55 customs duties alone accounted for more than 40 percent of government receipts and continued to do so through 1963 but sank to 26 percent in 1966. This decrease was a reflection, not of a downswing in revenues from customs, but of a great increase in taxes collected on commercial transactions (see table 10).

Duties on imports range from 10 to 100 percent, but a few items are dutiable at less than 10 percent. A maximum rate of 150 percent applies to alcoholic beverages. Gasoline, benzene, kerosene, machinery, and parts for industrial development are admitted duty free. Buses and trucks, automobile and truck parts, truck and tractor tires, pharmaceuticals and medical equipment are assessed a duty of 10 percent; grains, 25 percent; office machines, and textile machinery, 20 percent; paper products, 25 to 35 percent; chemicals and dyes, 30 to 35 percent; and cotton piece goods, 45 percent.

Arbitrary tariff values are fixed for purposes of duty assessment on virtually all imported items except drugs, medicines, chemicals, machinery, and technical and scientific instruments.

which are assessed on invoice value. A 4 percent ad valorem additional duty is levied on all imports except petroleum products and sugar. In addition, importers are charged an amount equal to 1 percent of the invoice value of imported goods to cover handling and administrative expenses.

The export proceeds from wool and cotton are subject to taxes of 15.56 and 28.89 percent, respectively. In 1965 the exchange tax on proceeds from karakul exports was eliminated and the tax on proceeds from wool exports lowered from 24.45 percent to the 15.56 rate.

Tax on the sale of consumer goods is similar to a sales tax. It is levied on the wholesale and retail sale of certain commodities; rates range from 2 to 5 percent. Taxes on commercial transactions include taxes on commodities (2 percent on domestic goods and 4 percent on foreign goods) or charges for the purchase, or sale of foreign exchange and stamps or the price of documents used in sales of real property, mortgages, bank loans, stock sales, and wills. Monopoly duties are payable by businessmen on monopolized items, such as snuff, cigarettes, gasoline, and motor vehicles.

Other Sources of Government Revenue

Sources of government revenues other than taxes include income from the sale of government property and services, from license fees and fines, from rents on government land and interest payments on government loans, from the profits of government enterprises, and from the commodity assistance program. Of these domestic sources of revenue, income from government-owned enterprises which almost doubled between 1963 and 1966 is the most important (see table 10).

Income from road tolls and from the sale of government property and services, such as postal, telephone, and telegraph services, has shown a steady rise as land sales have increased and communications services expanded. Income from license fees and fines has also risen as the general tempo of business activity has increased. This category of income includes the proceeds from the sale of licenses for vehicles; fees for the issuance of identification documents, passports and visas, marriage licenses, business licenses, and permits. Income is also derived from the rental of state lands, and the use of state property, including interest paid by banks and other institutions both public and private for state funds deposited with them.

Income from government enterprises encompasses not only the profits of government-owned factories, plant and electric power utilities, but also of cooperatives owned and operated by the gov-

ernment, slaughterhouses, grain supply offices, and silos. "Other income" is a category for listing revenues, such as voluntary contributions, which cannot be otherwise classified, and nonrevenue income comprises those items which are available for appropriation in a given year, such as overpayments to the government and repayments of employee loans which do not represent an effective increase in government revenues (see table 10).

Commodity assistance has become an important source of government revenue since it was initiated by the United States and West Germany in 1957. The Soviet Union and Communist China have also participated. The participating country provides Afghanistan with various commodities and the proceeds of local sales become government revenues which are used to finance the local currency needs of development projects. By the end of 1966, 4 billion afghanis in commodity assistance had been received. The United States had imported for sale various items, including wheat, edible oil, trucks, and fertilizer; the Soviet Union, sugar, wheat, gasoline, diesel oil, trucks, and miscellaneous items; West Germany, raw materials for factories; and Communist China, tea and textiles.

PUBLIC DEBT

The public debt has been rising rapidly since 1946 when it was reported to be 100 million afghanis. At the end of 1966 the total foreign debt amounted to \$554.4 million and the total domestic debt to 4.9 billion afghanis. The foreign debt represented loans from the Soviet Union, Communist China, Czechoslovakia, West Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the International Development Association (IDA). The domestic debt consisted of 4,371.05 million afghanis in long-term and 416.87 million afghanis in short-term credit extended by Da Afghanistan Bank to the government. To this is added a figure of slightly less than 100 million afghanis in debts owed the Bank by government enterprises, municipalities, and government banking institutions. The government pays the Bank 2 percent interest per year.

CHAPTER 26

BANKING AND CURRENCY

In 1967 the banking and currency system was still in the process of development. Although the first bank established by private interests in the 1930's, banking facilities remained limited and services were confined to the small percentage of families in the high income bracket and to the few relatively large business firms. Afghans still distrusted banks, generally preferring tangible and visible types of investments, such as land, buildings, flocks, horses (in the north), and stocks of commodities which were not easily stolen, looted, or destroyed and over which they could exercise some personal control. The habit of putting savings into hoards of precious metals or even currency was deeply ingrained, impeding the flow of domestic savings into capital investment. Since 1956 there has been a substantial increase in deposit and savings bank accounts, but much remained to be done to mobilize savings and idle funds into productive uses. The government was seeking, through new legislation and foreign assistance, to establish a more efficient banking system.

The people have been accustomed to money for many centuries, and in 1967 afghanis (see Glossary), both in paper currency and in coins, had been in general use throughout the country for a number of years. Outside the towns, barter, especially the nomad-farmer exchange of animal products for grain, still characterized a large portion of local transactions, but this practice was declining as agriculture became more commercialized.

A degree of stability in the value of the afghani, which had suffered a severe inflation beginning in late 1963, at 75 afghanis to the dollar, had been achieved by 1967 as a result of the more conservative fiscal and monetary policy adopted by the government in 1965. The government in its efforts to meet the investment targets of its Second Five-Year Plan (1962-67) had drawn heavily on credit from the central bank, the Bank of Afghanistan, thereby greatly increasing the money supply in the hands of the public in the first years of the Plan. Since the Standby Agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1965 whereby the IMF supplied a large portion of the government's foreign ex-

change reserves, budgetary deficits financed by bank credit had been reduced to a nominal figure resulting in a slight but salutary decrease in the money supply (see ch. 25, Public Finance).

THE BANKING SYSTEM

Afghanistan has five banks: the Bank of Afghanistan (Da Afghanistan Bank), the Agricultural and Cottage Industry Bank (Bank Zerati), the Afghan Commercial Bank (Pashtany Tejaraty Bank), the Bank for Construction and Mortgages and the Afghan National Bank (Bank Melli). A sixth bank, the Industrial Credit Fund, is in the process of liquidation. All have headquarters in Kabul; none is the branch of a foreign bank. Only three, of which one is the National Bank, Afghanistan's sole private bank, are actively engaged in banking. The bulk of the banks' business consists of granting short-term loans which are used to finance the export-import trade and related activities. The only regulated banking operations are those pertaining to foreign exchange derived from the sale abroad of fruit, wool, cotton, and karakul skins.

The Bank of Afghanistan

The Bank of Afghanistan, founded in 1938 with an original capitalization of 240 million afghanis raised to 480 million afghanis in December 1964, performs some central banking functions. It is directed by the Cabinet acting for the King. The Bank has a monopoly of currency issue and holds the official reserves of gold and foreign exchange. It acts as government banker making loans to the government, administering loans made by the government, and providing credit to municipalities, to government agencies and enterprises, and to other government banks. In addition, it lends funds at interest rates between 8 and 9 percent to provide business; only about 5 percent of its loans, however, are to private interests.

Loans and investments increased from 1.9 billion afghanis in 1951 to 4.9 billion in September 1963, mostly in government business. During 1955-56 the Bank advanced 115 million afghanis in short-term credit to commercial enterprises and 80 million in long-term credit to industrial enterprises. These activities were substantially increased by the Bank until in 1963 short-term credit granted to the private sector totaled 264.4 million afghanis and long-term investments 709.7 million.

In that year an IMF team studying the causes of the severe inflation threatening the afghani recommended, among other monetary reforms, that the Bank of Afghanistan cease making long-

term investments, which served to increase the money supply, and instead to withdraw it from commercial banking activities. The Bank has complied with the recommendation of the IMF that it limit loans and advances to the government to a sum of 300,000 afghanis each fiscal year but had found it difficult to divest itself of its other business. Thus, in 1967 short-term credit granted to the private sector totaled 404.9 million afghanis and long-term investment 736.6 million afghanis.

The Bank of Afghanistan buys and sells foreign exchange and is also a major depository for private and public funds. It pays 6 percent on savings and time deposits. The Bank has 40 branches, 5 in Kabul. Branches are located wherever there is commercial activity or where government operations demand the establishment of a bank. This includes most provincial capitals, industrial installations and construction sites. Five additional branches are to be opened each year of the Third Five-Year Plan. Branches of the bank do not make loans.

The Bank of Afghanistan's reserves increased from 500,000 afghanis in 1948 to 115 million in 1954 and to 122 million in 1967. Taxes paid by the Bank averaged between 6 to 10 million afghanis during the 1950's rising to 38.9 million afghanis in 1966, out of a total gross profit that year of 156 million afghanis. Since 95 percent of the stock is owned by the government, the Bank makes a considerable contribution to the public revenues.

Through the Bank of Afghanistan the government has carried out its policy of expanding the banking institutions of the country. Banks established are the Agricultural and Cottage Industry Bank, the Afghan Commercial Bank, the Bank for Construction and Mortgages, and the Industrial Credit Fund.

Proposals made to the government recommend a redefining of the Bank of Afghanistan's central banking functions, broadening its powers to achieve the objectives of monetary policy and providing a more precise legal framework for its operations. The draft of the State Bank of Afghanistan Act includes confirmation of the Bank's monopoly of currency issuance and its authority to act as fiscal agency and banker for the government and to buy and sell foreign exchange. Statutory limits are set on loans made to the government and to the commercial banks. The Bank is to divest itself of its privately owned deposits, its commercial activities, and its business investments. It is to establish a department for the inspection and supervision of the commercial banks with authority to compel compliance with the banking law. The Bank is to have authority to determine ceilings on bank credit and to relate the ceiling to interest rates charged on loans and paid on savings and time deposits.

The Agricultural and Cottage Industry Bank

The Agricultural and Cottage Industry Bank when it was founded in 1954 was expected to be capitalized at 150 million afghanis, but shares sold provided considerably less. Stated functions of the Bank were to provide short- and medium-term loans to farmers, small landowners, and settlers on reclaimed land for the purchase of seeds, implements, and other necessities and to furnish capital at low interest rates to craftsmen and to industrial and commercial enterprises. It was through this Bank that the government hoped to encourage development of cooperative credit societies, small-scale industry and handicraft production, but lack of funds prevented financial support for this sector of the economy. Funds, though constantly expanded, have been too limited to meet the credit needs of the average farmer let alone the artisan.

Loans are repayable in installments up to 10 years. Interest is calculated on the period of the loan: 4 percent for loans up to 1 year; 5 percent for those up to 5 years; and 5 percent for long-term advances. Officers of the Bank are hoping to receive authority to reverse this policy so that interest will be less on the longer term loans and higher on the shorter term loans.

The Bank of Afghanistan originally provided the Agricultural and Cottage Industry Bank with a capital of 25.5 million afghanis, later increased to 76.5 million. Other contributors included the Ministry of Finance, 5,906,621 afghanis; the National Bank, 2 million afghanis; the Maimana Company, 50,000 afghanis; the Karakul Company, 500,000 afghanis, the Red Cross, 200,000 afghanis, and individual subscribers, 843,000 afghanis.

Between 1954 and 1956 the Bank advanced nearly 90 million afghanis. Loans to individual farmers released 9,152 acres from heavy mortgages held by bazaar moneylenders and merchants, and the Bank financed the construction of 224 *karez* (underground canals) and the planting of 329 172 fruit trees. It also invested a total of 60 million afghanis in the Cotton Company (*Shirkat-i-Ittehadiyeh Shamali Pamba*) and in the Afghan Commercial Bank and the Bank for Construction and Mortgages when they were founded. It attempted to finance the establishment of agricultural credit cooperatives in order to assist the local farmers at Logar, Ghazni, and Istalif and credit cooperatives for craftsmen, mostly weavers, at Istalif and in Nangarhar province.

Between 1956 and 1967 the Bank invested 25.5 million afghanis in the reconstruction of old irrigation systems at Adjmir, Archi, Altibolak, and Bakhteyaran. It also purchased 3,000 tons of fertilizer at a cost of 12 million afghanis, 1,500 tons of sulfur, at 7.5

million afghanis, 10 million tetrachloride tablets for dosing sheep at 2.2 million afghanis, 200 tractors from the Soviet Union for 35 million afghanis, 200 tractors from Great Britain for 73 million afghanis, 250 water pumps from Pakistan for 18 million afghanis, 20 water pumps from the Soviet Union for 0.5 million afghanis, and 20 tons of DDT powder for 5 million afghanis. The bank distributes its purchases directly to farmers. In January 1967 outstanding loans totaled 117.5 million afghanis. The bank maintains branches in the towns of Baghlan, Mazar-i-Sharif, Ghazni, Kandahar, Herat, and in the Provinces of Nangarhar, Paktia, and Parwan.

Reorganization of the Agricultural and Cottage Industries Bank is planned by the government which has requested a loan from the International Development Association. Activities of the reorganized Bank would be confined to agriculture and to the processing and marketing of agricultural products. "Cottage Industries" would be dropped from its name. Direct loans at 6 percent would be made to farmers and marketing and processing firms as well as to agricultural cooperatives and other farm groups.

The Afghan Commercial Bank

The Afghan Commercial Bank was established in 1954 with an authorized capital of 120 million afghanis, issued in shares valued at 1,000 afghanis each. Of these the Bank of Afghanistan invested in 40,000 shares; the State Monopolies (importing sugar, petroleum products, and vehicles) in 20,000 shares; the Cooperative Textile Depot (a state-controlled distribution outlet) and the government's Pension Fund in 10,000 shares, and the Agricultural and Cottage Industry Bank in 5,000 shares. Forty thousand 1,000-afghani shares were designated for sale to the public. By 1967, paid in capital, the major part supplied directly or indirectly by the government totaled a little less than 230 million afghanis. The board of directors, which is chaired by the Minister of Commerce, is composed mainly of Ministers and deputy Ministers.

The functions of the Afghan Commercial Bank included the extension of short- and long-term credit to businesses and merchants, the issuance of bonds and securities, and the opening of savings and demand deposits. It was authorized especially to discount commercial paper of business firms, notably exporters of karakul, wool, carpets, and fruit. Most of its business, however, consisted of short-term loans mainly for financing the export-import trade and related activities. It has established branches in some of the provinces and has opened an office in Paris. The Bank also buys and sells foreign exchange. Interest charges on loans

are between 6 and 9 percent, and the Bank pays 6 percent on time and savings deposits. The Bank is not authorized to enter directly into either trade or business.

The Bank for Construction and Mortgages

The Bank for Construction and Mortgages, established in 1954 and capitalized at 60 million afghanis with 50 percent of its capital supplied by the Bank of Afghanistan, provides construction loans and short-term commercial and industrial credit. In January 1967 reserves totaled 28.3 million afghanis. The functions of this bank are the financing of low-cost community housing projects and hotels and the promotion of building materials supply companies. By mid-1955 advances of 37 million afghanis at 3 percent interest had been made to about 500 borrowers, mostly purchasers of homes. The Bank had difficulty in collecting loans and interest, and by 1967 long-term loans had been discontinued. Most of the Bank's business consisted of 3 to 5 year loans, mainly for the construction of homes and apartments for sale or rent. Interest varied between 3 and 12 percent.

Industrial Credit Fund and the Industrial Development Bank

The Industrial Credit Fund, Afghanistan's first attempt at industrial financing, was founded in 1957. Capitalized at 200 million afghanis, it was to provide loans and credits at 6 percent for industrial development projects which the government approved. Loans were to be granted for periods from 6 months to 5 years. The Fund was further authorized to obtain local and foreign loans to finance industrial projects. In its first year of operation it granted a total of 120 million afghanis to large and small industrial organizations and by the end of 1966 had lent 215 million afghanis to private investors.

By 1967 the Industrial Credit Fund was in the process of liquidation. The face value of its assets was 160 million afghanis, but actual value was between 30 and 40 million afghanis less. Most of its loans were overdue, and a large part of its assets consisted of interest accrued but not paid. It was expected that on final liquidation that part of its assets which belonged to the Bank of Afghanistan would be a loan to the proposed Industrial Development Bank, augmented by a new loan bringing the total to 200 million afghanis.

In 1967 bilateral negotiations were underway between aid agencies and West European, American, and international banks for financial and technical assistance in the establishment of an industrial development bank, mentioned above. The functions

of the proposed bank are: to finance and assist in the establishment, expansion, or modernization of privately owned industrial enterprises; to encourage and promote the participation of private capital, both domestic and foreign, in such enterprises; and to facilitate the expansion of capital markets and the acquisition by private investors of industrial investments and securities. In order to fulfill the stated objectives, the bank is to have authority to provide medium- and long-term credit to privately owned industrial enterprises; purchase shares for resale to private investors; underwrite new issues of shares, bonds, and other securities; provide, or assist in obtaining, technical, managerial, or professional assistance for privately owned industrial enterprises; organize or participate in the organization of enterprises and industrial organizations; and provide consulting services to borrowers and nonborrower privately owned enterprises on a fee basis.

The Bank is to have an authorized capital of 400 million afghanis, represented by 400,000 common shares at 1,000 afghanis per share. However, the initial capital issue will be only 240 million afghanis represented by 240,000 shares. Of these shares 122,400 are to be reserved for Afghan citizens; the remainder is to be available to foreign nationals and international organizations. Provision is made in the draft legislation that no single individual or family may acquire more than 30 percent of the subscribed capital.

The Afghan National Bank

The privately owned National Bank, founded in 1932, is the country's oldest bank. The capital and reserves total 715 million afghanis, which make it the biggest and most important bank. Its headquarters are in Kabul, and its branches are in the provincial capitals. It maintains foreign branches or agencies in London, Hamburg, Beirut, Karachi, Peshawar (in Pakistan near the Khyber Pass), and Chaman (southwest Pakistan rail terminus at Afghan border), and it is the largest shareholder in the Afghan-American Trading Corporation in New York. Although its major function is the extension of credit against collateral to firms and individuals, it has reached far beyond conventional banking practices to meet the needs of the government and the country.

The first Afghan experiment in modern banking, the National Bank, was established through the combined efforts of a few wealthy Afghans and Mohammed Hashim Khan, uncle of the King, who was then Prime Minister. At this time gold stocks and currency, financial transactions, foreign exchange, export and im-

port business, and similar matters were in the hands of foreigners or Hindu and Sikh moneylenders. To correct this situation the government issued a franchise for the establishment of a joint-stock company (*shirkat*) with limited liability, the Shirkat-i-Ashami, which became the National Bank.

Not only did the National Bank assume the function of the government's banker and issue the currency until the founding of the State Bank of Afghanistan in 1938, but it also financed and promoted the establishment of at least 125 joint-stock companies by the government. It provided managerial supervision and technical assistance to the joint-stock companies and placed the facilities of its foreign branches at their disposal for purchase of equipment and sale of their products. Most of the joint-stock companies became efficient organizations whose high level of earnings contributed further to the profitability of the Bank.

Within 4 years of the founding of the bank, its profit rate induced the royal family to invest. The earliest expansion of its activities into industrial ventures included the Textile Company of Pul-i-Khumri (Shirkat-i-Nasaji Pul-i-Khumri) in Baghlan Province and the Cotton Company. Their success gave the Bank a reputation as an industrial development bank and led it to invest in the Gulbahar textile plant, the Sarobi power plant, the Jangalak iron works, and machine shops and the Jabal-us-Siraj cement plant, all in the Kabul area. It invested also in the Kataghan cotton-seed processing mill and the Baghlan Sugar Refinery, both north of the Hindu Kush in the Kunduz area. The Karakul Export Company (Shirkat-i-Umumi Sadirat-i-Karakul) was another successful venture. Having a monopoly over karakul exports until 1956, when the government established new export outlets, it became the richest trading company in the country.

Certain practices of the National Bank however, aroused public ire. Dominated by Abdul Majid Zabuli, a wealthy Herati, and a few other merchants, the National Bank dealt almost exclusively with *shirkats*. It was difficult, then, for the average farmer and keeper of a small shop to obtain commercial credit even if he could afford the high interest rates of between 12 and 18 percent. The *shirkats* it controlled maintained a policy of paying low prices for the raw materials, such as karakul skins, cotton, and sugar beets, purchased from farmers and stockbreeders. This nullified the government's policy of improving and expanding yields of these products in order to meet the local demand and to increase exports.

In 1953 the newly designated Prime Minister Mohammed Daud initiated a policy through the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Afghanistan of restricting the operations of the National Bank

and of developing competing banking institutions and commercial enterprises which would more effectively meet the needs of the farmer, the small trader, and the craftsman. In line with this policy the government established various new banking institutions and the Karakul Cooperative and the Cotton Export Corporation to supervise the production of karakul and cotton, respectively. In New York it set up a new export-import company to compete with the Afghan-American Trading Corporation, once the exclusive outlet for karakul furs.

Despite the competition, the National Bank, with its affiliated commercial and industrial enterprises, remained the key establishment of the most important and influential economic group in the country. It has continued to prosper and to expand its activities. Loans have been confined mainly to those large firms which the National Bank established and which it owns wholly or in part. In January 1967 loans totaled 549.2 million afghanis; participation in ownership of business firms reported as 718.6 million afghanis, however, aggregated more than total loans. The Bank also deals in foreign exchange and in financing the export trade. Export credit against commodities, such as karakul and carpets, is usually extended up to 40 to 50 percent of current market value. Both demand and time deposits are accepted. An interest rate of 6 percent is paid on savings deposits. Time deposits are accepted from business firms, and the rate is 4 percent. In 1967 the expansion of banking services was receiving operational emphasis rather than participation in ownership. The Bank's power company was nationalized in 1966, stockholders receiving 100 percent of their investment.

THE MONEYLENDERS

Because of the limitations of the banking system, most Afghan traders, artisans, businessmen, and farmers who are seeking funds turn to the moneylenders, who it is generally agreed, command the largest volume of credit. Moneylenders are ubiquitous throughout the country, and many nomadic traders also lend money. Average rate of interest is reported to be about 2 percent per month, or 24 percent per year, and the high rate attracts the savings and temporarily idle funds of many individuals and merchants. In general, loans are based on personal acquaintance, credit reputation, family connections, and ability to put up land, buildings, and other property as collateral. Contracts do not state interest charges, since usury is prohibited by Islam but interest is included in the sum to be repaid.

CURRENCY

Afghans have long been accustomed to using money, but until the last century it was usually money issued by other nations. In 1940 the afghani was roughly equivalent to one-thirteenth of a dollar and in 1950 to one-fortieth of a dollar. The basic unit of currency in 1967, the afghani, was subdivided into 100 puls. With effect from March 22, 1963, the IMF and the government agreed to an initial par value of 45 afghanis per United States dollar. The parity for the afghani in terms of gold is 0.0197482 gram of fine gold per afghani and 1,575 afghanis per troy ounce of fine gold.

The currency consists of paper money and coins. Notes in circulation are in denominations of 1,000, 500, 100, 50, 20, 10, 5, and 2 afghanis. Nickel, bronze and copper coins now current are of 50, 30, 25, 10, and 5 puls. Both notes and coins are imprinted on the face with the image and name of the reigning King. They are legal tender throughout the country and now constitute the only currency in circulation. An issue, up to 1941, of 100 million silver afghanis, each weighing 10 grams of 0.900 fine metal, has disappeared from circulation, either into hoards or through leakage abroad, the value of the silver being greater than the monetary value.

Issuance of the Currency is a monopoly of the Bank of Afghanistan, which is required to maintain a reserve of gold, silver, and foreign exchange as cover for the note issue, the reserve not to fall below 30 percent. The Bank of Afghanistan has made some gold purchases abroad, but both gold and silver are obtainable within the country. Gold is found in the streams of Badakhshan, and a certain percentage of all gold washed and smelted is due the state for the right to work the streams. The state owns and operates a silver mine north of Kabul in the Hindu Kush near Charikar. Conservatively managed, the Bank of Afghanistan at no time has issued currency up to the amount permitted by the size of the reserves, and at various times it has held one-half to two-thirds of the note issue as cash reserves.

The amount of currency in circulation has, nonetheless, continually increased—more than doubling between 1950 and 1956 from 845 million afghanis to 2,015 million afghanis, and by 1967 more than doubling again to 5,194 million afghanis. The rapid expansion has resulted from the increased demands of the government on the Bank of Afghanistan for investment in development projects, the increasing participation of the Bank of Afghanistan in industrial enterprises, and the rise in export earnings. The amount of money in circulation is considered to be modest in view

of the size of the national income. A minimum of 75 percent of the economy, however, is on a barter base, and only the commercial centers are monetized. It is also conjectured that money in circulation has a high velocity, since in the monetized sector of the economy price rises have been pronounced during the period 1949-67, and holding paper money has been a hazardous means of hoarding.

FOREIGN EXCHANGE

Foreign exchange is of vital importance because the country must import certain basic consumer goods, all petroleum products, and all the equipment required to develop the economy.

In March 1963 the government undertook a comprehensive reform of its exchange system, replacing a complex of at least 17 buying and selling rates. The reform eliminated most of the previous multiple rate practices while maintaining freedom from restrictions on imports and on capital transactions and transactions in invisibles. The official buying rate of 45 afghanis to the U.S. \$1 applies to the proceeds of exports of karakul wool and cotton. Exchange taxes of 15.56 and 28.89 percent are payable on the proceeds from exports of wool and cotton, respectively. The official selling rate applies to foreign exchange payments by the government. All other transactions take place at free market rates through either the banks or the bazaar. The Bank of Afghanistan maintains its free market rate within 2 afghanis per U.S. \$1 either side of the free market rate quoted in the bazaar. The free rate has fluctuated between 79.8 afghanis to the U.S. \$1 in the first quarter of 1966 to 70.61 in November 1966. The free rate was 76.77 afghanis to the U.S. \$1 in March 1967.

Foreign exchange is controlled by the government through the Bank of Afghanistan. Exchange receipts from exports of karakul, wool, and cotton must be surrendered to the Bank at the official rate of exchange, and control of export proceeds is facilitated by the existence of relatively large companies specializing in the shipment abroad of these commodities. The proceeds of all other exports, irrespective of the currency in which they accrue, may be sold at free market rates or be used by the exporter to pay for imports. Exchange is provided by the Bank at the official rate for certain imports by the government. Payments for imports through the banking system may be made only under letters of credit against which a local currency deposit of 100 percent of the value of the imports is required upon establishment of the letter of credit. The Bank of Afghanistan is authorized to refuse to sell foreign exchange for import of a group of consumer

goods that are regarded as nonessential. Exchange for these items may be purchased, however, either from the commercial banks or in the bazaar.

Settlements with countries with which Afghanistan has bilateral trade and payments agreements—Communist China, Czechoslovakia, Poland, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia—must be made in the foreign currencies specified in the agreements.

SECTION IV. NATIONAL SECURITY

CHAPTER 27

PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY

The public order and internal security are the responsibility of the Ministry of the Interior. While the state of law and order throughout the country appeared in 1967, to be as good or better than at any time in Afghan history, the role played by the internal security forces, the National Police, and the Gendarmerie in maintaining this condition of national stability was only sketchily revealed.

Smuggling operations continued to add materially to public order and safety problems. The mountainous and desert areas, barren and sparsely settled along long stretches of the frontier, were ideal for all types of illicit trade. Army units were called upon to assist the Gendarmerie in armed clashes with armed guards of smuggling caravans, some of which had introduced motor transport for more efficient operations.

Afghan society is in a period of transition and only recently embarked on a program of social and political reforms. This effort toward the establishment of a modern state government by a central administration has automatically created the need for a more modern centralized organization for maintenance of public order.

The new constitution, adopted in October 1964, also introduced new features which have far-reaching effects in the field of public order. More modern legal codes were published, and on October 15, 1967, an independent judiciary, including a Supreme Court, was established. In developing a new system for the administration of justice, the government hoped to replace the varied customs and laws heretofore practiced by the different tribes and *mullahs* (Moslem religious leaders) throughout the country.

BACKGROUND

For centuries, until the accession of Abdur Rahman Shah (1880-1901), public order and safety measures on a countrywide basis were nonexistent. Each tribe defined proper behavior for

its members, trying and punishing them for violations. Relations between tribes were, more often than not, governed by armed force. Tribal chiefs and village leaders regarded themselves as independent rulers over their respective areas and treated those who traveled through their domains according to their whims. Brigands and robbers were common, preying mostly on travelers and passing caravans.

Abdur Rahman, a strong and forceful ruler, began early to establish law and order. He had a special interest in law and was a firm believer in the preventive power of terror. The new laws against violence and theft which he promulgated conflicted with many tribal customs. Nevertheless he applied them universally with force and determination. He organized Moslem courts and set up his own tribunals to deal with crimes against the state. It took 15 years of drastic measures to make the people submit to his rule, flee into exile, or, as he put it, "escape into the next world."

Although judges were supposed to administer justice, Abdur Rahman personally presided over the trials of all serious cases. His procedures were direct and frequently included imaginative forms of torture. His decisions often reflected a crude sense of fair play, but his punishments were generally harsh and occasionally capricious. When a wife sought to divorce her husband because he was toothless, the verdict was extraction of her teeth. A Kabul plocie chief, convicted of using the power of his office to annoy pretty girls, was tied to a post on a freezing winter night and doused with water "to cool his warm blood." Ordinary prisoners were expected to pay for their food as well as for the use of their cells.

Common punishments included amputation of a hand or foot and blinding. The official "blinder" became a prominent member of Abdur Rahman's court. Maximum punishments were reserved for those offenses which caused misery to others or exploited the poor. The death penalty was common and included such forms of execution as death by starvation and stoning and by being blown from a cannon. State revenues were considerably enhanced as a result of confiscation of goods or property seized in illegal activities.

The Amir greatly increased his police force and installed a network of agents and informers. In Kabul one out of every four able-bodied adults reportedly was engaged in some form of security work with the inevitable risk that some were not qualified. On the other hand, the Amir was as severe with arrogant, bullying disobedient policemen as he was with convicted criminals.

Abdur Rahman's son and successor, Habibullah Khan (1901-

19), continued many of his father's harsh methods, but in general he adopted less repressive policies in preserving law and order. His successor, Amanullah Khan (1919-29) was noted for his fiscal irresponsibility and did little to improve police administration. Generally poor conditions of public order and security continued throughout his reign.

A government modernization and improvement program, initiated by Nadir Shah (1929-33) and developed by his son, the present (1967) King Mohammad Zahir Shah, included provisions for rebuilding the police as well as the Army and the civil service (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). Before the program started, the Army was responsible for police work in almost all outlying areas. The increased police force soon took over such duties from many of the Army's small detachments stationed in widely scattered areas. Later, control of the police was transferred from the Army to the Ministry of the Interior.

The Gendarmerie, established in 1942 and placed under Ministry of the Interior, gradually took over security tasks in the rural parts of the country from the police and the Army. The police were then able to concentrate their efforts in the urban areas, while the Army remained available, if needed, to support police and Gendarmerie units.

In 1957 the Afghan Government signed an aid agreement with the United States which was intended to improve the operational effectiveness of the civil police through the provision of American technical assistance and training. Under this agreement English language instruction was instituted at the National Police Academy in Kabul. A number of Afghan police officers received specialized training in the United States, and more than \$300,000 worth of equipment was made available to the internal security forces. This equipment consisted of fire-fighting apparatus, scientific crime detection devices, laboratory material, photographic supplies, bicycles, and jeeps.

The United States assistance program laid the groundwork for the development of a modern, efficient, and public-oriented civil police department. Although the program was terminated shortly after 1959, it was replaced by a similar project under sponsorship of the Federal Republic of Germany. The Afghan police have continued to improve with its assistance.

THE POLICE SYSTEM

Police functions are performed by the Army, the National Police, and the Royal Afghan Gendarmerie. In general, the police operate in cities and large towns, the Gendarmerie in rural areas.

The strength of these two law enforcement groups in 1967 was about 21,000 men. These groups are supported in their internal security role by Army units dispersed in various parts of the country (see ch. 28, The Armed Forces). The allocation of these security forces and the division of responsibility is such as to make the presence and influence of the forces of public order felt in all major areas.

Within the government the basic responsibilities for public order rests within the Ministry of the Interior. The Ministry is organized into two major departments, Provincial Administration and Police and Gendarmerie. The first department has responsibility for the supervision of the Kabul traffic police and the operation of a traffic court in the capital city. The second department has jurisdiction over the police forces through the provincial and municipal police chiefs and the commanders of gendarmerie units.

The police appear to take their work seriously and assert their authority energetically and positively. They regard themselves as servants of the government rather than as agents of the people. They take particular pride in their work and seem to carry out their duties conscientiously in accordance with the orders of their superiors. They apparently treat high and low alike for similar infractions if they feel they have the support of their superiors. Stern measures are more or less expected from policemen, and the people in general do not appear dissatisfied with the system and obey them, perhaps more from fear, however, than from respect.

Ordinary police work is simplified by the restricted travel routes and facilities, by the limited number of foreigners, and by the general curiosity and concern over the presence of strangers. The arrival and subsequent actions of a stranger in any area is usually quickly known by many of the inhabitants including the police.

The National Police

National Police functions fall into two categories, municipal and provincial. The municipal police maintain public order in the organized cities and towns and to a short distance along the roads surrounding these populated centers. Municipal police are charged with safeguarding life and property within their areas and with the operation of jails and prisons. They arrest criminals, investigate criminal cases, serve summons, guard government buildings, and escort government vehicles carrying valuable cargoes.

Provincial police, under the authority of the provincial gover-

nor, maintain public order in rural areas and in towns which do not have a formal municipal government. Their responsibilities are similar to those performed by municipal police. All civil police forces wear the same uniform, patterned after that of the Army, but with certain distinguishing police patches. Normally the police are posted in pairs and carry side arms. On night patrols or on emergency missions provincial police usually carry a rifle as an additional weapon.

Fragmentary information indicates that each of the larger cities, except Kabul, has a small group of civil police which operates under the direction of a chief of police, an official on the staff of the mayor. These elements apparently function as a city police force and are paid from municipal funds. Even though they operate within the limits of the municipality they presumably are under the general supervision of the Department of Police and Gendarmerie as are the Kabul police.

The Royal Afghan Gendarmerie

The Royal Afghan Gendarmerie is the rural and frontier police force and operates in those areas not covered by the National Police or the army. It was established in 1942, and its work increased as the army's strength was reduced after World War II. Its tasks include garrisoning of some of the less important frontier posts patrolling sensitive stretches of the border, occupying important road check points and undertaking to settle or to suppress quarrels and disturbances in rural areas.

The gendarmes are usually mounted, but some safety patrols along the main roads employ small trucks or jeeps. In addition to these patrols, manned posts are established at various intervals, but are most frequently found in the difficult mountain pass regions. Other duties assigned the Gendarmerie include escorting government convoys, guarding vital installations, providing emergency aid to storm, fire, or earthquake victims, checking on military exemptions and deferments, collecting conscripts for the army, and apprehending deserters and conscript evaders.

LEGAL SYSTEMS

In 1967 the legal institutions were in a period of transition. The 1964 Constitution provided for an independent judiciary, an expanded and detailed listing of the rights of the people, and instituted the Office of Attorney General charged with the independent investigation and prosecution of criminal cases. These changes in effect, served to move the Afghan method of judicial administration from an ancient system, based almost entirely on

Moslem law, to a new one which largely incorporates concepts derived from the Western world. Some of these changes had already taken place by late 1967, but the old system still prevailed over much of the country.

Criminal Code

Shariat law (which covers all aspects of human conduct) is a compilation of precedents, rules and customs derived from Islamic laws and traditions and has no set codes. Specific interpretations are made if necessary for each case undergoing trial. It is indefinite in the criminal field, and many cases are decided on their own merits as well as on precedent (see ch. 12, Religion; ch. 14, The Governmental System). In Afghanistan *shariat* law is based on the Hanafi school's principles of jurisprudence and is administered and interpreted in the religious courts by men trained in theology rather than secular law.

Judiciary personnel are educated primarily at the Faculty of Theology at Kabul University, but a significant number have attended only local theological schools at the secondary level. *Shariat* law does not differentiate between criminal and civil cases as long as the charge deals with a violation of religious law. Both types of cases are tried in *shariat* courts.

Afghan secular laws are influenced somewhat by English common law and French law. They include the statutes and regulations which each government Ministry issues in carrying out its own operations and administers in its own courts, operated by the Ministry's judicial branch. Consequently, secular laws are administered by an unrelated group of courts.

The secular codes that pertain directly to petty crime and other public order and safety problems are published by the Minister of the Interior. These are administered under his jurisdiction by the police courts in the various provinces and municipalities. The Ministry of Commerce, through its commercial code, rules on smuggling, embezzling, black marketing, pricing violations, and other business practices considered detrimental to society. Civil servants and military personnel are subject to the criminal code and courts under the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of National Defense. They respectively operate to try violations of the civil service and military laws (see ch. 28, The Armed Forces).

Shariat Courts

Shariat courts do not utilize lawyers or juries, nor is *habeas corpus* a recognized principle. The payment of bail cannot be

substituted for detention. Once the judge has ruled that the crime is of a religious nature, the police or other accusing plaintiffs come before the judge, take an oath based on the Koran and then present their evidence. The defendant may call witnesses, and the judge questions every one until he comes to a decision on the guilt or innocence of the defendant. If found guilty, the judge then sentences the defendant. All sentences in excess of 2 weeks' imprisonment and flogging must be reviewed by an appellate court and confirmed by the Provincial Governor. Prison sentences in excess of 2 years must be confirmed by the King. The King may exercise unlimited pardon powers and frequently does so on national and religious holidays.

Murder is regarded as a heinous crime whose seriousness depends upon the nature of the weapon used. If a knife is used, it is adjudged as first-degree murder. On the other hand, killing a pedestrian with an automobile would, most likely, be regarded as third-degree murder. Other legal concepts also vary from those in Western law. Denouncing the Koran, Mohammed Allah, or the practice of praying is regarded as a crime. Conviction for rape requires the testimony of four witnesses; insanity is a defense and a bar to trial, and the system of retribution or indemnity payment to a victim's family is observed.

Shariat courts operate at a leisurely pace and are usually far behind schedule. Decisions in many of the courts lack impartiality, and many individuals are discouraged from bringing their problems to court. Out of court settlement is often resorted to and even takes place occasionally by common agreement while the matter is being tried in court.

Police Courts

Police courts, operating under the municipalities, probably have more direct influence on the public than any other type. They handle the great majority of lesser criminal cases involving petty offenses and can impose fines, flogging, and imprisonment according to the provisions of the criminal code. Most cases come before police courts at the initiation of a policeman and are adjudicated by a higher police official acting as a judge.

Appeals can be made from lower police court decisions, but they are time-consuming and must go through the provincial or central government or into the religious court system. Generally, the person apprehended on the street and charged with a minor violation faces a quick, summary trial and a punishment commensurate with the offense. Consequently, appeals are infrequent and when made are not readily granted.

Constitutional Changes

The national code of criminal procedure has been revised under the 1964 Constitution, which establishes for the first time an independent judiciary. Under this revised code, *shariat* courts are not provided for but, according to Article 102 of the Constitution, "Whenever no provision exists in the Constitution or the laws for a case under consideration, the courts shall, by following the basic principles of the Hanafi jurisprudence of the Shariat of Islam and within the limitation set forth in this Constitution, render a decision that in their opinion secures justice in the best possible way." The new criminal code which, in late 1967, had not yet been fully implemented also contains elements taken from the codes of civil law countries, as well as from the statutes of common law countries (see ch. 14, The Governmental System).

Under the new judicial system, established in mid-October 1967 by the Ordinance on the Organization and Functions of the Judiciary, several primary courts are to exist within the jurisdiction of each provincial court, as determined by the Chief Justice. These courts presided over by a single judge, would deal only with minor civil and criminal cases. Their decisions would be final in civil actions not involving more than 5,000 afghanis (see Glossary), and in all lesser criminal prosecutions.

The next higher courts are the provincial courts, one in each of the 28 provinces. Each court consists of at least four judges (*qazi*), including the president who is appointed by the King on recommendation of the Chief Justice. The president may assign a member judge to adjudicate juvenile cases until appropriate specialized courts are established. Provincial courts are authorized to try all cases lawfully referred to them for primary or appellate consideration. They have trial jurisdiction over civil cases relating to real estate contracts, inheritance and family rights. They also try cases involving malfeasance of public officials, press violations, smugglers, and other illegal practices. This court also considers appeals against decisions on tax claims, tort claims, expropriation disputes, and cases relating to the election affairs of the Parliament (Shura), as well as municipal and provincial councils.

The Ordinance of mid-October 1967 provides for a Supreme Central Appellate Court stationed in Kabul. It has at least six *qazi*, including its president, all of whom are appointed by the King on recommendation of the Chief Justice. This court is empowered to consider all cases originally tried by provincial courts providing appeals against their decisions are made within the limitations imposed by law. The court is competent to reconsider

the circumstances of a case and render a decision to reject the appeal, annul the sentence, change the sentence, or dismiss the case.

The highest court in the system is to be the Supreme Court (*Estra Mahkama*) centered in Kabul. It consists of a chief justice and eight *qazi*, all appointed by the King, and it is empowered to try judges, resolve jurisdictional disputes, interpret laws, and perform other broad functions beyond the competence of lower courts. In important matters where there is no governing law and no precedent, the Supreme Court will sit in plenary session and render its decision by a majority vote (see ch. 14, The Governmental System).

Tribal Justice

While *shariat* and secular government laws prevail in the cities and larger towns tribal law, often influenced by *shariat* law, regulates the behavior of most persons in tribal areas. In nontribal areas, such as those inhabited chiefly by Tajiks, public order is maintained by the village government and the *mullahs*, assisted if necessary by the Gendarmerie. Tribal laws are broad and binding, and transgression brings quick and harsh retribution. Consequently, violations are few, and those that do occur are usually handled locally on a tribal or subgroup level.

The Pashtun tribal code (*Pashtunwali*), the most important one in the country, is typical of other tribal codes (see ch. 13, Social Values). It covers many aspects of human behavior within a tribe, and any violation creates public order and safety problems. Refusal to pay debts usually is settled by the creditor who takes a hostage or some valuable piece of property from the indebted man's family and holds him (or it) until the debt is paid.

In an adultery case, the offended husband or one of his relatives has the right to kill the offenders. Whoever protects the adulterer or the adulteress may also be killed. If the adulteress takes refuge in a relative's house or is given asylum with strangers, she is entitled to protection for 2 years, after which she is turned out and is still liable for punishment.

An act or expression abusing a Pashtun's honor is a serious matter and calls for revenge by the offended party or his group. Revenge may be sought on the offender or his group and is achieved promptly and usually results in armed clashes. Murder, which is regarded as the most serious cause for revenge, is sometimes settled by a cash payment. If the bereaved family accepts money and later takes revenge on the murderer, the family must pay back more money than the original compensation. No distinc-

tion is made between murder and manslaughter. A broken promise is considered as serious as murder, and the victim may take the offender's life, if he so desires.

Intratribal disputes are settled by appropriate group leaders in consultation with their respective *jirgahs* (councils made up of lineage leaders and heads of families). These *jirgahs* sometimes sit for several days before a decision is reached and announced to the tribesmen. Violations of the tribal code or of *jirgah* decisions range from a forced apology, payment of a fine to mutilation, ostracism, exile, or death (see ch. 14, The Governmental System).

The second most widely practiced tribal code is that of the Hazara. Violations of custom and law in the Hazara code are handled by *maliks*, individual elected leaders who perform the same role as the *jirgahs* among the Pashtun tribes. Crimes in order of seriousness are lying, murder, theft, adultery, and drinking alcoholic beverages. Lying is regarded as the most serious offense, and it is also said to be the rarest. Punishments for these crimes are very similar to those imposed under the Pashtunwali.

THE PENAL SYSTEM

The penal system appears to have been originally designed for the enforcement of the punishments imposed by court sentences. In late 1967, however, the government initiated certain actions directed toward rehabilitating prisoners to good citizenship. Among these actions were the development of an expanded training program and the drafting of plans for the establishment of a reform school for juvenile delinquents. In addition, private associations in certain provinces have taken steps to help women prisoners, usually by making funds available for rehabilitation work and by conducting adult education classes.

In past years the government tended to use prison labor to produce wares used by the government, such as military clothing at a textile plant in the prison at Herat. More recently greater governmental stress has been laid on the teaching of trades and handicrafts and permitting inmates to retain the money earned from the sale of their products. Stone masonry, pottery making, and rug and carpet weaving were the most common trades and crafts taught.

Almost all cities and towns have jails, and the large administrative and population centers have prisons. In villages where gendarmerie posts are located, a lockup room presumably is available for the detention of offenders pending their further disposition. Food for prisoners is commonly furnished by relatives or friends,

otherwise the accuser is called upon to provide it. In such an eventuality, the accuser, especially in a prolonged case, frequently withdraws the charges. Provincial and central government officials make periodic inspections of the jails and prisons, but information on the purpose and results of these inspections is not available.

CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT

Afghans regard offenses against Islamic laws more serious than violations of secular laws. Although punishments in the past were harsh and cruel, they have since moderated gradually, and the trend in the late 1960's was toward the penal system used in Western countries.

Statistics on crime as well as incidence apparently are not collected on a national basis. The indications from scattered press reports are that smuggling, pocket picking, burglary, and theft rank highest in incidence. Because of the revenge tradition, homicide probably ranks highest among the serious crimes, particularly in the tribal areas. Many crimes of violence, including homicide, undoubtedly derive from the strict Moslem and tribal rules regarding behavior toward women. The nature of the economy is probably the most common cause of crime throughout the country. Water and property rights are vital in the predominantly agricultural communities, and disputes concerning these rights frequently end in crimes varying from thievery to blood feuds.

Few professional thieves or burglars are involved in reported crimes. First offenders predominate, allegedly because of the graduated system of punishments which increase with every conviction and serve as a deterrent to repeated offenders. Most pocket picking is done by children, usually boys and girls between 9 and 14 years of age. When arrested these juvenile offenders normally are released on bond into the custody of their parents, since there are no reformatories or juvenile detention homes available.

Death sentences are carried out by shooting, presumably by army personnel for sentences imposed by military courts, and by the Gendarmerie for sentences imposed by other secular or by *shariat* courts. Convicts are sentenced to hard labor on roads, canals or other public works projects. Punishments imposed by secular courts are generally limited to fines, flogging, imprisonment with hard labor, and in exceptional cases, death.

Smuggling and Black Marketing

Coping with smugglers and black-marketeers requires the resources of a major part of the Gendarmerie and the police, who

cooperate in attempting to control these illegal activities. Coordination of these countermeasures is the responsibility of the Department for the Prevention of Smuggling in the Ministry of the Interior. The allure of large and quick financial gain has attracted many individuals into smuggling and black marketing which still operate on a large scale.

The Gendarmerie and police use a large portion of their time and personnel in apprehending smugglers, in the surveillance of routes and border crossing points, and in investigating individuals suspected of smuggling. A great variety of contraband items are involved in this unlawful trade, the principal ones being opium and hashhish. Other articles often seized by the authorities include firearms, clothing, watches, transistor radios, herbs, spices, and tea.

The mountainous and desert country, barren and sparsely settled for long stretches along the frontier, is ideal for smuggling operations and adds to the difficulties of detection and capture. Army units reportedly have been called upon to assist the Gendarmerie in armed clashes with armed guards of smuggling caravans which use motor as well as animal transport.

CHAPTER 28

THE ARMED FORCES

Very little information is published by the government regarding its military forces. Details are lacking on almost all of the major aspects of the military establishment, and even pertinent minor developments are not available from the press or from official sources.

In late 1967 the armed forces, totaling between 80,000 and 90,000 men consisted of the Royal Afghan Army and the Royal Afghan Air Force. The Air Force, relatively small in size, is an integral part of the army. Being landlocked, Afghanistan has no navy. In addition to the regular establishment, internal security forces of about 21,000 men, consisting primarily of the Gendarmerie and the National Police, were operating under the Ministry of the Interior.

Since 1956 the armed forces have undergone far-reaching reorganization and modernization programs, as a result of extensive military assistance from the Soviet Union. Information has not been released regarding the extent of this military aid, but it has been considerable and has consisted of a great variety of up-to-date Soviet weapons, ammunition, and materiel, both ground and air. As a consequence the Afghan Army has become, for the first time in its history, an effective force in maintaining the stability and authority of the government.

BACKGROUND

Military operations, particularly those of tribal forces, have been the dominant factor in shaping the country's history. The importance of military achievements is firmly embedded in the mind of almost every Afghan through folklore stories and songs (see ch. 11, Artistic and Intellectual Expression). Successive conquests, such as those by Cyrus the Great of Persia (550 B.C.), Alexander the Great (331 B.C.), Genghis Khan (A.D. 1220) and many lesser leaders, overpowered the peoples in this area by armed force, ruled them only as long as armed force was applied, but their successor dynasties in turn were driven out by superior armed forces (see ch. 2, Historical Setting).

Ahmed Khan Sadozai, a Durani tribal leader, established himself as the first independent ruler of Afghanistan in 1747. In consolidating his position, armed force was the first essential in gaining the submission and retaining the loyalty of the various tribal leaders who had their own private armed forces. Actually, each tribe provided military contingents for the king. Thus, no national armed force existed except small groups serving as bodyguards in the royal retinue. Military operations during this early period consisted mainly of expeditions into neighboring territories; payments for services usually included appropriate shares in the loot obtained, an arrangement that seemed to be satisfactory to both the ruler and the participating tribal chiefs.

The first attempt to create a more or less professional armed force not under tribal control occurred in 1834, when Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk, one of the contestants for the throne, secured the services of a British officer, Captain John Campbell, to train the forces that were to oppose those of Amir Dost Mohammad, a rival contestant. Although Shah Shuja's forces fought well on the battlefield, the Shah fled the area leaving Dost Mohammad the victor and the wounded Captain Campbell a prisoner. After recovering from his wounds he resumed his military services under Dost Mohammad, serving directly under the Amir's son, Sardar Afzal Khan father of Abdur Rahman Shah, who later became one of the country's most colorful and forceful rulers (1880-1901). The innovations introduced by Captain Campbell during this period gave the army the rudiments of its ultimate British character.

Additional British influence on Afghan tactics and organization was introduced during the First Anglo-Afghan War (1838-42), which put Shah Shuja, the British-supported candidate, on the throne, Shah Shuja, however, proved to be an unpopular ruler, and British forces kept him in power by supplementing Afghan troops with British officers. Dost Mohammad regained the throne, assumed the title of Amir (King) after the British withdrawal from the country in 1842, and in the main, his reign continued to reflect acceptance of British ideas and concepts.

Twenty-five years later, development of the Afghan Army was resumed under British influence by Dost Mohammad's son, Sher Ali who after returning from a visit to India in 1869 instituted a series of reforms. Among them was a major reorganization and modernization designed to place the army on a permanent national basis, rather than depend on tribal levies. Other reforms included provision for payment of troops in cash on a fixed schedule, enrollment of some of the miscellaneous tribal irregulars as regular Afghan troops, instruction in all units in the Pashto

language, and the encouragement of soldiers to reenlist and make the army a career.

Progress in these reforms was interrupted and almost nullified by the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878-79) in which the Afghan Army was soundly defeated by British-Indian forces. When Dost Mohammad's grandson, Abdur Rahman came to the throne in 1880, the Army was virtually nonexistent. With a liberal financial loan from the British, along with aid in the form of weapons, ammunition and other military supplies, he began a 20-year long task of creating a respectable regular force by instituting measures which still form the basis of the military system. These included increased equalization of the military obligation by setting up a system known as the *hasht nafri*, whereby one man in every eight between the ages of 20 and 40 took his turn at military service; construction of an arsenal in Kabul to reduce dependence on foreign sources for small arms and other ordinance; introduction of supervised training courses; then organization of troops into divisions, brigades and regiments, containing battalions of artillery; and the development of pay schedules as well as an elementary (and harsh) disciplinary system.

The progress in army development achieved by Abdur Rahman was largely forgotten during the reigns of his two successors, Habibullah Khan (1901-19) and Amanullah Khan (1919-29). In the Third Anglo-Afghan War (May-August 1919) both the army and the larger tribal forces, although not victorious against British-Indian forces, gave creditable combat performances, particularly those under command of Nadir Khan who later became King in 1929.

Amanullah had many ideas concerning various types of reforms, including some military, but his lack of method and unwise policies in financial matters virtually bankrupted the country and led to reductions in the army and a serious loss of effectiveness. Two noteworthy military events, however, did emerge from his desire to modernize the country. One was the creation of an Air Force in 1924 through the purchase of two British aircraft and the hiring of German pilots to help put down a rebellion which his advanced social ideas had inspired. The other was the acceptance of a second Turkish mission in 1927 (an earlier mission had left Kabul in 1921 after an unsuccessful effort to reorganize the army) to assist in training and improving the efficiency of the army.

Amanullah's persistence in forcing reforms on the people led to greater popular dissatisfaction, and eventually serious revolts broke out in 1928 and 1929. The army shared the widespread feeling against the King and this together with its long-term

neglect was a major factor in its defeat by the rebel leader Bacha-i-Saqqo, a mountain Tajik who took Kabul in January 1929 and declared himself King (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). He, in turn, was ousted by General Nadir Khan, who rallied scattered army elements and retook the capital with help from several loyal tribes. On October 16, 1929, General Nadir Khan was proclaimed King by a tribal *loe jirgah* (council).

DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN FORCES

The organization of the modern military establishment stems from Nadir Shah's measures to reconstruct his armed forces. These measures included an increase in military pay, the acquisition of 10,000 rifles and a substantial loan from the British Government; the appointment as Minister of War and as commander in chief, of his own brother, Shah Mahmud Khan, an able trustworthy personality, respected by all, particularly by tribal leaders; the reopening of the Kabul Military College for officers; the opening of training courses in all combat arms for officers; the reinforcing of the Turkish military mission with some German instructors; and the hiring of Soviet air technicians to improve instruction in the deteriorated Royal Afghan Air Force. By 1933, when Nadir Shah was assassinated, military morale and capabilities had improved appreciably, and the army was an important factor in achieving a relatively peaceful accession of his young son Mohammad Zahir Shah.

The new King and his uncle, Sardar Hashim Khan, who exercised great influence over governmental affairs during the early reign of the King, continued the policy of military development and military progress initiated by Nadir Shah. Progress, however, was retarded by the materiel shortages and other restrictions imposed by World War II. During the war the country proclaimed its neutrality and concerned itself primarily with further stabilizing conditions within the country and generally increasing internal security. Some improvements were made in the organization of the embryonic Air Force through acquisition of a limited number of fairly modern aircraft.

The immediate post-World War II period was one of further readjustment between the internal security forces and the army. Little was done to improve the quality of arms or to adopt modern concepts requiring up-to-date equipment. This situation persisted until the signing of a military assistance agreement with the Soviet Union in 1956. Under this pact the Soviet Union undertook to modernize the army and to provide it with advanced types of armament.

Since 1956 the impact of Soviet military assistance has been great. While the quantity of Soviet aid is not known, it has been steady, and by 1967 the armed forces had become almost completely dependent upon the Soviets, not only for equipment for also for logistic support. As a consequence of their basic improvement, the military establishment has increased its effectiveness and capabilities, particularly in the role of providing domestic stability. This factor has been of great importance and assistance in the government's move toward the establishment of a constitutional monarchy.

ATTITUDES TOWARDS MILITARY SERVICES

The military traditions found in most armies having an historic past are lacking in Afghanistan's armed forces, mainly because of the relatively minor role performed by the army and of the many interruptions in its development. In victory the army's accomplishments usually were overshadowed by tribal leaders who extolled their individual and collective exploits as decisive factors on the battlefield. Although the Afghan forces eventually were defeated in the Third Anglo-Afghan War by the British, the conflict is considered basically a triumph for Afghan tribesmen over a great world power. This is based on the creditable combat performances of the Afghan forces and the favorable terms won by Afghanistan in the Treaty of Rawalpindi which concluded the war.

The Afghans tend to be hero worshipers, and the tribal people are proud of their warrior ancestors. They admire military exploits and regard death in battle as honorable. There is no hesitation to give up life in defense of tribal honor or to resist encroachment on tribal territory, but unity of action among tribes needed in many crisis situations has sometimes been lacking.

The population, in general, regards the armed forces as an instrument of the government, rather than an organization of citizens in the service of the nation. The individual normally respects authority, but this respect is shown first and foremost to his own tribal chief or head of family. Thus, the cooperation of tribal leaders is a key feature in the exercise of authority by government forces in a tribal area. The steady improvement in the armed forces over the past few years has served to impress tribal chiefs and has been a prime factor in insuring their continued cooperation.

MISSIONS AND ORGANIZATION

The army has the dual mission of maintaining the country's territorial integrity and of assisting the Gendarmerie and police

in preserving internal security. This entails the traditional military responsibility of maintaining a satisfactory state of combat readiness to repel external aggression and to carry out the government's military policies. The Air Force, as part of the army, is charged with providing air support for the ground forces and with assisting in the air defense of the country. The Gendarmerie, as a paramilitary force, has an additional mission of patrolling border areas in close cooperation with the army.

The military establishment as constituted in late 1967 was not a balanced force. The greater proportion of its total strength (80,000 to 90,000) was in the army, and this preponderance of ground elements, with the principal emphasis on infantry, limited its overall combat effectiveness. Continuing efforts are being made, with Soviet assistance, to organize and maintain more effective armored and specialized support-type units.

Under the constitution adopted in 1964, King Mohammad Zahir Shah is the Supreme Commander of the Afghan Armed Forces, but he exercises little direct military authority. Functional control of the armed forces under the direction of the Prime Minister, who may or may not hold military rank, is vested in the Ministry of National Defense. The Ministry, under General Khan Mohammad Khan, is believed to consist of various departments and staff elements which deal with the day-to-day supervision and administration of the armed forces. Such matters as defense construction ceremonies, military justice, and inspector general-type duties fall within their purview.

The principal combat elements of the army were three tactical corps and four separate divisions. Corps headquarters were located at Kabul, Gardez, and Kandahar, each controlling divisional units within a limited territorial area of responsibility. The separate divisions reported directly to Kabul and were dispersed throughout the parts of the country not under control of the three corps. The general reserve was maintained in Kabul, along with several elite units of the capital garrison including the Royal Brigade. The Air Force had fewer than 200 planes and operated from several airfields in various parts of the country. Like the army, the center of its activities was located in Kabul with its main fighter base at Bagram, 30 miles to the north.

FOREIGN INFLUENCE

Since the middle of the nineteenth century, the armed forces have been influenced by at least one of several powers—Great Britain, Turkey, and the Soviet Union. British influence was extensive and continued in one form or another until the with-

drawal of the United Kingdom from India in 1947. Much of the basic Afghan organization and many of the elementary military practices evolved under British guidance. Over the years Afghan leaders were aware of the vulnerable position of the country and its lack of resources, and while attempts were made to limit outside influence, it was generally accepted without resentment as essential to the nation's continued existence.

Turkish military instructors were introduced by Amanullah (1919-29), but little was accomplished by them because of the financial difficulties experienced during his reign. Other military missions followed beginning in 1927, and intensive efforts were undertaken to reorganize the ground forces and improve the training of both officers and enlisted men. The effects of Turkish aid and assistance continued to be felt in the armed forces in late 1967, particularly through the influence of the Turkish trained officers who have subsequently reached high command positions in the military establishment.

Soviet influence has been in the ascendancy since the mid-1950's. The acquisition of advanced types of modern air and ground equipment along with Soviet advisers to instruct in the maintenance, operation and employment of this materiel may eventually have a far-reaching influence on the Afghan Armed Forces. support to include gasoline, ammunition and spare parts would The almost total dependence of the military on Soviet logistic support appear to give the Soviets a large measure of control over Afghan military operations.

Despite the acceptance of foreign aid, the country has declared itself to be independent, neutral, and officially nonaligned. There are no known alliances or military agreements in force other than the Soviet military aid program (see ch. 16, Foreign Relations).

ECONOMIC IMPACT

Manpower

Source and Quality

The main source of personnel is the conscription system which, over the years, has selected hardy individuals, physically fit, adaptable, and capable of performing military duties in an acceptable manner. The population includes numerous ethnic groups having important differences in temperament mode of living, customs, and behavior standards which have major influences on their suitability for military service (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups; ch. 6, Languages and Communication; ch. 12, Religion; ch. 13, Social Values).

Some characteristics are common to the majority of Afghan tribesmen; generally they are strong, wiry, self-reliant, and resourceful. Accustomed to living under hardship conditions, they can subsist and fight for long periods on limited rations. They are proud of their fighting abilities, clever at ruses, and are quick to take advantage of an opponent's tactical mistakes. Negatively, the tribesman is inclined to be moody, somewhat excitable, and independent. On balance, the Afghan's reputation as a good warrior seems to be deserved.

Although many conscripts are quick to learn, industrious, and amenable to discipline, most of them are virtually illiterate (the literacy rate being 10 percent or less) and lacking in mechanical aptitude. Consequently, the scarcity of qualified military technicians affects the proficiency of the armed forces.

Procurement

Recruitment and conscription for national military service (including the paramilitary forces) have long been a matter of serious concern for the country's rulers. Military personnel to support the King and to enforce his authority have been obtained by two general methods, conscription and tribal levies or quotas.

Before the promulgation of the conscription law of 1954 some of the conscription methods introduced during the reign of Amir Abdur Rahman (1880-1901) were still in effect. They included the *quami* system by which each conscription age class contributed its quota of young men for the army according to its numerical strength. Amir Habibullah (1901-19) added the *hasht nafri* system by which every eighth man was called up from lists maintained yearly of men between the ages of 20 and 40. At first, exemptions could be bought for cash, but this practice was officially abolished when objections to the high price became too strong.

The *hasht nafri* and other conscription systems were superseded by the 1954 conscription act which applies in all areas where government conscription regulations are in effect. In general, the government requires tribal leaders to furnish their assigned quotas based upon the tribe's estimated strength. The conscription practices that prevailed under earlier systems largely have been eliminated.

In late 1967 the population included approximately 4,079,000 males between the ages of 15 and 49, about half of whom were regarded as fit for military service. The normal period of compulsory service is 2 years. The minimum conscription age is 22 years, and men over 28 years are seldom inducted. When youths reach the age of 19 their names are placed on a conscription

eligibility list prepared by the Ministry of the Interior in conjunction with the Ministry of National Defense. Four to six months before the reporting date, conscription notices are sent to municipal conscription centers and to Afghan diplomatic agencies abroad. Municipal, district, village, and tribal authorities, helped by the local Gendarmerie and police, forward the notices and explain them to the individuals concerned.

Exemptions are granted to permanent police personnel provided they have served with the police a period equal to the 2-year compulsory service period, certain teachers, all those considered physically unfit, persons 28 years of age or older who are the main support of relatives or other persons, religious leaders, and Moslem theological students whose credentials are properly authenticated by their provincial governors.

Deferments from service are granted in a variety of categories, including persons who are unfit for immediate service, students at home or abroad who are considered likely to complete their education, one of the sons of a widow or a father 60 years of age or older, the youngest of several brothers simultaneously called for service, and persons sent abroad under government auspices for research or study. Key personnel who are employed in technical work involving specialized knowledge are usually granted a nonrenewable 2-year deferment.

Upon discharge the conscript's name is entered on the reserve list, and the law provides that he may be recalled for 2-month periods of refresher training any time during the next 22 years, at the end of which time he is given a certificate relieving him of further military obligations. Reserves also may be called to active duty in case of hostilities, and the procedures are similar to those used for regular conscription.

Whenever practicable, army conscripts from a given locality are assigned to units widely separated away from their home areas. This policy was adopted for several reasons: to discourage military personnel from becoming involved in local political affairs; to encourage a spirit of national consciousness; and to avoid the necessity of conscripts being called upon, under troublesome conditions, to use arms or other repressive measures against their own people.

Conscription theoretically applies to all Afghans of military age, regardless of ethnic origin, religion, or social status but the authorities have been unable to apply the system effectively to the nomadic tribes which comprise an appreciable segment of the population. Certain tribes that do not provide conscripts to the service have agreed to furnish tribal levies in time of emergency in return for continued exemption from military service. Some

other tribes, such as those of the Kirghiz group in the Wakhan corridor of the extreme northeast take over the border patrol duties in their areas in exchange for exemption from conscription.

The majority of officers are obtained from the Royal Afghan Military Academy. A small percentage of reserve officers who have been to Reserve Officers' School are placed on active duty with various units in order to complete their training. A high proportion of officers come from families well known in the royal lineage or from groups influential in governmental affairs. There is a corresponding wide social gap, accordingly, between the officer corps and those serving in the enlisted ranks.

Military Budget

The defense budget has increased appreciably since 1956, along with the improvement of the armed forces. In fiscal year 1967 (covering the period March 21, 1966 to March 20, 1967) the military budget was about 810 million afghanis (see Glossary), or somewhat less than 20 percent of the total government expenditures. In fiscal year 1966 defense received approximately the same amount of funds. While relatively a heavy drain on the national economy, defense spending is still insufficient to support the armed forces without extensive augmentation from foreign sources.

TRAINING

Military training has been influenced almost continuously since 1834 by foreign missions and by officers furnished by countries to instruct in special subjects. The effects of this diversity influence have been lessened considerably since 1956 when the Afghans agreed to accept extensive military assistance from the Soviet Union. Since that time, the acquisition of sufficient quantities of modern Soviet weapons and equipment to supply most, if not all, units and the arrival of considerable numbers of Soviet technicians, has done much to equalize training standards and to improve training facilities and instruction.

Most conscripts are adept at using a rifle and maintaining it in good condition. They also have had experience as tribesmen in traveling and living in small groups in remote and rugged areas and in performing such security tasks as patrolling and reconnaissance. The practical experience thus obtained from their tribal existence gives them a fairly good foundation for an easy adjustment to the rigors of military life.

Almost all officers (including King Mohammad Zahir Shah) are

graduates of the Royal Afghan Military Academy in Kabul and of the Military School as well. The Military School, also located in the capital, is the basic preparatory school for practically all individuals who seek commissioned service. It takes students from the age of 10, and its course is roughly comparable to the junior and senior high school grades in the United States.

The army also maintains a number of service schools, including one for each principal arm. Selected conscripts attend a noncommissioned officers' school, and special courses are conducted to train specialists for the technical services.

Considerable numbers of selected officers from the Army and Air Force are sent abroad each year, most of them to the Soviet Union, to attend special courses and to receive technical training. Fewer numbers are also sent to Turkey and the United States for similar training. In addition, sizable numbers of foreign advisers, again chiefly Soviet, are stationed in Afghanistan and assist in training at all unit levels..

LOGISTICS

The armed forces logistic system is not highly developed. There is an almost total dependence on the Soviet Union for all supplies including weapons and equipment, spare parts, fuel, and ammunition. The absence of railroads and the inadequate road network complicates the supply system (see ch. 2, Physical Environment). In 1964 the opening of the Salang Tunnel through the Hindu Kush, about 55 miles north of Kabul, considerably improved the movement of material and supplies into the major supply center in the nation's capital.

Responsibility for the procurement, storage, and distribution of all military items is concentrated in the higher staff elements, but little is known concerning the responsibilities of various elements within the system. Apparently, a regulated flow of supplies moves in and out of Kabul. In outlying areas local arrangements for the procurement of certain supplies, including food, are made by unit supply officers.

RANK, INSIGNIA AND AWARDS

The rank and grade structure closely resembles that of the British, and the insignia of rank also follows the British pattern, with certain exceptions, for both officers and noncommissioned officers. Insignia up to and including the rank of senior captain consists of gold bars and gold-colored stars (sunbursts) worn on green epaulettes. A third lieutenant wears one bar; a second lieutenant, one bar and one star; a first lieutenant, one bar and two stars; a

junior captain, two bars and one star; and a senior captain, two bars and two stars.

Field grade officers wear a combination of gold-colored crossed swords and gold stars on maroon-colored epaulettes as well as cap cords of maroon and gold. A major wears crossed swords and one star; a lieutenant colonel, crossed swords and two stars; and a colonel, crossed swords and three stars. In addition to shoulder insignia, field grade officers wear maroon collar tabs embossed with a gold stalk of corn.

The rank of general officers is designated by a combination of a gold-colored national crest emblem and stars worn on crimson epaulettes. Their collar tabs are crimson, and are embossed with two gold stalks of corn; cap cords are gold. A brigadier general wears the National Crest and one star; a major general, the National Crest and two stars; a lieutenant general, the National Crest and three stars; and a general, the National Crest and four stars. The grade of field marshal is provided for, but apparently is rarely used except as an honorary designation.

Pay rates and living conditions have been steadily improved, the greatest impetus coming under former Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense, Sardar (Prince) Mohammad Daud. Although living cost have increased as well, the pay of military personnel in 1967 was generally in line with that of civilian personnel holding positions of comparable responsibility.

The government and the high command of the armed forces recognize the beneficial morale effect of giving recognition for gallantry and outstanding service. More than 12 awards or decorations have been instituted for which military personnel are eligible. Most of these include either money or land grants, and sometimes both.

Post exchanges or canteens are not provided for the use of troops, but this causes little resentment to the austere-living Afghan. While there is no organized chaplain corps, places of worship and the services of a *mullah* (Moslem religious leader) are easily found except in isolated frontier posts. Although many Afghans are sports-minded and recreation areas are usually available near all garrisons and stations, sports are not particularly emphasized in military training.

Military Justice

The military penal code is the basis of the court-martial system and for administering military law. Certain changes in the code will probably take place as a result of the adoption of a new constitution in 1964 which provides for the bringing into being, by

late 1967, of more modern legal codes and the establishment of a new, independent judiciary within the government (see ch. 14, **The Governmental System**). Military justice is supervised by the Ministry of National Defense.

Military courts are of four types: permanent courts for the trial of soldiers and junior officers in divisional or junior commands; temporary courts for the trial of senior officers or officers assigned to the principal headquarters in Kabul; martial law courts for the trial of those cases, military and civilian, that occur in areas under martial law; and a court which handles all appeals. The permanent military courts, which handle most of the army's cases in peacetime, normally consist of a president and six members and the membership is changed annually. In principle, the rank of the court members must be higher than that of the accused.

Courts of inquiry, similar to an inspector general's board of investigation in the United States Army, frequently are appointed by the Minister of National Defense or by division or garrison commanders, to investigate incidents involving breaches of discipline, misuse of government property, and similar matters. The court, usually consisting of three members, submits findings and recommendations to the convening authority.

Most offenses are minor, involving nonobedience of orders, loss of property, or overstaying leave or pass, and are normally handled by unit commanders. Only flagrant cases result in official referral to a court for trial. Sentences for misdemeanors and criminal offenses involve fines, loss of rank, dismissal from the service, and imprisonment for varying lengths of time. Extreme punishments in serious criminal cases include life imprisonment and the death penalty.

For noncommissioned officers, corrective punishment sentences automatically include reduction to private. For officers, a prison sentence of 1 year or more includes dismissal from the service. Death sentences require the King's confirmation, and, once imposed, can be reduced only by him. Execution is by firing squad in the presence of the condemned's unit. All sentences for longer than 1 year are usually served in civil prisons.

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Section IV, National Security

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GLOSSARY

afghani—Afghan monetary unit. Official rate of exchange in 1966 was 45 afghanis to 1 United States dollar; or 1 afghani equals \$0.0222. Free rate of exchange in 1967 was 75 afghanis to 1 United States dollar; or 1 afghani equals \$0.0133.

AID—See USAID.

alakadar—The official administrator of an *alakadari*, *q.v.*

alakadari—The smallest administrative subdivision within a province; commonly called a subdistrict in English.

amir—Once used in Afghanistan as a throne title; in modern times occasionally used in the Hazarajat to denote the leader of a dominant social group.

Asian Highway—An ECAFE-sponsored project, designed to span Asia by two major routes: (1) from Iran to Indonesia, and (2) from Turkey to South Vietnam, a section of which is to pass through Afghanistan.

attan—An Afghan national dance said to be brought to Afghanistan by Macedonian Greeks. It is the major public dance of the Pashtuns, but it is also practiced by other ethnic groups.

barak—A heavy woolen cloth commonly woven in the Hazarajat and used for men's clothing and blankets.

BBC—British Broadcasting Corporation.

beg—A title of honor used among the Turkomans in northern Afghanistan, to indicate high tribal status.

British Council—A British agency, formerly called the British Committee for Relations with Other Countries. Established in 1934, its principal purposes include promotion of wider knowledge of the United Kingdom and the English language abroad; development of closer cultural relations between the United Kingdom and other countries. It has provided aid for Afghan educational purpose.

burqa—A loose enveloping garment, usually with embroidered, latticed eyepieces, worn in public by many Moslem women in Afghanistan.

buzkashi—A very popular and exciting polo-type sport in which horsemen attempt to carry the carcass of a goat or sheep across the opponents goal.

chai-khana—An Afghan tea house.

- Colombo Plan**—The Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia was published by the Commonwealth Consultative Committee on South and Southeast Asia on November 29, 1950, and was to be effective from July 1, 1951 to June 30, 1957. The terminal date was extended to 1961 and later to include 1967. The Plan is an international cooperative effort to assist countries of the area to raise their living standards. Member nations in 1966 were Afghanistan (joined in 1963), Australia, Bhutan, Burma, Cambodia, Canada, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Laos, Malaysia, the Maldives, Nepal, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom, the United States, and South Vietnam. By mid-1967 no action regarding membership had been announced by the newly formed Republic of Singapore.
- counterpart fund**—A sum in local currency which each country participating in United States aid grants is required to establish to offset the gift in dollars to that country. The fund is approximately equivalent to three-fourths of the dollar value of the United States gift to that country.
- Dari**—The official language term adopted by the Afghan Government to denote the Afghan variant of the Farsi (Persian) language. One of the 2 major languages; the other is Pashto.
- Durand Line**—A line delineating the southern and eastern limits of the territory governed by Abdur Rahman Shah. The line was drawn on a map accompanying an agreement negotiated and signed in November 1893 with Sir Mortimer Durand, representing the government of India. The same line eventually became part of the boundary between Afghanistan and Pakistan.
- ECAFE**—Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, a regional body of the United Nations.
- ECOSOC**—Economic and Social Council of the United Nations.
- Estra Mahkama**—The Supreme Court.
- Farsi (Persian)**—See Dari.
- Farsiwan**—An urban-dwelling Tajik; Farsi is his mother tongue.
- gaadi**—Afghan two-wheeled, horsedrawn carriage.
- Hanafi**—An orthodox school of Islamic law founded by Abu Hanifah (699-767). The 1964 Constitution prescribes that religious rites in the country shall be performed according to the provisions of the Hanafite doctrine.
- Hanafite**—A follower of the Hanafi school.
- hasht nafri**—Literally "one in eight." A military conscription system formerly practiced in Afghanistan, under which every eighth man was called from lists (revised annually) of men between the ages of 20 and 40.
- Hazarajat**—Region extending from the highlands of the upper

Helmand River on the southern slopes of the Hindu Kush, west of Kabul. The western part of the Hazarajat extends nearly to Herat.

Hindu Kush—Mountain range extending from the western end of the Himalayas about 500 miles southwestward into Afghanistan to the Koh-i-Baba Range, west of Kabul. It is the watershed between the Kabul River on the south and the tributaries of the Amu Darya on the north. The rugged terrain of the range is reflected in the name Hindu Kush, Persian for "killer."

IBRD—International Bank of Reconstruction and Development, commonly known as the World Bank, a specialized agency of the United Nations.

IDA—International Development Association, a specialized agency of the United Nations.

IMF—International Monetary Fund, a specialized agency of the United Nations.

jirgah—A council. In Afghan tribal organization it usually refers to either a council of the elders, tribal leaders, lineage leaders or the heads of families.

jirib—Unit of land area; approximately 0.5 acre.

juis—Open ditches carrying water diverted from mountain streams and rivers through fields for irrigation purposes. They are also channeled into villages and towns. Water from them is used for general purposes, such as drinking, cooking, washing clothes, settling dust, freshening vegetables, for market and carrying away refuse.

JUSMAG—Joint United States Military Advisory Group.

kaum—A major tribe.

karez—An underground water tunnel.

khan—Suffix, chiefly used among the Pashtuns, indicating superior social status, and in some areas it designates a village or tribal chief.

kheyl—A single lineage group.

koochi—A term applied by many urbanites and villagers to denote nomads, but the nomads themselves regard the term as pejorative.

Loe Jirgah—National council of notables, tribal chiefs and *mullahs*; an appointive body until 1964. Under the 1964 Constitution it is composed of the members of both houses of Parliament and the chairmen of provincial *jirgahs*, q.v.

loe woleswali—Literally a "major-district;" a provincial subdivision, between the provincial and district levels, governed by a *loe woleswal*.

malik—Elected head of a village, commonly called the village chief. He is usually the head of the most important family in

- the village. The term is frequently used in the non-Pashtun areas of eastern Afghanistan.
- Meshrano Jirgah*—House of the Elders; equivalent to the upper House of Parliament.
- mullah*—Moslem religious leader.
- nan*—A nourishing, unleavened Afghan bread.
- No Rooz*—First day of the Afghan solar calendar year; a major secular holiday. Literally, "new day."
- North-West Frontier Province*—Formerly a province in northwestern British India on the Afghan frontier, now part of Pakistan. The general area is still referred to by some authors as the North-West Frontier.
- Nuristan*—An extremely mountainous region northeast of Kabul and south of the Hindu Kush. Formerly Kafiristan; literally, "the land of light."
- Parsi*—An adherent of the Zoroastrian faith, and who has descended from Persian refugees settled in India.
- Parsiwan*—Another term for Farsiwan, *q.v.*
- Pashtunwali*—The traditional code of conduct of the Pashtun ethnic group.
- powindah*—A name given by the British in India to Afghan nomadic caravan traders, who operated across the Afghan-Pakistan border. It is also applied by some authors to the Pashtun nomads who migrate annually across the Afghan-Pakistan boundary.
- pul*—An Afghan unit of value, representing one one-hundredth of an *afghani*, *q.v.* Also, a coin representing this unit.
- pardah*—A Moslem practice involving the screening or secluding of women from public observation by means of a long, loose outer garment, including the veil, and by use of high-walled inclosures, screens, or curtains within the home.
- qazi*—Judge, in both secular and religious courts.
- quami*—A military conscription system formerly practiced in Afghanistan, under which each age class contributed its quota for army service.
- Registan*—The desolate mountainous desert region southwestward from Kandahar.
- ruble*—Monetary unit in the Soviet Union. The official rate of exchange after January 1, 1961, was 0.9 rubles to 1 United States dollar; or 1 ruble equals \$1.111. Before January 1, 1961, the official rate was 4 rubles to 1 United States dollar; or 1 ruble was equal to \$0.25.
- rupee*—Pakistan monetary unit. Selling rate of exchange in 1966 was 4.802 rupees to 1 United States dollar; or 1 rupee equaled \$0.2082. Special rates are usually stipulated for each counterpart fund grant, *q.v.*

- satrap*—The governor of a province in historic Persia. Sometimes used pejoratively to denote an arbitrary subordinate official.
- SEATO*—Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. Formed by the United States, Great Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines by the Manila Pact of September 8, 1954. Member nations are committed to resist aggression to the treaty area.
- seer*—An Afghan unit of weight equal to 15.6 pounds. The term also applies to a unit equal to 2.057 pounds in India.
- Sistan*—Region of southwestern Afghanistan and eastern Iran. A depression with much marshland, including Lake Helmand. Formerly a province in eastern Iran.
- shariat*—Islamic law based on Allah's commandments as printed in the Koran and also in the Sunna, which contains the sayings of deeds of the Prophet Mohammed. It applies in theory not only to religious matters but also to political, economic, civil, criminal, ethnical, and domestic affairs.
- shirkat*—A joint stock company owned by government and private interests.
- Shura*—Parliament.
- sirdar*—A person of high rank, such as a general officer, chieftain or nobleman. This title is also used in India and Pakistan.
- Sunna*—The deeds and sayings of the Prophet Mohammed as reported by witnesses.
- UNESCO*—United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, a specialized agency of the United Nations.
- UNICEF*—United Nations Children's Fund, founded in 1946. Functions under the Economic and Social Council. Originally called the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund.
- USAID*—United States Agency for International Development.
- USIS*—United States Information Service.
- Wakhan*—The mountainous region at the narrow eastern tip of Afghanistan.
- wali*—Equivalent to governor. Literally, "the guardian." He governs the province.
- waqf*—Property held by a religious trust.
- WHO*—World Health Organization, a specialized agency of the United Nations.
- wilayat*—province.
- Wolesi Jirgah*—House of the People; equivalent to the lower House of Parliament.
- woleswal*—District governor.
- woleswali*—A provincial subdivision, equivalent to a district.
- yurt*—A light circular tent characteristic of the central Asian

plains, and the nomadic tribesmen of northern Afghanistan. The tent is a collapsible frame structure with a door on the side wall and a hole in the conical top to serve as a chimney. The framework is usually covered with light straw matting in the summer and felt in the winter.

zakat—An annual alms tax that each adult Moslem is expected to pay as a religious duty. It is used for charitable and religious purposes.

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